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PREFACE 
The  present volume  is part of a  series of sectoral studies on  the 
evolution of concentration in the member  states of the European 
Community. 
These reports were  compiled by  the different national Institutes and 
experts,  engaged  b,y  the Commission  to effect the study programme  in 
question. 
Regarding the specific and general  interest of these reports and  the 
responsibility taken by the Commission  with regard to the European 
Parliament,  they are published wholly in the original version. 
The  Commission refrains from  commenting,  only stating that the 
responsibility for the data and  opinions appearing in the reports, 
rests solely with the Institute or the expert who  is the author. 
Other reports  on  the sectoral programme  will be  published by  the 
Commission  as  soon as they are received. 
The  Commission will also publish a  series of documents  and tables of 
syntheses,  allowing for international comparisons  on  the evolution of 
concentration in the different member  states of the Community. 5 
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CHAPTER  1  INTRODUCTION  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
The  London  Graduate  School  of Business  Studies  (London  Business  School) 
was  contracted  by  the  E.E.C.  Con@ission  to  examine concentration  in 
three  industrial  sectors:  mechanical  engineering;  pharmaceuticals;  and 
photographic  film.  This  report relates  to mechanical  engineering. 
The  study  team consisted of Professor J.B.  Heath,  Dr.  J.  McGee, 
Mr.  N.  Owen,  Miss  A.  Dove  and  (pharmaceuticals  only)  Mr.  S.  Slatter. 
The  team would  like  to  thank  the E.R.C.  Corrroission,  Dr.  Linda  and 
Mr.  Schwartz  in particular,  for  having  initiated a  set of studies  that 
have  been  found  most  interesting and  worthwhile.  We  hope  that our work, 
especially  the  accompanying  details  i.n  the  agricultural machinery  and 
cranes  sectors  in this report,  and  in pharmaceuticals,  will play  an 
important part  in setting the  bare statistical details in a  wider 
business  environment  that will  illuminate  their meaning. 
Some  General  Conclusions 
Before  embarking  on  the  details of mechanical  engineering we  would  like 
to  record  some  general  conclusions  from having undertaken  these  studies. 
We  hope  they will  be  read  in  the  spirit in which  they are written,  as 
positive  responses  intended  to  be  helpful  in  the  further  extension of 
this work. 
First, we  sense  a  danger  in  the  over-elaboration of statistical measure§ 
of concentration.  Not  only are  the  more  complex  measures  more  difficult 
to understand,  especially for  the  non-economic  specialist who  may  have  to 
use  them,  but it is questionable  how  much  they  add  to  the  stock of 
knowledge  gained  from  a  less  sophisticated approach. 
Having acquired  a  deep  appreciation of  the  competitive  situation in  some 
sectors  of  industry  by  conducting many  interviews with  senior executives 
in a  large  number  of  companies,  and  then having  compared  this  understandin~ 
with what  the  statistics appeared  to  sho\v,  we  have  come  to  appreciate  that 
standard statistical  techniques  of  concentration analysis all have  their 
limitations and  that a  fairly  simple  measure  of concentration which acts 8 
as  a  trigger for more  penetrating studies conducted  by  a  variety of 
research  techniques  may  well  be  more  fruitful  in  the  long  run. 
Secondly,  some  basic. statistical. home  truths  seemed  entirely valid  in  the 
context  in which we  were  working.  For  example,  that it is better to  make 
an approximate  measure  of the  right variable  than  to  achieve  a  very  precise 
measure  of  the wrong  variable;  that  the measure  should  be  appropriate  to 
the purpose  for which it is being undertaken  and  there  may  be  many  purposes 
in measuring concentration and  its change  over  the years;  that  the way  in 
which  the  data are collected is itself influenced  to  an  important  degree 
by  the  type  of measure ID  which  one  is working - a  different measure  of 
concentration would  lead  one  to collect and  to  interpret primary  source 
material  in a  different way  so  that data are  not  readily  transferable  from 
one measure  to another;  that it is often best  to undertake  trial or pilot 
studies before attempting  to complete  the  final measure,  since  the pre-
liminary results  and  further  thought  and work  can often  improve  the quality 
of  the  final  product. 
Thirdly,  it seems  to  us  of great  importance  to  be  able  to  take  proper 
account of  international competition  in  studies of concentration.  In a 
community without tariff barriers,  and  in which non-tariff barriers are 
becoming  less  important also,  economic  dominance  must  surely  be  market 
based not production based.  The  share of output,  sales,  employment, 
profits,  or any  other  indicator of domestic  producers  may  be  grossly 
misleading  in a  free  trade  environment,  with ·at  least a  possibility of 
competition  from  companies  based  in other Member  States or  from  outside 
the  Connnunity.  To  have  a  set of measures  which  does  not  require  this 
approach would  seem a  fundamental  weakness. 
Likewise it is very  important  to  take proper account of diversification 
of enterprises.  While  this was  attempted  in  the  "units of economic 
activity" analysis,  our experience  showed  that  such results were  probably 
unreliable,  and  we  felt a  low  degree  of confidence  in attributing any 
great significance  to  the  numbers  that resulted.  Companies'  accounts 
in the United Kingdom  do  not often provide  financial  results  by  Divisional 
Activity,  and where  separate activities are undertaken  by  subsidiary 
companies  the  published operating results may  be  affected  by  corporate 
pricing and  other policies that make  them difficult to  interpret. 9 
Moreover,  in  the  'enterpri.ses'  analyses  the  arbitrary way  of  including 
or exluding divisionalised  companies  produced  some  clear  statistics! 
nonsenses  that disturbed us  considerably  (some  of  these are  mentioned 
in detail  later). 
The  fact  that a  firm  is diversified can  also mean  that  the  share  of its 
different products  in its total sales  could  be  changing significantly 
without  its value of total sales  showing  any  significant change.  Indeed, 
a  fit~ may  have  developed  a  product  and  marketing  strategy designed 
specifically  to minimise  fluctuations  in cash  flm-1  through  the  achieve-
ment  of a  product  range which has  contra-cyclical characteristics.  In 
such  a  case  the  fact  that its total sales value  showed  a  degree  of 
stability would  not necessarily  indicate  anything about  the  intensity 
of competition under  which  it was  operating. 
Competition is  ~een to  be  active if ov~r a  period  firms  change  their 
ranking in  their industry  sector,  and  if - in particular - the more 
efficient firms  are  seen  to be  increasing  their market  share at the 
expense  of  the  less efficient firms.  A  technique  of measurement which 
depends  sciely  upon  the  size_rrelationships, between  firms,  irrespective 
of whether  the  firms  concerned  are all the  same  firms  at different  times, 
may  miss  an  important  indicator of competitive effectiveness.  Thus  if in 
one  period  firms A and  B have  a  market  share  of  40%  and  30%  respectively, 
and  if in a  later period  firm B has  40%  of  the market  and  firm A  30%, 
very different conclusions  may  be  drawn  about  the  reality of competition 
in  such  an  industry  than if firms A and  B had  maintained  their previous 
market  shares. 
Furthermore,  significant changes  in market  share generally  do  not  occur 
rapidly.  A period of 4  to  5  years  is probably  too  short  to  show  other 
than marginal  changes,  but  they may  be part of a  longer  term fundamental 
movement  that clearly would  reveal  the  presence  of  intense competitive 
pressures  if one waited  longer.  In our pharmaceuticals  report,  for 
example,  we  found it desirable  to consider product competition and 
market  share  analysis  over  a  nine year period  (1964-73).  Firms  that 
are  lo'cked  in an  intense competitive  embrace,  like  two  \-lrestlers,  may 
not quickly  reveal  on  the outside what  forces  they  are  experiencing 
inside. 10 
Likewise  a  measure  which  does  not  take  account  of  the role of  innovation 
in achieving  concentration  change  or  ranking  change  again  may  overlook 
an  important  guide  to  the  efficiency of competition.  A stable market 
share  (in  the  example  in  the  above  paragraph,  firms  A and  B maintaining 
their relative positions  over  time)  may  well  be  consistent Hith both 
firms  engaging  in  a  substantial  degree  of innovation withiE  the  several 
sectors  in w·hich  they  are  engaged  in  mutual  competition  (as  clearly 
demonstrated  in  our  pharmaceuticals  report). 
Finally,  some  increases  in concentration are  to  be  welcomed  (and  indeed 
are actively encouraged  by  the  Governments  of Member  States,  and  in  some 
cases  by  the  Connnission  itself), while  others are  to  be  deplored.  No 
set of concentration  indices  in  themselves  can  distinguish one  from  the 
other;  this can  only  come  from  a  detailed analysis  and  appraisal of  the 
situation.  To  find potential candidates  for  this more  detailed  scrutiny, 
simple measures  of concentration may  well  suffice. 
Conclusions  on  Mechanical Engineering 
The  Mechanical  Engineering  industry  in  the  U.K.  is entering a  period of 
deep  recession  that will create unprecedented  difficulties  for  the 
majority of its constituent companies  (see  Chapter  3).  Fixed  investment 
in plant and  machinery  in  the  U.K.  is declining significantly during 
1975,  and will continue  to  fall  (at a  less  rapid  rate)  in  1976  and 
perhaps  during part of  1977  also.  As  the  principal  supplrer of this 
equipment,  the U.K.  mechanical  engineering  industry will  suffer  con-
siderably.  Imports  continue  to  take  a  larger  share of domestic 
consumption  (especially  from other Member  States).  Moreover  rapid 
inflation is causing  major  difficulties in  financing  both  stocks  and 
work  in progress  (which are  more  important  in  this  industry  than  in most 
other sectors of manufacturing)  and  fixed  investment  (long  term finance 
is both very  expensive  and  in short  supply). 
The  part of  the mechanical  engineering  industry  that is the  subject of 
the present study  has  been  divided  into  five  principal  sectors: 
agricultural  machinery,  textile machinery,  construction and  earth-
moving machinery,  mechanical  handling,  and  office machinery.  However, 
these  sectors  in total account  for  only about  25%  (by  value  added)  of 11 
the  industry as  a  whole  (see  Chapter  2),  and  cannot  therefore  be  said 
to  be  tvholly  representative  of  the U.K.  mechanical  engineering  industry. 
Nevertheless,  the  diversity of activity,  of  forms  of  industrial organisa-
tion,  and  of  degrees  of competition  that have  been identified within 
these  five  sectors may  well  represent  the  range  of  circumstances  that 
would  be  found  in  the  rest of  the  industry. 
The  ~..S.!:.!cultu:t:al  m8chinery  sector  (Chapter  4  and,  in a  very detailed 
case  study,  Chapters  9  to  15)  divides  itself quite naturally into  two 
dist~nct parts:  tractors  and  agricultural  equipment  (and within agri-
cultural  equipment  there  are  ten principal product categories).  The 
global  figures  on  concentration are meaningless  and  wholly misleading 
except  by  reference  to  the  details of  these  two  principal  sub-sectors. 
The  tractor part of  the  industry is highly concentrated and  dominated 
by  large multinational enterprises;  the  equipment part of  the  industry 
is much  more  fragmented,  in  general  is more  traditional  in its style of 
management,  and  economies  of scale are  less  important.  In all product 
lines dealers  are  important  intermediaries  in  the  selling process,  and 
the  organisation of production is perhaps  less  important  in understanding 
competition  than  is  the organisation of dealers. 
The  principal  feature  of  the  textile machinery  sector  (Chapter  5)  is 
the  importance  of international  trade.  In  1972  the  sector exported  73% 
of its production,  and  imports  accounted  for  52%  of domestic  consumption, 
and  in  general  the  larger companies  concerned  think  and  operate  on  a 
world wide  scale.  In  some  principal  product  lines  technical progress 
is the key  to  international competition.  In  these  circumstances  the 
relevance of concentration measures  based  purely upon  domestic  production 
is hard  to  discern,  and  as  in  the  case of agricultural machinery,  the 
figures  are  devoid  of  any  significance as  indicators of  the  intensity of 
competition. 
About  75%  of  sales  in  the ~onstruction and  earth-moving sector  {Chapter  6) 
come  from  'earth-moving equipment',  and  this product category  is  involved 
in  the  production of  ever  larger individual pieces of equipment,  which 
only  the  largest companies  make.  Hot11ever,  domestic  consumption  in this 
sector of mechanical  engineering has  been  static or declining for  some 
years,  and  the present  recession  in  the U.K.  economy  as  a  whole  can only 12 
make  matters worse.  Nevertheless,  some  of  the  largest  firms  are 
multinationals,  and  the  large  export business  of  the  sector has  been  a 
sustaining factor.  As  in agricultural machinery,  dealers  are  an  impor-
tant part of  the  competitive  system:  indeed,  some  makers  of agricultural 
tractors,  faced with little grm.;th  in demand  for  their products,  are 
moving  into  the  construction machinery  sector,  to  some  extent  on  an 
international  scale. 
The  mechanical  handling sector  (Chapter  7)  consists of  five principal 
product lines, with  the  most  dominant  product - industrial trucks  -
occupying about  one  third of total sales.  Companies  appeared  to  be 
fairly  specialised within  their own  product  line,  so  that  from  the 
point of view of concentration and  competition  the  sector is in reality 
five  distinct sub-sectors.  Moreover  the  sector is more  than usually 
dominated  by  a  long tail of  small  enterprises  (over  60%  of enterprises 
recorded  in  the U.K.  Census  of Production  on  Hechanical Handling 
employed  less  than  25  persons). 
The  special  study of  the  cranes  sub-sector '\'lithin mechanical  handling 
(Chapters  16  to  18)  shows  that the principal products  serve quite 
distinct and  separate markets  and  are  in general  not  competitive with 
each other,  but  that over  the whole  sub-sector  imports  are  taking an 
increasing share of domestic  consumption  (from  11%  in  1966  to  23%  in 
1973).  A distinctive  feat~re of this sub-sector,  which  has  some  para-
llels in construction and  earth-moving equipment,  is  the  dominance  of 
hiring rather  than  purchasing, 
Concentration  in  the  land  crane market  increased dramatically  in 1968-69  -
one  firm acquiring  a  70%  share  in production  through state-assisted 
mergers within one  year of first entering this product area.  Certain 
benefits appear  to  have  resulted  from  this  increase  in concentration, 
and  the original companies  are  still run as profit centres within the 
main  enterprise. 
Finally,  in  the office machinery  sector  \Chapter  8)  the most  important 
product area  - document  copying  - is  in a  state of  unprecedented  change, 
due  to  the rapidity of  technical progress  and  the  expiry  of key  patents. 13 
However,  measures  of concentration at  the  sector  level  show  a  remarkable 
stability that conceals  the  considerable  tensions  that actually exist. 
Multinational  enterprises - predominantly  owned  in  the United  States -
are  important  in  the whole  of this  sector,  and  their competition is on 
a  world wide  basis. 
Having  now  su~mrised briefly the  conclusions relating to  each of  the 
five  principal sectors within  the  mechanical  engineering  industry,  it 
must  be  said  that in every  sector  there were  considerable statistical 
problems  that  rendered much  of our  company  account concentration data 
of very uncertain significance  (see Chapter 2).  Through  our  attempts 
to  reconcile  the  company  account data with  the U.K.  Census  ur  Production 
we  came  to realise  that measures  of concentration based  on  the  Census, 
which historically has  been  the usual  statistical source  for  studies of 
this kind,  are also  subject  to certain fundamental weaknesses.  There 
is  no  way  in which  these  djfficulties can be  overcome  until U.K.  com-
panies  are  required  to  publish their financial  and  operating accounts 
on  a  product  by  product basis  that is not only  more  detailed  than is 
current practice but  that is aligned  in product classification with  the 
official statistical categories that are widely used  for other purposes. 
To  do  this,  however,  will  involve many  companies  in making  somewhat 
arbitrary divisions  that  in  themselves  could  be  misleading.  We  do  not 
see  any  easy  solution  to  these  difficulties. 
It is for all these  reasons  that we  have  come  to  the  conclusion that 
concentration measures at best can  give  only  a  very  general  indication 
of  the  state of competition,  and  that more  usually  the measures will 
have  no  real meaning at all.  Concentration measures  are a  crude  sign-
post that will often point in the wrong  direction;  but whether  in any 
specific instance  the  signpost is being reliable cannot be  discerned 
from  the measures  themselves,  however  sophisticated  they  may  be  made; 
further  and  more  detached work  on  the  individual circumstances  is 
necessary  for  that purpose. 
Finally,  it became  apparent as  a  result of the very  detailed  study of 
the agricultural machinery  sector  (the work  of Mr.  N.  Owen  on  our 
Research  Team)  that not  only were  the  concentration measures  devoid of 
meaning but  that  (as  described  in Chapter  15)  the whole  of  this  branch 
of economics  was  unsound. 14 
The  subject of  'industrial organisation',  as  developed  most  elaborately 
by  J.S.  Bain(l),  requires very  substantial modification,  to  such  an 
extent  indeed  as  to  undermine  totally  the  now  traditional  frame\vork  of 
'structure-behaviour-performance'  (in North America  often  referred  to 
as  'structure-conduct-performance').  The  emphasis  in  that  Chapter  is 
on  the  role  of  the  experience  curve  in determining  costs  and  profits, 
on  the practice of marketing as  the  key  to  understanding competition, 
and  on  the  size of company  as  conferring certain benefits  that have 
significance for  competition. 
Even  if one  could  in practice overcome all of  the  statistical weaknesses 
of measuring  concentration  referred  to  earlier (e.g.  to  obtain reliable 
data  on  diversified  companies,  and  to measure  concentration  in  the  sup-
ply of markets  rather  than  in  terms  of production), it \vould  still be 
misleading.  The  reason  is this.  Large  ~ompany size  is often associated 
with high concentration,  because  total output is  limited  by  the  size 
of  the market.  But  large  company  size brings with it the  resources of 
professional management,  including a  marketing capability that inten-
sifies the  awareness  of competitive behaviour by  rivals,  and  it offers  the 
opportunity for powerful  analysis  and  advanced  skills  in planning and 
executing  responses. 
Thus,  while  it may  be  correct  to  conclude  that,  for  example,  parallel 
pricing is likely  to  be  a  consequence  of  a  high  degree  of  concentration, 
one  cannot  draw  any  conclusions  from  this about  the  intensity of 
competition since  that will  be  determined  also  by  the  consequences  of 
large  company  size,  especially in relation to  a  professional  approach 
to marketing,  that may  accompany  high concentration.  Measures  that 
rely solely on  the  size distribution of firms  miss  this entirely.  The 
crucial point is that  there  is no  way  of telling from concentration data 
alone  (even if all of  the  statistical  defects were  overcome)  whether 
or not  they are conveying correct  information  about  the  intensity of 
competition. 
(1)  "Industrial Organisation",  John Wiley  &  Sons,  1959. 15 
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CHAPTER  2  COVERAGE  AND  DATA 
1.  COVERAGE 
The  sectors  included  in our  study were  as  follows: 
s.r.c.  No. 
331 + 380 
335 
336 
337 
338 
.1 
• 2-4 
.3 
.5 
Agricultural Machinery & Tractors 
Textile Nachinery & Accessories 
Construction Equipment 
Mechanical Handling: 
Conveyors & Aerial  Ropeways 
Cranes & Hoists 
Lifts & Escalators 
Industrial Trucks 
Office Machinery 
N.I.C.E.  No. 
361 
364.1 
366.3 
366.5 
362 
Data was  collected at the  company  level  to  include  the  following 
variables as  specified by  the  Commission: 
Enterprise Data 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
vi) 
vii) 
viii) 
Turnover  (total sales  including exports). 
Number  employed. 
Total wages  +  salaries. 
Net profit before  tax. 
Cash  flow  (net profit+ depreciation). 
Net  investment  - no  reliable figures  for  the U.K. 
Own  means  (shareholders capital - i.e. equity+ reserves). 
Exports. 
In line with parallel studies being conducted  on behalf of the E.E.C. 
Commission,  individual  companies were  classified as  'enterprises'  pro-
ducing within  the  specific  industrial sector if 50%  or more  of their 
turnover was  accounted  for  by  the  sale of products classified to  that 
sector. 18 
Units  of Economic  Activity Data 
'Units  of economic  activity'  analysis  included also  companies  in each 
sector where  less  than  50%  of  their turnover  wa~ accounted  for  by  the 
sales of products classified  to  that sector.  In  some  cases  these were 
very  large  firn1s  which  predominated  in  the  sectors concerned,  but which 
were  excluded  from  the  'enterprise'  data  because  less  than  50%  of  their 
turnover \vas  in  the  relevant products.  But  lack of reliable  information 
usually meant  that an  element  of  judgement was  necessary  in deriving data. 
Even  so,  it was  possible  to  produce  data  only  in relation to category  (i) 
above,  on  'turnover'  (much  of it estimated),  and  to  have  produced  data 
on  the other  seven categories would  have  resulted  in  an  unacceptable 
degree  of guesswork. 
In both  sets of analysis  companies  employing less  than 200  persons were 
excluded(l),  where  employment  number  could  be  identified.  Likewise 
imports were  not explicitly  taken  into account  since  the  data  required 
referred only  to  companies  which  manufactured within  the U.K.  (the 
relevance of this exclusion  is discussed  in more  detail  in  the  sectors 
principally affected). 
The  Sub-Sectors  in this Study 
The  sub-sectors  of  the U.K.  mechanical  engineering  industry  that have 
been  the  subject of this  Report  are listed  in Table  2.1,  together with 
an  assessment  of their  importance within  the  total mechanical  engineering 
industry.  It can  be  seen that this Report  covers  only  about  25%  of value 
added  in  the  U.K.  industry,  and  about  23%  of  employment.  The  situations 
described  later cannot,  therefore,  be  taken as  in any  way  representative 
of  the  industry  as  a  whole.  But  the  range  of circumstances  is  so wide 
that it is difficult to  believe  that  the  rest of  the  industry  is  in any 
way  fundamentally  different. 
(1)  As  will be  seen later,  in practice  a  very  small  number  of  such  com-
panies were  included  in the analysis.  This  Has  because  they were at 
first  thought  to  be  larger,  but  subsequent  study  (after  the  data 
sheets were  prepared)  showed  them  probably  to  be  smaller.  The  overall 
effect of  this was  insignificant. 19 
TABLE  2.1: 
MECHANICAL  ENGINEERING  INDUSTRY 
Value Added  E':llP 1  oyme.n  ~ 
£ mill  % {;tal!  '000  to  Total  ---
Agricultural Machinery  113.7  5.5  48  5 
Textile Machinery  95.1  4.6  4·9  5 
Construction Machinery  100.5  4.9  40  4 
Mechanical Handling  133.2  6.6  62  6 
Office Machinery  60.0  2.9  31  3 
Total  Study  Sectors  502.5  24.5  230  23 
Other  Sectors  1530.6  75.5  774  77 
TOTAL  MECHANICAL 
ENGINEERING  2033.1  100  1004  100 
Source:  U.K.  Census  of Production,  1968. 
2.  METHODOLOGY  AND  MAJOR  DATA  PROBLEMS 
(a)  The  study is based  on  data collected from  the  annual  audited accounts 
of companies  classified  to  the  appropriate  industry sectors. 
The  advantage  of using  'primary'  sources  is that  the  data~c being 
collected with a  specific purpose  in mind.  Any  research worker 
would  be  quickly aware  of their varying  degrees  of reliability 
(using  secondary  sources,  such as  Government  statistics,  one  tends 
to  ignore  this problem,  real  though it is).  Information at company 
level,  however,  raises its own  problems.  This  is clear  from  the 
difficulties in dealing with large diversified companies,  such  as 
I.B.M.  and  Ford  Mot~  Company,  whose  activities cover  a  wide  range 
of sectors  besides  those which we  are  studying.  These  cannot  be 
included as whole  companies,  nor  can  they  be  ignored,  because  in 
both cases  a  very false  impression of market concentration ·would 
result.  Companies  do  not have  to  break  down  their activities  by 
product  type  and  are  only  required  by  law  to  submit  one  set of 
consolidated accounts. 
It was  for  this  reason  that data was  collected for  both  'enterprises' 
and  'units of  economic activity'.  The  'enterprise'  data uses  the 20 
50%  cut-off point.  This  excludes  I.B.M.  from  the  office machinery 
sector,  although it is a  major manufacturer of typewriters.  But 
its estimated contribution to  the  sales of  the office machinery 
sector is  included with  the  'units of  economic  activity'  data. 
Where  a  large company  published  separate accounts for  subsidiary 
companies  engaged  in  different activities,  the  subsidiary itself 
would  be  included as  an enterprise.  For  example,  using  the  50% 
rule,  George  Cohen  600  is excluded  from  the  crane  sector,  but its 
two  subsidiaries,  manufacturing  cranes  exclusively,  are  included 
as enterprises.  It is not  always  possible  to  do  this satisfactorily, 
because of  the divisional  structure of  the parent  company. 
(b)  Another  problem with  the  consolidated accounts  of  large  companies 
is that  they  include  returns  from  foreign  subsidiaries.  This  does 
not affect employment  and  remuneration  data,  which  are  usually 
given for  the U.K.  only.  But  turnover,  cash  flow  and  profit figures 
will exaggerate  a  company's position in relation  to  the U.K.  market. 
In  some  cases allowances  can  be  made  for  this  in relation to  turn-
over,  although  there  is no  reliable way  of allowing for  the 
contribution of foreign  subsidiaries  to profit. 
In fact  the profit figure  in all cases  should  be  treated with 
considerable caution.  Since  companies  are  taxed  in relation to 
profits, it may  pay  them to  show  accounting profits lower  than 
those which  they actually made.  Larger  companies  have  a  major 
interest in maintaining a  steady growth path of profits because of 
possible effects on  their share price.  Moreover,  'own  means'  does 
not necessarily give  a  good  indication of capital  employed  since 
it excludes  lo~n capital.  The  latter is often an  important  source 
of financing  for  the  larger companies,  and  many  small  subsidiaries 
rely on  loans  from parent companies.  Turnover  and  employment, 
therefore,  appear as  the  two  most  reliable indicators. 
(c)  Using company  data  leads  to  problems  in calculating the  residual -
the  size of  the  'tail'.  Business Monitor  figures  (published  by 
the Government)  cover all goods  manufactured within  the  U.K.  by 
companies  employing  25  or more  persons  assigned  to  each  industry 21 
on  the  basis of their principal products.  But  a  sUimnation  of 
turnover  for  the  top  20  firms  in a  sector  from their accounts 
(supplemented  by  personal  enquiry)  is invariably larger  than  the 
Business Honitor  total  for  the  industry.  This  is  because: 
i)  turnover  figures  may  include  sales  by  foreign  subsidiaries; 
ii)  turnover will  c.over  sales  of  the  company  made  outside  the 
particular  industry - since we  are  using  50%  as  the cut-off 
point this  could  be  a  major  source  of  the error; 
iii)  turnover  includes  returns  from leasing of machines  - (espe-
cially relevant  to  Rank-Xerox  in office machines). 
(d)  Another  problem arises  from using Standard  Industrial Classification 
to  indicate  the  industry boundaries.  For  example,  the  S.I.C. 
classification of  'office machines'  includes  duplicating machinery 
but excludes  copying machinery.  These  two  products  are direct 
substitutes for  each  other.  The  major manufacturer of  the  latter, 
Gestetner,  is at present being  sued  by  Rank  Xerox  for  infringement 
of patent rights.  Therefore it was  thought unrealistic  to  exclude 
Rank  Xerox  from  that sector, which was  extended  to  include manu-
facturers  of photocopying machines.  There  are various other market 
boundary problems,  which are discussed  in  the context of  the 
industries concerned. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We  have  done  the best we  can with the  information available.  But it 
must  be  recorded  that  those  who  have worked  most  closely with  the  figures 
feel  a  deep  sense  of unease  about  their general  validity and  reliability. 
We  believe  that  they  represent correct orders  of magnitude,  but  they 
should  not  be  taken  too  literally. 23 
CHAPTER  3  TilE  MECHANICAL  ENGINEERING  INDUSTRY  TODAY 
1.  BACKGROUND 
From  the  time  when  it was  the  spearhead  of  the  Industrial  Revolution 
until  today,  when  it remains  the  largest of all manufacturing  indu~tries 
in  the United  Kingdom,  and also  the  largest exporter,  the  Mechanical 
Engineering  industry has  been of  great  importance  to  the  economy.  The 
industry as  a  ,.;rhole  accounts  for  approximately  13%  of  the  output  of all 
manufacturing  industry  in  the  U.K.,  and  a  slightly higher percentage of 
those  employed  in manufacturing.  Furthermore,  currently it accounts  for 
about  31%  of all U.K.  manufactured  exports. 
The  industry is very diverse  in  terms  of its product  range  and,  in  spite 
of a  high  degree  of concentration  in  some  sectors,  it is still dominated 
by  a  very  large  number of small  firms.  Concentration in distinct markets, 
involving  specialisation in economic  or  geographical  space,  does  not 
generally match at all closely with  the  conventional  statistical divi-
sions of  the  industry;  hence  the reality of  competition cannot  be 
identified reliably from  the  statistics. 
Although  some  sectors match  the  most  advanced  technology currently 
applied  anywhere  in  the world,  in many  respects  traditional ways  of 
organising and  managing  companies  prevail·  In  the  last decade,  however, 
some  large  groups  have  emerged  as  predominant  enterprises within  the 
industry which  have  been able  to  introduce more  professional  management 
and  to  spread  risks  through  diversification.  Studies  indicate that for 
many  years  the  industry has  on  balance  been exporting products  that are 
less  sophisticated,  technologically,  than it has  been  importing. 
In common  with other capital  goods  industries,  mechanical  engineering 
has  always  suffered  from  the cyclical effects of  demand,  the  national 
business  cycles  being amplified  by  the  time  they  reach  the engineering 
sector.  The  lags  behind  national  turning points  in economic  activity 
are  considerable.  At  the present  time,  for  example,  the  industry  is 
still achieving a  high  rate  of activity and  some  managers  are complaining 
about  labour shortages;  but it is quite  evident  from  the  performance 
of  the  national  economy  and  of economies  overseas,  and  from  medium  term 
forecasts,  that activity will decline  substantially until  the  bottom of 
the recession is reached,  probably not  before  1977. 24 
Short Term  Prospects 
Indeed,  the  econometric  model  of  the  national  economy  of  the  London 
Business  School,  managed  by  Professor Jim Ball  and Terry Burns,  expects 
there  to  be  a  substantial decline  in fixed  investment in plant and 
machinery  of about  11%  in 1975  as  compared  with  1974,  and  a  further  fall 
of about  6%  in volume  terms  in  1976  over  1975,  and  it is not expected 
that any  substantial  recovery  in fixed  interest will  occur until the 
latter part of  1977.  For  the mechanical  engineering  industry,  which 
is by  far  the  largest supplier of plant and  machinery  for  fixed  investment, 
these  prospects  are  gloomy  indeed. 
TABLE  3.1: 
SHORT-TERM  FORECASTS 
Real  GDP 
Volume  of Investment  in 
Plant and  Machinery 
Source:  London  Business  School 
(%  change  over  previous year) 
1975  1976  1977 
-1  +1~  +4 
-11  -6  +6 
These  estimates are supported  by  a  consideration of  the  net acquisition 
of financial  assets  in  the  industrial and  commercial  company  sector 
within the U.K.  (this is defined as  the  sum  of corporate  savings  and 
capital  transfers  into  the  corporate  sector,  less  growth  of fixed  capital 
formation  and  less  the  increase  in  the value  of  stocks  and work  in 
progress).  Chart  3.1  shows  that  in  these  terms  the  industrial and 
commercial  company  sector as  a  whole  went  into  substantial financial 
deficit during  the latter part of  1973  and  in 1974,  with  some  recovery 
towards  a  more  normal  relationship  in  1975.  But,  as  Chart  3.2  brings 
out,  the  closing of this  gap  is  being brought about  much  more  by  the 
decline  in  domestic  fixed  capital  formation  rather than  any  substantial 
increase  in corporate  savings  and  net capital  transfers.  While  there 
is no  doubt  that  investment  demand  will  increase substantially in  the 
future,  the  timing of this  seems  likely  to  create cash  flow  difficulties 
for  a  number  of companies  in  the mechanical  engineering sector. 25 
CHART  3.1: 
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These difficulties are  compounded  by  the  continuing  rapid  rate of 
inflation in  the U.K.  Most  companies  do  not yet adjust their accounts 
to  take  proper and  full account  of  this high  rate of  inflation,  and  as 
a  result most  companies  have  not  made  adequate  financial provisiors both 
for  refinancing their working capital  in  stocks  and  for  the  replacement 
of obsolete plant  and  equiprnent  at the  much  higher price  levels  that 
are  now  prevailing. 
There  are  two  basic  methods  of adjusting company  accounts  to  make  proper 
provision for  inflation:  the  'Constant Purchasing Power'  method, 
advocated until recently by  the  Insitute of Chartered Accountants,  and 
the  'Current Cost Accounting'  method  recently advocated  by  the  Sandilands 
Committee  on  Inflation Accounting(l).  Table  3.2  shows  that adjusting 
the published  accounts  of industrial and  commercial  enterprises on  the 
basis of CPP  accounting would  result  in only  a  small  percentage  reduction 
on  the pre-tax profits exhibited  in  the published  statements,  but that 
on  a  CCA  basis  there would  be  something  like  a  65%  reduction  in  the 
published accounts  for  pre-tax profits if full account were  taken of 
inflation on  that basis.  The  Table also  shows  some  estimates of  the 
effects of  inflation adjustments  on  the  rate of return  in  the engineering 
sector.  A Phillips & Drew  research  publ~ation (4th  September  1975) 
estimated that for  general  engineering  the  reduction  on  a  CPP  basis 
would  be  about  12%,  and  estimates  by  the National  Economic  Development 
Office  (a  Government  agency,  as  described  below)  calculated  that  the 
decline  in profits after  taking account of inflation on  that basis would 
be  about  10%.  But  for general  engineering on  a  CCA  basis,  Phillips & 
Drew  estimate  that the  reduction  in profits would  be  of the order of 
88%.  In other words,  in an  industry that exhibited  book profits of 
the  order of  £195  million  in 1973/74 on  a  CPP  inflation adjusted basis 
the  true profit level would  be  about  £174  million,  and  on  a  CCA  infla-
tion adjusted basis  the  true profit would  be  only  £23  million.  Whether 
these  figures  are precisely right or  not  is difficult to  judge,  but 
what  is clear is  that  the  real  level of profitability in  the  mechanical 
engineering sector is far  too  low  to  support a  programme  of capital 
replacement  and  expansion at the price  levels currently prevailing. 
Clearly this is a  most  serious  situocion for  the  industry. 
(1)  "Inflation Accounting:  Report of  the  Inflation Accounting Connnittee", 
Chairman:  F.E.P.  Sandilands  CBE,  HMSO  1975. 28 
TABI..E  3. 2: 
ESTIMATED  EFFECTS  OF  INFLATION  AgCOUNTING  ~~ PRE-TAX  PR~~~~TS  :  LATEST  ACCOUN' 
(1)  Total  Industrial and  Commercial 
(1)  (of which  Gene~al Engineering) 
(2)  Hechanical  Engineering 
% Change 
CPP 
-1 
-12 
-10 
Sources:  (1)  Phillips & Drew  Research,  4th  September  1975. 
CAA 
-65 
-88 
(2)  N.E.D.O.  1973/74 estimates  based  on  "Inflation and 
Company  Accounts". 
The  long  term position of  the mechanical  engineering  sector in  the 
U.K.  has  also been  most  unsatisfactory.  While  the  growth  of  fixed 
investment  has  not  been  significantly below  the  level of Hestern 
Germany,  as against other Member  States  the  growth  in the  volume  of 
gross  fixed capital  formation  in manufacturing  industry  has  been  sub-
stantially less,  as  shown  in Chart 3.3  (which  shows  also  the U.S.A.  and 
Japan).  This  Chart  is derived  from  the  figures  in Table  3.3 below. 2000 
CHART  3. 3: 
TREND  LINES  OF  MANUFACTURING  INVESTMENT 
(Index:  1960 = 100  Constant Prices) 
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INDEX  NU}'ffiERS  OF  GROSS  DOHESTIC  FIXED  CAPITAL  FORMATION  (1-iA.NUFACTURING) 
IN  CONSTANT  PRICES  FOR  SELECTED  ECONOJ-HES  1960-72 
....... ------· 
(1960 = 100) 
(1)  ( 2  ,1~)  (2,4)  (3)  (3) 
Year  -~~.!--~~Ge  ~man_y  __  E.!"~.!:!.~~_§_~  A.  Japan  Ita_!;z  Belgium  Netherlands 
·~-~ 
1960  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1961  118.7  109.7  120.0  93.9  124.2  118.9  122.4  114.5 
1962  109.6  109.6  134.1  99.3  104.2  133.3  137.2  125.6 
1963  96.8  101.0  143.7  104.7  116.9  145.0  136.5  129.3 
196!~  109.2  106.4  154.5  121.6  127.7  115.8  135.8  155.8 
1965  120.5  117.8  159.4  1/~L~ .1  104.4  91.8  149.8  159.5 
1966  123.8  114.9  172.5  168.4  121.4  101.2  172.6  178.4 
1967  120.8  102.7  178.5  171.0  183.9  114.9  168.4  184.2 
1968  124.9  100.5  182.4  166.6  229.3  127.3  152.2  192.8 
1969  141.1  133.6  209.8  175.7  287.0  141.3  171.9  190.7 
1970  148.2  154.0  242.8  169.9  313.3  160.0  198.0  221.9 
1971  138.9  148.7  257.5  162.9  283.2  162.4  194.7  215.1 
1972  125.4  137.2  n/a  174.6  284.4  158.0  183.1  196.9 
(1)  Includes  fishing,  quarrying for  building materials  and  construction. 
(2)  Derived  by  deflating a  current price  series of  GDFCR  in manufacturing 
by  an  implicit price  index  for private non-residential  GDFCF. 
(3)  Includes  mining  and  quarrying,  construction,  gas,  electricity and 
water. 
(4)  Private  sector only. 
Sources:  OECD  National Accounts  (except lvest  Germany). 
Deutsches  Institut fUr  Wirtschaftsforschung:  West  Germany. 
But  over  the  same  period  productivity  in manufacturing  industry  has 
been  grmving  much  more  slowly  in  the  U.K.  than  in other Nember  States, 
and  in North America,  as  shown  in Table  3.4.  This  Table also  shows  that 
in  the period  since  1970  the  growth  of productivity in manufacturing 
has  been  nearer  that of other countries,  although  this is deceptive 
because  productivity  grew  rapidly  during  the  period  of  rapid  gro'tvth  in 
output during  1972,  and  subsequently declined  thereafter. 31 
The  truth is  that  the  rate  of  growth  of productivity  in manufacturing 
industry  in  the  U.K.  has  been  slower  than  that  in Western  Germany  and 
France  for  a  great many  years,  going back  before  the  Second  World  War, 
and  has  as  much  to  do  with  the  attitudes. of people  in industry  tm·1ards 
work  as it has  to  do  with  the  rate of  growth  of  investment.  Attitudes 
towards  work,  the  lack of a  sense  of unity  of purpose within  industry 
that is  now  a  prominent  feature  of our  industrial  society,  are diffi-
cult  to  overcome  in  the  short  term. 
TABLE  3.4: 
OUTPUT  PER  MAN-HOUR  IN  MAl'HJFACTURING 
(1963  =  100)  (1970 = 100) 
1969  1975  (1st Qtr.) 
U.K.  98  117 
Germany  141~  120 
France  148  116 
Italy  152  145 
Netherlands  160  122 
u.s.A.  124  114 
Canada  127  118 
Source:  NIESR 
International Trade 
The  declini.ng competitiveness of  the U.K.  mechanical  engineering 
industry  is illustrated  in its trade  performance  with E.E.C.  Member 
States and  with North America.  The  major  reversal  of  the  industry's 
positive  trade  balance with other E.E.C.  countries  that had  existed 
for many  years  is a  symptom  of  the  problems  that  the  industry faces. 
Table  3.5  below  summarises  the  trend.  As  mentioned earlier,  the  unit 
value  of U.K.  imports  in this  industry  tends  to  be  significantly higher 
than  the  unit value  of its exports:  this  suggests  that the  degree  of 
sophistication of  imported  machinery  is  rather higher  than  the  degree 
of  sophistication of machinery  that it exports,  although a  comparison 
of unit value  of unit value  indices  is a  very  crude  indication of  this. 
Nevertheless,  this declining competitiveness  as  shown  in  the  trade 
balance  is a  cause  for  considerable concern. 32 
TABLE  3. 5: 
U.K.  Imports  U.K.  Exports 
_(~.i.~  (f.o.b.) 
1963  102  165 
1970  333  340 
1971  365  385 
1972  447  429 
1973  694  529 
1974  877  686 
*  the original siz Hernber  States. 
Source:  U.K.  Trade Accounts. 
Relations with  Government 
U.K.  Trade 
Balance 
--~  ... ---.--
·1·64 
+7 
+20 
-18 
-165 
-191 
The  National Economic  Development  Office,  which  is an  agency of  the 
Government,  since  its formation  in  1962,  has  had  a  number  of  industry 
committees  (called  'Little Neddys')  on  which  sit representatives  from 
large  companies  in  the  industry  (generally  COI!lpany  ChairTI!en  or Chief 
Executives),  senior  trade union  leaders  concerned with  that industry, 
Government officials concerned with  that  industry,  and  some  independent 
members;  the  Chairmen  are  generally  senior executives  from another 
industry  so  as  to maintain  independence.  From  the  early days  of  the 
N.E.D.O.  the mechanical  engineering industry has  had  its own  industry 
committee. 
Originally  these  separate  industry committees  were  seen  as  part of the 
Government's  planning process,  but  in  recent  years  their role has 
changed  somewhat  to  become  a  forum  for  discussion of problems  in 
specific  industries,  a  channel  of connnunication  for  special studies 
and  reports,  and  a  centre of advice  to  the Director General  of  the 
N.E.D.O.  in his  discussions with the  heads  of Government  and  trade 
unions.  The  current performance  of the U.K.  mechanical  engineering 
industry is at present  subject  to  considerable discussion  in  this 
forum. 33 
With  a  few  minor  exceptions,  all of  this  industry  is  in  the private 
sector.  It is,  however,  the  policy of  the present Government  to  set 
up  a  National  Enterprise Board  that will  assume  responsibility  for 
managing  the  Government's  existing financial  interest in companies,  and 
will acquire  a  stake  in other companies  in  important sectors - including 
the mechanical  engineering  industry.  This  is expected  to  occur during 
1975  or early in  1976. 
Earlier Government  interventions  in  this  industry occurred with the 
activities of  the  Industrial Re-organisation Corporation,  set up  in 
1965  and  closed  down  in 1970.  This Corporation was  established in order 
to  promote  and  assist with the  restructuring of British industry  through 
merger  in order  to  improve  efficiency.  The  mechanical  engineering 
sector was  involved  to  only  a  minor  degree,  however,  and  affected  the 
cranes  sub-sector of Mechanical Handling Equipment most  of all. 
Government  interventions affecting the  industry have  also centred 
round  schemes  to  promote  investment  in manufacturing  industry.  These 
have  included  investment  grants,  being effectively a  means  of subsidising 
investment at the  time  when  the  expenditures are incurred,  investment 
allowances  under which  expenditures  can  be written off against profits 
before  incurring corporation  tax,  and  free  depreciation which  allows 
companies  to  choose  the  rate of  depreciation  that  they will apply  to 
newly  installed  fixed  assets,  again with provision for writing this 
off against profits before  the application of corporate  taxation. 
However,  studies  that have  been undertaken of the effects of these 
investment  incentives generally fail  to  find  that  they have  had  any 
marked  or significant effects  on  the  rate of  investment above what 
would  othe1vise have  been  incurred.  This  does  not mean  that  in  no  cases 
have  investment  incentives had  any  effects,  but it does  suggest  that 
this  is not  an  appropriate way  of increasing the  rate of  investment  in 
any  economy  th~  appears  to have  been  investing at a  lower rate  than 
many  of its competitors.  The  main effects  have probably arisen because 
of  regional  differentiation in  the way  in which  investment  incentives 
have  been applied,  so  that while  the  geographical  distribution of 
investment probably  has  been  significantly affected  by  the various 
incentive  schemes,  it is difficult to  identify that they have  had  much 
effect on  the  aggregate level of  investment within  the country  as  a 
whole. 34 
Perhaps  the most  significant  intervention of Government  in  this  industry 
in  recent years  has  been  through  the  attempt  to  control  inflation  by 
holding  down  prices.  The  last five  years  in particular have  seen  a 
regime  of price restraint and  control of  increasing  severity and  com-
plexity.  This  has  not,  of course,  been  confined  to  the  mechanical 
engineering  sector:  it has  been  nationwide,  and  has  been applied with 
particular severity  in  state enterprises. 
The  long  run  effect of  this has  been very  damaging  to British  industry. 
Ir particular we  believe  that it has  been  damaging  to  grmvth  of  investment, 
because it has  squeezed  cash  flmv  and  profitability,  and  in more  usual 
circumstances  this  is  the  major  source  of  funds  for  investment.  Thus  the 
operation of  the  price  code,  albeit relaxed  to  some  degree  in 1975,  has 
had  a  fundamentally  undermining effect not  only  on  the  firms  in  the 
mechanical  engineering  sector directly,  but also  indirectly through  the 
difficulties  that  the  rest of manufacturing  industry have  had  in financing 
their expenditures  on  the  products  of  this  industry. 
In  the  circumstances  described  in this chapter it is little wonder  that 
the  real crisis is one  of  confidence  in  the  future.  Even  when  demand 
does  recover,  will  the operations  of  the  price  code  permit  a  sufficiently 
high  level of profitability and  of expected  returns  from  new  investment 
that full  recovery of  the  mechanical  engineering industry will occur? 
This  is a  most  serious  question  for  all of  the  firms  concerned. 
CONCLUSION 
The  mechanical  engineering  industry  today  is in  a  state of declining 
activity that may  last  through  to  1977.  Confidence  is  lacking  throughout 
much  of British  industry  that will affect seriously  the  likely rate of 
this recovery,  and  in this context  the  operations  of  the Price Code  -
as  one  of  the  Government's  ways  of overcoming  the  present rapid rate of 
inflation - is  a  key  factor. 35 
PART  2:  SECTOR  STUDIES 37 
CHAPTER  4  AGRICULTURAL  HACIIINERY 
-------------
Since  later we  devote  seven chapters  to  a  detailed  and  comprehensive 
study  of  the Agrictltural  Hachinery  sector,  at this  stage  only  a  brief -
mainly statistical - presentation  is  nec·essary. 
1.  DEFINITION  OF  THE  SECTOR 
Basically  the  industry is divided  into  two  parts:  tractors  and  agricul-
tural  equipment.  In  1974  tractors accounted  for  53%  of industry sales, 
and  equipment  for  the  remainder. 
'Equipment'  included  the  following  ten principal product categories: 
Combine  Harvesters  (about  80%  of  the  domestic  market  being  supplied  by 
'  imports);  Balers;  Forage Harvesters  (about  70%  imported);  Milling 
Equipment;  Rotary Cultivators;  Manure  Spreaders;  Grain Drying  and 
Handling Equipment;  Haymaking  Equipment  and  Root  Harvesters.  The  range 
of products  is clearly very wide;  and  in six  product categories  (out  of 
ten),  imports  account  for  one  third of more  of  domestic  consumption. 
Indeed,  in  tractoc~ imports  accounted  for  81%  of  domestic  consumption  in 
1974,  and  on  average  imports  accounted  for  69%  in the  equipment  market. 
Basic  data collected  from Company  Accounts,  used  as  the  basis of  the 
concentration measures  in  this chapter,  are  given  in Table  4.1,  below, 
They  show  that  in  1971  'enterprise'  turnover was  £274 million,  and 
employment  was  39,000 persons  •  Turnover  in  'U.E.A.'  companies was, 
however,  of  the  order of  £299  million. 
TABLE  4.1: 
SUNMARY  OF  DATA  FROM  PRINARY  SOURCES 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Enterprises:  Turnover  229  254  265  274  322 
Employment  38  40  42  39  37 
Wages  & Salaries  47  53  60  61  68 
Net  profit  14.3  12.3  1.7  0.7  11.4 
Cash  flow  76.7  72.4  72.6  76.8  82.2 
Exports  130  144  145  151  175 
U.K.  Home  sales  99  104  110  112  131 
U.E.A.:  Turnover  254  278  291  299  34~ 
Source:  Company  Accounts  and  L.B.S.  Study. 38 
No  precise comparison  is possible with  the  1971  Census  of Production, 
because  (partly  in  order  to  conceal  individual  company  information) 
'wheeled  tractors'  overlaps with  'construction equipment,  and  the  Census 
definition of  'agricultural machinery'  includes  a  number  of agricu1J.:ural 
engineers which were  not  producers  of equipment.  For  what  they  are 
worth,  however,  the  comparison  is  given  in Table  4.2  below. 
TABLE  4. 2: 
AGRICULTURAL  }IACHINERY  INDUSTRY  COMPARISON 
~~~~~~--~~-----------
L.B.S.  Study  1971 
Enterprises 
U.E.A. 
£  million 
Turnover 
274 
299 
1971  Census  of Production  (gross output) 
Agrictitural Nachinery  191 
138  Wheeled  Tractors 
Source:  1971  Census  of Production and  L.B.S.  Study. 
1000 
_Employment 
39 
27 
24 
Table  4.1  also  shoHs  that demand  has  fluctuated  over  the  study period, 
with a  major recession  (shown  most  clearly  in  the  cash  flow profit  figures) 
in 1970-71. 
2.  CONCENTRATION 
Concentration data  based  on  the  turnover of  'enterprises'  are  given  in 
Table  4.3  below.  They  show  some  slight variability over  the  period  -
not,  one  might  gather from  this data,  of  any  great significance. 
Slightly lower  concentration ratios  for  the  same  'enterprises'  appear 
on  the basis of employment  statistics, as  shown  in Table  4.4. 39 
TABLE  4. 3: 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  HEASURES  BASED  ON  TURNOVER  DATA  FROH  'ENTE~PJ3:!:.~~ 
1968  1969  1970  1971 
4-firm concentration ratio  80.9  81.3  80.4  81.2 
8-firm concentration ratio  91.4  91.8  91.7  90.6 
Coefficient  of variation  2.6  .26  .25  2.5 
Gini  coefficient  0.77  0.78  0.77  0.77 
Herfinde1 Hirschmann  333.4  33.73  318.8  322.0 
Entropy  -75.6  -75.1  -77.4  -77.3 
( 
Ln"i'-"m  .826  .878  .832  .790 
(  n"i'>'m  22  22  22  22 
Linda  Indices -( 
(  Ln  h  1.91  2.20  2.20  2.08 
(  n  h  3  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
TABLE  4. 4: 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  HEASURES  BASED  ON  Et-fPLOYMENT  DATA  FROM 
I ENTERPRISEs I 
1968  1969  1970  1971 
4-firm concentration ratio  79.6  79.5  79.8  78.5 
8-firm concentration ratio  90.5  90.3  90.9  89.8 
Coefficient of variation  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.4 
Gini coefficient  0.75  0.75  0.76  0.75 
Herfindel Hirschmann  268.3  280.9  292.9  285.4 
Entropy  -82.8  -81.8  -79.9  -81.7 
( 
Ln~~m  .719  .730  .778  .724  ( 
Linda  Indices -( 
n~':m  22  22  22  22 
(  Ln  h  1.501  1.648  1.622  1.668 
(  n  h  2  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
1972  -----
79.0 
90.1 
2.4 
0.75 
288.5 
-81.6 
.720 
22 
1.79 
2 
1972 
77.1 
89.5 
2.3 
0.74 
268.8 
-84.1 
• 686 
22 
1.624 
2 
Based  on  'U.E.A. 1  data,  concentrat,ion  appears  to  be  somewhat  lower,  with 
a  more  pronounced  tendency  towards  decline  than was  apparent  from  the 
'enterprise'  results,  as  shown  in Table  4.5  below. 40 
Sffiv~1ARY  OF_  CC!_~~C!::_!iTRA?~'ION_J'1EASURES2~-SED  0~_']}..  E;  ~~-~. '  TURNOVER  DATA 
1968  1969  1970  1971  19"/2  -- .... ,---·---- --·~- .. ,. 
4-firm concentration ratio  72.4  72.9  70.6  71.1  69.5 
8-firm concentration ratio  86.4  86.6  86.1  85.8  84.9 
Coefficient ot variation  2.15  2.14  2.07  2.05  1.93 
Gini coefficient  -736  .739  .730  .723  .709 
Herfindel Hirschmann  194.5  192.9  182.7  186.3  169.4 
Entropy  -95.4  -95.5  -97.5  -96.6  -99.9 
(  Ln"i'"m  .519  . 5Lfl  .511  .508  .470  ( 
Linda  Indices -(  n*m  28  28  28  27  27 
(  Ln  h  .986  .994  .984  1.04  .907 
(  n  h  3  3  3  3  3 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
The  significance of these  figures  for  competition  is.  explained  in great 
detail  in Chapters  9  to  15  below.  In  summary,  there  is great variability 
between product categories.  The  tractor ntarket  is,  for  example,  domina-
ted  by  only  a  few  U.K.  producers  - mostly multinationals  (the  five  major 
producers  acrounting for  90%  of  emplo)~ent in  that  sector)  - and  the 
majority of  these  employees worked  in large plants  (90%  of  employees 
were  in establishments of over  500  persorn );  in the  equipment  market, 
however,  the  five  largest producers  employed  about  30%  of that sector's 
labour  force,  and  only  40%  of employees  were  in  large  establishments of 
over  500 persons. 
Furthermore,  the characteristics of  companies  in  the  two  sectors are 
typically quite different,  their management  styles  and  cultures  being 
also dissimilar would  result in different  responses  to  market  pressures 
and  competition.  Economies  of  large  scale  operations  are  evident  in 
tractor production but  not  generally  in equipment  supply,  ';vhere  the 
chosen production method  and  where  market characteristics appear  to  be 
the  more  significant factors.  And  there  appears  to  be  a  considerable 
degree  of mobility  in market  share within  equipment  product categories 
that become  submerged  in the  aggregate  concentration  data  presented  in 
the earlier tables. 41 
What  can  be  concluded  from  the  detailed  study  ]Rter is  that these 
ea rlicr concentration  tables  provide  no  meaningfu  1  apprec  i.c3 tion  of  the 
degree  of monopoly  or competition  in  the  agric·ultural  machinery  sector. 
They  are  simply  numbers. 43 
CHAPTER  5  TEXTILE  HACHINERY 
1.  DEFINITION  AND  DESCRIPTION  OF  TgE  SECTO~ 
The  Textile Machinery  sector of mechanical  engineering  includes all 
those  companies  which  manufacture  a  range  of  textile mctchincs  and  their 
accessories.  Final products  cover  a  wide  variety of machines,  used  for 
a  diversity of  textile processes,  ranging  from  the  extrusion of  man-
made  fibres  to  the  more  traditional spinning,  weaving,  knitting,  dyeinr; 
and  finishing machines. 
The  Textile Machinery  industry covered  by  this study  employed  about 
28,500 persons  in  1971  (in  'enterprises'), with  'enterprise'  turnover 
of  £159  million.  The  turnover of  companies  in  the  'units of  economic 
activity'  analysis was,  however,  £198  million  (since  this analysis 
included  companies  whose  output  in this  sector was  less  than  50%  of 
their total output),  while  the  1971  Census of Production  showed  a 
turnover of  £212  million - with  43,600  employees.  As  explained  later, 
this  large difference  in  the  number  of employees  arises mainly  because 
of the  inclusion in  the Census  of  firms  of  less  than  200  employees. 
TABLE  5.1: 
TEXTILE  MACHINERY  INDUSTRY  COMPARISON  (1971  Data) 
This  Study 
'Enterprises' 
'UEA' 
Turnover 
(£ mill) 
159 
198 
1971  Census  (Gross  Output) 
212 
Employees 
('000) 
28.5 
43.6 
Sources:  L.B.S.  Study,  and  1971  Census  of Production. 
In volume  tenns,  production  in  the U.K.  has  fluctuated  about  an  almost 
horizontal  trend,  as  shown  in Table 5.2. 44 
TARLE  5.2:  ------
TEXTILE  MACHINERY  U.K.  PRODUCTION 
·~-;.___ 
£ million 
Volume''' 
_(£  1970)  (1968=100) 
1968  161  (100) 
1969  173  (107) 
1970  163  (101) 
1971  154  (96) 
1972  162  (101) 
1973  173  (107) 
-;'\  at 1970  prices 
Source:  Annual Abstract of Statistics 
Major  Product  Groups 
Current Year 
Values 
143 
158 
163 
172 
197 
234 
As  Table  5.3  below  illustrates,  the  two  largest sectors  in this  industry 
are first,  looms,  weaving machines,  knitting machines  and  auxiliaries 
(a  sub-sector of this  industry  that has  recently experienced  a  severe 
contraction  in output),  and  secondly,  spinning and  twisting machinery 
(which,  in contrast,  has  grown  rapidly). 
TABLE  5.3: 
TEXTILE  MACHINERY  U.K.  PRODUCTION  BY  SUB-SECTOR 
£  million'i'' 
1972  1973 
Machines  for  processes  preparatory  to  spinning & twisting  19.2 
Spinning  &  twisting machinery  26.8 
Looms,  weaving machines,  knitting machines  & auxiliaries  56.7 
Tufting machines,  carpet machines,  etc  8.8 
Dyeing  &  finishing machines  12.1 
Parts & accessories  30.2 
Other **  53.0 
TOTAL  197.0 
*  Current Year  Values. 
**  Production  by  establishments classified  to  other sectors. 
Source:  Business Monitor 
22.7 
46.0 
48.7 
14.8 
12.1 
35.1 
55.0 
234.0 45 
Comparison  w.i th Census· .of  Production Data 
The  Textile Machinery industry  id~ntified for  the  purposes  of  this 
enquiry  covered  20  companies  for  the  'enterptise'  analysis  and  28  com-
panies  for  the  'units of  economic  activity'  analysis.  But it can  be 
s·een  fpom  Table 5. 4  that  tqe  1971  Census  of Ptoduc tion records  491 
enterprise~  in- the  T-extile  :t-iachif\ery  sector - the  vast majority  employing 
less  than  200  petson.s  (and  88~ of  them .employing  under  100  persons). 
Most·of  theBe  sftlctll-~r  firms  are  en·gaged  i~ the  manufacture  of  acces~ories, 
such as  bO.bb\n.s,  i'I.E~edl~s  an~ shuttles,  .and  they also undertake machinery 
repair work  .:i.n  this  ihd,ustry.  As.  such  they  are  important  suppliers  to 
the  industry and  a  nec~~sary part of it, as  organised at present. 
TEXTILE  MACHINERY·  :  INDUSTRY  COMPARI$0~  EMPLOYMENT 
'Number  of  'Enterprises',  1971 
Size Class.by 
0  ... 
200 
300 
500 
1,5UO  & 
This 
EniE loymet;t t  of 
199 
299 
499· 
1~499 
o"er 
Study:  Number  1971  Census 
'Enterl?rises'  of Production 
1  491 
4  11 
8  13 
4  8 
3  4 
20  527* 
*  Since  some  enterprises control establishments  in more  than  one  sector, 
after allowing for  double  counting  the  number·  of companies  is 491. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study,  and  1971  Census  of Production. 
The  1971  Census  of Production also  records  a  larger number  of enterprises 
in each of  the  size categories of 200  employees  and  above  than  in our 
own  study  of  'enterprises',  but  this  is  to be  expected  because  of  the 
exclusions  under  the  specification of  'enterprise'  for  our purposes. 
(Unfortunately it is  not possible  to categorise companies  according  to 
'units of  economic activity',  by  size distribution of  employment,  since 
this  information  is not available). 
Categorised  by  turnover,  the  number  of enterprises  in  the  'enterprise' 
and  'units of  economic  activity'  analysis  arc  shown  in Table  5.5 by 46 
size distribution of  turnover  (unfortunately  the  1971  Census  of  Production. 
does  not  show  a  comparable  distribution).  As  to  be  expected,  there are 
rather more  companies  in  the  latter category  than  in  the  former,  although 
the  28  companies  in our  'units  of  economic  activity'  analysis are  fewer 
than  the  36  companies with  200  or more  employees  sho\'m  in  the  1971  Census 
of Production  (Table 5.4 above). 
TABLE  5. 5: 
TEXTILE  HACHINERY  INDUSTRY  COMPARISON  :  TURNOVER 
Number  of Companies 2  1971 
Size Class  b;t:  Turnover  'Enterprises'  'UEA' 
(£ mill) 
0  .49  1  4 
.5  .9  5  5 
1.0  1.9  3  5 
2.0  4.9  5  5 
5.0  9.9  1  2 
10.0  19.9  2  3 
20.0  &  over  3  4 
20  28 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 
International Trade  and  its Implications 
Historically  the  machinery  industry depended  on  the  cotton manufacwring 
industry  in Lancashire.  Ho,.,ever,  in  the  1930s,  when  the U.K.  demand  for 
new  machinery  slumped,  textile machinery  companies  became  dependent  on 
the  growth  of textile industries  in  the  developing Commonwealth  nations. 
The  industry was  able  to  expand  by meeting a  need  for fairly unsophis-
ticated  equipment  in countries which  owed  their competitive  edge  in 
cotton textiles  to  cheap  labour and  labour intensive operations. 
During  and  immediately after the  Second  World War,  U.K.  manufacturers 
had  to  concentrate first on  armaments  and  then  supplying  goods  to  the 
depleted  home  market.  Loss  of  some  traditional exports markets  and  a 
falling behind  in research and  development  resulted.  Competition  overseas 47 
grew with  the  development  of major  industries  in Switzerland,  Germany 
and  later in India  and  Pakistan.  In particular,  the  Swiss  developed  the 
'Sultzer'  shuttleless  loom.  Traditional  sectors  of  the  U.K.  industry 
suffered;  the  number  of  loom makers  fell  from about  fifteen  in  1945  to 
approximately  four  today,  and  all the  latter are minor  companies.  The 
world-wide  textile  recestiion of  1952  accentoated  the  trend. 
But  this  recession coincided with  the  development  of  synthetic yarns. 
The  U.K.  industry had  to  turn  to  new  markets  to  come  to  terms with  these 
developments.  Radically  new  processes were  required,  such as  texturing -
designed  to  give  the desirable properties of natural  fibres  to 
yarn.  Knitting also was  developed.  There were  improvernents  across  the 
entire range  of machinery,  raising machine  speeds,  combining processes, 
automating  transfers  bet\veen processes.  The  textile  industry  became  a. 
more  capital intensive operation and  the  textile machinery  industry  a 
high  technolog¥  engineering sector.  Readiness  to  develop  and  exploit 
improvements,  such as  electronic patterning in knitting operations  and 
open-end  spinning,  has  determined  the  ability of  the various  sectors of 
the  industry to  compete  internationally.  Thus,  sectors  in which British 
companies have  made  significant developments  show  a  strong positive trade 
balance,  whereas  sectors  such as weaving  are weak  internationally. 
The  international nature  of  this industry accentuates  the  problem of 
estimating concentration ratios  based  on  domestic  output.  Because  of 
the high level of exports  (71%  of  domestic  production  exported  in  1973) 
and  of  imports  (56%  of domestic  consumption  supplied  by  imports  in 1973), 
concentration  indices  based  on  U.K.  manufacturing  companies  alone will 
seriously distort  the  significance of concentration indices  for  the 
industry. 
Moreover,  the  trend  of  sales of U.K.  manufacturers  is different  from 
the  trend  of production  (shown  in Table  5.2),  because  some  U.K.  manufac-
turers were  also selling imported machinery.  While  the  index of  sales 
(Table  5.6 below)  also  shows  a  marked  recession  in  1971,  as  did production, 
the  trend  is clearly rising  (1973  was  24%  up  on  1968,  whereas  production 
was  only  7%  up). 48 
TABLE  5. 6: 
TEXTILE  :tvrACHINERY  SALES,  E~P9_B.T~_AND  _giPORTS'  1968-73  ( £  mill)  1:  __________  ,..,._ 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
-r-
Total  sa1es(1)  130  142  147  149  200 
Total  sales:  1968  .  (2) 130 
pr~ces  137  128  118  148 
Index  (1968=100)  100  105  98  91  114 
----m-
Exports  100  106  116  134  lL•7 
Imports (3)  42  46  49  50  58 
T1·ade  Balance  ((3)-(4~  -t 58  +60  +67  +84  +89 
% sales  exported  76  74  78  89  73 
% home  market  supplied 
by  industry  44  44  39  26  48 
U.K.  market  [Cl)-(3)+(4U  72  82  80  65  110 
U.K.  market:  1968  prices~) 72  78  7L  51  81 
-/(  All  values  rrunded  to  the  nearest  £  million and  expressed  in 
prices unless  otherwise  stated. 
Sources:  (1)  Business Monitor  Series,  Department  of Industry. 
(2)  Based  on  index of wholesale  prices  in mechanical 
engineering,  Monthly Digest  of Statistics. 
1973 
233 
161 
124 
166 
88 
+78 
71 
44 
155 
107 
current 
(3)  Overseas  Trade Statistics,  Department of Industry. 
Profitability 
Profitability varies considerably,  both over  the  period of  study  and 
between different  sectors  of  the  industry.  The  average  profit ratio for 
1968  was  14%.  and  it had  fallen  to  2%  in  1972.  Companies  making  con-
sistent! y  low  or  negative profits are  those  engaged  in  the manufacture 
of  looms,  and  some  of  the  jute machinery manufacturers.  Companies 
consistently earning high  returns  on  capital over  the  period  could  be 
classified as  the  technical  leaders  in  their  specific areas;  thfu  implies 
there  are considerable  returns  to  investment in R & D available  in  this 
industry.  For  example,  Scragg's  technological  leaderffiip  in  the  design of 
yarn  texturing machines  earned  a  record  71%  on  capital  employed  in 
1969/70.  Edgar  Pickering,  the  carpet tufting machinery manufacturer, 
also have  a  good  earnings  record. 49 
Analysis \vas  undertaken  to  investigate  the  relntjonship  bct.Hcen  profits 
and  size of  companies  (in  terms  of  ein;loymet\t).  The  industry  is  fa:irly 
concentrated and  one  may  expect  large1·  companies  to  be  n1aldng  about 
average profits.  The  hypothesis Has  that size,  because  of  the  level 
of concentration,  may  explain  the  variBtion  in profit levels.  There-
fore  profit levels were  regressed  against  numhers  employed  over  a 
sample  of  t\venty  companies,  for  both  1.968  and.  197 2.  NoithQr  equation 
showed  significant values  for  the coefficients  aod  the  R2  was  approx-
imately  zero.  Therefore we  cannot  find  a  statistical. relationship 
between  size and  profitability in  this  sector. 
2.  CONCENTRATION 
The  principal  information  for  our analysis of concentration is contained 
in Table  5.7  below  (regretably,  1973  data  were  not  fully available, 
and  so  had  to  be  omitted).  It shows  that  'enterprise'  turnover  increased 
by  59%  over  the period  1968-72,  while  the  net profit of  those  companies 
increased  by  27%  in total,  'UEA'  turnover  increased  by  only  30%,  however. 
TABLE  5. 7: 
SUI-fMARY  OF  PRIHARY  SOURCE  DATA 1.  1968-72 
Indices 
1972 
Unit  Variable  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  ( 19  68:=:~_9_0) 
1 Enterprise' :  Turnover  (£  m)  104  135  135  159  165  159 
Number  employed  ('000)  27  27  27  28  28  104 
Wages  & Salaries  (£  m)  27  31  33  41  46  178 
Net profit 
II  15  18  11  16  19  127 
Cash  flow  rr  17  21  14  19  23  135 
Own  capital 
II  50  44  45  55  58  ] 1 5 
Exports 
II  57  168  70  81  97  170 
'UEA':  Turnover 
II  158  185  187  198  205  130 
Source:  Company  Accounts  (L.B.S.  Study). 
Tables  5.8a and  5.8b  summarise  the  main  concentration ratio results. 
They  show  that overall  'enterprise'  concentration in turnover  in  those 50 
companies  measured  increased  during  the  period,  as  also  in  employment; 
each  exhibited  a  small  decline  in  1970 . 
. TABLE  5. Sa: 
4-firm concentration ratio 
8-firm concentration  ratio 
Coefficient of variation 
Gini coefficient 
Herfindel-Hirschman  Index 
Entropy 
Linda 
Indices 
(Ln"'~m 
( 
-( 
(Ln  h 
( 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 
TABLE  5.8b: 
L 
L 
n  h 
1968 
64.6 
85.1 
1.38 
. 605 
ltf5. 3 
-101.1+ 
.409 
10 
1.0 
2 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  NEASURES 
4-firm concentration ratio 
8-firm concentration ratio 
Coefficient of variation 
Gini coefficient 
Herfinde1  Index 
Entropy 
Linda 
Indices 
(Ln"'~m 
( 
-( 
(Ln  h 
( 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 
L 
L 
n  h 
1968 
71.4 
85.3 
1. 62 
I  635 
181.8 
-95.1 
I  436 
19 
.853 
4 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
-------·-----~-----.... --
71.8 
88.3 
1.38 
. 637 
145.5 
-97.9 
• 362 
4 
.76 
2 
69.2 
86.9 
1.41 
• 634 
150.1 
-98.5 
.441 
6 
.77 
2 
73.3 
89.3 
1.53 
. 669 
167.5 
-93.8 
.492 
5 
.58 
3 
1 ENTERPRISES'  :  EMPI.OYHENT 
1969 
73.6 
85.6 
1.65 
.643 
186.8 
-93.7 
.440 
19 
.787 
3 
1970 
72.5 
84.4 
1.64 
.631 
184.0 
-94.9 
.415 
19 
.835 
3 
1971 
76.3 
86.2 
1.83 
.666 
217.9 
-88.7 
1.05 
5 
74.0 
88.7 
1.73 
. 682 
199.9 
-9010 
.561 
2 
.56 
2 
1972 
77.8 
87.1 
1.91 
. 680 
231.5 
-86.2 
.529 
19 
1.27 
3 
Table  5.9  below gives  the  results  for  turnover  on  a  'units of  economic 
activity'  basis.  It shows,  as  would  be  expected,  a  lower  overall 51 
concentration ratio,  but also  a  much  slower  inc.rease  in  the  ratio  over 
the  period  1968-72. 
TABLE  5.9: 
SUHMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  l'1EASURES  I UEA I  :  TURNOVER  _____  .. _,... ______  _ ___  ,.... _____ 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  --------.--.... --
4-firm concentration ratio  62  57  58  60  65 
8-firm concentration ratio  82  82  81  83  84 
Coefficient of variation  1.48  1.40  1.1+1  1.47  1.61 
Gini  coefficient  • 655  .649  • 6Lj 8  . 664  • 682 
Herfindel  index  113.9  105.2  107.0  113.0  128.2 
Entropy  -110.4  -111.5  -111.8  -109.8  -106.7 
( Ln-;'~m  L  .343  .281  .279  .302  .380 
Linda 
(  n"''m  9  5  9  8  7 
Indices 
-( 
(Ln  h  L  .589  ,654  .714  .809  .958 
(  n  h  2  2  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
The  U.K.  industry is dominated  by  four  major  companies,  Bentley Engineering: 
(1) 
Stone-Platt Industries,  James  Mackie  Ltd.  and  Ernest  Scragg  ,  which 
accounted  for  over  60%  of  total  sales  by  U.K.  manufacturers  in  1973. 
There  are  a  further  seventeen  com~nies which  had  total sales  in excess 
of  £1  million  in  1973.  But  few  of  these  companies  compete  directly with 
each other.  The  number  of  different machines  manufactured  is  so  large 
that there  is  room  for many  small  companies  to  survive  alongside  the 
giants of  the  industry.  There  are  a  large  number  of even  smaller  com-
panies,  but  they  supply mainly  spares  and  accessories  to  local markets. 
Our  data  does  not  extend  to  1973,  but  in that year  Stone-Platt acquired 
Saco-Lowell  for  approximately  £9.5 million.  This  increased  their textile 
machinery  sales  from  £26~ million  in  1972-73  to  £43  million  in  1973-74; 
in spite of this  large  increase  in  turnover,  they  are still second  in 
size to Bentley.  Since  Saco-Lowell  is an American manufacturing company, 
operating  in  the United  States,  the  merger may  have  little effect on  the 
U.K.  industry. 
(1)  It was  announced  in  the  sun~er of 1975  that E.  Scragg  and  Stene-
Platt Industries  are planning  a  merger. 52 
Concentration varies  in  the  individual  sub-sectors.  For  example,  there 
are  only  two  U.K.  manufacturers  of carpet  tufting machinery,  'l:vhereas  in 
the  textile dyeing  and  finishing machinery  sector  there are approximately 
sixteen manufacturing  companies.  Knitting machinery  manufacture  is 
another concentrated  sub-sector,  dominated  by  Bentley Engineering and 
its subsidiaries;  -,Tith  the  liquidation of  G.  Stibbe  &  Company  in 1974, 
concentration  in  this  sector is increasing. 
Competition  in  the  textile machinery  industry is at the  international 
level;  there  appears  to  be  little direct competition  between U.K.  manu-
facturers  in the U.K.  market. 
Technology  is an  important  feature  of competition in  the industry -
technical  innovators  often appear  as  market  leaders.  The  "Sultzer"  loom 
manufactured  in Switzerland  dominates  the world-wide  market  for  looms; 
Scragg are  universally  acknowledged  for  their crimping machines,  which 
use  electronic methods  and  operate at much  higher  speeds  than conventional 
machinery  in this field;  Bentley produce  high  speed  large  diameter 
circular knitting machines.  Each-of  these  machines  would  be  considered 
world  leaders  in  their  specific areas. 
Other Structural Features 
Entry Barriers:  The  advanced  level of  technology in the  industry makes 
barriers  to entry high  for  the  new  firm.  The  established engineering 
company  \vishing  to  diversify might  be  attracted by  the high  rates of 
return made  by  some  of  the  innovators  in the  industry  (Scragg  earned  a 
record  71%  on  capital employed  in 1969-70);  but  in  fact  there  are  few 
diversified engineering firms  in  the  industry  (see  below).  Preparatory 
machines  for  synthetics,  such  as  those made  by  Scragg,  are very advanced. 
Three  out of  the  four  largest companies,  Scragg,  Platt and  Mackie,  operate 
in  the  preparatory  and  spinning machinery  sub-sectors,  making entry less 
attractive. 
But  the  level of  technology varies considerably between  sub-sectors. 
The  U.K.  loom manufacturers  have  not advanced  as  rapidly as  their European 53 
competitors,  and  so  technical barriers are  not  so  high;  but  companies 
in this sector  earn  a  below  average  rate  of  return  so  entry  appears unattrac-
tive.  Nevertheless,  there are still ne'i.-7  firms  movinz  into  this  sector 
since  the initial capital comnitment  is not  excessive.  The  great variety 
of types  of machines  required  by  the  textile  industry allmvs  small 
specialised operntors  to exist alongside  the  pmverful manufacturers. 
Vertical  Integration:  There  is little significant vertical  integration 
in  the  industry.  G.  Stibbe manufactured knitting machines,  in competi-
tion with Bentley,  and  had  a  textile manufacturing division 'vhich  they 
sold  in 1972.  They  have  subsequently  gone  into  liquidation.  Courtaulds 
have  their own  subsidiary engineering camp any  '..rhich  manufactures machines, 
mainly  for  their  m.vn  use,  so  it does  not  compete  directly ,.,ith  other 
companies  in  the  industry.  Some  of  the  larger  companies  are vertically 
integrated within  the  industry.  Sears Holdings,  who  mvn  Bentley Engin-
eering,  the  major  U.K.  knitting machinery  manufacturer,  also controls  a 
company  manufacturing knitting machire  needles  and  one  manufacturing 
knitting machine  components.  Sears Holdings  made  a  step  towards  further 
vertical integration in their  £45  million bid  for Nottingham Hanufacturers 
(the major  carpet  and  knitwear manufacturers)  in 1974.  Since  Sears had 
acquired Edgar  Pickering in 1973  (one  of  the  two  major U.K.  manufacturers 
of carpet  tufting machines)  they would  have  had  a  major  customer  for 
both Bentley's and  Pickering's machines  under  their common  control.  But 
the  bid was  referred  to  the  Monopolies  Co1nmission  and  subsequently 
withdrawn before  the  enquiry began. 
Diversification:  Diversification in  some  of  the  sub-sectors  seemed  to 
occur  as  a  result of necessity  than  as  a  positive move  towards  more 
profitable areas  of production.  For  example,  when  the Pakistan  jute 
market  collapsed  in 1968,  jt1te  machinery  manufacturers  such as Keay  '"ere 
forced  to diversify  to  survive  (they  now  make  machinery  for  paper  sacks). 
Dransfield Bros.  also make  machines  for  the  paper  industry.  Some  of 
the  companies  in the  dyeing,  finishing  and  bleaching sector  of  tl1e 
industry are  diversified  into other sectors of  engineering.  }1ather & 
Platt make  centrifugal  pumps  and  fire-fighting  equipment. 54 
A  significant pr·oportion of  the  companies  are privately O\•;ned,  including 
one  of  the  'top four',  James  Hackie  (Holdings)  Ltd.  The  percentage  of 
foreign  control  is  loH with only  four  firms  (I.cesona,  Singer  (U.K.)  Ltd., 
Crostol  and  Proctor Dalgleish)  under  foreign  0\·Jnership.  There  has  been 
little change  in  the  ownership  structure of  the  industry  over  the  period. 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
Concentration  ratios  in  the Textile Nachinery  sector  show  so111e  increase 
over  the  period  1968-72,  the  increase  being larger on  an  'enterprise' 
than  on  a  'UEA'  basis.  Some  sub-sectors \-Jere  dominated  by  only  one  or 
a  few  firms:  other sectors were  more  atomistic  in  structure.  The 
industry has  a  long  tail of  small  firms  about which published  information 
is very  fragmentary. 
But as  indicators relating  to  competition  such  information  is difficult 
to  interpret.  In  1972  the  industry exported  73%  of its production,  and 
imports were  52%  of domestic  consumption  (some  imports were  sold  by 
U.K.  manufacturers,  others were  imported  directly  by  users).  In  some 
sectors  advanced  technology  holds  the  key  to  success,  and  here  competition 
is world-wide. 
We  conclude,  therefore,  that concentration ratios  based  on  U.K.  producers 
in Textile Machinery are  rather meaningless  statistics.  Much  detailed 
information about  individual  companies  is  necessary  for  a  full  under-
standing of  the  nature  of competition  in  this  sector. 55 
CHAPTER  6  CONSTRUCTION  AND 
EARTH-HOVING  EQUIP1'-1ENT 
1.  DEFINITION  AND  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  SECTOR 
This  sub-sector of  the  mechanical  engineering industry  includes  those 
con~anies making  certain kinds  of  equipment  for civil engineering con-
tracting companies.  Final  products  include  the  follmving: 
- Digging machinery,  including excavators,  trenchers  and  ditchers. 
- Other  earth-moving  equipment,  including graders,  levellers, 
crmv-bar  tractors,  dumpers  and  powered 
- Concrete  mixing  and  placing machinery. 
- Road  making  and  maintenance plant,  including asphalt,  tarmac  and 
bitumen  processing and  laying equipment,  and  road  rollers. 
- Crushing,  pulverising and  screening plant,  both  fixed and  mobile 
machines. 
- Well-drilling,  piledriving and  earth-moving equipment. 
The  name  'construction equipment'  is  rather misleading,  because  the 
official S.I.C.  definition excludes mobile  cranes,  cable hoists  and 
drag  lines,  which  are part of materials handling,  crawler and  tower 
cranes  and  forklift  trucks. 
The  construction  and  earth-moving  equipment  covered  by  this  study  employed 
about  26,400 persons  in  1972  (in  'enterprises') with a  corresponding 
turnover of  £245  million.  The  turnover of  companies  included  in  the 
'units of  economic  activity'  analysis was,  however,  about  £293  million 
while  the  1972  Census  of Production  showed  a  gross  output of  £340 million 
with  38,400  employees.  This  is  due  largely  to  the  inclusion  in  the 
Census  of companies with less  than  200  employees,  compared with  the 
criterion for  inclusion  in our  study of a  minimum  of  100  employees. 
/ TABLE  6. 1: 
INDUSTRY  COMPARISON  1972 
This  Study 
'Enterprises' 
'Units of Economic  Activity' 
1972  Census 
Gross  output 
56 
Turnover 
T£ mill) 
245 
293 
340 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study  and  Census  of Production  1972. 
TABLE  6. 2: 
U.K.  PRODUCTION 
1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
(£ mill)  157.6  190.6  207.6  232.1  222.0 
Source:  Annual Abstact of Statistics. 
Employees 
(  f 000) 
26.4 
38.4 
As  Tables  6.3  and  6.4 below  illustrate,  the  product  group  labelled  'other 
earth-moving equipment 
1  (graders,  levellers,  crmvbar  tractors,  dumpers, 
etc.)  is  the  largest  and  most  dynamic  force  in this sector.  It com-
prises more  than  50%  of  the  sector and  has  shown  the  largest  growth  rate 
since  1963. 
TABLE  6.3: 
U.K.  DELIVERIES  BY  PRODUCT  GROUP 
Product  Group 
Digging 
Other  earth-moving 
Concrete mixing  and  placing 
Crushers,  pulverisers,  etc. 
Road  making  and  maintenance 
TOTAL 
Source:  Business Monitor 
1963  1971  Per Cent  Change 
(£ mill) 
35.9  52.1  45.1 
67.5  146.2  116.6 
10.4  12.4  19.2 
8.2  14.7  79.3 
10.9  20.6  89.0 
132.9  246.0  85.1 TABLE  6.!~: 
U.K.  SALES  BY  PRODUCT  GROUP 
Product  Gro_~P.. 
Digging 
Other earth-moving 
Concrete  mixing  and  placing 
Road  making  and  maintenance 
Crushers,  pulverisers,  etc. 
Well-drilling,  etc. 
Other 
TOTAL 
Source:  Business  Monitor. 
57 
72.5  93.7 
155.8  187.6 
16.5  21.[; 
25.3  32 .l+ 
17.9  19.5 
12.2  19.1 
7.8  9.2  ______  ..__ ____  ~--·--·--
308.0  383,3 
(Note  a  reorganisation of official statistics accounts  for  the 
difference  in presentation between  Tables  6.3  and  6.4). 
Nearly  75%  of  total  sales  comes  from  the  manufacture  of  earth-moving 
equipment  (the  first  two  items  in Table  6.4).  About  11%.  comes  from 
integrated differ  tractor combinations,  17%  frortl  sales  of  }}arts  for 
earth-movers,  and  17%  from  salescf tractor  shovels  and  c.:.rm  ...  ~ler  tractors. 
The  manufacture  of construction and  earth-moving  equipment  is  one  of the 
oldest sectors  of  the  mechanical  engineering  industry,  vJith  natural  and 
traditional associations with  the mining  and  engineering  ind~stries. 
The  industry  is  intimately  linked \vith  the  performance  of  the  economy, 
cyclical movements  being amplified  bacb;.;rards  along  the  chain of  supply 
so  that  construction  equipmen~ allowing  for underlying  trends,  is 
subject  to  large  fluctuations  in activity. 
Many  of  the  larger units  of  construction equipment  have  experienced 
relatively infrequent  design  changes,  although  there  has  always  been  a 
trend  to  build  larger and  more  powerful  earth-movers.  Competition  tends 
to  be  greatest  and  size  of enterprise  smaller  among  suppliers of  smaller 
equipment. 
The  construction and  earth-moving  equipment  identified  for  the  purpose 58 
of  this  study covered  23  companies  for  the  'enterprise'  analysis and 
29  companies  for  the  'units of  economic  activity'  analysis.  From 
Table  6.5 it can  be  seen  that  the  Census  of Production  records  170 
enterprises  in  this  sector,  the  great majority  employing  less  than  200 
persons  - in  fact  7!~:%  of enterprises  employ  less  than  100  persons. 
TABLE  6. 5 
INDUSTRY  COrWARISON  EHPLOY1-'ffiNT 
Number  of Enterprises  :  1972 
Size Class  b:t  EmE1o:tment  L.B.S,  Stud~  1972  Census  of Production 
0  - 199  1  149 
200  - 299  3  10 
300 - 399  4  4 
400  - 749  4  10 
750  - 1,499  6  10 
1,500 and  over  5  5 
23  188* 
Sourc:  L.B.S.  Study  and  Census  of Production  1972. 
*  Some  enterprises control  establishments  in more  tha.n  one  size  grouping. 
After allowing  for  this  double  counting  the  number  of companies  is 170. 
The  Census  records  39  enterprises  employing  more  than  200  persons, 
compared  to  the  22  in our  study.  This  is  to  be  expected  due  to  the 
exclusions made  under  our  definition of  'enterprises'  and,  in  smal]Pr 
part,  due  to  common  ownership  of  some  enterprises  recorded  bv  the  Census. 
2.  MAJOR  CHARACTERISTICS 
The  basic  data  on  our  sample  of enterprises,  in contrast to  some  other 
k  h  d  .  d .  (  h  .  A  6  l\( l )  sectors,  rna  es  rat er  epress1ng  rea  1ng  s  own  1n  nnexe  .B)  •  From 
l968  to 1972  turnover  increased  by  34%,  employment  fell  by  6%,  profits 
fell  by  8%,  cash  flm-1  dipped  and  then  reverted  to its 1968  position, 
own  capital  increased  by  20%  and  exports  by  47%. 
First of all this means  ei  fairly stagnant home  market  declining gradually 
from  £119  million  in  1969.  Secondly,  profit margins  have  declined,  the 
(1)  All  ~nnexes are collected  together at  the  end  of  this Chapter. 59 
margin  on  turnover  dropping  from  nearly  11%  to  7~%. 
A detailed analysis  of  the  data  (Anncxe  6.C  reveals  that only  5  out of 
23  enterprises  have  profit margins  over  10%,  and  none  over  20%.  No 
less  than  7  enterprises  export more  than half of their  turnover. 
There  is no  clear correlation betHeen  export performance  and profit 
margins. 
Table  6.6 displays  the  turnover size distribution of enterprises  in our 
study under  both  the  'enterprises•  and  •units  of  economic  activity' 
headings.  The  significant point here  is the relatively large  number  of 
medium  size  companies,  turnover  £5  million to  £10  million,  and  the  lack 
of  complete  dominance  by  the  largest companies. 
TABLE  6. 6: 
INDUSTRY  CO~WARISON TURNOVER  1972 
Number  of  Com:eanies 
Size Class  bx  Turnover  (£ mill)  'EnterErises'  'U.E.A. I 
0  - • 49  0  0 
.5  - .99  1  3 
1.0 - 1.99  3  1 
2.0 - 4.99  5  9 
5.0 - 9.99  7  7 
10.0 - 19.99  5  6 
20.0  and  over  2  3 
23  29 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
Table  6.7  indicates  the  extent  to which  the  largest U.K.  manufacturers 
are  committed  to  overseas markets  - about  54%  of  production is exported. 
Moreover,  in  these  seven  companies  56%  of  sales are  from wholly  owned 
foreign  (i.e,  American)  subsidiaries.  The  export  share of sales is  71%, 
78%  and  42%  for  the  U.S.  subsidiaries,  compared with  55%,  54%  and  18% 
from wholly  mvned  U.K.  subsidiaries. TABLE  6. 7: 
LARGEST  U.K.  }~NUFACTURERS 
• 
Company 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
J.C.  Bamford  Excavators 
General  Motors  (Scotland) 
Aveling Barford 
Clark Equipment* 
Ruston  Bucyrus 
Hy-Mac 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
·k  13  months. 
Ov1nership 
60 
Sales 
61,104 
32,000 
19,882 
19,323 
16,253 
14,470 
10,089 
----
173,121 
1972 
_Exeorts 
43,156 
17,600 
15,500 
10,426 
6,899 
4,986 
1,860 
91.,.' 217 
Ovmersh!.P.. 
Foreign  subsidiary 
U.K.  private 
Foreign  subsidiary 
U.K.  subsidiary 
Foreign  subsidiary 
50%  U. K.  ,  50% 
foreign  subsidiary 
U.K.  subsidiary 
The  ownership  and  size distribution of  firras  in our  'enterprise'  sample 
is  shown  in Table  6.8(l~ OE  fue  23  companies  only  six are  quoted  companies 
in  the U.K.,  and  only  nine  have  an  ownership  untrammelled  by  other 
interests  - that is,  quoted  and  private  companies.  In other words,  14 
companies  are  subsidiaries.  Five  in  the  sample  are  mvned  abroad  and  t·Ho 
more  have  joint U.K.  and  foreign  ownership.  The  foreign  ownership  in 
this  sector is  always  American.  Of  the  seven  largest companies with 
turnover more  than  £10  million,  four are  U.K.  controlled. 
(1)  Annexe  6.A  contains  a  full  listing of  'enterprises'  and  'units of 
economic  activity'  in  this sector,  together with brief notes  on 
parent  companies,  associated subsidiaries,  major  products  and 
merger  and  takeover activity. 61 
TABLE  6.8: 
TUID~OVER DISTRIBUTION  AND  OWNERSHIP 
Size Class  by 
'Enterpri~_~s 
1 
Turnover  Total  ~~~  UKP  UKS  FS  --~.§_/FS  --·-
0  - .49  0 
.5  - .99  1 
1.0 - 1.99  3  2 
2.0- 4.99  5  2 
5.0 - 9.99  7  2 
10.0 - 19.99  5 
20.0  and  over  2 
Legend: 
23  6 
UKQ  = U.K.  quoted  company 
UKP  =  U.K.  private  company 
UKS  =  U.K.  subsidiary 
FS  = foreign  subsidiary 
1 
1 
1 
3 
UKS/FS  = jointly mvned  subsidiary 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
1 
1 
2 
2  1  1 
2  2  1 
1 
7  5  2 
In general  terms,  this is an  industry with  a  stagnant U.K.  market,  poor 
and  declining profitability,  and  dominated  by  the  biggest  firms  but 
nevertheless  subject  to  significant foreign,  multinational  ownership. 
3.  MARKET  STRUCTURE 
Concentration 
The  basic  information  for  our analysis  of concentration is contained  in 
Annexe  6.D,  where  for  each variable  the  various  concentration  indices  are 
tabulated  for  the  period  1968-72.  Some  of  this  is  summarised  in 
Table  6.9  below,  where  the  concentration measures  for  turnover are 
collected  together.  A similar tabulation for  'units of economic 
activity'  is  shown  in  Table  6.10. 62 
TABLE  6. 9: 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  MEASURES  FOR  TURNOVER  OF  'ENTERPRISES' 
4-firm concentration  ratio 
8-firm concentration  ratio 
Coefficient of  variation 
Gini  coefficient 
Herfinde1-Hirschmann 
Entropy 
Linda:  Lni(m 
Ln*  1 
n*  1 
n 
1968  1969 
~;;._:_: __  _ 
49.7  52.2 
72.4  74.9 
1.09  1.19 
. 50  . 53 
95.0  104.9 
-116.9  -114.3 
.212  .234 
16  16 
1.05  1.22 
2  2 
23  23 
1970  1971  ------
55.1  55.1 
76.4  75.8 
1.25  1.28 
. 56  . 55 
111.7  114.5 
-111.9  -112.1 
.204  .259 
14  16 
.96  1.12 
2  2 
23  23 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study  and  E.E.C.  Computer  Programme. 
TABLE  6.10: 
1972 
54.0 
74.2 
1.23 
.54 
108.9 
-113.6 
. 244 
18 
.95 
2 
23 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  MEASURES  FOR  TURNOVER  OF  'UNITS  OF  ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY' 
4-firm concentration ratio 
8-firm concentration ratio 
Coefficient of variation 
Gini coefficient 
Herfinde1-Hirschmann 
Entropy 
Linda:  Ln~'~"m 
n*m 
Ln*  h 
n*  h 
n 
1968 
39.1 
63.0 
.95 
.48 
65.9 
-129.7 
.155 
20 
.842 
2 
29 
1969 
41.7 
65.9 
1.04 
.50 
71.8 
-127.6 
.173 
21 
.975 
2 
29 
1970 
44.5 
68.7 
1.11 
.53 
77.0 
-125.1 
.193 
16 
. 769 
2 
29 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study and  E.E.C.  Computer  Prograunne. 
1971 
44.9 
68.6 
1.11 
.53 
77.0 
-125.5 
.191 
20 
.899 
2 
29 
1972 
43.9 
67.2 
1.08 
.52 
74.4 
-126.2 
.187 
25 
.764 
2 
29 63 
The  overall picture  from  these  statistics is  one  of stability.  Turnover, 
net profits,  and  exports  show  signs  of  increased  concentration;  own 
means  shows  decreasing concentration;  employment  and wages  and  salaries 
show  no  trends;  and  cash  flow  is  a  little ambiguous.  Some  variables 
show  a  tendency  for  concentration  to  rise  in  the first half of  the  sample 
period,  only  to  fall  back  in  the  second half.  None  of  these  trends  are 
particularly strong.  The  concentration of  tutnover  on  a  'units of 
economic  activity'  basis has  a  similar pattern  to  'enterprises'. 
Concentration measures  do  not  reveal movements  of individual  companies 
within a  market  - although  there are  likely  to  be  more  when  using  4-firm 
ratios.  Annexe  6.E  shows  rankin~ of enterprises  by  size of  turnover  and 
profits.  The  stability of concentration measures  is reinforced  by  the 
great stability of  turnover  rankings.  The  rank correlation coefficient 
between  each paircr successive  years  is  .987,  .987,  .982  and  .985.  In 
fact,  the  same  coefficient for  1968  and  1972  is over  .95.  The  only 
remarkable  point is  the  Linda  definitions of  'superpowers':  Caterpillar 
Tractor Co.  (No.  1)  is always  ranked first,  but  the  second  superpower 
is General  Motors  (Scotland)  Ltd.  (No.  2)  for  3  years  and  Ruston  Bucyrus 
Ltd.  (No.  6)  and  J.C.  BamforoExcavators  Ltd.  for  1968  and  1972  respectively. 
The  ranking  by  profits  shows  much  more  variability as  one would  expect. 
The  year  to year  rank correlations are  .56,  .66,  .91,  .81  and  .58  for 
1968  to  1972.  However,  the critical value  for  the  Spearman  Rank 
Correlation Coefficient at a  significance  level  of  .01  is  .497,  so 
there  is still a  statistically significant correlation  from year  to 
year,  albeit a  weakened  one  compared with  turnover.  Much  of this 
weaker correlation is  due  to  the  lapse  of J.C.  Bamford  Excavators  into 
losses  in  1969,  followed  by  a  return  to  large profits in 1970. 
Jther  companies  have  moved  into  losses and  then back  into profits: 
British-Jeffrey Diamond  (No.  22),  Hy-Mac  (No.  7).  Clark Equipment 
(No.  5)  has  dropped  into  the uncomfortable position of  three_  successive 
years with  increasing losses.  J.I.  Case  (No.  17)  and  Thomas  Green 
(No.  21)  show  persistent losses. 64 
The  rankings  by  profit: correlate  significantly \vith  those  by  turnover 
(coefficient is  .58)  - generally  this  is what  one muld expect.  The 
largest enterprises  by  turnover  to  show  losses  are Clark Equipment 
(No.  5)  and  Hy-Hac  (No.  7).  The  five  or  si.x  hig'her  ranked  companies all 
make  profits. 
There  appear  to  be  two  important characteristics  in  the  industry -
economies  of  scale  in production  and  the  value  of a  strong dealer organ-
isation.  These  are most visible  in  the  earth-moving  equipment  sector 
where  large multinational,  usually American,  companies  predominate.  The 
President of Caterpillar  says,  "economies  of  scale are  very  important 
in our  business  and  we  like  to  supply  from  a  single  source wherever 
possible"(!).  Thus,  Caterpillar's entry  into  the hydraulic  excavator 
market  (hitherto a  European preserve)  involves  a  sole manufacturing 
plant at Gosselies  in Belgium for  ilie  light end  of the  range  for distri-
bution  throughout  the world,  and  t\vO  manufacturing points,  Belgium and 
the U.S.A.,  for  the  heavy  part of  the  range.  Similarly,  with its 
Japanese  partner,  Mitsubishi,  Caterpillar \vill  manufacture  in Japan  a 
range  of  srt1all  tracked  and  \vheeled  loaders  for  distribution to  the  \vorld 
market.  Newcastle  is its worldwide  source  for  tractor-dra~;vn  scraper~. 
Clark Equipment,  with its main  plants at Camberley  and  Strasburg,  are 
moving  in  the  same  direction. 
The  industry has  traditionally been  split into  two  parts.  At  the  'small' 
end  it has  always  been  easy  for  entrepreneurs  to  set up  in  business  by 
buying  in  standard  components,  assembling  them,  and  selling the  finished 
product  in  local  markets at a  highly  competitive price.  This has  always 
been  less  feasible '\vith  bigger  items where  component  costs  are  greater 
and  the  technology more  advanced.  However,  there are  signs  that  those 
companies  which  can manufacture  in greater volume,  and  thus  achieve 
economies  of  scale  in  production  and  purchasing,  and  offer a  wide  range 
of products  through  a  strong dealer  netwcr k  are  attracting more  and  more 
( 1)  Finane ial Times,  30th NoverrJ)er,  1972. 65 
business.  Some  commentators  observe  that  the  right strategy in  the 
earth-moving equipment  market  is  to  compete  over  a  sufficiently broad 
front  to  provide  dealers with a  viable  business.  Examples  of  such 
companies  are Poclain  (France)  the  European  leader  in hydrauli_c 
excavators  - and  Orenstein & Keppel  (Germany)  who  have  an  even  broader 
line.  J.C.  Bamford  have  followed  this  strategy in the  U.K.  by  extending 
from  simple  digger-loaders  based  on  tractors to hydraulic  excavators, 
wheeled  tractors  and  crawler  tractors.  Their  turnover  increased  by 
130%  in four  years,  1968-72. 
Another  important potential  force  in  the  market  is  the makers  of  farm 
tractors who,  faced with little grmvth  in their  traditional business, 
are pushing  into· construcLion machinery.  (Caterpillar,  many  years  ago, 
exitted  from  the  farm machinery business).  Massey  Ferguson  have  a  new 
construction equipment  factory  in Italy.  Ford  have  acquired  Richier, 
one  of  the  larger  and  more  diversified French construction machinery 
manufacturers.  British Leyland  own  Aveling Barford  in  the  U.K.  and 
General  Motors  have  a  subsidiary in Scotland. 
Overseas  Markets 
In 1972,  the world  construction equipment  market was  oelieved  to  be 
worth  over  £2,500 million a  year(l)  and  growing healthily.  The  u.s.A. 
has  always  been  by  far  the largest exporter,  followed  by  the U.K., 
Germany  and  France.  In  1971,  of the  £244 million deliveries  by  the  U.K., 
£136  million was  exported.  The  leading American  companies  have  organised 
their European  production facilities  to  take full  advantage  of  economies 
of scale.  The  Japanese  industry  shows  signs  of  becoming more  active, 
partly because  of  a  strong home  market  (a similar situa,tion has  enabled 
the German  industry  to  organise  to achieve  economies  of  scale).  Present 
indications are  that on  a  European  scale  the  industry  i~ rather  frag-
mented  both in manufacturing and  distribution.  The  traditional 
concentration of producers  on  limited product  ranges  may  well  be  ending, 
together with  the  traditional  links between manufacturer  and  purchaser. 
(1)  Financial Times,  30th November,  1972. 66 
Diversification 
Fourteen of  the  enterprises  in this  sector are  subsidiaries of other 
companies  which  usually have  a  broadly diversified  engineering  base. 
The  U.K.  quoted  and  private  companies  tend  to  be  highly  specialised and 
non-diversified.  The  merger activity  (as  noted  in Annexe  6.A)  has 
generally  been  across  industry  boundaries. 
4.  CONCLUS10NS 
(1)  The  sector has  been  in a  state of  stagnation relieved  only by  the 
strength of  export markets. 
(2)  The  industry  shmvs  structural stability without  unduly  high  levels 
of concentration of  turnover or  employment. 
(3)  On  a  world  scale  the  nature  of competition  seems  to  favour  larger, 
multinational  companies  able  to  win  economies  of  scale  in produc-
tion  and  marketing.  Concentration  in profits is quite  significantly 
higher  than  in turnover. 
(4)  It will probably  require  a  major  expansion  in  both  the  European 
and U.K.  market  to  trigger off increases  in  size  of  enterprise 
through  internal  expansion  probably,  together with vertical 
integration forward  into dealer  and  wholesale  networks). ANNEXE  6~A:  CONSTRUCTION  & EARTH-MOVING  EQUTP_ME_N_T....;.....;-...;..;E_N_TE_RP;.;;;;...R_I...;;.S....;.E_&.;__;U;...;.-.:.E...;.._A.._. _L_I_S_T_IN_G 
Identi-
fication 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Name  of Company 
Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. 
Type  of 
Company 
Foreign 
subsid. 
General  Motors  Foreign 
(Scotland)  Ltd.  subsid. 
Ave ling Barford 
Ltd. 
J.C.  Bamford 
Clark Equipment 
Ltd. 
Ruston-Bucyrus 
Hy-Mac  Ltd. 
Priestman Bros. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
private 
company 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Assoc. 
company 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Parent Company 
Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 
u.s.A. 
General Motors 
Corp.,  U.S.A. 
British Leyland 
Clark Equip-
ment  Co.,  U.S.A. 
G. E. C.  Ltd.  & 
Bucyrus Erie 
co., u.s.A. 
Powell-Duffryn 
Ltd. 
Acrow  (Engin-
eers) Ltd. 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
Subsidiaries 
Barfords of Belton 
John Cocksworth 
Invicta Bridge  & 
Engineering 
A.  Bowns 
(+  7  more) 
J.C.B.  Research 
J.C.B.  Earth-
movers 
J.C.B.  Sales 
J.C.B.  Service 
Coles  Cranes  Ltd. 
Subs  ... _  .... aries 
in other 
Countries 
Australia 
Canada 
Canada 
France 
u.s.A. 
Major Products 
Track-type  tractors,  bull-
dozers,  traxcavators, 
(also forklift trucks) 
Highway  earth-moving 
equipment,  rear  dumps, 
crawler tractors,  front  end 
loaders 
Road  rollers,  dumpers,  motor 
graders & shovels,  contrac-
tors'  plant,  small  dumpers, 
agricultural drainage 
implements 
Earthmovers,  excavators 
Earthmoving  equipment, 
cargo van  bodies, 
refrigeration units, 
(also  forklift  trucks) 
Excavators,  mobile  cranes 
Hydraulic  excavators, 
earth-moving  equipment 
Mergers/ 
Takeovers 
Subsidia~y 
of British 
Leyland 
since  1967 
Acquired 
Chaeside  in 
1968 
In  1967/8 
acquired 
Stracatruc 
Ltd.  for 
£2  million 
In 1968/69 
acquired 
Peter Haulto 
Equipmert Ltd 
& Hydraulic 
Nachinery  Co 
£650  thou. Identi-
fication 
Nu:-r.ber 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Name  of Company 
Type  of 
Company 
Frederick Parker  U.K. 
Ltd.  private 
Brehan 1-1uller 
Group  Ltd. 
Benford  Concrete 
Machinery Ltd. 
Barber  Greene 
England  Ltd. 
Liner Concrete 
Machinery 
Marshall-Fowler 
Ltd, 
Allis-Chalmer 
(G.B.)  Ltd. 
(Fiat-Allis 
(U.K.)  Ltd.  on 
4.1.74 when 
acquired  by  Fiat 
SpA  of Italy) 
company 
U.K. 
quoted 
U.K. 
quoted 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Thwaites  Engin- U.K. 
eering Co.  Ltd.  private 
.I.I.  Case  & Co. 
Ltd. 
B.S.P.  Inter-
national 
Foundations 
Ltd. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Parent Company 
Barber Greene, 
u.s.A. 
Thos.  W.  Ward 
Allis-Chalmers 
Corp • ,  U • S  . A. 
Tenneco Inc., 
-u.s.A. 
Edward  Le  Bas 
Ltd. 
(controlled by 
Le  Bas  Invest-
ment  Trust) 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
Subsidiaries 
Titan Vacuum 
Engineering 
Bristowes Machinery 
Co. 
Three  gravel 
companies 
David  Brown 
Tractors 
Subsj · · 'lries 
in  ...  _ner 
Countries 
India 
Parkistan 
Major  Products 
Builders & contractors plant, 
road making plant. 
Mechanised  handling plant 
for quarries,  asphalt 
machinery,  macadam  plant, 
contractors plant,  concrete 
mixers 
Concrete machinery & 
galvanizers 
Concrete  block & mixing 
machinery 
Industrial & agricultural 
crawler  tractors,  road 
rollers,  boilers 
Earth-moving equipment 
(1971  - manufacture  of 
agricultural  equipment 
discontinued) 
Excavator  equipment 
Crawler & wheeled  tractors 
Pile driving & extracting 
plant  equipment,  public 
works  contractors 
Mergers/ 
Takeovers 
Was  known  as 
Brehan p, .:-
terson & 
Benham  m.~il 
acquired 
Hiller's 
Hachinery in 
1971 
Vickers  own 
49%  of cap'l 
t·!as  kno•-m  as 
!3ritish Pile 
Steclin:~ Co. 
t.:nri.l  hecn:nc 
i'"'-~  of  Le 
B3.s  l9GY/70 Identi-
fication 
Number 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Name  of Co!!!J2an::z: 
Johnson Construe-
tion Equipment 
Group 
A.C.E.  Machinery 
(Holdings)  Ltd. 
Thomas  Green  & 
Sons  Ltd. 
British Jeffrey 
Diamond  Ltd. 
Bray Construe-
tion Equipment 
Ltd. 
Ransomes-Rapier 
International 
Harvester 
Massey  Ferguson 
Type  of 
Com:2an::z: 
U.K. 
quoted 
U.K. 
quoted 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Parent Co!!!Ean::z: 
Hawker-Siddeley 
Group  &  then 
I.C.F.C. 
Sheep  bridge 
Engineering 
Ltd. 
Central & 
Sherwood  Trust 
(immediate 
parent  is 
Newton  Chambers 
&  Co.  Ltd.) 
International 
Harvester, 
u.s.A. 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
Subsidiaries 
Plant hire com-
panies  in group 
N.C.K.  Rapier 
N.C.K.  Excavators 
Subsj ··aries 
in  _her 
Countries 
South Africa 
Major Products 
Construction equipment, 
dumpers,  pumps,  rammers 
(also mechanical 
systems) 
Contractors'  plant special-
ists, building & construc-
tion equipment,  mechanical 
handling equipment,  plant 
for  disposal  of  sludge & 
slurry 
Deadweight,  rubber tyred & 
vibratory rollers & other 
road  construction equipment 
Road  rollers 
(also mining machinery & 
conveyors,  crane  dis-
tributor,  refuse pulver-
ising plant) 
Earth-moving  equipment, 
agricultural & 'off the 
road'  heavy  duty  tractors 
50%  Excavators 
(also  50%  mobile  cranes) 
Industrial & earth-moving 
tractors- whee led/  crawler, 
other agricultural & con-
struction equipment 
Tractors 
Mergers/ 
Takeovers 
Changed  from 
Hawker 
Siddeley  to 
I.  C. F. C.  in 
1972/73 Identi-
fication 
Number  Name  of Co!!!Eanx: 
27  Ford  Motor  Co. 
(Blaw  Knox  Ltd. 
28;'('  -(Muir Hill Ltd. 
(Winget  Ltd. 
29  Eaton Yale 
30  Stothert & 
Pitt Ltd. 
Type  of 
co~anx 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
Parent Company  Subsidiaries 
Ford,  U.S.A. 
Babcock & 
Wilcox 
Eaton Corp., 
u.s.A. 
Plant hire com-
panies  associated 
Eaton Ltd. 
Subsidiaries 
ir.  :.her 
Countries  Major  Prod.tcts 
Tractors 
Construction machinery 
(also forklift  trucks) 
Concrete  mixers,  road 
rollers 
Mergers/ 
Takeovers 
*  These  subsidiaries of Babcock & Wilcox are  treated collectively in the  data,  except as  regards Major  Products which  applies 
solely to Blaw  Knox  Ltd. ANNEXE  6.B:  CONSTRUCTION  AND  EARTII-MOVING  EQUIPMENT  SUMMARY  STATISTICS 
Wages  & 
Wages  &  Net  Cash  Own  Exports/  Prof its/  Profits/  Salaries/ 
Year  Turnover  E!!!Eloyees  Salaries  Profits*  Flow'"  Means*  ExEorts  Turnover  Turnover  Own  Means  E~loyees 
(£ mill)  ( '000)  (£ mill)  (£  mill)  (£ mill)  ( £  mill)  (£mill)  (%)  (%)  (%)  ( £/  pe.r son) 
1968  182.6  28.2  32.7  19.8  29.4  83.8  88.3  4S.4  10.8  23.6  1,160 
1969  208.4  29.5  38.3  16.6  21.2  89.7  89.3  42.9  8.0  18.5  1,298 
1970  231.1  29.5  40.1  19.1  23.5  91.1  125.6  54.3  8.3  21.0  1,359 
1971  232.6  28.1  43.0  19.6  24.0  95.8  122.0  52.5  8.4  20.4  1,530 
1972  244.9  26.4  46.7  18.2  30.9  100.4  129.7  53.0  7.4  18.1  1,769 
..  k  Including  losses  and  other negative  flows . 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 72 
ANNEXE  6.C:  CONSTRUCTION  ~-f.ARTH-HOVING EQUIPMEN'f_;_ 
PROFITABILITY  BY  ENTERPRISE  1968-72 
Enterprise 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Turnover 
-(%)-
16.3 
11.1 
4.8 
8.3 
-5.3 
17.5 
-7 .o 
8.3 
5.4 
8.7 
14.3 
6.2 
5.4 
0.6 
5.2 
13.6 
-7.8 
4.3 
6.3 
7.8 
-4.8 
2.9 
4.2 
Exports/ 
Turnover 
-(%_)_ 
59.4 
68.2 
59.2 
42.0 
53.8 
39.7 
26.3 
35.7 
52.0 
17.6 
33.7 
90.1 
19.4 
20.6 
71.7 
25.4 
32.1 
36.5 
18.9 
32.8 
32.8 
22.5 
42.2 
NOTE:  Ratios  are  unweighted  averages  of five years,  1968-72. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 73 
ANNEXE  6.D:  CONSTRUCTION  &  EARTH-HOVING  E_QUIPMENT  :  CONCENTRATION  HEASURE~·;  1 9  68-· 7  ~  - .......... -.- ..... ·----
VARIABLE  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm Concentration  Ratio 
Turnover  49.7  52.2  55.1  55.1  54.0 
Employment  51.3  49.9  50.0  49.8  50.3 
Wages  and  Salaries  51.8  54.4  57.8  53.8  51.6 
Net Profits  77.0  82.2  81.0  74.9  80.  !+ 
Cash  Flow  72.5  79.1  78.8  73.3  80.3 
Own  Means  64.0  63.4  64.8  61.5  61.8 
Exports  59.0  53.3  64.8  65.1  66.8 
8-firm Concentration  Ratio 
Turnover  72.4  7l~. 9  76.4  75.8  74.2 
Employment  71.8  71.6  72.1  71.5  71.2 
Wages  and  Salaries  72.7  74.7  74.8  73.5  73.7 
Net Profits  87.6  92.6  94.9  92.2  91.lt-
Cash  Flow  87.6  90.1  93.2  89.3  92.2 
Own  Means  81.4  81.8  84.6  80.2  80.2 
Exports  80.0  79.9  86.3  83.7  84.9 
Linda  Index  Core  Ln-l:m  I  n~:m 
Turnover  .212116  .234116  .264114  .259116  .2<+4118 
Employment  .226120  .212114  .217115  .212116  .219115 
Wages  and  Salaries  .230112  .252113  .262116  .239115  •  24411L~ 
Net Profits  .540117  .848116  .64715  .53115  .701116 
Cash  Flow  .45415  .660117  .486/5  .53615  .51613 
Own  Means  .381119  .379110  .40319  .326115  .327/14 
Exports  .301113  .263110  .37518  .385115  .420/16 
Linda  Index  SuEerEowers  Ln-1:  h  I  n* 
Turnover  1.0512  1.2212  .9612  1.12/2  .9512 
Employment  .5912  .6112  • 6112  .5512  .5212 
Wages  and  Salaries  .6912  .5613  .5313  .5513  .60/2 
Net Profits  .9412  1.4112  1.0212  1.4512  1.0014 
Cash  Flow  • 6512  1.3612  1. 0612  1.4512  .8112 
Own  Means  .8212  .79/2  .76/2  .7512  .7212 
Exports  1.3412  .6412  .90/2  1.0312  1.2312 
Coefficient of Variation 
Turnover  1.09  1.19  1.25  1.28  1.23 
Employment  1.01  .99  1.02  1.03  1.02 
Wages  and  Salaries  1.05  1.14  1.19  1.14  1.09 
Net Profits  1.76  2.07  1. 74.  1.81  1.77 
Cash  Flow  1.65  2.05  1.72  1.73  1.58 
Own  Means  1.55  1.47  l.l.l  1. 3!+  1.33 
Exports  1.47  1.14.  1.50  1.63  1.  61+ 
Gini Coefficient 
Turnover  .50  .53  .56  .55  .54 
Employment  .50  .49  .50  .50  •  L~9 
Wages  and  Salaries  .51  .53  .54  .53  .52 
Net Profits  • 69  .74  .72  .72  • 69 
Cash  Flow  .70  .73  .71  .68  • 68 
Own  Means  • 63  • 62  .62  .59  • 60 
Exports  .61  .58  .66  • 65  .66 
.........  lcon.t:. 74 
ANNEXE  6  ._~  __ :_G_Q~STRY_9'l'I9_~-~  EAR~l-1'!9Vl~G  _!QUIP1:1EN~ 
CONCENTRATION  NEASURES  1968-72  (cont.) 
VARIABLE  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  ----
Herfinde1-Hirschmann  Index  .  --
Turnover  95.0  104.9  111.7  114.5  108.9 
Employment  87.9  86.1  88.4  89.7  88.7 
Wages  and  Salaries  91.2  100.0  105.4  100.3  95.1 
Net  Profits  194.3  279.1  223.0  214.0  243.8 
Cash  Flow  162.5  247.8  208.3  199.8  193.8 
Own  Means  147.9  137.4  ll/1.7  127.4  125.9 
Exports  136.8  100.1  141.9  159.0  160.7 
Entrop_z 
Turnover  -116.9  -114.3  -111.9  -112.1  -11.3.6 
Employment  -118.0  -118.6  -117.8  -117.9  -118.1 
Wages  and  Salaries  -116.9  -114.6  -113.2  -114.9  -116.2 
~et Profits  -91.3  -77.9  -81.8  -86.3  -81.6 
Cash  Flow  -95.6  -83.6  -85.6  -90.8  -86.9 
Own  Means  -103.5  -105.0  -101.9  -106.5  -106.6 
Exports  -105.6  -111.5  -101-5  -100.9  -99.9 
Source:  L. B.S.  Study and  E.E.C.  Computer  Programne. 75 
_Al'!_~~~_J~,  __  ?_~~_:. _  _sO!'i§TJ~UCTION &  EARTH-HOVING  ~QU  IPMENT 
ENTEJa'RlSE  RANI~INGS 
w  -·-~--
~!__:_~?_nk  i~g by  Tu~nover~'( 
1968 
Superpm-.1ers:  1 
6 
Core:  2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
14 
18 
9 
8 
11 
15 
12 
22 
17 
16 
23 
13 
10 
19 
20 
?1 
Superpower entries: 
"  exits: 
Core  entries: 
"  exits: 
1969 
1 
2 
6 
4 
3 
5 
7 
14 
15 
18 
9 
8 
11 
12 
17 
22 
16 
23 
13 
10 
19 
20 
21 
1 
1 
1970 
1 
2 
3 
6 
4 
5 
15 
14 
7 
9 
18 
12 
11 
8 
17 
22 
16 
13 
23 
10 
19 
20 
21 
2 
1971 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
14 
7 
18 
15 
9 
11 
8 
12 
22 
17 
16 
10 
13 
23 
19 
20 
21 
2 
1972 
1 
4 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
15 
18 
14 
9 
11 
12 
8 
22 
17 
13 
16 
10 
23 
20 
19 
21 
1 
1 
2 76 
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ENTERPlD SE  RAN KINGS  (cont.)  ------· 
E2  :  Ra~1king.J?_y  P'£..<?.fits 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Superpo-v1ers:  1  1  1  1  1 
6  6  2  2  4 
Core:  2  2  6  6  6 
4  11  ,._  4  11 
11  3  3  3  15  ----· 
12  16  11  11  9 
22  12  15  9  2 
7  18  12  15  16 
9  8  18  16  3 
16  14  16  18  18 
18  9  9  12  13 
5  5  14  8  7 
14  10  10  10  10 
13  15  23  22  23 
3  13  20  20  22 
8  19  13  14  20 
10  22  19  13  19 
19  20  21  19  -21 
23  23  -8  23  -12 
20  -21  -22  7  -17 
15  -17  -17  -21  -8 
-17  -7  -5  -17  -14 
-21  -4  -7  -5  -5 
Superpower entries:  1  3 
"  exits:  1  1 
Core  entries:  2  1  11 
"  exits:  3  12 77 
CHAPTER  7  'MECHANICAL  HANDLING 
1.  DEFINITION  -~ND  _Qf:_SCR_l.~)TION  OF  THE  SECTOR 
The  Mechanical Handling  sector of engineering covers  companies  producing 
a  wide  range  of  products,  which  fall naturally  into  four major  sub-sec~or: 
A,  Conveyors  and  aerial  ropeways;  elevators  (excluding underground 
conveyors);  pneumatic  and  hydraulic handling plants. 
B.  (a)  Cranes  and  transporters;  includes mobile  cranes,  electric 
overhead  travelling cranes,  dockside  cranes  and  tower  cranes. 
(b)  Hoists;  lifting and  winding devices. 
C.  Lifts and  escalators;  including equipment  for  both  passengers 
and  goods. 
D.  Powered  industrial  trucks. 
Total  employment  of  the  'enterprise'  companies  covered  by  this study was 
of  the  order of  35,000  in  1971,  with a  turnover  of  £207  million.  Turn-
over  in  the  industry  in  'UEA'  companies was  estimated at  £260  million. 
These  compared with a  Census  of Production figure  of  £367  million gross 
output  (which  included  an  undisclosed  amount  of  double  coonting where 
the  output of  one  firm was  the  input of another  firm in  the  industry). 
The  figures  are  given  in Table  7.1  below: 
TABLE  7.1: 
MECHANICAL  HANDLING  ;  INDUSTRY  COHPARISON  (1971  Data) 
This  Study 
'Enterprises' 
'UEA' 
1971  Census  -----
Turnover  Employees 
(£mill)  ('000) 
207 
260 
(Gross  Output) 
367 
35 
6~-
Sources:  L.B.S.  Study,  and  1971  Census  of  Prod~ tion. 78 
Production  in  the  industry  sector as  a  whole  has  increased  by  about  23% 
in volume  terms  over  the  period  1968-72,  as  Ehown  in Table  7.2. 
TABLE  7. 2: 
MECHANICAL  HANDLING  :  U.K.  PRODUCTION  ------------------------- £ million  -------- Volu111e 
Index  Current Year 
..(!_1_9_§JU  .D-_?68=100)  Values  -------
1968  169  100  169 
1969  185  109  193 
1970  196  116  230 
1971  184  109  251 
1972  202  120  311 
1973  208  123  373 
(Note:  figures  pre- and  post-1971  are  not  exactly comparable) 
Source:  Business Monitor  and Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
Major  Product  Groups 
Production  in  the  five  major  sectors of  the  industry are  show  in 
Table  7.3.  Industrial  trucks  occupy  almost  one  third of  the  whole  industry. 
TABLE  7.3: 
MECHANICAL  HANDLING  U.K.  PRODUCTION  BY  SUB-SECTOR 
£ million 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Conveyors & aerial  ropeways  42  44  51  59  72  84 
Lifting & winding  devices  10  11  12  13  34  38 
Lifts & escalators  31  34  36  40  38  41 
Cranes  47  55  68  77  79  86 
Industrial  trucks  39  49  63  62  8l~  113 
TOTAL  169  193  230  251  311  373 
(Note:  Figures  for  1971  and  1972  do  not  add  to  the  total because  the 
total  figure  is adjusted  upwards  for  sales of  these  goods  made  by  firms 
outside  the  sector). 
Source:  Business Monitor. 79 
Because  of  the  low  cross elasticity of  demand  between  these  sub-sectors, 
companies  identified as  producers  of mechanical  handling  goods  could  be 
classified meaningfully  to  one  of  the  sub-sectors.  This  was  strai~lt­
fonvard  because  there \Jas  very  little overlap  of  products:  nearly all 
the  major  companies  produce  exclusively  for  one  of  the  sub-sectors. 
One  notable  exception are  the  overhead  crane manufacturers,  \vho  are 
also major  manufacturers  of hoists and  hoist blocks  (they are  included 
in  the  crane  sector) . 
Comparison \vith  the  Census  of Production  Data 
The  Census  of Production  (1971)  identifies  548  enterprises  in  the  sector. 
Of  this total  479  employed  less  than  100  persons  (and  over  60%  of  these 
Census  enterprises  employed  less  than  25  persons). 
TABLE  7.4: 
MECHANICAL  HANDLING  INDUSTRY  COMPARISON  :  SIZE  DISTRIBUTION  BY  E}~LOYlffiNT 
Number  of Companies.  1971 
This  Study:  Number  1971  Census 
Size Class  by  Employment  of  'Enterprises'  of Production 
0  99  1  479 
100  399  13  89 
400  499  1  6 
500  749  6  16 
750  1,499  9  6 
1,500  1,999  3 
2,000  &  over  3  4 
36  600'1'( 
*  Some  'Census Enterprises'  were  companies  in more  than  one  size  group. 
Net  of duplication the  number  of Census  companies  was  548. 
Sources:  L.B.S.  Study,  and  1971  Census  of Production. 
As  in  several  other sectors,  the  large  number  of  firms  employing  less 
than  100 persons partly explains  the  difference  in  employment  (noted  in 
Table  7.1)  between  the  L.B.S.  figures  and  those  in  the  Census.  And  the 
usual  statistical difficulties with  the Census  of Production are  present 
that  m-:1ke  the  strict interpretation of Table  7.4 difficult. 80 
The  industry as  a  whole  exports about  one  third of its output  - a  share 
that has  been  varying considerably  over  time.  Imports  account  for  about 
one  fifth of  domestic  consumption;  and  the  sector has  a  balance of  trade 
surplus.  But  this  trade  surplus has  been  declining  since  the  peak year 
1971,  as  shown  below  in Table  7.5. 
TABLE  7. 5: 
MECHANICAL  HANDLING  TRADE  AND  CONSUMPTION 
(£ million  :  Current  Va~ues) 
Total Exports 
Total Imports 
Trade  Balance 
U.K.  Domestic 
Consumption 
t  of Production 
Exported 
Imports  as  % of 
Consumption 
U.K.  Consumption 
at constant 
prices 
(1968=100) 
1968 
47 
24 
+23 
146 
28% 
16% 
100 
1969 
70 
23 
+47 
146 
36% 
16% 
96 
1970  1971  1972 
84  108  92 
30  36  47 
+54  +72  +45 
176  179  266 
37%  43%  30CZ. 
17%  20%  18% 
103  97  118 
Sources:  Overseas  Trade  Statistics,  and  Business Monitor. 
1973 -
108 
66 
+42 
331 
29'Z. 
20% 
126 
The  share  of  output  that is exported varies considerably also  benveen 
sub-sectors,  from  5%  of lifts and  escalators  to  41%  of forklift  trucks. 
The  former  sub-sector  is  dominated  by  one  manufacturer,  a  single multi-
national;  the  latter is a  more  oligopolistic sector with several  large 
manufacturers.  Since  the  degree  of  engineering expertise  in  the  industry 
is generally  low,  competition  tends  to  be  very  intense.  In  some  sub-sectors 
transport costs  have  become  a  significant  percentage of final  selling 
price and  have  made  exported  goods  of this  type  less  competitive 
abroad.  Manufacturing  by  license is therefore  quite usual.  But with 
some  of  the  larger machines,  such  as  the  heavy cranes,  only  the  moving 81 
parts are exported,  the  construction steel work  being  done  in  the 
importing country.  Firms also export their engineering expertise,  for 
example  by  sending out engineers  to  supervise  the building of  structures 
on  site. 
In recent years  a  world-wide market  for  handling equipment has  come  from 
containerisation:  sales  in Tahvan,  Singapore  and Australia have  follmv-ed 
the  development of container facilities.  Containerisation has  also 
led  to  revolutionary  changes  in handling methods with  gantry crane  side 
loaders  and  modified  forklift trucks.  And  of course  a  good  market  has 
developed  in the Middle  East,  for  obvious  reasons. 
2.  CONCENTRATION 
The  principal  information  for  our analysis  of  concentration is contained 
in Table  7.6 below.  It shows  that while  the  turnover  of  'enterprises' 
included  in our  study  increased  by  47%  in  1968-72,  net profits increased 
by  only  20%.  Wages  and  salaries  increased by  56%. 
TABLE  7. 6: 
SUMMARY  OF  PRIMARY  SOURCES  DATA  1968-72 
Indices 
1972 
Unit  Variable  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  (1968=100) 
'Enterprises':  Turnover  (£  m)  135  156  190  207  198  147 
Employment  ('000)  32  33  35  35  34  106 
Wages  & Salaries  (£  m)  36  41  50  55  56  156 
Net profit 
11  10  11  10  13  12  120 
Gross  cash  flow  "  13  13  13  16  16  123 
Own  capital  "  52  52  53  54  57  110 
Exports  n  26  35  52  65  51  196 
U.K.  market  "  110  121  132  142  147  13.7 
'UEA':  Turnover  II  209  243  260  255  (122)* 
*  1969=100 
Source:  Company  Accounts  (L.B.S.  Study). 82 
The  principal concentration ratios  for  the  'enterprises'  included  in 
this  study are  given  in Tables  7.7a  and  7.7b.  They  show  that  turno~ 
concentration has  been  very static over  the  years  1968-72,  while 
employment  concentration has  been  rising. 
TABLE  7. 7a: 
SU}ffiARY  OF  CONCENTPATION  INDICES  'ENTERPRISES'  :  TURN" OVER 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm concentration ratio  37  42  38  40  37 
8-firm concentration ratio  56  60  56  57  55 
Coefficient of variation  .99  1.10  1.03  1.07  1.03 
Gini Coefficient  .478  .500  .485  .492  . 4-80 
Herfindel  index  65.7  65.3  57.3  59.7  57.5 
Entropy  -137.6  -134.1  -138.1  -137.2  -138.2 
(Ln*m  L  .134  .149  .135  .136  .133 
Linda 
(  n*m  32  31  35  34  32 
Indices 
-( 
(Ln  h  L  .66  .76  .64  .58  .66 
(  n  h  2  2  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
TABLE  7. 7b: 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  INDICES 
1 ENTERPRISES'  :  ENPLOYMENT 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm concentration ratio  34  37  38  39  39 
8-firm concentration ratio  54  50  57  57  57 
Coefficient of variation  .90  .96  1.02  1.03  1.02 
Gini coefficient  • 45  .46  .49  .49  .49 
Herfindel  index  51.6  56.7  56.8  57.2  56.8 
Entropy  -139.9  137.4  -13  7. 9  -137.9  -138.1 
(Ln"~~m  L  .120  .130  .136  .138  .137 
(  n·km  29  28  28  23  33 
( 
(Ln  h  L  . 672  .678  • 648  .586  .528 
(  n  h  2  2  2  2  2 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 83 
Likewise  Table  7.8  shows  the  only  concentration  data  available  on  the 
basis of  'units of  economic  activity'  companies.  Concentration ratios 
have  varied  over  the  period,  but  about  a  broadly horizontal  trend  (as 
did  the  ratios  for  turnover  concentration  in  'enterprises'). 
TABLE  7. 8: 
SUMMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  INDICES  :  'UEA'  =  TURNOVER  -----·-
1968"':  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm concentration ratio  32  30  32  30 
8-firm concentration ratio  47  46  47  4lt-
Coefficient of variation  1.20  1.02  1.07  1.02 
Gini coefficient  0.52  0.47  0.48  0.47 
Herfindel  index  42.2  40.1  42.2  39.8 
Entropy  -155.0  -153.9  -153.0  -154.4 
(I.n·km  L  .000  .099  .091  .092  .089 
Linda 
(  n*m  47  48  48  47  44 
Indices 
-( 
(Ln  h  L  .66  .76  • 64  .58  • 66 
(  n  h  2  2  2  2  2 
~  'UEA'  figures  for  1968  not available. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study 
It is,  however,  difficult to  conclude  anything meaningful  about  industry 
concentration at the  sector level.  There  is surprisingly little overlap 
between  sub-sectors  in  that nearly all  the  major  companies  produce 
exclusively in  only  one  of  them.  A  notable  exception is Acrow,  a  diver-
sified engineering  company  which manufactures  handling  systems  and  overhe&d 
travelling cranes,  and  has  moved  into  the mobile  cranes  sector with its 
takeover  of  the Steel Group  in June  1972  (in 1973  the  company  had  30% 
of its turnover  from mechanical  handling  sales  compared with  19%  in 1969). 
It is noticeable  that  amongst  a  large  number  of companies  operating  in 
this  sector  there are relatively  few  foreign  subsidiaries,  and  no  major 
multinationals.  Eaton Ltd.,  Hyster  and  Clarke  Equipment,  the  three 
American  truck manufacturers,  all manufacture  forklift  trucks  in  the U.K.; 
but  they have  nothing like the  same  dominance  in this market  than  in  the 
United  States. 84 
The  only  other notable foreign  subsidiary  is  the  Otis Elevator Company, 
which  has  a  large  share  of  the lift market.  But  a  large  number  of  the 
major  U.K.  engineering  companies have  subsidiaries manufacturing  in 
this  sector;  for  example,  Tube  Investments,  George  Cohen  600  Group, 
Thomas  Ward  & Son  and  G.E.C. 
The  three  largest companies  in order of  1973/74  turnover are Coles 
Cranes  Ltd.  (part of  the Acrow  Group),  Lansing Bagnall  (now  The  Kaye 
Organisation Ltd.),  and  the Otis Elevator Company.  All  three operate 
in  separate sectors:  cranes,  industrial  trucks,  and  lifts and  escalators 
respectively.  There  is virtually no  cross elasticity of  demand  between, 
for  example,  conveyors  and  cranes.  Also,  companies  do  not necessarily 
provide a  threat of potential competition;  the  technology  needed  to 
manufacture,  for  example,  a  crane or forklift  truck  is more  akin  to  the 
technology  in manufacturing  of construction and  earth-moving  equipment 
rather  than  the  other  sectors of mechanical  handling.  It is almost 
meaningless,  therefore,  to  discuss  the  concentration of  the mechanical 
handling  industry as  a  whole,  but  some  remarks  may  be  appropriate  con-
cerning concentration at the  sub-sector  level.  Each  of  the  four  principal 
product  groups  is discussed  separately. 
Sub-Sector Concentration 
(a)  Conveyors  and Aeria  1  Rope,vays 
Most  of  the  major  producers  in this sector are  subsidiaries of 
large engineering groups.  Doughty  Meco  (part of  the  Doughty  Group), 
with  a  turnover of  £7.2 million in 1973/74,  and  G.E.C.  - Elliott 
Mechanical  Handling,  with a  turnover of  £8.1 million in  that year, 
are  the  two  major  companies.  Lamson  Industries,  Powell-Duffryn, 
Tube  Investments,  Babcock & Wilcox  and Acrow  all have  subsidiaries 
manufacturing  these  products.  In  the  1950s  many  companies  entered 
the  sector as  a  ready  means  of  diversification. 
The  Tube  Investments  subsidiary,  George  W.  King Ltd.,  ceased 
production  in November  1973.  At  the  time it was  the  largest company 
of its kind,  producing  a  complete unit handling  system for  the  motor 
industry,  supplying heavy  conveyor  systems.  Its closure  came  as  a 
result of both  internal management  problems  and  a  new  approach  to 85 
ordering  equipment  by  the  motor manufacturers,  which  subjected 
King  Ltd.  to  direct and  intense  competition  from American  com-
panies. 
Except  for  the  closure  of George  W.  King,  there has  been  littre 
structural  change  in  the  industry  since  1968.  The  manufacture  of 
conveyors  is  an  easy  process  so  there  are  many  small manufacturers 
producing  conveyors  of  specific  specialist types,  many  being 
members  of  large groups.  Entry  and  exit at  the  tail  end  of  the 
market  is fairly  frequent.  Hmvever,  the  two  major  companies 
account  for  just under  20%  of  total sales  in  the  industry,  and 
the  four-firm concentration is approximately  30%. 
There  exists  a  threat of potential competition  in  the  sector because 
of  the  ease  of entry.  Almost  any  engineering  company  can produce 
its own  conveyor.  Therefore  a  conveyor manufacturer will have  to 
keep  price  (and profit)  levels  fairly  low,  otherwise  some  of their 
customers will produce  their  own  conveyors.  But  the  introduction 
of  fully  au·tomated  handling  systems  require  a  degree  of  technical 
expertise,  and  manufacturers  can  hope  for better returns  in  the 
future,  if they  follow  the  trend  tow·ards  automated  systems. 
(b)  Cranes  and Hoists 
Concentration and  competition  in this  sector is discussed  in much 
greater detail  in Chapters  16-18.  Some  remarks  in parallel with  those 
from  the  other  three  sub-sectors,  nevertheless  may  be helpful here. 
The  crane market  is interesting since it has  undergone  considerable 
structural  change  since  1968.  Significant mergers  were  promoted  by 
the Government  sponsored  'Industrial Reorganisation Corporation'  at 
both  the  heavy  and  the  mobile  ends  of  the  market.  Intent on putting 
together  the  fragmented  land  crane market,  the  IRC  helped  Clarke 
Chapman  Ltd.  to  raise its share  of  the  heavy  crane market  to  80%  in 
little over  a  year after first  taking an  interest in  the  field. 
In  the middle  of  1968  Clarke Chapman  acquired Clyde  Crane & Booth 
Co.  Ltd.  and  then bought  Sir William Arrol,  one  of  the country's 
largest crane manufacturers,  m.aki.ng  hea~vy  cranes  for  steelwork, 86 
shipbuilding and  docks  with up  to  650  tons  lifting capacity.  In 
1969  the  crane  interests of Wellman  Engineering were  taken  over  by 
Clarke Chapman.  The  nm\1  Clarke  Chapman  now  had  the  largest share 
of  the  crane market with  the  help  of  a  £2  million  government  loan. 
At  the mobile  end  of  the market  the  Steel Group  subsidiary,  the 
British Crane  and  Excavator Corporation  (now  known  as  Coles  Cranes 
Ltd.)  had  npproximately  70%  of  total U.K.  production of  the  ranges 
it manufactured.  In  September  1969  the  Steel  Group,  encouraged  by  a 
£1  million  loan  from  the  IRC,  took over  Priestman Brothers,  manufac-
turers of excavators  and mobile  cranes.  Following  this  the  Steel 
Group  had  a  very  successful year  in-197.0/71 with profits up  by  100%: 
the  Steel  Group  was  then  taken over  by  Acrow  in  1972. 
Mobile  cranes  account  for  over half of  total U.K.  deliveries  of 
cranes.  The  trend  is  towards  heavier units.  For example,  Coles 
Cranes  introduced  a  new  Colossus  range  in 1971  capable  of handling 
loads of up  to  170  tons  but which  can still be  driven  on  the  road. 
In  the U.K.  the majority of cranes are  not  bought  but are hired 
from  one  of the  many  plant hire companies,  of which  the  largest is 
the British Crane Hire Corporation.  Turnover  of  such  companies  has 
risen  from  £15  million per  annum  in  1962  to  £125  million per annum 
in 1972. 
But  some  European  countries appear  to  have  erected effective technical 
barriers  to protect their own  industry.  France  is reported  to 
require cranes  to  have  ropes  different  from  those  fitted  in any 
other country,  and  in Italy the  technical  requirements  (covering 
how  ropes  are  slung  from  booms)  are  different  from other European 
countries.  (At  present  the main  export markets  for  cranes  appear 
to  be  outside Europe). 
(c)  Lifts and  Escalators 
In  terms  of val\.le  of output,  this  is  one  of  the  tv70  least  important 
sectors  in mechanical  handling.  In constant  prices~  output  has  in 
fact  fallen  from  £30.9  million  in  1968  to  £22.7  million in 1973. 
Future  growth  prospects  are  poor  because  of  the  sharp  decline  in 
the  U.K.  construction activity. 87 
Concentration  is higher  than  in  the  other  three  sub-sectors.  The 
market  is  dominated  by  the American  mu~tinational,  the  Otis Elevator 
Company,  ,.,hich  has  nearly  507,  of  the  market.  Their major competitors 
are  the  Express  Lift Company  (another  G.E.C.  subsidiary)  and  the 
Marryot  Group  Ltd.,  and  approximately  30  other  companies.  Again, 
many  of  the  manufacturers  are  subsidiaries of other  larger manufac-
turers  in  the  sub-sector,  and  so  treated as  one  large  enterprise 
with  them.  Several manufacturers  are  subsidiaries of other engineering 
companies.  The  Herbert Morris  Group  (crane manufacturers)  have 
their  own  lift manufacturing division. 
Because  of  these  complexities of company  structure,  the  problem of 
identifying the  small  independent  firms  is made  very  difficult. 
The  four  firm concentration ratio of well  over  80%  may  exaggerate 
the actual  level of concentration,  and  the  data  collected  does  show 
that inter-relationships exist between  the major  companies  in this 
industry,  as  is  summarised  in Table  7.9  below. 
TABLE  7. 9: 
MAJOR  LIFT  &  ESCALATOR  MANUFACTURERS 
Company  Accounts 
Oti&  Elevator  Group 
Marryot  Group 
Express Lift Company 
United Lift & Escalator Company 
Evans  Lifts 
William Wadsworth & Sons  Limited 
Hammond  & Charnpness 
Total deliveries by  U.K.  manufacturers  of 
(£ million) 
1972  sales 
20.8 
8.9 
8.0 
2.6 
2.8 
1.7 
3.8 
48.6 
lifts and  escalators  (Business Monitor  series)  38.0 
Sources:  Business Monitor,  and  L.B.S.  Study. 
The  table  emphasises  the difficulties  involved  in  reconciling  com-
pany  data with  total  sector  data.  From  our  company  data  it appears 88 
we  have  identified all the manufacturers,  but  we  know  there  is a 
tail of  small  companies,  and  there  is  no  t.vay  of estimating  the 
latter's contribution  to  the  industry's  sales.  The  problem arises 
as  a  result of including companies  as  a  ,.;hole  (if 50%  or more  of 
their sales are of  lifts and  escalators).  In  fact,with  the  above 
manufacturers  the  percentage  of  sales of  the  industry's products 
is a  great deal  higher  than  50%.  But,  because  none  of  the  compnnies 
break  down  their activities,  there  is no  way  of  telling where  the 
£10 million  discrepancy  occurs. 
The  structure of  the  industry has  been very  stable over  the period. 
There was  only  one  major  ownership  change,  when  Harrm1ond  &  Champness 
Ltd.  were  sold  by  Elevators & Engineering  Ltd  to  the  Dover  Corpo-
ration in the U.S.A. 
(d)  Industrial Trucks 
This  section  of  the  industry  is highly competitive,  and  has  expanded 
rapidly  since  1968.  The  forklift  truck is  the basic unit of mechan-
ical handling and  is a  very  flextible machine.  Technical  developments 
have  not  been  in relation to  power,  but to  expanding  the versatility 
of  the  machine  to  side  loading,  containerisation and  so  on.  The  worker 
environment was  found  to  inhibit performance  of faster  trucks  (trucks 
with performance  specifications differing  by  as  much  as  65%  were  found 
to vary  by  less  than  1~ times  overall  in working conditmns where  the 
power  can  never  be  fully utilised).  Innovation has  been  the hallmark 
of  the  sector,  and  forklift  trucks  can be  found  to undertake  the most 
awkward  stacking and  storage  problems. 
The  forklift  truck manufacturers,  together with  the mobile  crane 
manufacturers,  were  those most  prepared  for  the  European  market. 
Lansing Bagnall has  approximately  20%  or more  of  the  European market, 
and,  like Lancer Boss,  has  operations  in Germany.  The  European 
market  is still fragmented  so  there  is a  tendency  for  manufac-
turers  to  switch  from  Corrunomvealth  to  Europe.  The  prerequisite 
for  obtaining  large European contracts is an efficient distribution 
system.  European  distribution is  fragmented  and  British 
manufacturers  have  begun establishing their own  marketing operations 
in Europe. 89 
As  shown  in Table  7.10,  the  forklift  truck  industry has  a  four 
firm concentration ratio of  about  60%.  There  is one  major  company, 
The  Kaye  Organisation  (previously  known  as  Lansing Bagnall),  with 
a  turnover  in ecess  of  £20  million,  followed  by  a  block of four 
companies with  turnovers  of  approximately  £10  million each. 
TABLE  7.10 
CONCENTHA.TION  IN  THE  INDUSTRIAL  TRUCKS  HARKET 
4-firm concentration ratio 
8-firm concentration ratio 
(Ln"'"m  L 
(  n"':m 
( 
(Ln  h  L 
(  n  h 
1968  1972  -----------------
58 
86 
.272 
7 
.701 
2 
59 
86 
.307 
11 
1.501 
2 
Based  on  'Units of Economic  Activity - Turnover 
Source:  Company  Accounts,  L.B.S.  Study. 
Entry  into the  sector has  occured  over  the past  ten years.  In 
June  1966  the Henley Forklift Truck Company  was  registered,  and  by 
1972  had  achieved  a  turnover  in excess of  £4  million.  Montgomerie 
Reid  rose  from  relative obscurity  to  take  over Wessex  Industries, 
another manufacturer of forklift trucks,  in 1972. 
Several  large  engineering companies,  especially those manufacturing 
construction equipment,  have  found  forklift truck manufacture  a 
convenient area of diversification.  Both Clark Equipment  and  the 
Caterpillar Tractor Company  make  forklift  trucks,  as  do  Eaton Yale 
Limited.  It is noticeable  that all the  latter are American 
companies;  none  of  the English constructfun equipment manufacturers 
have  made  this move  yet,  but  they exist as  a  threat of potential 
competition  to  existing manufacturing.  (Ransomes  & Jeffries,  the 
agricultural machinery manufacturers,  do  however  manufacture  fork-
lift trucks). 90 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  mechanical  handling  sector consists  of  five  industries,  or major 
product  lines.  Each  of  these  five  is  dominated  by  a  few  firms,  but 
there  is little diversification between  them.  Thus  concentration 
ratios  based  on  grouping  the  five  sub-sectors  together  into a  single 
mechanical handling  industry  is  bound  to  be  misleading,  and  to under-
state  the true concentration levels  that exist. 
However,  difficulties with  the  data,  especially where  small  firms  are 
subsidiaries of larger  firms  in  each  sub-sector,  mean  that the  data we 
have  provided  is  not  completely reliable. 
The  cranes  industry had  been  subject  to considerable  structural change, 
inspired and  promoted  by  the  Government's  Industrial  Reorganisation 
Corporation,  and  supported  by  Government  money,  for  this  reason we 
thought  it appropriate  to  conduct  a  special  inquiry  into  this area, 
supported  by  a  large  number  of  interviews. 
Chapters  16  to  18  below. 
This  is  reported  in 91 
CHAPTER  8  OFFICE  MACHINERY 
1.  DEFINITION  OF  SECTOR 
Principal Product Categories 
The  office machinery  sector  divides  into five  sub-sectors: 
- Typewriters. 
- Accounting machinery,  including adding,  calculating and  punched 
card machines,  and  cash  registers. 
- Document  copying  equipment,  including photocopying machines  and 
stencil,  spirit and offset litho duplicators. 
- Other office equipment  includes addressing machines,  coin 
counting and  sorting machinery,  cheque  encoders  and  paper 
shredding  equipment. 
- Miscellaneous,  including  spare parts. 
The  Standard Industrial Classification for  this  sector  includes  photo-
copying machines.  However,  the  fastest  growing  development  in recent 
years  has  been  the  process  of xerographic  and  photographic  document 
copying.  Here,  we  include it under  the heading of office machinery 
rather  than  instrument  engineering as  the  S.I.C.  classifies it. 
The  enterprises  covered  by  this study  employed  about  51,400 persons  in 
1972 with  a  corresponding  turnover of  £353.6 million.  Two  of  the 
largest companies,  Rank-xerox  and  Gestetner,  have  overseas  subsidiaries 
whose  earnings  and  profits are  consolidated  into  the U.K.  accounts.  In 
this  study we  have  generally  tried  to  exclude  the  overseas  portion of 
their activities amounting  to  about  £213  million.  However,  the  concen-
tration measures  reported  in Annexe  8.D(l) are  based  on  published accounts 
for all enterprises. 
The  Census  of Production for  1972  shows  a  turnover of only  £124.9  million 
employment  of  26,90C  persons.  This  very  large discrepancy arises  from 
the difficulty of  separating office machinery  only  from other  related 
activities.  About  £80  million of  the  difference  is  due  to  photocopying 
(lJ  All  lettered Annexes  are collected  together  ac  the  end  of  the  chapter. 92 
equip1nent.  The  remainder  is  due  to activities of  the enterprises  in 
S.I.C.  categories,  electronic computers,  metal  furniture,  shop  and 
office  fittings  and  general  painting and  publishing. 
TABLE  8.1: 
INDUSTRY  COHPARISON  1972  TURNOVER,  EMPLOYEES 
Thi~tudy'l': 
'Enterprises' 
'Units of Economic  Activity 
1972  Census 
Gross  Output 
Turnover 
(£ mill) 
353.6 
422.6 
124.9 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study and  Business Monitor. 
Eme_~ees 
(I  000) 
51.5 
26.9 
*  excluding overseas  earnings. of Gestetner and  Rank-Xerox. 
According  to  the  Census,  the  largest of the  five  sub-sectors was 
document  copying equipment which,  in 1971,  accounted  for  nearly  44%  of 
total deliveries  (see Tables  8.2 and  8.3 below). 
TABLE  8. 2: 
DELIVERIES 
(£  million) 
1963*  1971  % Change  1963-71 
Typewriters  8.3  11.8  42.2 
Accounting machinery  41.6  59.4  42.8 
Document  copying**  13.3  81.0  509.0 
Other  office  equipment  5.3  10.4  96.2 
Miscellaneous  10.9  22.8  109.2 
TOTAL  79.4  185.4  133.5 
Source:  Business Monitor. 
*  Including cash registers,  ticket machines,  calculators. 
**  Includes  photocopying. 93 
TABLE  8.  3: 
SALES  ----
(£  million) 
1972  1973  __ E~~rt:~_l~Ll.  ___  !!nports  1973 
Data  processing and 
handling 
Duplicators 
Typewriters 
Accounting  Machinery~·: 
Other  (addressing, 
document  handling, 
parts,  etc.) 
33.0 
23.9 
22.1 
34.3 
14.7 
21.1  1A.3 
26.7  lLt-. 8 
29.7  19.4 
37.2  16.6 
17.6  6.2 
--------------~-------
TOTAL  128.0  132.3  71.3 
-----------
*  Including cash  registers,  ticket machines,  calculators. 
Source:  Business Monitor. 
5.1 
2.1 
26.0 
51.5 
9.8 
94.5 
Deliveries of photocopying  equipment  alone  were  valued  in  1971 at an 
estimated  £63  million.  Since  1963  the major  growth  point  in  the  industry 
has  been  the  development  of  document  copying  equipment,  ther deliveries 
alone have  increased  from an  estimated  £6  million in 1963  to  £63  million 
in 1971,  a  950%  increase. 
A reclassification and  re-organisation of statistics makes  it difficult 
to  compare  Tables  8. 2 and 8.3- in particular Ehotoco£ying  is excluded 
from  Tabl_~.  Rough  estimates place  the  photocopying market  in  1972 
at £70  to  £75  million. 
Two  points arise  from  this table.  First is  the  extensive  import/export 
trade  reflecting increasing  specialisation of production.  The  second  is 
the very  large  import  figure  of  £51.5  million for  accm1nting  machine.cy. 
Fully  50%  of  this is due  to electronic calculators where  sales have  more 
than  doubled  in  1972-73. 
The  physical  dimensions  of this sector arc  difficult  to  define  vd.th  turn~· 
over  for  1972  estimates  ranging  from  £125  million  to  £566  million. 94 
A  rough  guide  to  the  composition of  the  larger  \.~stimate  is: 
Turuover 
(£--;-ill  ion) 
Census/Business Monitor  estimates  125 
Document  copy] ng  equipm(:ll t  85 
Overseas  earnings  of Gestetner and  R3nk-Xerox  210 
Unidentified,  con~rising other sectors,  other overseas 
earnings,  double  counting  140 
TOTAL  560 
Annexe  8.A  lists all  the enterprises  and  units  covered  by  this  study with 
notes  on  Ovlnership,  subsidiaries,  major  products  and  merger/takeover 
history. 
Table  8.4  compares  our  coverage  of  enterprises with  that of the  Census. 
The  latter record  79  enterprises  to  our  20,  the  difference  being principally 
in  the  49  companies  recorded  in the  Census  employing  less  than  100  persons. 
In  the  larger size categories  of  1000  employees  and  over,  this  study  counts 
14 enterprises  to  the  Census'  9.  The  turnCN er  from  the  5  extra enter-
prises must  amount  to at least  £25  million  in  1972,  perhaps  even  as  high 
as  £200  million.  Our  data  on  companies  does  not permit  the  drawing of 
very  tight market  boundaries.  We  chose  to collect together  those  companies 
who  had  substantial  interests  in otfice machinery  but were  unable  to 
separate  out  their other activities.  For  example,  if Rank-Xerox  document 
copying activities are  their  largest  single activity,  then  the  Census 
would  exclude it from  the  enumeration whereas  we  would  include  it.  Rank 
Xerox  alone  would  then  explain  £100  million of  the  £225  million discrepancy 
(document  copying  plus unidentified). 
TABLE  8. 4:  ------
INDUSTRY  CO~fPARISOi-I  :  ENTERPRISES  AND  EtiPLOY!,lliNT 
S i z e  C  1 as  ~~y_.J;.T:E?.l.'?..Y  men t 
0  - 99 
100  - 299 
300  - 999 
1,000 - 4,999 
5,000 and  over 
Number  -
L.B.S.  Studz 
0 
3 
3 
12 
2 
20 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study  and  Business Monitor. 
of  En~erpriseses 
1972  Census  of 
49 
11 
10 
) 
~- 9 
79 
:  1972 
Production 95 
Table  8. 5  displays  Lhe  bJ ruover  size distribution of  entE!rpriscs  Hi~d 
units in  the  study. 
TABLE  8 • .5:  --------
Number  of  Co,..n,)anies  ----·--·,.---·--.A.---·--·-----
s  i~_Q~-~~  .  .l'.Y._!l!.T_~  (_l_~~-~ 
1 En tern  r i .s e s 
1  1U.E.A. I  ____  .. _,_,.._,  .. .,._  .. _____ 
(b)  --·c-aT  .. __  (a) 
less  than  1.0  1  1  1 
0  - 1.99  2  2  2 
2.0 - 4.99  lJ,  4  6 
5.0  9.99  ,- 5  5  - J 
10.0 - 19.99  2  2  3 
20.0 - 39.99  3  2  3 
40.0 - 99.99  2  3  3 
100.0 - 199.99  1  0  1 
200.0 and  over  0  1  0 
20  20  24 
(a)  excludes  overseas activities of Gestetner  and  Rank  Xerox  by 
estimation, 
(b)  includes all activities of  Ges~Ptner and  Rank  Xerox  consolidated 
into U.K.  accounts. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
2.  MAJOR  CHARACTERISTICS 
In general  terms  this  sector has  a  high  growth  rate  and  a  wide diversity 
of products  ;  from  1968-72  turnover  has  grown  91%,  profits and  cash  flow 
by  more  than  150%,  and  o~vn means  by  86%. 
statistics. 
Annexe  8.B  contains  summary 
Sales  are  sensitive  to  the  general  level of  economic  activity  showing 
distinct pauses  during  times  of  economic  difficulty.  The  mainspring of 
grmvth  lies in the  fact  that  expansion  in the  economy  has  involved  a 
large  increase  in clerical  and  administrative work,  often of  a  highly 
complicated  nature.  With  labour  increasingly  scarce  and  costly,  the 96 
tendency hns  been,  ar1d  is likely  to  coutinue  to  be,  the  substitution 
of labour  by capital.  These  trends  are  world-\Yidc,  consequently  leading 
to  the  establishment of multinational  entcrpris0s with  specialised 
production facilities  and  diverse  mnrl\ets.  This  weans,  for  example, 
that it is posr:d.bh to  sell certain  types  of  offic.e  equipm2nt  to  the 
U.S .A. ,  the  largL: s t  market  a.nd  the  strongest  suppliers  in  the  v:or lcl. 
The  1960s  sCJH  t~·?O  feEJtures  in  the marketing of  office machinery.  First 
was  the  establishment of  large  and  vigorous  sales  forces  with  more  than 
a  hint  of  the  hard  selling approach.  Second,  in order  to  increase 
sales,  frequent  model  changes  were  announced  producing  a  kind  of  planned 
obsolescence  for  existing equipment.  Perhaps  more  important  than  this 
obsolescence  vvas  the  need  to maintain  competitive  product  advantages 
in  the  market.  Hm·lever,  it \vas  the  1970s  \vhich  produced  major  changes  -
these were  based  on  technical  innovations,  and  are  discussed  in section 
3  below. 
Office machinery  has  long  been  dominated  by  overseas manufacturers, 
principally American.  Table  8.6 itemises  the  9  largest manufacturers 
in  the U.K.  in  1972,  7  of whom  are  foreign  subsidiaries. 
TABLE  8. 6:  _  ___, ___ 
LARGEST  U.K.  H.A.~·UFACTU  RERS  - . 
ComE any 
Rank  Xerox~·, 
National  Cash  Register 
Burroughs  Machines 
British Olivetti 
Gestetner Holdings* 
Addressograph-Multigraph 
Roneo  Ltd.  (Vickers) 
Imperia  1  TypC\vri ters 
G.A.F.  (U.K.)  Ltd. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
:  1972 
Turnover  ExEorts 
107,000  15,000 
46,000  7,700 
45,000  7,400 
28,000  900 
23,000  11,000 
20,000  1,800 
18,000  1,800 
11,000  1,200 
10,000  700 
308,000  47,500 
Or.vnership 
U.K./Foreign  subsidiary  (U.S.A.) 
Foreign  subsidiary  (U.S.A.) 
If  If  (  II  ) 
II  "  (Italy) 
U.K.  quoted 
Foreign  subsidiary  (U.S.A.) 
U.K.  subsidiary 
Foreign  subsidiary  (U.S.A.) 
II  II  (u.s.A.) 
*  Overseas  activities of Gestetner  and  Rank  Xerox  have  been  excluded 
by  esti1.11ation. 97 
Table  8. 7  analyses  enterprises  by  turnover  size  and  mvnership.  '1\velve 
out of  twenty  are  foreign  subsidiaries,  and  sixteen are  subsidiaries of 
larger companies.  0\·1nership  patterns are  very  stable - see  Annex  A 
be(:ause  the major  companies  are  already  subsidiaries of  large  foreign 
companies.  No  mergers  have  been  found  during  1968-72. 
TABLE  8.7: 
TU&.~OJ  ER  A~;n  OhTNERSHIP  1972 
~~-----U_KP  _______  U_K~S  _______  F~S  _____  U~K_S/F~-
Legend:  UKQ  = U.K.  quoted  company 
UKP  = U.K.  private company 
UKS  = U.K.  subsidiary 
FS  = Foreign  subsidiary 
2 
1 
1 
4 
UKS/FS  = jointly mvned  subsidiary 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
q. 
2 
3 
2  1 
11  1 
*  Overseas  earnings  of Gestetner and  Rank-Xerox  are  included. 
3.  MARKET  STRUCTURE 
Concentration 
The  basic  information  for analysis of concentration is contained in 
Annexe 8.D,  where,  for  each variable,  the  various  concentration indices 
are  tabulated  for  1968-72.  Some  of  this is  sun@arised  in Table  8.8 
(below)  where measures  of  turnover  concentration are collected together. 
A  similar tabulation for  'units of  economic  activity'  is  shown  in 
Table  8.9. 98 
TABLE  8.8: 
SU:t-1HARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  l-lliASURES  OF  TURNOVER  OF  'ENTERPRISES' 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm concentration ratio  72.3  73.6  77.7  76.9  76.8 
8-firm concentration ratio  88.1  79.2  79.4  79.7  79.5 
Coefficient of variation  1.54  1.57  1.86  1..86  2.05 
Gini  coefficient  • 65  .66  .71  .70  .72 
Herfindel-Hirschmann  169.0  173.0  223.0  222.0  261.0 
Entropy  -95.0  -95.0  -87 .o  -87.0  -84.0 
Linda:  1n~'•m  .49  .49  • 65  • 63  • 67 
n*  15  15  14  14  14 
L  n"''  h  .97  1.06  1.45  1.53  1.77 
n*  h  2  2  2  2  2 
n  20  20  20  20  20 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study and  E.E.C~  Computer  Programme. 
TABLE  8.9: 
SU:MMARY  OF  CONCENTRATION  MEASURES  FOR  TURNOVER  OF  'U.E.A.' 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm concentration ratio  56.0  56.0  61.7  59.1  58.0 
8-firm concentration ratio  77.7  77.6  80.9  79.2  79.1 
Coefficient of variation  1.17  1.16  1.34  1.78  1.33 
Gini  coefficient  .56  .56  .61  .59  .59 
Herfindel-Hirschmann  99.0  97.0  117.0  110.0  115.0 
Entropy  -114.0  -114.0  -109.0  -111.0  -111.0 
Linda:  L  n•'•m  .28  .27  .34  .31  .31 
n""m  20  17  16  13  12 
L  n*  h  .54  .55  .58  • 65  1.15 
n*  h  2  2  2  2  2 
n  24  24  24  24  24 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study  and  E.E.C.  Computer  Programme. 
Over  such  a  short period  one  does  not  expect great changes  in  struct~e, 
particularly where  the  competing units are  large and  internationally 99 
owned.  The  picture  is one  of stability of concentration at  a  fairly 
high  level  - over  75%  4-firm concentration ratio  in  1972.  However, 
dropping  the  overseas  earnings  of Rank-Xerox  and  Gestetner  reduces  this 
to around  32%.  Insofar as  trends can  be  identified,  the  concentration 
of  turnover has  been  stable with  a  small  peak  in 1970,  those  for  employ-
ment  and  wages  and  salaries has  been  stable if not  declining slightly, 
those  for profits,  cash  floH  and  own  means  show  definite  increases  over 
the period,  and  exports  showing  a  smaller increase.  Profits are very 
heavily concentrated among  the  top  four.  Looking at Annexe  8.C,  11  of 
the  20  enterprises have  profit sales ratios of less  than  10%. 
This  stability at a  high  level of concentration  is further illustrated 
by  enterprise  rankings  from year  to year.  Annexe  8.E  shows  rankings  by 
turnover  and profit in each  year.  The  Linda  indices  show  very  few 
movements  in and  out  of  the  'core'  of oligopolistic enterprises or of 
the  'superpowers'.  The  rankings  of  turnover  are  remarkably  stable  from 
year  to year  as  evidenced  by  the  rank correlation coefficients all over 
.96.  Profits  rankings show  less stability,  as  usual,  hut  nevertheless 
are  remarkably  stable.  The  'core',  as  calcuffi ted  for profits,  consists 
only of  four  or six companies,  compared with fourteen or  fifteen  for 
turnover. 
Introducing  'units'  into  the analysis means  considering  I.B.M.  Their 
activities in this  sector are  less  than  50%  of their total  turnover, 
but are  exceeded  only  by  Rank  Xerox.  On  a  units basis in 1972  N.C.R. 
dropped  out of  the  superpower classification to  be  replaced  by  I.B.M. 
This  is probably  a  quirk  of  the calculation procedure  which requires 
a  minimum  of  two  to  be  in a  category.  From  the  data  listing for  1972 
it is clear that Rank  Xerox  stands  on  its own  in  terms  of  size  (£107 
million  turnover) with  I.B.M.,  N.C.R.  and  Burroughs  grouped  together 
with about  £45  million  turnover.  From  1968-71  N.C.R.  was  the  second 
superpower,  but  these  four have  always  led  the  field. 
Nature  of Competition 
The  office  document  copying  sector in the  U.K.  is  in a  state of 
unparalleled  flux.  For  several years  the barriers bet:\veen  market 
sectors have  been  eroded  gradually as  technical  innovation has  improved 100 
the  versatility of a  wide  range of products,  bringing  them  into com-
petition vlith  each other  for  the  first  time.  The  centre of  the market 
is  the  plain paper copier  business  in which  few  of the  participants 
are  likely  to  emerge  in  the  same  condition as  they  entered.  This was 
all partly caused  by  the  expiry of  several Xerox  patents around  1970. 
Since  late 1973  a  number  of  new  names  have  appeared  in  the  market 
alongside  Rank-Xerox,  Gestetner,  Agfa-Gevaert,  I.B.M.  and  Nashua.  A 
(1)  recent report  puts  the  number  of ne\oJ  entrants at 13,  with Kalle 
Infotec  (subsidiary of Hoechst),  Reprographic  and  Ronco  Vickers  notable 
among  them.  There  is  a  strong possibility that there will  be  an 
inundation of  new  products  from  the major Japanese  electronics manu-
facturers.  Rank-Xerox,  with its  95%  share of  the U.K.  market,  is under 
investigation by  the Honopolies  Conm1ission. 
The  second major  technical advance  has  been  in production of transistorised 
circuits for electronic calculators.  Competition is perhaps at its most 
intense  in  this area with further  technical  changes  expected  to  bring 
prices  down  even  more  by  1980.  The  extent of price-cutting does  seem 
to worry  the  industry and  there  are  suggestions that  by  late  1975  there 
will  be  only half a  dozen  major producers  - all of whom  will have  exten-
sive  interests  in  related fields.  This  might  not  be  expected  to  reduce 
the  number  of brand  names. 
The  third  and  potentially most  significant technical  change has  been  the 
advent of  'word  processing  machines'.  The  concept is the  use  of  sophis-
ticatea electronic typewriters  to  increase  the  speed  of  transcribing 
oral words  into  type.  The  idea originated with  I.B.M. 's German  subsidiary 
and  I.B.M.  generally  dominate  the market with  85%  of U.S.  sales and  about 
the  same  in  the  U.K.  However,  most  of  the world's major  typewriter 
manufacturers  are  in  the word  processing market  now.  I.B.M. 's main 
contenders  in  the U.K.  are Ultronic  Data  Systems  (D.D.S.),  Kalle  Infotec, 
Olympia,  Olivetti Dataflex  (the  only  assembler  in the U.K.)  and  Business 
Data  Products,  which  markets  the  Redactron machine  made  in  the u.s.A. 
Sperry  Remington  has  recently announced  its entry  and, even  more  recently, 
.  .  (2)  d  .  l"k  R  k  X  3M  d  T  .  h  Adl  h  1ts ex1t  ,  an  compan1es  1  e  an  - erox,  an  r1ump  - er,  t  e 
(1)  Financial  Times,  lOth June,  1974. 
(2)  Entry  in 1973,  exit in  1975. 101 
German  subsidiary of Litton Industries,  were  thought  likely  to  introduce 
their own  models,  but  the present recession appears  to  have  at least 
delayed matters. 
Other Structural Features 
The  principal entry barriers are  technology  in  the  document  copying  and 
word  processing sections,  probable  economies  of  scale  in manufacturing 
throughout  the  sector,  although  there  is little evidence  about  this. 
The  dominance  of  the  leading five  companies  and  their acquisition of 
profits makes  entry a  dubious  proposition.  No  information could  be 
collected on  pricing behaviour. 
There  has  been little evident change  in vertical integration or diversi-
fication over  the  sample  period.  Host enterprises historically have 
'ipecialised  in one  or other product  group,  with only  the  large multi-
nationals having  a  widely  diversified base within  the  sector as we  have 
defined it. 
Ownership  is predominantly American,  including six of  the nine  largest 
enterprises- one  of  them in joint ownership with  Rank  (U.K.)- viz  Rank 
Xerox.  Two  of  these  nine  are U.K.  m-1ned  - Gestetner  and  Roneo  Ltd. 
(Vickers).  The  ninth is Italian owned  - British Olivetti.  There has 
been  no  significant merger activity  to  record. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
(1)  It is difficult to  define precisely what is the  sector - official 
definitions are narrower  than  the  activities of companies  themselves. 
Generally,  it is a  growing,  profitable sector with a  high  technology 
content  in its products. 
(2)  The  industry is dominated  by  large American  owned  companies 
operating on  a  world-wide  scale. 
(3)  Concentration  in  the U.K.  has  been  stable  on  the whole with  a  ten-
dency  for profits and  mvn  capitalisation  to  become  increasingly 
concentrated. ANNEXE  8 .A:  OFFICE  MACHINERY  ENTERPRISE  & U.E.A •. LISTING 
Identi-
fication 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Name  of Co!!!Eany 
Gestetner 
Holdings  Ltd. 
National  Cash 
Register Ltd. 
Burroughs 
Machines  Ltd. 
British Olivetti 
Ltd. 
Addressograph-
Multigraph 
Gross  Cash 
Registers 
Imperial 
Typewriter Co. 
Rotaprint Ltd. 
Pitney-Bowes 
Ltd. 
S.C.M.  (U.K.) 
Ltd. 
Type  of  Major  (or Assoc.) 
Com:eanl  Parent Com:eany  Subsidiaries 
U.K. 
quoted 
Foreign 
subsid.., 
Nati6nal  Cash 
Register Co., 
U.S.A. 
Foreign  U.S.A.  parrent 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Olivetti Italy 
Addresspgraph-
Multigraph, 
u.s.A. 
Litton Indus-
tries, u.s.A. 
Pitney-Bowes 
Inc.,  u.s.A. 
S.C.M.  Corpo-
ration,  u.s.A. 
Burroughs  Leasing 
Co. 
Underwood  Business 
Machines 
Bizerba Ltd. 
SubsJ.diaries 
in other 
Countries 
34  foreign 
subsidiaries 
u.s.A. 
Major Products 
Copiers & duplicators 
Machines  for  recording, 
storing,  computing  & 
processing;  cash regis-
ters & adders. 
Desk  size computers, 
calculators,  adders, 
large  scale  data 
processors. 
Manual  typewriters, 
systems & data processing, 
computer  terminals. 
(office  typewriters  sold 
by  trade  through  about 
1,000 dealers) 
Addressing & duplicating 
machines 
Cash  registers & elec-
tronic calculators 
(made  public  1965) 
Typewriters,  photocopiers 
& adding machines. 
Printing & duplicating 
equipment 
(began  as  a  selling 
company  for Belgian 
manufacturer) 
Postage meters,  mailing 
& busi~ess machines. 
Office  equipment 
(subsidiary of British 
Typewriters,  which  is a 
subsidiary of S.C.M., 
U.S.A,) 
Mergers/ 
Takeovers 
0 
1\) Identi-
fication 
Number 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Name  of Company 
Rank  Xerox  Ltd. 
Roneo  Vickers 
Ltd. 
G.A.F.  (Great 
Britain) Ltd. 
Type  of 
Company 
Foreign 
subsid. 
u  .. K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Veeder  Root Ltd.  Foreign 
subsid. 
Omal  Group 
A.B.  Dick & Co. 
Ltd. 
Ofrex Engineer-
ing Ltd. 
Elliot Business 
Machines 
Nig  Banda  Ltd. 
U.K. 
quoted 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
Parenc Company  Subsidiaries 
Rank  Xerox 
(U.K.) 
(which  is  subsid. 
of Xerox Corp., 
u.s.A.) 
Vickers  Ltd. 
G.A.F.  Corpo-
ration U.S.A. 
Veeder  Indus-
tries U.S.A. 
A.B.  Dick U.S.A. 
Ofrex  Group 
Dymo  Industries 
u.s.A. 
Ozalid  Group 
Vickers  Lane 
Barber-Greene Eng-
land 
Hirst-Buckley 
4  + Ltd. 
Esco  Ltd. 
Rex  Business 
Machines 
Office Appliances 
Ltd. 
Office Machinery 
Ltd. 
Subsidiaries 
in  1er 
Councries 
Worldwide 
Worldwide 
Mergers/ 
Major Products  Takeovers 
Xerographic  copying 
equipment,  dry  copiers, 
data processing equipment 
Duplicating machines  & 
supplies,  office furniture 
Reprographic  products 
Counting & computing 
devices,  mechanical & 
electro-mechanical 
Adding,  calculating, 
dictating,  duplicating 
machinery,  office 
furniture 
Offset duplicating 
equipment & photo-
copying machines 
Office  equipment 
Office  equipment 
Copying machinery, 
·equip!Tlent  &  !IlQterials 
for  drawing office & 
print room 
Acquired 
Hirst-Buckley 
in May  1969, 
who  are  sta-
tioners  for 
computers, 
manufacture 
business 
forms,  etc. 
....... 
0 
(..) Identi-
fication  Type  of 
Number  Name  of Company  Company 
20  Bell Punch  Co. 
21  Sperry Rand 
22  Singer  (U.K.) 
Ltd. 
23  3M  (U.K.)  Ltd. 
24  I.B.M.  (U.K.) 
Holdings  Ltd. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Major  (or Assoc.) 
~arent Company  Subsidiries 
Lanson  Indus-
tries 
Sperry Rand 
Corp.  U.S.A. 
Minnesto Mining & 
Manufacturing Co. 
u.s.A. 
I.B.M.  Corp. 
u.s.A. 
Su'l--c:idiaries 
other 
Countries  Major Products 
Photocopying machinery 
Data  processing machines, 
electric  typewriters, 
dictating machines  & 
true  recording equipment 
Me;-gers/ 
Takeovers 
Lanson  Ind. 
became  a 
partner of 
Moor  Corp. 
Ltd.  of 
Canada  1973/ 105 
ANNEXE  8.B:  OFFICE  HACHINERY  :  SUMMARY  STATISTICS 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
( £ mill)  Turnover  (U.K.  only)  184.8  242.9  331.4  326.5  353.6 
(I  QQQ)  Employees  47.7  51.4  56.5  st  •. 9  51.5 
(£ mill)  Hages  & Salaries  54.7  66.3  81.9  86.9  90.1 
(£ mill)  Net  Profits'i',.  48.0  76.8  124.5  111.8  124.2 
(£ mill)  Cash  Flow•',.  67.1  101.3  163.5  150.7  174.8 
(£ mill)  Otvn  Means'~'•  130.9  154.6  188.2  225.2  243.7 
(£ mill)  Exports  54.7  80.4  117.3  118.7  127.5 
(%)  Exports/Turnover  29.6  33.1  35.4  36.4  36.1 
(%)  Profits/Turnover  26.0  31.6  37.6  34.2  35.1 
(%)  Profits/Own Means  36.7  49.7  66.2  55.3  51.0 
(£/person) Wages  & Salaries/ 
Employees  1147  1290  1450  1583  1750 
*  These  figures  are  net of  losses  and  other negative  items. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study. 
ANNEXE  8.C:  OFFICE  MACHINERY  :  PROFITABILITY  BY  ENTERPRISE  1968-72 
Enterprise 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Profit/TurnOJ er 
(%) 
13.2 
12.5 
17.4 
-4.9 
12.9 
16.8 
-13.2 
12.3 
4.9 
13.3 
39.9 
2.9 
6.6 
7.9 
0.9 
3.1 
8.1 
11.0 
4.3 
4.3 
Exports/Turnover 
(%) 
22.0 
23.0 
25.3 
20.5 
21.7 
10.5 
52.0 
34.3 
28.1 
43.1 
23.0 
12.1 
10.8 
41.8 
5.3 
28.9 
26.6 
12.8 
22.8 
Turnover  figures  include  earnings of overseas  subsidiaries of Rank 
Xerox  (2)  and  Gestetner  (1). 
Both  ratios are unweighted  averages  of yearly ratios. 
Source:  L.B.S.  Study and  Companies  House. 106 
ANNEXE  8.D:  OFFICE  }~CHINERY  CONCENTl~TION HEASURES  1968-72 
VARIABLE  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
4-firm Concentration Ratio 
Turnover  72.3  73.6  77.7  76.9  76.8 
Employment  60.4  57.8  58.3  57.6  54.0 
Wages  and  Salaries  61.3  63.1  64.5  61.9  58.2 
Net Profits  89.1  91.9  94.0  93.8  94.5 
Cash  Flow  88.8  91.1  93.2  93.8  93.2 
Own  Means  79.5  80.4  82.3  85.0  79.8 
Exports  75.1  74.1  78.1  78.2  75.6 
8-firm Concentration Ratio 
Turnover  88.1  88.0  9Q.5  89.9  90.4 
Employment  80.1  79.2  79.4  79.7  79.5 
Wages  and  Salaries  81.1  81.8  83.1  84.3  82.0 
Net Profits  96.6  96.9  97.7  98.3  98.9 
Cash  Flow  96.5  96.0  97.1  98.2  98.0 
Own  Means  90.8  91.4  92.3  93.4  92.6 
Exports  87.7  88.5  90.7  91.7  90.9 
Linda  Index  Core  Ln""m  I  n'''"m 
Turnover  .49115  .49115  .65114  • 63114  . 67 I 14 
Employment  .27115  .27115  .26115  .27115  .25114 
Wages  & Salaries  .30115  .31115  .33115  .34114  .29114 
Net Profits  1.1414  1.10/4  1.57/4  1. 69 I 4  2.9016 
Cash  Flow  1.30/4  1.26/4  1.7614  1.81/4  2.8216 
Own  Means  • 6314  .68115  .79115  .8414  • 7616 
Exports  .41/4  .52112  • 68112  .72/13  • 6017 
Linda  Index  SuEeq~owers Ln* 
Turnover  .97/2  1.06/2  1.4512  1.5312  1.7712 
Employment  .8612  .94/2  .8612  • 63/2  .5312 
Wages  & Salaries  1.04/2  1.0312  • 60/2  .6112  . 66/2 
Net Profits  2.63/2  2.7112  4.0112  4.8012  5.77t2 
Cash  Flow  3.0212  3.2612  4.6412  5.0012  6.6812 
Own  Means  1.0712  1.30/2  1.63/2  1.8612  1.4912 
Exports  .68/2  1.17/2  1.73/2  1.6512  1. 8 612 
Coefficient of Variation 
Turnover  1.54  1.57  1.86  1.86  2.05 
Employment  1.14  1.15  1.11  1.07  1.01 
Wages  and  Salaries  1.25  1.30  1.29  1.24  1.15 
Net  Profits  2.28  2.61  2.97  2.86  3.03 
Cash  Flow  2.37  2.78  3.11  ,2.90  3.30 
Own  Means  1.77  1.87  2.08  2.20  1.95 
Exports  1.42  1.58  1.95  1.93  1.83 
Gini Coefficient 
Turnover  .65  .66  .71  .70  .72 
Employment  .54  .54  .54  .54  .52 
Wages  and  Salaries  .57  .58  .59  .59  .56 
Net  Profits  .78  .82  • 85  • 8q .  .86 
Cash  Flow  .78  .83  .86  .85  .87 
Own  Means  .71  .72  .74  .77  .73 
Exports  • 63  .66  .71  .71  . 69 107 
ANNEXE  8.D:  OFFICE  NACHINERY  CONCENTRATION  NEASURES  1968-72  (cont.) 
VARIABLE  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Herfindel-Hirschmann 
Turnover  169  173  223  222  261 
Employment  115  116  111  108  101 
Wages  and  Salaries  128  135  133  127  116 
Net Profits  387  410  517  539  677 
Cash  Flow  414  437  534  555  660 
Own  Neans  207  226  267  292  253 
Exports  159  184  253  249  230 
Entro:ex 
Turnover  -95  -95  -87  -87  -84 
Employment  -108  -108  -109  -109  -111 
Wages  and  Salaries  -105  -104  -103  -104  -107 
Net  Profits  -63  -60  -50  -48  -35 
Cash Flow  -61  -59  -50  -47  -38 
Own  Means  -87  -85  -80  -76  -82 
Exports  -95  -92  -83  -83  -86 
Sources:  L.B.S.  Study  and  E.E.C.  Computer  Programme. 108 
ANNEXE  8.E:  OFFICE  MACHINERY  :  ENTERPRISE  RANKINGS 
E1  :  Ranking  by  Turnover•'• 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Superpowers:  11  11  11  11  11 
1  1  2  1  1 
Core:  2  2  1  2  2 
3  3  3  3  3 
12  4  4  4  4 
4  12  12  12  5 
5  5  5  5  12 
13  12  12  6  7 
6  6  6  13  13 
1U  19  19  7  19 
20  10  7  19  9 
9  7  10  9  6 
7  9  9  8  8 
8  20  8  10  10 
19  8  14  14  16 
14  14  16  16  20 
15  17  17  17  17 
18  18  18  18  18 
17  15  15  15  15 
*  Turnover  figures  include  sales  by  overseas  subsidiaries of Gestetner  (1) 
and  Rank  Xerox  (2). 
Superpower entries:  1  1 
"  exits:  1  1 
Core  entries: 
"  exits:  1 
SEearman  Rank  Correlation Coefficient 
Year  to Year:  .96  .99  .98  .97 
1968-72  .91 109 
ANNEXE  8.E:  OFFICE  MACHINERY  ENTERPRISE  RANKINGS 
E2:  Ranking  by  Profits.,·~ 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Superpowers:  11  11  11  11  11 
1  3  3  2  1 
Core:  2  1  2  1  2 
3  2  1  3  5 
5  5  5  6  3 
12  6  6  5  19 
10  10  13  19  6 
6  12  19  13  10 
8  8  10  8  16 
13  9  8  10  8 
14  19  9  20  14 
9  13  4  12  12 
18  17  12  14  20 
17  18  14  17  18 
15  14  20  18  13 
16  4  18  9  17 
20  16  17  15  15 
7  15  16  16  9 
4  20  15  7  4 
19  7  7  4  7 
*  Profit figures  include earnings  from  overseas  subsidiaries for  Rank 
Xerox  (2)  and  Gestetner  (1). 
Superpower  entries:  1  1  1 
11  exits:  1  1  1 
Core  entries:  2 
11  exits: 
Spearman  Rank  Correlation Coefficient 
Year  to Year:  .89  .91  .90  .88 
1968-72  .72 111 
PART  3:  TWO  CASE  STUDIES 
(i) AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY  (WRITTEN  BY  MR.  N.  OWEN) 113 
CHAPTER  9  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
This  Study will  be  understood better if its purpose,  methods  and 
character are made  clear at the  outset.  Ther.e  are  two  ways  of studying 
the  economics  of  industry;  by  analysing a  broad cross-section of 
industries with  the  aid  of statistical  techniques  in search of general-
isations  about  the way  industries behave,  depending  on  their structure 
and  circumstances;  and  case  studies of individual  industries in depth, 
attempting  to understand  their peculiarities and  logic.  This  study is 
of  the  latter type.  It attempts  to penetrate  the bald  industrial 
s·tatistics '\•lith  the  aid of discussions with managers  in  the  industry, 
to obtain an understanding of  the  context within which  the industry 
operates  and  its critical operational  features.  Once  having gained 
such a  feel  for  the  texture of  the  industry,  it is possible to see 
whether  and  in what ways  the  structure of  the  industry influences its 
perspectives  and  behaviour. 
In this way  the  Study  hopes  to  find  some  meeting  ground  between  indus-
trial economics  and  business management,  two  disciplines which  in many 
ways  seem  to have  drifted apart.  The  view of  this author,  to put it 
bluntly,  is that at the present  time  these  two  disciplines  do  not  meet 
at all.  The  massed  typewriters  and  computers of academic  research have 
laboured  for  a  long  time  to  produce  conclusions  about  the  impact of 
industrial  structure \vhich  are  either insufficiently conclusive or 
quantitatively significant to offer guidance  to  Government  policy makers, 
and  still less  to  business managers.  This  study does  not claim to 
remedy  this but it does  try  to  explain why  it is that industrial economics 
fails  to  engage with  busine~s life,  and  explores  the possibilities of 
bringing  these  two  disciplines closer  together. 
The  study  may  well  di.sappointproponents  of both.  Students of industrial 
structure will  note  and  possibly  disapprove  of the  absence of question-
naires,  sampling  frames  and  a  statistical rigour,  and  the reliance on 
observations,  opinions  and  intuition.  On  the  other hand,  business 
managers  may  regard  industrial structure as  a  provocative perspective 114 
for  any  industrial  study  to have  as  a  framework  with its free  use  of 
such  terms  as  'monopoly',  'oligopolistic behaviour'  and  'market  shares', 
which  seem  to  suggest a  condemnatory  attitude  to  business activities 
right  from  the  outset.  No  such attituJe is present in this  study;  it 
simply  takes  as  given  a  tr~dition of economic  analysis  along  these  lines, 
which  is highly influential  in anti-trust policy-making  in North America 
and  an  increasing number  of  European  countries)and  attempts  to  confront 
this analysis  "~dith  as  realistic a  view  of  the agricultural machinery 
industry as  can  be  obtained  by  an  outsider  in a  few  months  of observation, 
aided  by  the  generous  assistance  of  a  number  of its representatives. 
An  unstructured research  approach  -c;-1as  adopted  in  the belief that  the 
priority in  a  study of this kind  is  to understand  the  nature of the 
business  first  and  then  see if industrial structure has  any  relevance 
to it, rather  than  trying  to  fit business  behaviour  into  a  questionnaire 
based  on  industrial structure and  competition.  It is felt  that  the 
insights  gained  from  individuals  in the  industry  amply  justified the 
approach  adopted. 
The  study  involved  interviews with around  20  companies  and  conversations 
with  several  more  on  detailed points.  Fortunately  the  companies  which 
agreed  to cooperate permitted a  balanced  representation of large and 
small  companies,  manufacturers  and  importers,  and  the  three  main 
product categories  - tractors,  implements  and  farmyard  equipment.  The 
opinions  of dealers  and  farmers were also  incorporated  into  the  study. 
Particular gratitude  is  due  to  a  number  of  tolerant and patient 
individuals  in  the  industry who  set aside  their time  to  explain the 
workings  of their  industry,  who  must  unfortunately  remain  unanimous  for 
reasons  of confidentiality. 115 
DEFINITION  AND  SCOPE  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 
For  the purposes  of  this  study  the  industry embraces all machinery 
designed  exclusively  for  farm use;  tractors,  harvesting machinery, 
tillage and  miscellaneous  implements,  and  machinery  installed  in  farm 
buildings  such  as milking machinery,  crop  hanpling  and  drying  equipment. 
It excludes  garden  equipment,  tractors used  for  industrial and  construc-
tion purposes,  motor vehicles  and  farm buildings.  It corresponds  to 
the  two  Census  of Production minimum  list headings  380 (tractors)  and 
331  (agricultural machinery). 
Size and  Shape  of the  Industry 
The  size and  growth  of  the  industry  is indicated  by  Table  9.1.  The 
industry serves  a  replacement  market  and  despite  a  boom  in demand  in 
1973/74 its size  remained  fairly constant  in real  terms  at around 
£200 million for  the  last few  years.  As  will become  more  apparent 
later,  the  distinction between  tractors  and  other farm  equipment  is 
important.  The  industry has  a  powerful 1  export-orientated tractor 
sector which  exports  over  70%  of  its output,  and  a  comparatively tveak 
equipment  sector which  exports around  25%  of its output.  The  trade 
balance  is strongly positive  in tractors and  roughly  neutral  in  farm 
equipment. 
Table  9.2  indicates  that the  industry's  size distribution is very 
unequal.  It is dominated  by very  few  companies  which  dwarf  the  remainder. 
Massey  Ferguson alone  accounted  for  20%  of the  total U.K.  agricultural 
machinery  sales  in  1973.  Of  the  seven  largest  companies,  five  are 
tractor companies,  five  are multinationals.  In 1973  there was  only  one 
top-ranked British-owned company,  British Leyland,  and  only  two  indigenous 
equipment manufacturers with turnovers  in excess of £10  million,  How·ard 
and  Ransomes,  both of which  factor  a  nnmber  of  foreign products. 116 
TABLE  9.1 
SALES,  EXPORTS  AND  !~WORTS OF  AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY  - 1968-74 
U.K.  Agricultural Machinery  Sales~  ExP._~E..~..:c:; 2  Imports  1968-74  ( £m);': 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974-
Sales  (1)  Tractors  140  143  135  142  160  16l.  197 
Equipment  76  75  72  74  106  134  172 
Total  216  218  207  215  266  298  369 
Total  .  ( 2)  -1968  pr1ces  216  210  180  170  197  207  207 
Exports 
(1)  Tractors  100  104  93  104  113  119  145 
Equipment  27  29  28  27  24  32  42 
Total  128  133  121  131  137  151  187 
Imports(l)  Tractors  4  3  4  4  6  10  11 
Equipment  15  14  16  19  27  44  59 
Total  19  17  20  23  33  54  70 
Trade  Balance  (3)  Tractors  96  101  89  100  107  108  134 
Equipment  14  15  12  8  -3  -12  -17 
Total  109  116  101  108  104  97  117 
% Sales  Tractors  71  73  69  73  71  72  74 
Exported  Equipment  36  39  39  37  23  24  24 
Total  59  61  58  61  52  51  51 
% Home  Market  Tractors  91  89  91  90  89  82  81 
Supplied  by  Equipment:  77  77  77  71  75  70  69  Industry 
Total  81  82  81  78  80  73  72 
U.K.  Market (4)  Tractors  44  44  46  42  53  56  64 
(domestic  Equipment  64  60  60  66  109  146  189  consumption) 
Total  108  104  106  108  162  202  253 
Total 
- 1968  prices  108  100  93  88  120  140  142 
*  all values  are  .counded  to  the  nearest  £  million. 
Sources:  (1)  Business Monitor Series,  Department of  Industry.  (Tractor 
data  refer  to  completed  tractors.) 
(2)  Based  on  index of wholesale mechanical  engineering prices, 
Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
(3)  Exports  - Imports. 
(4)  Sales - Exports +  Imports. 117 
TABLE  9. 2 
COMPANIES  WITH  TURNOVER  IN  EXCESS  OF  [1  MILLION  - 1973 
_C_o_m~p_a_n~y~  _________________  l_9_7_3 __  S_a_l_e  __  s_* ____  M_a __  in Products 
Massey  Ferguson"''"''"  190-.'•·k•'"" 
Ford**  100*** 
International Harvester**  60 
Howard  40 
New  Holland**  25*** 
David  Brown'''"""  20 
British Leyland  20•':-:...:: 
Ransomes  15 
Alfa-Laval**  10 
Fullwood & Bland  8 
Bamford  8 
County Commercial  6 
Gascoigne,  Gush  & Dent  5 
Simplex  4 
Bentall  3 
Salopian Kenneth-Hudson  2 
Standen  2 
Root Harvester  1-2 
Bamford  & Evershed  1-2 
Alvan Blanch  1-2 
Archie Kidd  1-2 
Turner Engineering  1-2 
British Lely**  1-2 
Twose  1-2 
Parmiter  1-2 
Teagle  1-2 
Stanhay  1-2 
Full  line 
Tractors 
Full  line 
Rotary  cultivators 
Grain  and  grass  harvesting machinery 
Tractors 
Tractors 
Tillage  equipment  and  root harvesters 
Milking  equipment 
Milking  equipment 
Harvesting and  tillage equipment 
Tractors 
Milking  and  farmyard  equipment 
Grain handling  and  storage equipment, 
milking machinery 
Crop  drying  equipment 
Hay  making  equipment,  ploughs 
Root  harvesting equipment 
Root  harvesting equipment 
Hedge  trimming  equipment,  cultivators 
Crop  drying  equipment 
Forage harvesters,  rollers 
Flail mowers 
Hay-making machinery 
Miscellaneous  implements 
Miscellaneous  implements 
Miscellaneous  implements 
Precision drills 
*  Sales  figures  are  rounded;  more  precise figures  appear  in Table 12.2. 
**  Foreign owned  companies. 
***  Estimated;  no  separate accounts published  for  agricultural machinery 
divisions. 118 
The  polarisation of  the  industry  into  tractors and  equipment  becomes 
more  apparent  by  looking at  the  size  structqres of these  two  sectors 
in Table  9.3.  The  tractor  sector is more  concentrated;  whereas  five 
major U.K.  tractor producers  accounted  for  90%  of  the  employment  in 
this sector,  six companies  accounted  for  only  40%  of  the  employment  in 
the  equipment  sector.  Tractor plants  are  of course  larger,  operated 
on  a  flow-line  basis whereas  the  smaller equipment plants operate  a  batch 
system with  the  exceptions  of Howard  and  New  Holland.  Whereas  94%  of 
employees  in  the  tractor sector worked  in establishments  employing more 
than  200  employees,  61%  of  the  equipment  sector employees  worked  in 
plants of this size. 
TABLE  9.3 
SIZE  STRUCTURE  OF  TRACTORS  AND  EQUIPffi~NT  SECTORS  - 1968 
Tractors  EguiEment 
Number  of  Proportion of  Number  of  Proportion of 
Number  of  Employees  Enterprises"''"  Sector  Labour  Enterprises*  Sector Labour 
in each  Establishment  Force  (%)  Force  (%) 
1  - 5  13  less  than  1  119  2 
6  - 10  11  "  75  3 
10 - 24  13  "  109  10 
25  - 49  4  "  25  5 
50 - 99  7  2  26  9 
100 - 199  4  2  14  10 
200  - 499  4  4  12  21 
over  500  5  90  6  40 
Total  65  100  366  100 
*  Some  double-counting  may  occur  to  the  extent that enterprises declare 
employment  in  more  than  one  size-class of establishment. 
Source:  Reports  on  the  Census  of Production,  1968,  50 & 81. 
Ownership  Patterns 
The  multinational  companies are diversified,  the  indigenous  companies 
tend  to  be  specialists.  Ford  is of course primarily a  vehicle builder. 
Massey  Ferguson  and  International Harvester originated as  farm  equipment 
companies  but  have  since diversified  into  industrial  and  construction 
equipment.  New  Holland  is part of  the  Sperry Rand  organisation.  David  Brown 119 
was  acquired  in  1972  by J .I.  Case,  the United  States full  line agricul-
tural machinery  manufacturer,  now  part of  the  Tenneco  Group.  Alfa-Laval 
is part of  the  Swedish Engineering Group. 
Most  of  the  indigenous  companies  are  specialists  and  have  long  traditions 
in  the  industry;  only a  handful  are  linked  to  companies  in other 
industries.  Six  companies  have  been acquired  in recent years  by  com-
panies  outside  the  industry:  Simplex  by  G.E.C.,  Gascoigne  Gush  & Dent 
by  Thomas  Tilling,  Bentalls  by  Acrow,  Stanhay  by Hestair,  Standen  by 
Tremlett,  Salopian Kenneth Hudson  by  Rubery  Ch-1en.  In  these  cases  the 
acquirer acts more  or  less as  a  holding  company,  appointing a  Managing 
Director  and  relying  on  fairly  relaxed  reporting relationships.  The 
acquired  companies  have  not apparently been  used  as  a  vehicle  for 
companies  outside  the  industry  to  exploit  their existing facilities  in 
agricultural machinery production or marketing.  Mergers  between 
agricultural machinery  companies  are fairly rare.  In  recent years 
Ransomes  acquired Catchpole,  once  a  successful  specialist in  sugar-beet 
harvesting machinery;  Root  Harvester acquired Wheatley Trailers.  Two 
other acquisitions were  of  a  horizontal  nature,  strengthening existing 
market positions;  Bamford  acquired Jones  Balers  securing a  20%  of  the 
U.K.  baler market;  Stanhay acquired Ernest Webb  to  obtain  a  90%  share 
of  the  precision drill market. 
Forward  integration is rare  in  the industry;  David  Brown  acquired eight 
dealers  in Lincolnshire  and  East Anglia  to  gain better access  to  the 
large acre  farm market;  Howard  acquired  the marketing  company  J.  Mann, 
the U.K.  distributor of  the Claas  Combine.  Generally,  the  structure 
of the  industry has  not  been greatly modified  by mergers  and  acquisitions. 
Market  Structure 
The  profile of  the  industry provided  so  far  is  simply  descriptive, 
depicting  the  concentration of the  industry  in  terms  of U.K.  production. 
Descriptive statistics of this sort do  not illuminate  the  critical 
aspects of  an  industry's  structure,  namely  the  inter-relations between 
the  companies  concerned.  They  do  not  indicate which  companies  compete 
directly with each  other;  whether  large  companies  compete with other 
large  companies  or whether  they  each  dominate  a  sub-sector of  the  market. 120 
In other words,  the  structure of an  industry  in  terms  of  aggregate 
production or  turnover  tells us  little about  the  structure of  mar~e_!1! 
because it ignores  two  critical elements  - market  segmentation  and 
international  trade.  Table  9.1  provided  a  general  indication of  the 
role of  trade  in  the  industry.  Table  9.4  shows  the  market  leaders 
and  the  role  of  trade  in  the  industry's  main  sub-sectors.  Market 
leaders are mentioned  in order of  their estimated position  in  these 
markets;  for  reasons  discussed  later,  it is difficult  to  obtain,  or 
publish,  precise market  shares  for a  number  of markets.  Imported 
machines  are asterisked.  The  detailed market  structure  to  larger sec-
tors,  tractors and  combines,  is  shown  in Table  9.5. 
TABLE  9.4: 
MARKET  SEG~ffiNTATION  IN  THE  AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY  INDUSTRY 
1974  Market 
Market 
Tractors 
Combine 
Harvesters 
Balers 
Forage 
Harvesters 
Milking 
Equipment 
Rotary 
Cultivators 
Size 
(Nearest 
63 
25 
8 
6 
7 
7 
5 
% 
£m)  Imports 
17 
80 
30 
70 
15 
5 
13 
Market  Leaders 
Ford,  Massey  Ferguson,  David 
Claas-1:,  New  Holland-1:,  Massey 
Ferguson 
New  Holland,  Bamford,  Massey 
Fergusoni;-
New  Holland*,  John Deere*, 
Barmfordi: 
Fullward & Bland,  Alfa-Laval, 
Gascoigne  Gush  & Dent 
Howard,  Bomford  & Evershed 
Howard,  Massey  Ferguson 
Brm.;n 
Manure  Spreaders 
Grain Drying & 
Handling 
Equipment 
5  0  Bentall, Alvan Blanch,  Simplex 
Haymaking 
Equipment 
Root Harvesters 
Ploughs 
Fertiliser 
Distributors 
*  Imported machines. 
4 
4 
3 
3 
60 
50 
40 
30 
Fahr*,  PZ*,  Bamford*,  New  Holland*, 
Lely 
Standen,  Grimme*,  Ransomes*, 
Root Harvester 
Ransomes,  Bamford*,  Massey 
Ferguson*,  Colchester Tillage*, 
SKHi• 
Vicon*,  Bomford  & Evershed 121 
It is apparent  from  Table  9.4  that  the  industry is  fairly well  segmen-
ted  into  non-competing  sub-groups.  Three  of  the  five  major U.K.  tractor 
companies  are  specialists.  Only  Massey  Ferguson has  significant 
positions  in other agricultural machinery  markets;  the other  two  main 
North American  full-line  companies,  International Harvester and  John 
Deere,  have  limited  roles  in the U.K.  - International Harvester estab-
lished plants  in Britain  only  in  1951  after Massey  Ferguson had  already 
established  dominant  positions  and  John  Deere  has  no  production facilities 
in the  U.K.  at all.  Nmv  Holland  does  not  manufacture  tractors but  has  a 
strong position in all three of  the  markets  for  the heavier machines  for 
harvesting grass  and  grain - combines,  foragers  and  balers.  New  Holland 
is not  so  strongly  represented  in  the  smaller haymaking  machines which 
it includes  more  for  the  sake  of  completing  the  product line than for 
profitability.  Leadership  in  these markets  belongs  to  German,  Dutch  and 
French  companies,  Fahr,  PZ,  Lely and  Kuhn.  The  largest  indigenous 
manufacturer,  Ransomes,  is significantly involved  in only  two  sectors, 
tillage equipment  and  root  harvesters.  Howard  has  a  special position in 
rotary cultivators, which it pioneered.  It also  developed  a  'big roll 
baler'  and  imports  the Claas  combine which holds  the market  leadership, 
through  a  marketing  subsidiary,  Manns  of Saxham.  Milking machinery 
companies have  diversified  into other  farmyard  equipment,  notably machinery 
for  treating and  handling slurry,  but  they  remain  basically milking 
specialists,  as  do  the  crop drier manufacturers.  Not  surprisingly,  as 
one  penetrates  further  into sub-sectors,  specialisation is still greater 
and  market  dominance  can  be  very substantial;  Vicon  in fertiliser broad-
casters,  Stanhay  in precision drills and  Bomford  & Evershed  in tractor-
mounted  hedge  trimmers  are  examples  of this.  It is clear that market 
segmentation  is quite pronounced  in this industry.  Apart  from Massey 
Ferguson and  New  Holland, it is unusual  to  find  companies with  leading 
market  positions  in  several  sectors. 122 
TABLE  9. 5: 
MARKET  LF..ADERS  IN  TilE  U.K.  TRACTOR  AND  COMBINE  MARKETS 
Tractor Market  Shares  (%)  Combine  Market  Shares  (%) 
1972 (l)  1973 (2)  1974 (2)  1972 (2)  1974 (3) 
Source  of 
Company__  Company  Machines 
Ford  29  27  27  Claas  27  28  Germany 
Massey  32  25  24  New  28  23  Belgium 
Ferguson  Holland 
David  Brown  11  11  10  Massey  26  22  U.K. 
Ferguson 
Interna- 9  11  10  John  Deere  9  9  Germany 
tional 
Harvester 
British  7  10  9  La verda  7  9  Italy 
Leyland 
Zetor  n/a  n/a  5  Fahr  n/a  3  Germany 
John Deere  n/a  3  4  Ransomes  n/a  2  U.K. 
Interna- n/a  1.5  France 
tional 
Harvester 
Dania  n/a  0.5  Denmark 
Total 
Market  33,000  33,000  30,000  2,600  4,000 
(units) 
Sources:  (1)  "Profile of  the Tractor Industry",  Richard  Lee,  Agricultural 
Machinery Journal,  March  1974,  based  on  Economist  Intelligence 
Unit's Bulletin,  Motor  Business. 
(2)  Conversations  in  the  industry. 
(3)  "Market Analysis of  the  Combine  Harket",  Ian Greig,  Agricul-
tural Machinery Journal,  January  1975. 
In tractors Ford  and  Massey  Ferguson usually account  jointly for  50-60% 
of  the market  and  have  competed  closely for  the  leadership for  many  years. 
A  significant cause  of  changes  in  shares is supply difficulties;  both 
companies'  shares  suffered  in  1973  due  to  losses  in output  due  to  indus-
trial unrest  and  boom  demand  conditions which  sucked  in additional  imports, 
mainly  from Eastern Europe.  The  significant feature  of the  tractor market 
structure  is that around  60%  of  the tractor market  is supplied  by  companies 
with  no  interest in equipment,  leaving a  high  proportion of dealers  open 
to  the  equipment  specialists. 123 
In  combines,  three  suppliers  account  for  three-quarters of the U.K. 
combine  sales,  only  one  of which,  Massey  Ferguson,  manufacture  combines 
in the U.K.,  apart  from Lely which manufactures  only  a  handful.  The 
only  significant  indigenous  producer,  Ransomes,  ceased  production in 
1974.  The  two  leading positions are occupied  by  specialists,  Claas  and 
Claeys;  the latter was  acquired  by  New  Holland  in 1964.  There  is very 
little overlap  between  these  two  largest markets;  only Hassey  Ferguson, 
80%  of whose  world wide  farm  equipment  business  is concentrated  in  these 
two  products,  appear  in  the  top  five  in both  the U.K.  tractor and  combine 
mark~ts. 
Concentration  in  these markets  could  be  described as fairly substantial; 
in  1974  the  top  four  companies  accounted  for  80%  of the  tractor market 
and  84%  of  the  combine  market.  These  degrees  of concentration are 
comparable with what  is known  of  the  concentration in  the  smaller  sectors 
of  the  industry,  with this  important  difference;  it is rare for  the 
market  leader  in  the  larger sectors  - tractors,  combines,  balers and 
foragers  - to corner more  than  40%  of  the market.  The  usual position 
seems  to be  that  the  leader has  around  one-third of the market,  followed 
by another  company  with only  slightly less.  In other words  leadership 
in  these  sectors  does  not  imply  dominanc·e.  In the  smaller  sectors 
leadership  is more  pronounced;  the  dominant  company  frequently  has  a 
share of  60%  or more,  and  sometimes  exceeds as  much  as  90%. 
The  Role  of Trade 
Imports  account for  around  30%  of non-tractor equipment  sales  in  the U.K. 
and  it is  important  to understand  the  significance and  origins of these 
imports.  As  Table  9. 4  shows,  import  pere tration is significant in 
combines,  forage  harvesters,  haymaking  equipment,  root harvesters, 
ploughs  and  fertiliser distributors.  In part,  the  trade position reflects 
sourcing decisions  by  the multinationals.  The  world agricultural machinery 
industry is dominated  by  the North American  full-line producers,  Massey 
Ferguson,  International Harvester  and  John Deere,  all of w1om  extended 
their manufacturing operations  to  Europe  after  the  Second World  War.  The 
bulk of  the U.K.  imports which  originate  from  these  companies  are  sourced 
from  their E.E.C.  locations,  as  Table  9.6  indicates. 124 
TABLE  9. 6: 
E.E.C.  LOCATIONS  OF  U.S.  MULTINATIONALS'  OPE!~TIONS 
Company 
Massey 
Ferguson 
International 
Harvester 
John Deere 
Ford 
New  Holland 
United  Kingdom 
engines 
tractors 
combines 
mowers 
tractors 
(lower  HP) 
transmissions 
tractors 
components 
balers 
mowers 
trailed  foragers 
France 
tractors 
combines 
balers 
combines 
transmissions 
implements 
Germ!!n.l 
components 
engines 
tractors 
tractors 
combines 
tractors 
. Belgium 
tractors 
components 
combines 
foragers 
Note:  In addition  implements  are  bought  in on  an E.E.C.-wide basis, 
e.g.  Massey  Ferguson  buys  in Huard  ploughs  from France,  New  Holland 
buys  in Stolle hay  tedders  from Germany,  Internatwnal Harvester 
buys  in ploughs  from Norway. 
All  the  tractor companies  mentioned  compete  actively  in France  and  Germany; 
in 1973  Massey  Ferguson was  market  leader  in  the French tractor market 
with an  18%  share,  International Harvester was  second with a  16%  share 
and  Ford was  fifth with  9%.  In  Germany,  International Harvester has  led 
the tractor market  for  five  years,  currently holding a  22%  market  share. 
Massey  Ferguson,  Ford  and  International Harvester  jointly manufacture 
over half the  tractors produced  in Western  Europe.  The  multinationals 
are  integrating their E.E.C.  operations,  sourcing  their implement  require-
ments  from one  location and  transferring components  between plants.  At 
one  time,  International Harvester produced  tractors and  combines  in each 
major E.E.C.  market;  after 1962  a  decision was  taken  to  locate  combine 
production  in France,  tractor production  in  the  U.K.  and  Germany. 
Integration embraces  component  shipments  too;  International Harvester 
ships  tractor transmissions  from  France  to  Germany  and  engines  from 
Germany  to  France  and  the U.K.  Ford  operates  two  tractor plants  in Europe 
at Antwerp  in Belgium and  Basildon  in Britain;  Antwerp  supplies Basildon 125 
with  rear axles  and  gear  boxes,  Basildon  supplies Antwerp  \lith engines 
and hydraulic  units. 
The  remaining  imports  are  due  largely  to  the  activities of a  number  of 
medium-small  equipment  specialists,  v7ith  outstanding product  designs, 
backed  by  good  dealer organisations  in  this  country.  Claas  of  Germany 
and  Claeys  of Belgium both  developed  reliable high  volume  combines  which 
were  more  suited  to  the  damp  U.K.  conditions  and  high yields per acre 
on  British farms  than  the  early prairie machines  from North America. 
They  were  both  strongly represented  in Britain,  Claas  by  Mann  and  Claeys 
by  Bamford  until  1964,  and  then  by  Ne\v  Holland.  Continental  companies 
made  significant advances  in haymaking  equipment.  The  Dutch  company 
Lely  developed  the  'spider wheel 
1  windro\ver,  PZ  developed  hay  conditioners 
and  drum  mowers,  both of which  speeded  up  haymaking  operations.  The 
third Dutch  company,  Vicon,  developed  the  modern  fertiliser distributor, 
based  on  research at Wageningen University.  In  Germany  Fahr  developed 
a  rotary star hay  conditioner and  Grimme  pioneered potato harvesters. 
In France Huard  (ploughs)  and  Kuhn  (haymaking  equipment)  are  the 
outstanding  companies  which  have  penetrated  the United  Kingdom  market. 
The  Norwegian  company,  Kvernelands,  has  made  a  large  impact  on  the  plough 
market,  despite  the  dominance  of  Ransomes,  partly  due  to  its  success  in 
the world  ploughing championships  following  the  withdraHal  of Ransomes 
from this kind  of competition. 
Imported  products  owe  part  of  their success  in the U.K.  to  the  factoring 
operations  of manufacwring  companies  like Bamford  and  Ransomes  and  to 
the  existence of  importers  such  as  Pearson,  Watveare,  Bamlett  and 
Colchester Tillage,  which have  strong marketing  skills and,  in  some 
cases,  notably  Pearson,  contribute  to  adapting  foreign  equipment  to 
suit British conditions.  It has  been  suggested  that marketing  special-
ists are  more  effective because  they  treat marketing as  a  profit centre, 
rather  than as  an  adjunct of  production. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  critical structural features  of  the  industry are: 
(1)  The  importance of  the multinational  companies  and,  to  a  lesser degree, 
their E.E.C.-wide  sourcing decisions. 126 
(2)  The  distinction between  tractor and  equipment  sectors  in  terms 
of company  size,  ownership  and  production methods. 
(3)  The  fragmented  nature of  the  equipment  sectors. 
(4)  The  importance  of market  segmentation. 
(5)  The  predominance  of  foreign  companies  in  several  sectors. 
The  significance of  these  features  for  competitive  behaviour  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  large  companies  compete  primarily with other  large  companies, 
smaller  companies  with  smaller  companies.  It follows  that  the  industry 
structure has  less  significance  than  the  market  structure  since it ignores 
market  segmentation and  the  role of trade.  Concentration was  found  to  be 
substantial  in  most  sectors  of  the  industry but interestingly,  many  medium 
small  companies  which  achieve  market  sector  leadership were jul ged  to 
have  larger market  shares  than  the  giants of  the  industry.  In  terms  of 
the  structure of  the  relevant market,  larger companies  face  more  competi-
tion  than  many  of the  smaller  companies.  The  more  successful of  the  latter 
have  contrived  to  occupy  and  dominate  a  particular niche  in  the market, 
so avoiding head-on  competition with  the major  producers;  their  ~~in 
source of competition derives  from  companies  of  similar  size  in other 
E.E.C.  countries. 127 
CHAPTER  10  - THE  INDUSTRY'S  ENVIRONMENT 
The  industry has  operated within  a  stable  environment.  As  Table  10.1 
indicates,  the  aggregate  demand  for  agricultural machinery  remained 
static in real  terms  for  most  of  the  period  1963-73.  As  Table  10.2  shows 
the  demand  for  individual  items  is also fairly  stable.  This  is unusual 
for a  capital  goods  industry;  in fact,  the  industry exhibited  less cyc-
lical behaviour  than any  other mechanical  engineering sector  in  the  1960s. 
This  stability is largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the British farming 
industry is administered  in  such  a  way  as  to  stabilise  farm  incomes  (see 
Table  10.2).  Relative  crop  prices  remain  stable and  so  too  does  the  cmp 
pattern.  The  two  main  crops are  cereals  and  grass.  Over  75%  of  the 
12  million or  so  acres under  tillage  in  the U.K.  are accounted  for  by 
cereals.  Mown  grass  accounts  for  another  5~ million acres.  The  remaining 
crops  provide  very  limited markets  for machinery,  in order of  importance: 
potatoes,  1.5 million acres;  sugar-beet,  0.5 million acres;  vegetables, 
Oe4  million acres.  The  pattern is set for  the  industry;  the  larger 
companies  concentrate  on  providing tractors,  tillage and  harvesting 
equipment  for  cereals and  grass,  leaving machinery  for  the  farmyard, 
milking,  planting and  harvesting  sugar-beet and  potatoes  and  other vege-
tables  to  the  smaller companies. 
TABLE  10.1: 
GROSS  FIXED  CAPITAL  FORMATION  IN  U.K.  AGRICULTURE  :  1963-73  (£m  current prices) 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967.  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Vehicles  19  20  19  19  20  20  19  18  35  40  45 
Plant and  86  86  86  88  91  102  94  100  99  129  191 
Machinery 
New  Buildings  63  65  67  65  75  88  99  114  137  160  209 
All Fixed  168  171  172  172  186  210  212  232  271  329  448 
Assets 
All Fixed  168  168  164  158  168  181  177  179  190  212  264 
Assets 
(1963  prices) 
Source:  National  Income  and  Expenditure,  Central Statistical Office. 
In the  long  term this  type  of market  poses  no  perplexing problems  for 
company  strategists.  Cornp:1 nies  can plan confident  that  the  broad  dimensions 128 
of the  agricultural  machinery market  look much  the  same  10  years  ahead 
as  they  do  at present.  But  in  the  short  term,  the  market  poses  definite, 
problems.  Demand  is strongly seasonal  as  the  Chart  10.1  indicates. 
Deliveries are  peaked  in  the  first quarter and  even  more  so  in  the  second 
of each year,  reflecting expenditure  on  heavy  harvesting equipment  in 
the  spring  and  the  farmer•s  desire  to  reinvest available  income  before 
the  end  of  the  financial year  in April  for  tax  reasons.  The  seasonal 
nature of  demand,  coupled with  farmers'  preference  for  short  lead  times, 
compels agricultural machinery  manufacturers  to  consider ways  of  coping 
with uncertainty,  either by  manufacturing  for  stock,  better forecasting 
or by  shifting the  stock  on  to  dealers or  farmers  in  the off season  by 
suitable discounts. 
To  try to understand  the workings  of the agricultural machinery markets, 
some  econometric  results have  been  assembled  for  selected products. 
They  identify  some  of the  factors  influencing demand  and  enable  some 
distinction to be  drawn  between  the  sub-sectorsof  the market.  They 
also  indicate  some  of the difficulties  in  forecasting  in  this  industry. 
TABLE  10.2: 
EXPENDITURE  ON  SELECTED  AGRICUL11TRAL  }fACHINES  ( £m  current prices) 
Product 
Category  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  197~ 
Tractors 
(excluding 
truck-
laying) 
Balers 
Dairy 
Nachinery 
Root 
Harvesters 
Manure 
Spreaders 
Farm 
Incomes 
30  28  30 
4.3  5.1  4.4 
2.7  2.9  3.4 
1.7  1.9  2.0 
1.8  2.0  2.2 
450  460  460 
34  38  43  42 
3.0  2.9  4.2  4.0 
4.5  4.9  6.1  5.9 
2.1  2.3  2.7  1.9 
2.1  2.4  2.5  2.3 
480  520  480  560 
Sources:  Business Monitor,  Department  of Industry; 
Trade Statistics of  the U.K.; 
46  42  52  73 
4.5  3.8  5.9  5.0 
6.1  8.9  n/a  9.4 
2.3  2.3  3.0  3.7 
2.0  2.1  3.1  4.4 
610  684  860  1280 
Survey  of  Farm  Incomes,  Ministry of Agriculture,  Fisheries & Food. 
85 
7.9 
10.5 
4.2 
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Demand  Studies  in Agricultural Machinery  Sectors 
The  U.K.  demand  for  tractors has  been  studied  in depth  by  Raynor  and 
Cowling(!)  who  found  that  the  demand  for  tractors was  largely explained 
by  the  changes  in  the  price  of  tractors,  relative  to  the  price  of 
agricultural  labour,  and  the existing stock of  tractors  in British farms. 
Farm  incomes  were  not  found  to  be  a  decisive  factor.  Between  1963  and 
1973  agricultural machinery prices  rose  by  70%  and  agricultural -.;.;rage 
rates  by  150%.  Largely  in  response  to  this  change  in relative  factor 
prices,  tractors have  been  substituted  for  labour  in  a  process  of capital 
deepening.  The  price elasticity was  found  to  be  around  0.7  in  the  short 
run  and  unity  in  the  long  run.  The  existing stock of  tractors was  found 
to have  a  depressing effect on  demand,  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
tractor is  a  large  item which  not all farmers  wish  to  change  each  year 
in response  to  changed  economic  circumstances.  The  closer is  the 
farmer's  'stock'  of  tractors  to  the  level  that he  desires,  the  less is 
his  desire  to  replace  them.  Incomes  were  not  found  to  be  a  decisive 
factor  because  tractors are  a  fairly basic  item which  farmers  accord 
.  .  I  1  t  d  ( 2 )  h  h  .  .  d  k  pr1or1ty.  n  a  a  er stu  y  t  e  aut ors  1nvest1gate  tractor mar et 
shares  and  found  them  to be  strongly influenced  by  the relative horsepower 
price  of  each manufacturer,  with  share  price elasticities of  around  three 
in  the  short  run  and  seven  in the  long  run.  These  results  suggest  that 
price changes  could  be  a  potent  competitive weapon  leading  us  to  expect 
fairly narrow  tractor price differentials  and  a  fairly  guarded  attitude 
to price competition. 
The  demand  for  implements  appears  to  be  governed  by  different factors. 
Table  10.3  presents  the  resultsfor three  products,  balers,  fertiliser 
distributors  and  manure  spreaders.  It is apparent  that farm  incomes 
largely explain  the  sales of  the  two  smaller  implements,  fertiliser 
·distributors and  manure  spreaders,  whereas  relative prices  and  existing 
stocks  have  no  significant  impact  on  their sales.  The  sales of balers 
are  not affected  by  farm  incomes.  Their  sales  behave  rather  similarly 
to  tractor  sales  in that they are affected  by  baler prices and  the 
existing stock of balers  on  the  farms. 
(1)  "Demand  for  a  Durable  Input:  An  Analysis  of  the U.K.  Market  for 
Farm Tractors",  A.J.  Raynor  and Keith Cowling,  Review  of Economics 
and  Statistics,  November  1967. 
(2)  "Price, Quality and  Market  Share",  A.J.  Raynor  and  Keith  Cmvling, 
Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol.  78,  1970. TABLE  10.3: 
DEMAND  EQUATIONS 
(£ million) 
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SELECTED  IMPLEMENTS  DEPENDENT  VARIA=B~L~E~~A~N~NU~A~~L~D~E~·}_~_N_D 
Product  Constant  -n  2 
'""  ·~----~~---~~--------
Pick-Up 
Balers 
Artificial 
Fertiliser 
Distribu-
tors 
Manure 
Spreaders 
26,900 
-1,921 
11,000  3. 27-Jo': 
(4.62) 
-6,900 
(0.91) 
-.37 
(1.00) 
.35 
.95 
.82 
(t  ratios appear  in brackets) 
*  indicates  significance at the  5%  level. 
**  indicates  significance at the  1%  level. 
Sources & Hethods:  U.K.  Demand:  U.K.  Production+ Imports-Exports  Produc-
tion  figures,  were  obtained  from  the Business Honitor 
Series,  Department  of  Industry,  trade  figures  from Trade 
Statistics of  the U.K. 
Farm Incomes:  Farm  Incomes  in England  and Wales  1972-73, 
Ministry of Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food. 
Relative Prices:  Relative Price  refers  to  the  ratio of 
a  retail machinery  price  index  to  the  agricultural  ~age 
index.  Prices were  obtained  for  representative machines 
from  some  of  the manufacturers  concerned,  who  were  asked 
to  identify machines  which  had  remained  broadly  unchanged 
over  the period. 
Stocks:  Series were  based  on  the Agricultural Census  for 
Great Britain,  1963,  and  developed  by  adding  successive 
annual  purchases  and  depreciating  by  12%  per  annum,  a 
rate calculated by  John Nix,  "Farm Management  Pocket-
book",  Wye  College,  1974. 
From  these results  and  the  much  more  detailed  studies by  Raynor  Rnd  Cowling 
on  tractors,  there  emerges  a  clear distinction between  larger basic  items 
such  as  tractors  and  balers  and  the  smaller  items  lower  down  in  the  farmer's 
pecking order.  Sales of  the  larger  items are price sensitive but  because 
they are basic  to  farming  operations  they  are  not  affected greatly by 
farm  incomesCO. Existing stocks  are  important  too;  other  things  being equal, 
a  larger stock this year  implies  fewer  sales  next year.  Sales  of  smaller 
items  on  the other hand  are  governed  by  how  much  money  the  farmer  has  left 
(1)  This  refers  to  normal  conditions;  the really sienificant rise  in arable 
incomes  in  1973  due  to  the  rise  in  the world  grain price  led  to  a  sig-
nificant rise in tractor demand. 132 
to  spend after making  his  larger purchases.  This  confirms  the  observa-
tion made  by  several  companies  that farmers  consult their accountant at 
the  end  of the  financial year and  use  any  surplus  funds  at short notice 
to  buy  small  items  of equipment.  In other words,  large  items  are  purchased 
like capital equipment,  small  items  like consumer  products. 
FORECASTING  IN  THE  INDUSTRY 
The  strongly seasonal pattern of agricultural machinery  demand  makes  it 
important  that manufacturers  forecast accurately one year  ahead  so  that 
adequate  stocks are available for  the  seasonal  peak.  Delivery perfor-
mance  is more  important  in  this industry  than  in other mechanical 
engineering industries because  a  small  delay  in delivery  renders  the 
equipment useless  to  the  farmer  for  another year.  Accurate  forecasting 
is the first step  in achieving delivery performance  and  this aspect  is 
considered  now. 
Most  manufacturers  base  their forecasts  on  their own  judgements  rather 
than  formal  statistical methods.  A  few  large  companies which  have 
developed statistical procedures  use  them merely as  guidelines  to  be 
interpreted  in the light of their own  feel  for  the  market.  What  concerns 
us here  is whether  this approach  justifies itself or whether greater 
forecasting accuracy could  be  achieved  by adopting more  formal  procedures. 
This  question can be  resolved  by  a  simple  test;  if the accuracy  achieved 
by manufacturers  is greater  than  that achieved  by  statistical methods, 
the  industry's  informal methods  are vindicated.  Manufacturers  typically 
predict sales  for  the period 9-21  months  ahead,  finalising  their manu-
facturing programmes  for  the  following year  in  the  spring of  the  previous 
year.  The  accuracy  achieved varies with  the  product;  manufacturers  of 
large  items claim to achieve  forecasting accuracy  to within  5%;  manufacturers 
of smaller  implements  forecast  to within  10-15%.  This  difference  can be 
explained by  the  fact that the purchases  of smaller  items  are  subject  to 
less planning  by  farmers,  and  as will  be  seen,  the  larger companies which 
manufacture  the  larger items are  better organised  to monitor market 
trends.  The  accuracy claimed  by  manufacturers  is probably overstated 
in  some  cases.  No  company  which  discussed  this question professed  to 
really know  the  extent of unsatisfied  demand  for its products.  Many  do 
not  even  know  the  final  demand;  they  only know  the  sales  to  dealers  each 133 
year  and  tend  to  deduce  final  demand  from  these  sales,  and  any  knowledge 
of dealers'  stock changes  that  they possess  - fairly slight in many 
cases.  Forecasting errors appear  small  partly because manufacturers 
incline  tmvards  a  conservative manufacturing policy,  preferring to  leave 
some  demand  unsatisfied  than  to  be  left holding unsold  stocks for perhaps 
another year,  'vhich are  a  burden  on  costs  and  interfere with plans  to 
introduce  new  models. 
Could  these  forecasting limits  be  narrowed  by  statistical analysis?  The 
tractor model  was  subject  to  a  10%  mean  error.  This  implies  that if 
manufacturers  had  correct  information  on  the  rclevant  variables  - the 
price of  tractors relative  to agricultural  labour and  the existing stock 
of  tractors  on  the  farm,  10%  is the  average  limit of  the model's  fore-
casting accuracy.  Since  the  explanatory variables  in  the model  are 
either pre-determined or predictable it is a  useful  forecasting model 
and  the  10%  limits could  be  actually achieved  if it were  used  for  this 
purpose.  However,  it is less accurate  than  tractor manufacturer's  own 
forecasting methods.  The  model's  strength lies in predicting turning 
points  in  tractor  expenditure  (in real  terms).  Between  1950  and  1965 
there were  seven  down-turns  in real  tractor sales.  Whereas  a  naive  trend 
projection would  not  have  predicted  any  of  these,  the  tractor model 
predicted  four  of  them;  it was  also able  to  predict changes  in both 
directions  in  13  out of  the  15  years  covered  by  the  model. 
The  largest  formal  forecasting  study of  the  industry was  carried out  by 
the P-E  Consulting Group  for  the National  Economic  Development  Office 
in 1970(l).  With hindsight it is possible  to  check  on  the  accuracy of 
these  forecasts after adjusting  them  for  differences  between  the actual 
and  anticipated  rates  of inflation.  The  average  forecast error(2)  for 
four  products  - balers,  spreaders,  root harvesters  and  milking machinery  -
for  each  of  the first  three  forecast  years  1969,  1970  and  1971,  turned 
out  to be  respectively  23%.  35%  and  56%.  The  error  inc~eased with 
distance  from  the  forecast  period as  one would expect,  but  even  the  first 
year error is rather greater than  the  limits of accuracy  manufacturers 
(1)  "Agricultural Machinery:  A  Study  in U.K.  Demand  and  World  Trade 
1963-75",  Mechanical  Engineering Economic  Development  Committee, 
N.E.D.O.,  London  1970. 
(2)  The  difference  between  actual and  forecast  demand,  as  a  percentage 
of actual  demand. 134 
set  themselves.  One  should also  remember  that the  N.E.D.O.  study  referred 
to  sectors whereas  manufacturers  have  to  consider  both  the  sector  demand 
and  their expected  share  of it(l). 
Lastly,  it is possible  to  check  forecasting accuracy  of the  demand  equa-
tions  calculated  for balers,  fertiliser distributors  and  spreaders.  The 
baler equation was  too  weak  to use  for  forecasting at all,  but  the  other 
two  fitted well  and  were  used  to  generate  forecasts  for U.K.  demand  in 
1974 at current prices.  Table 10.4 compares  actual with forecast  demand 
levels  for  these  two  products  and  reveals  that  the errors are considerable. 
TABLE  10.4: 
FORECAST  ERRORS  OF  SELECTED  I}WLEMENT  MODELS 
U.K.  Demand,  1974  (£ mil) 
Actual 
Forecast 
Forecast Error % 
Fertiliser Distributors 
2.59 
1.27 
+100% 
Source:  N.E.D.O.  Study  and  L.B.S.  Model. 
Manure  Spreaders 
4.63 
6.11 
-25% 
On  the  evidence  shown  here,  formal  statistical analysis  is unlikely  to 
offer improvements  on  the  industry's  own  methods,  and  considering  the 
difficulties  involved,  the  industry's  forecasting  efficiency  is quite 
impressive. 
THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  MARKET 
The  industry's market  structure is highly  fragmented.  As  Table 10.5 
indicates,  95%  of  farmers  farm  less  than  500  acres  and  account  for  50% 
of the  total agricultural acreage.  There  is  a  marked  geographical  seg-
mentation of the  market.  The  5%  of  farmers  who  farm  45%  of  the  arable 
acreage  are mostly  located  in  the  cereal-growing areas  in East Anglia 
and  Yorkshire.  Farms  in  the West  are  smaller  and  concentrate  on  dairy 
herds  and  grassland  farming.  This  division  simplifies marketing;  tillage 
(1)  This  is not  a  criticism of  the  study  w~tich was  intended  to  indicate 
long  term trends,  extrapolating  from  a  fairly  short data  base, 
1962-68,  and  not  demand  levels  for  particular years,  which were 
expected  to  deviate  from  this  long  term trend. 135 
and harvesting machinery  tends  to  go  East  and  dairy  equipment  and  hay-
making machinery  goes  to  the  Midlands  and  the Hest.  Moreover,  the  larger 
and  more  sophisticated  items  of  equipment,  such as  high horsepower  and 
four-wheel  drive  tractors,  the  larger combines,  reversible ploughs, 
multi-stage  sugar-beet harvesters  and  precision drills,  are  more  likely 
to  find  a  home  on  the  big eastern  farms. 
TABLE  10.5:  --------
FARHS  IN  GREAT  BRITAIN 
Farm  Size  Number  % of Total  Area  % of Total 
(acres)  ('000)  ( 1000  acres) 
less  than  5  23  9  60  0.1 
5  - so  92  36  2,020  5 
50  - 500  130  50  20,940  50 
over  500  13  5  18,470  45 
Total  258  100  41,490  100 
Source:  Agricultural Statistics of  the U.K.,  1972. 
Only  a  tiny proportion of  farmers  (3%)  employ  more  than  five  employees. 
Except  for  a  fe~v  farms  m.;ned  by  industrialists and  operated  by  profes-
sional managers,  there are  few  big customers.  There  is no  question of 
their being many  large  farm machinery  contracts  of  the  sort that vehicle 
manufacturers  conclude with fleet operators.  Farming  remains  largely 
a  family  business  and  is traditional  in outlook.  The  farmer will probably 
use  the machine  himself and  when  buying  a  machine,  his  decision process 
is fairly  informal.  He  does  not  have  to  consult anyone  or present  a 
formal  case  on  paper,  as  does  the purchasing officer of  a  typical  engin-
eering company,  for  instance. 
These  features  set the  agricultural machinery  industry apart  from  most 
other capital  goods  industries  and  help  to  shape  the marketing patterns 
for  the  industry.  The  fragmented,  dispersed  and  informal  nature of  the 
market presents  the  machinery manufacturers with peculiar problems  of 
access  and  accounts  for  the  key  role  played  by  the agricultural machinery 
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THE  DISTRIBUTION  SYSTEM 
The  machinery manufacturers  market  their products  to  the  farmer  but 
~ctually sell  them  to  the  1,200  recognised dealers  in Britain.  This  is 
an accepted  custom of  the  trade  and  it~ very  rare  indeed  for  the  manu-
facturer  to  bypass  the  dealer and  sell directly to  the  farmer.  Even  on 
those  occasions when  the manufacturer's  representative arranges  a  deal 
with the  farmer  himself,  the  local  dealer will  be  asked  to close  the 
deal  and  supply  the machine.  Manufacturers'  support  for  dealers  is 
manifested also  by  the  fact  that  250  of  them are associate  members  of 
the dealers'  trade association,  the British Agricultural and  Garden 
Machinery Association  (BAGMA).  Dealers  are  independent  of manufacturers 
aud  vertical  integration is very  rare;  David  Brown  own  eight dealerships 
in Lincolnshire  and  East Anglia  and  it is not  unknown  for  dealers  to 
manufacture  themselves  on  a  small  scale.  Dealers  are  fairly  fragmented; 
the Burgess  organisation is the  largest group,  owning  around  80 outlets, 
followed  by  Doe  and  Southern Counties  Farmers,  each with around  50 
outlets.  Even  the  largest groups  of dealers are  not  seen  by  manufacturers 
to exert any  significant degree  of market  power,  except  in  limited  geo-
graphical areas.  As  we  shall see,  the  discretion that many  dealers  have 
to accept or reject the  products  of particular manufacturers  derives  not 
from  the  market  structure of the  dealers  themselves  but  from  the marketing 
strategies of  the  dominant  machinery  manufacturers. 
The  questions  of particular interest here are:  Why  do  not  manufacturers 
deal with  farmers  direct?  What  functions  do  dealers  perform which 
manufacturers  could not perform so  effectively  themselves?  Dealers  hold 
stocks  of machines  and  spares  and  provide maintenance  and  repair facili-
ties.  The  dealers  trade  association  lays  down  minimum  standards  for  its 
members  relating to capitalisation,  specialised equipment,  workshop  floor 
space,  and  the  like, which  are vetted  by  an  inspectorate.  Maintaining 
the machine  population  in operation is one  of  the dealers'  crucial  roles 
because  timeliness  is vital in farming.  Most  machines  are used  intensively 
for a  few  weeks  of the year,  in which  time  breakdowns  could cost the 
farmer his crop ff  repair facilities or parts are unobtainable.  The  dealer's 
proximity to  the  farmer,  the  engineering servies he  offers and  his willing-
ness  to  put himself out as  occasions  demand  make  him indispensible  to  the 
farmer.  The  goodwill  that these  operations  generate  give  him the  status 137 . 
and  trust in his locality,  which  in turn makes  him indispensible  to  the 
(1) 
manufacturer  • 
In contrast,  the  chemical  companies  are  able  to sell fertilisers directly 
to  farmers  because  no  maintenance  problems arise.  Their attempts  to 
supply machines  for  applying fertilisers directly have  run  up  against 
dealers'  reluctance  to  service machines  which  they  have  not had  an 
opportunity  to  sell. 
Another  feature  of his business  is that  sales of new  machines  entail a 
trade-in of  an  old machine.  Dealers  accept  them  in part-exchange, 
re-condition  them in their workshops  and  dispose of  them  through contacts 
or  through various  auctions  around  the  country.  A manufacturer wishing 
to deal  direct has  also  to  become  involved  infue  second-hand market and 
the repair business.  It is unlikely  that the  farmer  would  wish to  buy 
a  machine unless he  could  be  assured  th~it could  receive  repairs  and 
spare parts locally.  Fearing that dealers would either refuse  to repair 
a  machine  that  they  had  not  sold  outright or have  little interest in 
doing  so,  the  farmer would  consider it a  false  economy  to buy  direct from 
a  manufacturer  rather  than  from a  dealer. 
There  are also  some  sociological aspects  to this.  Being  a  dealer is a 
way  of life.  For  one  thing he  is himself  intimately  involved with the 
local  farming  community  and  its problems.  It is no  accident  that  few 
agricultural machinery  dealers sell cars  from the  same  premises;  the 
cultures of  the  two  trades are different as  is apparent  from  the  style 
of dress,  speech  and  manner.  Because  of  the  trade's attractions its 
profitability tends  not  to  be  very great.  Despite  the  advantages  of 
large  scale operations  and  a  trend  towards  larger units,  the  dealer 
population is stable,  being continually topped  up  by  a  stream of optimists, 
many  of whom  are  encouraged  by  new  tractor companies which  have  entered 
the market.  The  financial  rewards  for  a  manufacturer wiShing  to  inte-
grate  forwards  into distribution are probably less attractive  than 
expansion  in machinery manufacture. 
(1)  This  observation refers  to  the U.K.,  where  the general quality of 
the dealer trade  is high.  In France,  the  dealer  trade  is compara-
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The  only manufacturers  who  could  conceivably  integrate  forwards  are  the 
t.ractor  companies  and  the  full  or  long  line  companies;  no  other manu-
facturer would  have  sufficient sales  in any  particular  locality to 
justify owning  its own  dealers.  But  there  is  a  wide  cultural  gap 
between  the  large  scale manufacturer  and  the  dealer.  The  former  is 
concerned  with  systems,  repetition,  procedures,  and  standardisation, 
all geared  to  producing  large  volumes  of  standardised  products at fixed 
prices(l).  Dealers,  on  the other hand,  operate at a  personal  level  on 
a  one-off  basis;  and  their title rightly  implies  that  they  'deal'.  Each 
deal  contains  two  elements:  the  discount  offered  to  the  farmer  from  the 
manufacturers  recommended  retail price,  and  the  trade-in price  on  the 
old machine.  Juggling  these  elements  requires  skill and  it is also 
part of  the  personal  'handshake  tradition'  of the  trade which  farmers 
enjoy.  It is said  that  they  pay more  attention to  their discount  than 
the  recommended  retail price itself - the  former  is  something  they can 
influence,  the  latter is not.  Essentially,  the  dealer bridges  the  gap 
between  two  trading culturffiand  because  of his  vital role,  the  marketing 
task  for  the  manufacturer  in this  industry  is mainly  to  do  with dealers; 
whether  they agree  to cary his product,  whether  they actively promote 
it, whether  they  provide  an  information channel  between  the  manufacturer 
and  the  final  consumer. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  significant  features  which  emerge  are  as  follows: 
(1)  The  industry operates  in  an  environment which  is stable  in  terms 
of aggregate  demand  for  machines,  the composition of this  demand 
and  the  technology  involved.  These  features  facilitate  long  term 
forecasting and  the  formulation  of corporate  strategy. 
(2)  There  is  a  strong  seasonal  element  in  the  industry which  puts  a 
premium on  delivery performance  and  short  term  forecasting.  The 
industry's  informal  forecasting methods  showed  up  well  in com-
parison to  econometric  methods. 
(1)  The  exception  is David  Brmvn.  Observers  of  the  industry would 
probably agree  that  of  the  major  companies,  David  Brown,  with its 
personal  management  style,  comes  closest  to  bridging this  gap. 139 
(3)  The  fragmented,  dispersed  and  personal  nature of  the  market makes 
the manufacturer  heavily  dependent  on  the  dealer;  the  reasons  are 
to  do  with  the  purely physical  problems  of  reaching and  servicing 
a  dispersed clientele and  the  cultural problem,of  coming  to  terms 
with  the  farmer's  mode  of  doing business. 141 
CHAPTER  11 - MARKETING  AND  DISTRIBUTION 
It was  explained  in Chapter  10 that machinery  dealers are  essentially 
the  'gatekeepers'  to  the  agricultural machinery  market.  This Chapter 
discusses  the way  that this feature  shapes  the marketing policies of 
the  industry,  the marketing advantages of  large  companies  and  the 
problems  of entry. 
Developing dealer networks  is  the  key  to  success  in this industry. 
Whereas  a  strong network  can  outweight price and  design  disadvantages 
the  converse  is not  true.  The  tractor is  the  staple  item of any 
dealer's  trade,  accounting  for  an  average  of around  20%  of his  turnover. 
The  great majority of dealers are  exclusively  committed  to  a  single 
tractor manufacturer.  Of  the  1,200 or  so  recognised  dealers,  those 
indicated  in Table  11.1  have  exclusive arrangements with  the major 
companies. 
TABLE  11.1: 
DEALER  ORGANISATIONS  OF  LEADING  CO}WANIES 
Type  of Company 
Tractor and 
Full-Line Companies 
Long-Line  Companies 
Company 
Ford 
Massey  Ferguson 
David  Brown 
International Harvester 
British Leyland 
Johne  Deere 
Claas  (Mann)~'d~ 
Bamford 
New  Holland 
Fahr  (Watveare)** 
Ran somes 
No.  of U.K.  Dealers"'( 
130 
200 
150 
73 
70 
70 
160 
148 
130 
80 
50 
*  These  are  approximate  figures:  there  is inevitably  some  abiguity 
about  the  term  'dealers'  - \·7hether  it refers  to  companies  or branche: 
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The  exclusivity only applies within  each  of  the  two  categories  shmvn 
in  the  Table)  because  the  dealers which handle  the  tractors of  the 
specialist tractor  companies,  Ford,  David  Brown  and  British Leyland, 
need  to  complete  their  range.  Ford  dealers  handle all  the  New  Holland 
harvesting machi.nery,  as ,.,ell  as  the  Ransomes  tillage  (but not its 
harvesting)  equipment.  David  Brown  and  Briti. sh Leyland  dealers  look  to 
Bamford  and  Claas  for  harvesting equipment.  Watveare  handle  Fahr 
harvesting equipment  and  Deutz  tractors,  all  from  Germany.  These 
figures  do  not  really convey  the  strategic  importance  of  the exclusive 
dealing arrangements  which  large  companies  have with their dealers. 
It is  genercilly  recognised  that Massey  Ferguson  and  Ford,  with nearly 
60%  of  the  tractor market  between  them,  have  secured  the biggest and 
best dealers  and  would  have  no  difficulty in recruiting more  if they 
desired  them.  There  never  has  been  an attempt at blanket coverage 
of  the  agricultural machinery market  in  the  U.K.,  in an attempt  to 
exclude rivals,  as  has  occurred  in  the United  States where  manufacturers 
subsidise  their dealers'  stocks.  All major  U.K.  companies  are moving 
towards  a  smaller  number  of  more  economic  dealer operations,  through  a 
process  of natural wastage.  Neither of  these  two  companies  ever  lose 
dealers  except  through attrition and  occasionally  through  termination 
of franchise  by  the  company,  usually  through the  dealer's  failure  to 
observe  the  exclusivity clause.  It is knmv-n,  for  example,  that if a 
Massey  Ferguson dealer is  taken  over  by  the Burgess  organisation,  the 
largest dealer  in  the  country,  he  loses  his  franchise,  due  to  a  disagree-
ment  on  this  issue  some  years  ago. 
Exclusivity works  both ways;  tractor manufacturers  sell only  through 
their franchised  dealers.  The  exclusivity avoids  running  up  against 
the Restrictive Trade  Practices  legish tion  since it applies  only at 
the  w·holesale  level,  i.e.  a  dealer  may  retail  into another  dealer's 
territory but  he  may  not  sell to  another dealer  in  that  territory.  In 
practice  this  effectively eliminates  trading across  franchise  boundaries 
because  farmers  would  not wish  to  buy  from a  remotely  situated dealer 
for  fear  that he  might  not obtain  the  spares  and  maintenance  he  would 
need  from  the  local  dealer  that has  been  bypassed  by  this  type  of sale. 
The  strength,  stability and  loyalty of  the major  companies'  dealer 
organisations,  and  the  necessity of operating  through  dealers,  pose  a 
considerable  barrier  to entry for  tractor manufacturers,  a  smaller but 143 
significant barrier to  combine  harvester manufacturers,  and  a  slight 
barrier to  implement  manufacturers.  Exclusivity entails  that,  if he  is 
to  succeed,  the  new  tractor entrant must  persuade  a  dealer  to  switch 
completely,  probably writing off his  stock of  spares  in  the  process,  a 
harder  task  than  persuading  him  that his  prospects would  be  enhanced  by 
handling  an  additional  range  of tractors.  Entry is easier in  Germany 
where  double  franchising  is common,  and  in  Fr~nce where  the weakness  of 
the  dealer  trade  necessitates direct selling  in  some  regions. 
There  are  two  avenues  open  to  the entrant,  forward  integration and 
recruiting dealers with  no  previous  experience.  The  only  instance  of 
vertical integration in  the  industry  is David  Brown's  acquisiton of 
eight dealers  in East Anglia  and  Lincolnshire  to  gain  a  stronger foothold 
in the more  lucrative  large  farm/high  horse  power markets.  As  Chapter  10 
indicates,  there are  diffi.culties  in marrying  the  mass  production and 
agricultural  trading culture.  David  Brown  appear  to  succeed  because of 
their  informal  and  sensitive managerial  style and  their appreciation of 
this cultural difference.  Forward  integration would  be  unlikely  to 
succeed  for  the  foreign  tractor  companies  now  attempting  to break into 
the U.K.  market,  since  they would  operate without  a  deep  understanding 
of  the market. 
Developing  a  dealer organisation  from  inexperienced  dealers  is also 
difficult.  The  entry of John Deere  into  the U.K.  market  illustrates 
this very well.  Deere  entered  the U.K.  in  1966 and  is  looking for  a 
10%  share  of the  tractor market.  Many  of its early dealers  had  little 
experience  in handling  tractors  and  their mortality  rate was  high.  They 
were  supported  by  Deere's credit policy;  several  over-committed  them-
selves  and  ran  into cash  flow  difficulties.  Gradually  dealers of rival 
manufacturers were  induced  to  switch by  the  growing acceptability of 
Deere's products,  the  company's  evident  commitment  to  developing its 
U.K.  market  share  and  its long purse which enabled it to  do  so.  Deere 
is  the world's  largest  farm machinery producer and  the  most profitable 
of  the North American  full-line  producers.  It spends  more  on  R &  D -
both absolutely and  in  relation to  turnover  (4%)  - than  any  other major 
company  and  has  one  of  the  most  modern  product  ranges.  Its marketing 
style is  greatly respected  in  the  trade.  Eight years after entry its 144 
share  of  the U.K.  tractor market  was  4~.z%(l).  This  rate of penetration, 
which  is considered  impressive  in  the  trade,  indicates  the diffirulty of 
entry  into  this market,  bearing  in mind  Deere's  considerable  strengths. 
Leading  manufacturers  in E.E.C.  countries  - Deutz,  Fendt,  Fiat,  Same  and 
Renault  - are all represented here  but  their shares  are  far  less  than 
the U.K.  market  shares  of E.E.C.  motor manufacturers  and  are  likely to 
ren~in so.  This  contrast between  the  penetration of European  tractor 
and  car manufacturers  underlines  a  factor which  reinforces  dealers'  grip 
on  the  machinery market,  namely,  farmers'  lack of reponse  to media 
advertising,  in marked  contrast to car buyers.  A position in  the  tractor 
market  can only be  developed  by  pushing  sales  through  a  well  run  dealer 
organisation,  not  by  'pulling sales  through'  by  use  of  the  media.  Sales 
promotion  budgets  of the  major  companies  are very modest  - around  one 
half per cent of turnover. 
The  resiliance of  the  market  leaders'  dealer  organisatfuns  and  customer 
loyalty has  been  underlined  by  the  recent  shortages of  tractors.  During 
the  period  1972-74 U.K.  tractor manufacturers were  unable  to meet  U.K. 
demand  and  as  a  result there was  a  surge  of  cheap  imported  tractors 
from Eastern European countries,  which  rose  from 4,000  in  1972  to  8,000 
in 1973.  This  is only  a  temporary  phenomenon  and  has  always  been  regarded 
so  by  the U.K.  manufacturers.  A's  the  supply  situation  improved  in  1974, 
imports  fell  to  5,000.  Because  new  machines  were  unavailable  to many 
farmers  they preferred  to  operate  their old machines  longer  rather  than 
purchase  an  imported machine,  in marked  contrast to British car owners, 
for example.  The  secondhand  market  contracted,  driving  up  the price of 
one  and  two  year old  tractors,  above  the  price  of new  tractors on  some 
occasions,  persuading  secondhand  buyers  to  buy  cheap  imported  machines 
instead.  The  difficulty which  the  better Eastern European  tractors have 
had  in establishing a  position in  the market  is  due  to  inadequate  dealer 
representation,  rather  than  deficiencies  in quality;  probably the  best 
model  is  the Zetor manufactured  by  the  Czechoslovakian  Skoda  works,  a 
well  engineered product which  includes as  standard  several  features 
which U.K.  manufacturers  market  as  optional  extras,  offered  to  the farmer 
(1)  This  refers  to units  and  understates Deere's  share  in  terms  of value 
since Deere  specialises  in high  horsepower  models. 145 
with a  seven year  guarantee  at a  price  30%  below U.K.  levels.  The  fact 
that  such  a  tractor  secured only  a  5%  market  share  in 1974 at a  time 
when  the market was  under-supplied  testifies  to  the  strength and  resil-
iance  of  the  market positions of  the  established manufacturers. 
BARRIERS  TO  ENTRY  IN  OTHER  }fACHINERY  MARKETS 
Barriers  are fairly high  for  combine harvesters.  Successful  entry 
requires  the  cornnitment  of  the  larger dealers who  alone  can afford  to 
stock this  expensive  item which  can cost around  £15,000.  Conversely, 
a  company with a  strong marketing organisation could sell any  reasonable 
combine.  In 1964  Bamford  lost its  imported machine  when  New  Hdland  took 
over  the Belgian  combine  manufacturer,  Claeys.  Bamford  looked  for  a 
foreign  substitute ana  in  1974  secured  an  8%  market  share with  Laverda 
machines  from Italy.  Companies  with small  shares are at a  disadvantage 
in this market.  To  maintain U.K.  coverage  seventy or  so  dealers are 
needed.  Smaller  shares  imply  fewer  combines  for  each  dealer - two  or 
three per year  for  companies with  shares  of  less  than  10%,  as  opposed 
to  eight  to  ten per  dealer  for  the  market  leaders.  The  risks  and  expense 
of  stocking  such  an  expensive  item.with  a  prospective  turnover  of only 
two  or  three  a  year  are  obvious.  Trading on  a  sale-or-return basis  is 
one  solution  for  the manufactures  in  this position,  but this  reduces  the 
dealers  commitment  to  sell  the  machine. 
Barriers  to  entry in  implement markets  are  less significant.  Even  in 
the  tillage equipment market,  which  is  linked  strongly to  the  tractor 
market  and  hence  the  tractor companies'  dealers,  has  seen  significant 
entry  from kvernelands  from Norway  and  Lemken  from  Germany,  bypassing 
the  Massey  Ferguson  and  Ford  dealer  networks.  Fahr  from  Germany  has 
risen to market  leadership  in mowing  machinery,  PZ  from  the Netherlands 
in hay  conditioners.  These  cases  indicate  that entry into  the  implement 
markets  is possible,  provided  the manufacturer has  a  good  product  and  is 
represented  by  a  U.K.  company  with a  strong marketing capability. 
ASPECTS  OF  DEALER  MANAGEMENT 
·Maintaining Loyalty 
It has  been  argued  that  the  major  companies'  links with their dealers 146 
is a  source  of  market  power  but  it should  not  be  imagined  that  this 
power  is conferred  by  company  size per  se,  as  is often  assumed  in  the 
literature on  industriAl  structure.  There  is no  straightforward, 
mechanical  link  between  company  size  and  dealer representation.  Dealers 
are  independent  companies.  Cultivating effective  relationships with 
them requires  patience,  diplomatic  skills and  a  thorough understanding 
of  the  trade.  Th~re is  no  question  of  large  companies  sin~ly buying 
their way  in,  nor  can  established  companies  rely  on  their goodwill  with 
dealers  indefinitely.  Once  an  established  company  begins  to acquire  a 
reputation  for  clumsy  or  offhand  treatment  of  their dealers  its market 
performance  suffers  accordingly. 
Some  examples  of  the  type  of difficulty  ~~hich can arise between  manu-
facturers  and  dealers will  convey  something  of the  marketing skills 
required of manufacturers.  Availability and  delivery are obviously 
important  to  the  dealer.  Tractor availability has  been  a  particularly 
sensitive subject during  the  last three years  when  U.K.  producers  have 
been  unable  to meet  demand  and  have  delivered  to  dealers  on  an  anocation 
basis.  The  fact  that  the  U.K.  tractor  industry is used  as  a  production 
resource  by  the  multinatillnal  companies  which  dominate  it, and  exports 
around  70%  of its output,  is apt  to  give U.K.  dealers  the  impression 
that  the  companies  concerned  regard  the U.K.  market  as  of  secondary 
importance.  Maintaining dealer  goodwill  throughout  this period  has 
severely strained  the  diplomatic  resources  of  tractor companies'  marketi~ 
departments. 
In discussing  this  issue with  representatives  of  the  trade  one  is  struck 
by  dealers'  sensitivity to  small  things  on  the  one  hand,and  on  the 
other  their willingness  to  overlook  large  defects  provided  that  the  manu-
facturer maintains  a  responsive  and  encouraging attitude.  In  one  instance 
the  dealer was  apparently  ready  to  overlook  the  fact  that  the  manufacturer 
had  introduced  an  unappealing  and  unreliable product,  which  gave  the 
dealer a  lot of maintenance  problems  at  the  height of the  season,  because 
the manufacturer was  willing  to  take  the  dealer's advice  and  make  the 
necessary modifications.  But  in another  instance  a  dealer mentioned 
that he  was  disenchanted with a  foreign  supplier because  the  latter 
showed  insufficient appreciation of  the  promotional  efforts  that  the 
dealer  had  made  in his  behalf  and  ignored  the  dealer's  complaints  about 
a  technical weakness  in  the  machine.  In  another  instance  an  imaginative 147 
promotional  scheme  devised  by  the  manufacturer went  awry  simply  because 
it '\vas  not  presented  to  the  dealers  in  the  most  diplomatic  way.  The 
scheme  linked  a  give-mvay  item to  every  machine  sold  during  a  specific 
period,  the gift  to  be  financed  from  the  dealer's margin.  The  scheme 
failed  because  the  negative aspect of  the  operation,  the  financing of 
the gift from  the  dealer's margin,  was  given  more  emphasis  than  the 
additional  net profit which  the  scheme  would  probably have  generated 
for  the  dealers.  Manufacturers  have  also  to  have  some  regard  for  dealers' 
sensitivity to  any  signs  of  favouritism.  An  illustration of  this was 
provided  by  a  company  with considerable marketing  experience.  Two  of 
the  company's  dealers '\vere  proposing  a  campaign  to  promote  its products 
and  suggested  that the  company  assist by  advertising the  campaign  in a 
local  newspaper.  The  manufacturer  made  it a  condition of  supporting 
the  scheme  that  two  other dealers  in  the  locality also  be  invited  to 
participate,  for  fear  of alienating the  latter. 
Dealer reactions  condition the manufacturersr  marketing mix  in various 
ways,  in respect of  technical  innovation and  price.  Ford  experienced 
difficulties in  the  early 1960s '\vith  the  'selectaspeed'  automatic 
transmission  because  the  maintenance  of this  system posed  technical 
problems  for  the  dealers.  As  regards  pricing,  attempts  to penetrate 
with  a  low  price can backfire  because  of dealers'  unfavourable  reactions. 
Whereas  one  might  expect  that dealers would welcome  such  a  tactic  since 
it holds  the  prospect of greater net profit for  them,  the  reaction could 
be  unfavourable  because  they would  smse  that the manufacturer was 
losing business  and  ~uld make  little or no  profit on  the  machine  and 
would  soon  lose his·  conunitment  to  it.  Dealers  are very  sensitive  to 
manufacturers'  commitment  to  their products.  As  is mentioned  in 
Chapter  13,  a  contributory cause  of  the  decline of Ransomes'  combine 
harvester Has  the  fact  that  the manufacturer failed  to  communicate  a 
long  term commitment  to  its dealers  and  its product.  These  examples 
indicate  that  the  successful  maintenance  of dealer good,.,ill  is as  much 
to  do with  diplomacy  as  market  muscle. 
Dealer  Effic~enc_y 
The  fact  that  industry  leaders  have  the  best dealers  is not  due  simply 
to  their ability to attract  them  by virtue of  their market  power.  Most 
large  cornp~nies are  in  a  position  to  offer managerial advice  to  their 148 
dealers.  Generally,  dealers'  strength lies  in  their links with  their 
locality  and  their knowledge  of  the  trade,  rather  than  in  their  technical 
business  skills.  One  fairly  basic  skill  in which  deficiencies have  been 
noticed  is  the ability  to  maintain  control  over  the  business. 
The  nature  of  the  dealers'  business  poses  a  number  of cost accounting 
problems  'vh:i.ch  can  often  conceal  the profitability or othenvise of each 
of  the  three  principal activities  - selling  new  machines  and  spares, 
trading in  secondhand  machines  and  servicing.  All  three  are  linked; 
the  sale  of  a  new  machine  invariably entails  the  trade-in of an  old  one. 
Disposing  of  the  trade-in machine  may  entail buying  a  still older one 
in  part  exchange  and  so  on,  in which  case  the  true price  of  the  new 
machine  cannot  be  determined  exactly until this  chain  of  transaction 
''vashes  out'.  The  service  department exists as  a  support  for  new  sales 
as 'vell as  a  means  of  rendering  the  secondhand  equipment  resaleable. 
There  is a  tendency  a.mong  dealers  to  regard  servicing as  an  expense  of 
selling,  which  generates  goodwill,  rather  than  as  a  revenue-earning 
activity in its own  right.  The  difficulty in controlling the  mechanics' 
time  contributes here  too,  with  the  result that dealers  sometimes  fail 
to operate  their service  departments profitably,  even  if  they  intend  to 
do  so.  Larger manufacturers  attempt  to  supply  this deficiency where  it 
occurs,  offering advice  on  how  to  monitor  the profitability of  the  various 
aspects  of  the  business.  Some  companies  insist on  monthly  operating 
accounts  as  a  means  of  identifying dealers'  difficulties in  time  to  take 
remedial  action.  Itfu usual  to  run  a  voluntary  computerised accounting 
service which  provides  the participating dealers with  the  appropriate 
accounting  data  and  an  idea  of his  comparative  performance. 
Narketing  Methods  and  Scale  Advantage~ 
It is apparent  from  the  structure of  the  industry that marketing  is  the 
critical function  in agricultural machiner)J subject  to  more  significant 
scale  advantages  than  any  other.  This  is  revealed  by  the  fact  that most 
large  compflnies  market  many  more  products  than  they manufacture  them-
selves.  They  buy  in  because  there are  insufficient production 
economies  in  many  implements  to  give  them  a  production  advantage,  but 
more  importantly,  a  critical mass  is  required  to  confront  dealers;  i.e.  a 
range  of worthwile  products which  can  provide  a  dealer with  a  living and 
to 'vhich  he  is prepared  to  commit  himself.  The  marketing  capability  seems 149 
to  be  the  mnchinery  companies'  most  resilient asset;  '"hen  their  m.,;rn 
products  become  obsolete or fail,  t:hey  buy  in  foreign machines  without 
apparent  loss  of market  share.  Bamford  factors  as  many  foreign  machines 
as  any  company,  mainly  haymaking  machines  and  ploughs.  Ransomes  markets 
German  potato harvesters.  An  establjshed  company  like Bamlett,  which 
ceased  production altoBether,  now  successfully  imports  foreign machinery. 
Before  discussing  this,  an  important  distinction must  be  made  at  the 
outset  between  'scale advantages'  and  'economies  of  scale'  and  the  type 
of analysis  appropriate  to  each.  Academic  studies  on  cost-volume 
relationships  and  the work  on  'experience curves'  developed  by  the Boston 
Consulting  Group  are  concerned with  the  latter,  this discussion with  the 
former.  'Economies  of  scale'  refer  to  total unjt  costs.  The  presump-
tion underlying  this  concept  is  that  there are  definite  functions  con®on 
to all business which  can be  performed  more  or  less economically  in 
companies  of different sizes.  This  co~cept is useful  in discussing 
certain types  of  physical  operation  in production  and  distribution.  It 
is  less appropriate  for  discussing  broader and  less precise  functions  -
marketing  and  product  development,  where  it is not  so  much  a  question of 
larger companies  performing  these  functions  at  lower unit cost as  of 
performing  these  functions  more  effectively,  and  getting dealers  to 
perform them better  too,  or  doing  things  that  smaller companies  do  not 
do  at all.  In  thi.s  sense,  it is more  appropriate  to  speak of  'advantages 
of scale'.  Accordingly,  this section as  well  as  the  chapter  on product 
development  is concerned with qualitative differences  between  the  com-
panies'  marketing rather  than with  any unit cost  type  measures  of marketing 
efficiency,  such  as  turnover per  salesman.  An  additional  reason  for  this 
approach  is  that  the  reasons  why  some  companies  are  larger than others 
is at least as  interesting as  differences. between  the  companies;  the 
types  of marketing policies pursued  must  have  an  important  bearing on 
this question. 
Marketing agricultural machinery  hinges  round  the  dealer  and  on  what he 
is willing and  able  to  do  for  the manufacturer.  The  dealer's margin  is 
close  to  20%  for  most  items  - a  sizeable  fraction  of  the  retail price. 
The  central  issue  for  the  manufRcturer  is  simply:  what  services  does  he 
secure  in  return  for  this  20%  margin? 150 
The  advantage  of  larger companies  is  that  they  can  secure  some  or all 
of  these  services: 
(1)  Exclusivity. 
(2)  Information  feedback  from  the market. 
(3)  Provision of minimum  stock levels  of  new  machines  and  spares, 
and  repair capabilities. 
(4)  Value  for  money  in  terms  of promotional  effort. 
Dealing with  these  in  turn,  the  value  of exclusivity as  a  barrier to 
entry is  now  apparent  from earlier discussions;  in addition,  it commits 
the  dealer  to  promote  the  company's  products  and  provides  the  manufac-
turer with  reliable representation  in  those  geographical  areas  he  is 
particularly interested  in.  Whereas  larger firms  secure  exclusivity as 
a  condition for  granting  a  franchise,  smaller  companies  have  to  buy  the 
privilege  by  offering higher discounts. 
The  principal  type  of  information provided  to  the  manufacturer  by  dealers 
re~tes to  sales and  stock  levels.  Information  on  the  state of  demand 
is basic  to effective marketing and  production planning and  many  small 
companies  do  not  receive  it.  The  dealer  system  tends  to  insulate 
manufacturers  from their markets,  the  smaller companies  particularly. 
Without  this  data,  manufacturers  have  to  estimate  the  level  of final 
demand  from  their own  deliveries  to  dealers  and  any  guess  they might  make 
about  changes  in dealers'  stock  levels.  These  changes  can  be  very 
significant,  bearing in mind  that  jealers are  numerous  and  might  each 
expect  to sell  less  than  ten machines  of  any  one  manufacturer  each  year. 
A  change  in  stocks  of  two  machines  per  dealer  is  a  significant fraction 
of final  demand.  To  illustrate this,  the  estimate  of  the  1974  U.K. 
demand  for  balers~ 8,000 units,  calculated  on  the  basis  of  trade  figures 
and  the manufacturers'  delivery  figures  supplied  to  the  Government 
Statistical Office.  The  industry itself puts  the  demand  at only  6,000 
units.  If the  Government's  statistics were  correct,  dealers  accumulated 
2,000 balers  in  1974,  one  third as  much  as  the  final  demand. 151 
Such  behaviour is typical.  The  familiar  feast-famine  cycle  operates 
in  this  industry.  If there  appears  to  be a likelihood of  short  supply, 
some  farmers  order several  different machines,  intending  to  buy  only  one, 
and  dealers  tend  to  over-order as  well;  if the supply  situation looks 
easy,  dealers  may  not  bother  to  stock at all.  The  manufacturer  is 
presented with  a  very magnified view of  the market's  fluctuations which 
he has  to  interpret.  Without  information  feed-back,  production planning 
is made  very difficult,  resultingfu chaotic  attempts  to  get machines  out 
of  the  factories  at the  seasonal  buying  peak.  As  one  production  manager 
in a  small  company  put it, "production ceases  to  be  a  rational activity". 
Large  companies  can  ensure  that dealers perform their basic  functions  on 
their behalf- stocking the  company's  machines,  displaying  them promin-
ently,  and  maintaining adequate  service  levels  for  spares,  i.e.  ensuring 
that  a  minimum  percentage  of  demand  can be  met.  This  last aspect  is not 
monitored  rigorously,  as  does  the Caterpillar Tractor Companym  the U.S.A.,  for 
example,  but  dealers 'vhich  order  spares  from  the manufacturer at short 
notice  receive  less  discount  and  are also  encouraged  to  stock up.  In 
contrast,  smaller companies  feel  lucky  to  get their products  into dealers' 
yards wherever  they  can.  In part,  this  difference  is  due  to differences 
in  the  products  produced.  Whereas  the  larger companies  specialise in 
the  more  engineered  products which  require  skilled maintenance  and 
presentation  to  the  farmer  by  a  selected group  of dealers,  smaller  com-
panies  incline  towards  more  rudimentary  products which  require as  broad 
a  coverage  by  dealers  as  possible. 
At worst,  dealers  simply act as  order-takers  and  do  not actually promote 
the  smaller  companies'  products at all.  The  small  company  which  is not 
satisfied with  this  can  send  its sales  representatives around  the  dealer 
to  the  farmer  himself  if it is able  to  identify its customers.  In other 
ways  too,  smaller companies  receive  less  promotional  inputs  for  their 
money.  The  promotion offered  by  dealers  to  smaller  companies  varies 
considerably but all are paid  the  same  discount.  For  instance,  some 
dealers  retain fitters  for  installing a  particular manufacturer's  farm-
yard  equipment while  others  do  not,  yet all receive  the  same  disc:}unt. 
Many  manufacturers  offer graduated  discounts  as  an  incentive  to  stock 
their products,  quite  apart  from  quantity  discounts  for  bulk orders.  In 
the  course  of  discussion  about  this  type  of  incentive with  a  large and  a 
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the  achievement  of some  target  sales volume,  judged  by  the  manufacturer 
to  be within  the dealer's  reach,  the  smaller  company  offered  the  discount 
to all of its dealers which were  expected  to achieve  a  minimum  volume 
of sales.  The  larger  company  used  its  d.i.scount  with much  greater pre-
cision  to  secure additional  promotional  efforts  on  its behalf,  whereas 
the  smaller  company  could  not  be  sure  that it was  securing  any  extra 
promotion at all. 
Larger  companies  derive  some  of  these  advantages  by  exerting their market 
power.  It is market  power which  secures exclusivity and  enables  larger 
companies  to  insist on  operating  standards  and  to  obtain  information they 
need.  Dealers  do  not  supply  this  readily.  It is said  that a  major 
tractor franchise  is  a  'papen·leight',  in that  two  additional clerical 
staff are  needed  simply  to  handle  the  extra administration  involved. 
Smaller  companies  could  not  conceivably  insist on  dealers  supplying 
regular  information on  sales and  stocks  or monitor dealers  as  closely as 
the  major manufacturers  can.  The  market  leaders  in  the  tractor market, 
Massey Ferguson  and  Ford,  appear  to  take  the  firmest  line of  any  companies 
with  their dealers.  Another  leading tractor manufacturer  reported  that 
only  60%  of  their dealers  supplied  the  information  the  company  required. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Marketing  is  the critical function  in this  industry.  Through  their 
control  of their dealers  the  larger companies  do  much  to maintain  their 
market  shares.  But  the  advantages  of  scale are  not  solely  due  to  market 
power.  Large  companies  are managed  differently and,generally  speaking, 
their marketing policies convey  a  sense  that  they  are  in control of 
events whereas  smaller companies  seem  to  be at the  mercy  of events.  There 
are  several aspects  to  this: 
(1)  Large  companies  tend  to  be  more  numerate  and  able  to monitor  the 
market  more  closely.  Through  their Trade Association,  the Agricul-
tural Engineers Association,  the  tractor manufacturers  have  organised 
a  computerised  market  information  system based  on  tractor registra-
tions.  Thj.s  facilitates detailed monitoring of  the  market  do,vn  to 
the parish level,  permitting a  degree  of  'fine  tuning'  of the 
marketing  function,  i.e.  identifying areas  of weak  or declining 
penetration  and  being  in  a  position to  set targets  for  each  of  their 
dealers  on  an  informed  basis. 153 
(2)  Larger  companies  give more  direction  to  their sales  representatives. 
Most  companies  in  the  industry have  area  representatives whose 
functions  are  to keep  in  touch with  farmers  and  liaise with  dealers. 
The  typical  staffing ratio appears  to  be  around  four  or  five 
representatives per  £1  million turnover.  In smaller companies, 
the  representative operates  fairly  independently and  performs  an 
ambassadorial  role.  He  has  little formal  training and  reports 
company  personally around  three  times  a  year  and  aims  to visit 
dealers with  the  same  frequency.  Larger companies  train  their 
representatives  and  guide  their operations  to  a  much  greater extent. 
The  Sales Manager  in  the  small  firm acts  in many  ways  as  the  senior 
representative,  handling enquiries  and  taking  orders whereas  in 
the  larger company  he  is essentially a  manager  - guiding  and 
monitoring representatives'  activities and  liaising with production. 
In general  this must  be  the  proper role of  the  Sales  Manage~ though 
in  this  rather  informal  industry there are  examples  of  successfUL 
companies  whose  human  assets more  than compensate  for  lack of an 
explicit and  active management  of its marketing functions.  In 
one  company  it is  the personal qualities of  the  Sales Manager  and 
his contact with the  farming  community;  in another,  it is the 
design  skills of  the  owner-manager which  cause  the world  to make 
a  beaten path to his  door.  The  company  has  no  sales  representative 
at all and  produces  to  capacity. 
(3)  There  is a  greater awareness  among  larger companies  of the  need 
for market  information;  information  on  the  company's  customers  an~ 
on  their future  demands.  Demand  forecasts  are  made  independently 
of  dealers.  Smaller  companies  tend  to  rely on  the  dealers  for 
forecasting purposes,  when  the  truth is  that dealers  rely  on 
manufacturers  to  know  how  many  machines  they  expect  to sell.  Most 
large  corrpanies  have  a  clear idea  of who  their customers are,  some 
small  companies  do  not. 
(4)  Larger  companies  achieve  a  greater integration of production  and 
marketing,  despite  the  inhibiting effect of  size on  internal 
communications.  As  Chapter  13  indicates,  Massey  Ferguson  have 
adapted  their production  progra~~e to marketing requirements. 
The  Coventry plant operates  a  flexible production prograrnne 154 
capable of  rapid  delivery performance  in  normal  demand  conditions. 
Another  tractor company  does  the  reverse;  marketing adjusts  to 
the  requirements  of  the  production progranime  by  pushing certain 
models  at particular times.  The  more  advanced  corporate planning 
procedures  in  larger companies  also assists co-ordination  betw·een 
production and  marketlng plans  and  secures  a  commitment  to  these 
plans  by  all  the  dealers  concerned. 155 
CHAPTER  12  - PRODUCTION  CHARACTERISTICS  AND 
SCALE  ECONOMIES  IN  AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economists'  interest in scale  economies  amounts  almost  to an  obsession. 
They  tend  to interpret production patterns and  industrial structures 
purely on  these  terms.  Some  structuresare deemed  to be  defici~nt in 
that they prevent  the  fullest exploitation of  the available scale 
economies;  such,  for example,  is  the approach  taken by  the Canadian 
Royal  Commission  to  the Farm Machinery  Industry,  discussed  below. 
Alternatively,  industries are criticised for being excessively concen-
trated in that companies are  larger than  they need  be  to explJit the 
available scale economies. 
This chapter is not  a  rigorous attempt  to measure  scale economies  in 
this industry.  That  task,  we  argue,  is virtually impossible  due  ~o the 
number  of factors.  It is difficult to establish comparability between 
plants in  terms of product mix,  make-or-buy deci3ions,  and  the vintage 
of  the  equipment used.  Company  financial  statements are  the main 
source of  information on  companies'  operations  and  these reflect many 
other factors  than  scale economies,  notably company  policy on  pricing, 
delivery,  stock levels9  variety and  valuation of assets.  The  purpose 
of  the chapter is to  try and  review  such  evidence  on  scale  economies 
as can  be  assembled  and  attempt  to view it in  the context of  the 
observed operating situations and managers'  own  perceptions of scale 
P.conomies  and  production problems. 
Indicators of  Scale Economies 
A partial  indicator of relative efficiency is provided  by  the  labour 
productivity data  in the Census of Production.  This  relates  to  'net 
output per employee'.  It is, of course,  influenced  by  the product mix, 
by  capital intensity and  depreciation policies,  but it is nevertheless 
a  useful  general  guide  to  such major  differences as may  exist. 
As  Table  12.1  indicates,  among  agricultural machinery  companies  there 
is no  simple  relationship between  company  size and  labour productivity. 156 
In the non-tractor sector the  largest companies with over  500  employees 
seem  no  more  efficient in this respect  than  those  in  the  100-200  size 
class.  There  appear  to  be  some  scale economies  operating up  to this 
range,  but  the  relatively poor performance of  companies with  between 
200  and  500  employees  suggests  that once  beyond  the  200  employee  level, 
companies  begin  to  encounter problems.  In  the  tractor sector  the  top  5 
companies  are vastly greater  than  the  remainder  in  terms  of size,  but 
their efficiency is very  similar.  There  is, however,  a  striking 
difference  in labour productivity between  the  tractor sector and  the 
remainder of the agricultural machinery  industry,  reflecting the 
relatively capital  intensive flow  line techniques  used  in tractor 
production. 
TABLE  12.1: 
NET  OUTPUT  PER  EMPLOYEE  AND  WAGE  RATES  BY  SIZE  OF  ESTABLISHMENT 
Size of  Net Output/  Wage  &  Salary 
Establishment  Number  of  Number  of  per Employee  per Operative 
Sector  (emploxees)  Establishments  ComE!lnies  ( £)  (£) 
Agricultural  25  - 49  25  2j  1770  830 
Machinery  50  - 99  26  26  1890  850  (excluding 
tractors)  100  - 199  15  14  2'010  930 
200  - 299  4  3  1750  970 
300  - 399  6  6  1750  880 
400  - 499  3  3  1930  850 
over 500  6  6  1990  980 
Tractors  50  - 99  7  7  1750  950 
100  - 199  4  4  2110  1050 
200  - 399  4  4  2450  1080 
over  500  9  5  2770  1260 
Source:  Census  of Production  1968,  Department of  Industry. 
The  absence  of any  simple  relationship between  the  company  size and 
labour productivity in the  non-tractor sector is corroborated  by  an 
analysis of company  profitability.  Company  results for  a  sample  of  26 
companies  were  analysed over  the  6  year period  1968/73.  The  companies 
range  in  size  from  around  100  employees  up  to  the  largest company  in  the 157 
industry,  Massey  Ferguson.  For  each  company  the average pre-tax net 
returns  on  net assets and  sales were  calculated for  the  period.  There 
turned out  to be  no  significant association between  these measures of 
performance  and  company  size. 
Some  comparisons of profit margins  and  growth are  set out in Table 8.2. 
which  reveals  some  interesting features. 
(1)  The  large  companies  are  slightly less profitable,  though not 
significantly so.  The  average profit margin of  the 10  largest 
companies was  5.5%,  of  the  remaining 16,  8%.  There  appears  to 
be  a  greater opportunity amongst  smaller  companies  to earn high 
returns;  only  one  of  the  top  10  companies  shown  here  earned more 
than  10%  on  sales over  the period 1968/73,  whereas  7  of  the 
remaining  16  did  so. 
(2)  There  is no  link between  growth  and profitability. 
(3)  There are  some  signs  that  the  largest firms  grow  more  slowly  than 
the  small  firms:  three  tractor companies,  Massey  Ferguson, 
International Harvester and  David  Brown,  together with Ransomes 
and  Bamford,  were particularly sluggish. 
(4)  On  this evidence  the tractor sector appears  less profitabie than 
the rest of  the  idustry,  but  the major  sectors of  the latter -
tillage, harvesting,  dairy  and  farmyard  equipment - seem  to be 
equally profitable. 
(5)  In  so  far as  it is possible  to allocate companies  in particular 
sectors and  compare  profitability within  these  sectors,  scale 
economies  seem  evident only  in tractors;  Massey  Ferguson's  size 
advantage  corresponds  to  a  distinct but not  dramatic  advantage  in 
profitability vis-a-vis its smaller scale rivals,  International 
Harvester  and  David  Brown. 
Table  8.2 must,  however,  be  regarded with  some  caution.  Tax  planning 
by  individual enterprises distorts  the published accounts,  by  amounts  that 
are not known.  And  in  some  cases  a  different consolidation of related 
companies within a  group  can  give  different results,  and  from  the  outside 
it is difficult to get this  right(some  companies  have  been kind  enough  to 
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TABLE  12.2: 
SIZE,  PROFITABILITY  AND  GROWTH  OF  15  LARGE  COMPANIES  1968/73 
Net Profit/Sales 
1973  Sales  1968/73  1973  Sales 
Co!!!eanl  (£  million)  (average  %)  1968  Sales 
1.  Massey  Ferguson  188  5.5  1.5 
2.  International Harvester  58  0.5  1.8 
3.  Howard  38  10.4  3.6 
4.  David  Brown  34  2,3  1.7 
5.  Ransomes  Sims  & Jefferies  16  8.7  1.3 
6.  Alfa-Laval  10  6.4  2.1 
7.  Fullward & Bland  8  4.9  2.6 
8.  Bamford  8  7.9  1.9 
9.  County Commercial  6  4.8  1.7 
10.  Gascoigne  Gush  & Dent  5  5.3  2.5 
11.  Simplex  4  9.4  2.0 
12.  Ben tall  2.6  10.8  2.0 
13.  S.K.H.  2.4  -2.0  5.7 
14.  Standen  2.1  14.3  2.1 
15.  Root  Harvester  1.8  10.0  1.8 
16.  Bamford  & Evershed  1.8  10.5  1.9 
17.  Alvan  Blanch  1.3*  0.3**  1.4*** 
18.  Archie  Kidd  1.4  16."  3.5 
19.  Turner Engineering  1.2  4.8  4.~ 
20.  British Lely  1.1  3.9  1.4 
21.  Twose  1.1  10.5  2.7 
22.  Parmiter  1.0  7.6  3.5 
23.  Teagle  1.0  7.3  2.0 
24.  Bettison  0.8  12.7  5.1 
25.  John Willer  0.5  7.6  2.1 
26.  Edmonds  0.2  4.5  1.8 
Average  7.0  2.5 
*  1972  sales. 
**  net profit on  sales  1968-72 
***  sales  growth  calculated for  1968-73  on  basis of 1968-72  sales. 
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It is  ~orth considering whether  the  structure of the  industry  through 
time  reveals anything about  scale  economies.  It has  sometimes  been 
suggested  that structural changes  in an  industry over a  longish period 
reveal  the relatively efficient company  or plant sizes.  Efficient size 
classes of company  or plant  'reveal'  their efficiency by  their ability 
to maintain or increase  their share of  the  industry's output.  Efficiency 
is used here  in  the  total  (and perhaps  tautological)  sense of a  company's 
ability to compete  effectively.  A study by  Rees(l) which used  this 
approach  identifies  the  optimal  plant size  range  for agricultural machinery 
(excluding tractors) as  25/500  employees with an  average of  around 
120 employees.  This  size  range  embraces  the  great majority of  companies, 
and  50%  of its total employment.  In effect,  this analysis  is  simply 
noting  the  fact  that,with the  exception of blacksmiths'  workshops  at 
the  small  end  of  the  spectrum and  a  few  large  companies with over  500 
employees  such as  Ransomes  and  Bamford,  all sizes of company  in the 
industry exhibit a  similar capacity to  grow. 
According  to  the picture which  emerges  from  these  exhibits  there are 
very  few  signs of  scale economies  in the  non-tractor  sector of  the 
industry.  Company  size  is unrelated  to profitability,  labour produc-
tivity and  capacity to  survive.  The  tractor sector,  on  the  other hand, 
appears  to be  both more  efficient and  less profitable  than  the  remainder 
of  the  industry and  indicates  sigps of distinct  though fairly modest 
economies of  scale.  Tractors,  combine harvesters  and  'other products'· 
are  now  considered  in more  detail. 
ENGINEERING  ESTIMATES  OF  SCALE  ECONOMIES  IN  TRACTOR  PRODUCTION 
An  alternative  approach  to measuring  scale  economies  is  through  engin-
eering estimates.  In pursuit of its exhaustive  study  on  the North 
American  farm machinery  industry,  the  Canadian Government's  Royal 
Commission  on  Farm Machinery  appointed  a  team of consultants  to  estimate 
scale economies  in  tractor production,  referred  to hereafter as  the 
Canadian Costs  Study(2).  The  estimated relative costs for  each plant 
(1)  op.  cit. 
(2)  MacDonald  et al "Farm Tractor Production Costs",  Royal  Commission 
on  Farm Machinery,  Study No.  2  (Ottawa,  Queen's Printer,  1969). 160 
size,  for  each of  the major processes  involved,  are presented  in 
Table 12.3.  The  consultants  used  an  approach  adopted  by company  engineers 
when  considering investment  decisions  in  new  plants.  The  estimates are 
based  on  production  technology  and  North American wage  levels prevailing 
in  1968.  The  method  involved  dismantling representative  tractors  sup-
plied  by  the manufacturers,  designing processes for  their manufacture 
and  assembly  in plants of  three  sizes,  20,000,  60,000  and  90,000 units 
a  year.  Estimates were  based  on  a  constant product mix.  Once  the cost 
of each part was  estimated  a  hypothetical decision was  made  whether  to 
make  or  buy  each  component  for  each  type of plant considered. 
TABLE  12.3: 
TOTAL  UNIT  COSTS  BY  SIZE  OF  PLANT  AND  PROCESS 
Process 
Purchased parts 
Foundry costs 
Stamping costs 
Machinery costs 
Assembly  costs 
Administrative  and  support costs 
TOTAL 
Unit Cost  by  Plant Size 
(20,000  un.it  cost  =  100) 
20,000  60,000  90,000 
tractors  tractors  tractors 
100  93  91 
100  84  81 
100  78  72 
100  86  82 
100  89  84 
100  84  79 
100  89  86 
Source:  Based  on  MacDonald  et al,  op.  cit.,  Tab~  40,  p.l35. 
It was  estimated  that  the unit manufacturing cost  in  the  90,000  tractor 
plant  is  14%  lower  than  that  in  the  20,000 plant.  In addition,  in  the 
large plant it is  reckoned  to be  economic  to produce  a  higher proportion 
of  components  than  in a  smaller plant,  realising further  economies 
which  increased  the  cost advantage of  the  larger plant  to  19%.  This 
estimate  is considerably larger  than  the  earlier estimate  by  Joe Bain(l) 
who  put  the optimum plant size at  60-90,000 units  and  its cost advantage 
over a  30,000 unit plant at  something  less than  8%.  Bain's estimates 
were  based  on  a  questionnaire circulated among  company  engineers. 
(1)  J.S.  Bain,  "Barriers  to  New  Competition'',  Harvard,  1956. 161 
The plant size structure of  the U.K.  tractor industry  is  roughly as 
follows: 
TABLE  12.4: 
MAJOR  TRACTOR  PLANTS  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Company  Plant Location 
Massey  Ferguson 
Ford 
David  Brown 
International Harvester 
British Leyland 
Source:  Published  accounts. 
Coventry 
Basildon 
Meltham 
Doncaster 
Bradford(!) 
Bathgate 
Annual  Tractor Output 
(completed &  kits) 
95,000 
50,000 
25,000 
20,000 
9,000 
20,000 
If the Canadian Cost  Study estimates are correct  and  apply  to  the U.K. 
operating conditions,  the  implications would  be  profound.  Given  that 
David  Brown  and  International Harvester,  each with plants producing around 
20,000 units annually,  have  barely broken  even  over  the  past size years, 
Massey  Ferguson with a  plant of  'optimal'  size might  b~ expected  to earn 
as  much  as  20%  on  sales.  The  profitability of most  U.K.  tractor opera-
tions  is difficult to  pin  down  since David  Brown  is the  only  tractor 
specialist;  the  remaining  four major producers  do  not publish  separate 
accounts  for  their tractor divisions.  For what it is worth,  comparison 
of the  financial performance  of DaVid  Brown  and  Massey  Ferguson  (U.K.) 
indicates  that in  the  size year period  from  1968-73 David  Brown,  on  average, 
earned  3.6%  net profits while  Massey  Ferguson earned an average  of  5%  net 
profits on  sales.  The  Massey  Ferguson  figure  may  not faithfully  reflect 
the profitability of  the  U.K.  tractor operation  since it is a  full-line 
company  and  its multinationality provides opportunities  to  transfer 
profits  through manipulation of  transfer prices.  In practice,  these  fac-
tors probably  do  not  bear  significantly on  the U.K.  accounts.  Tractor 
operations are  by  far  the  largest component  of U.K.  operations  and  the 
transfer prices on  tractors exported  from Coventry  to other Massey  Ferguson 
companies  and  distributors are  not centrally determined;  they  are  subjects 
for  negotiation  between Coventry  and  the  recipients of its tractors.  This 
being so,  the  difference  in profit margin  between  the  two  companies 
would  broadly  represent  the  extent of seale  economies  in the  range  of 
(1)  On  28th August  1975  International Harvester  announced  a  70%  expansion 
of capacity at Bradford,  bringing it up  to  around  15,000 units  per  annum. 162 
25,000-90,000 units,  if prices were  comparable.  But,  as Table  12.2  indi-
cates,  David Brown  tractors are  5%  cheaper  than Massey  Ferguson's  on  a  £/HP 
basis and  this alone  could account  for  the  difference  in  the  companies' 
profit margins.  In  terms  of profit performance  there  is little evidence 
of  scale economies. 
To  understand  why  reality is  so different  from  the  Canadian estimates 
it is necessary  to consider  some  salient features of the manufacturing 
operations  involved,  against  the  background  of  the  Costs  Study.  The 
Canadian  study  assumes  a  very  simple  product mix  in  terms  of horsepower 
types,  appropriate  for  the North American market.  A 90,000  tractor 
plant in Europe  must  inevitably service many  national markets  given  the 
size of  the markets  involved.  For  example,  the  annual U.K.  demand  of 
only  30-35,000  tractors would  itself not  justify an  'efficient'  plant. 
This diversity of markets  requires  the  simultaneous  compliance with  a 
number  of  legal  requirements imposed  on  tractors  in respect of  such 
factors  as  engine  speed  controls,  electrical witing,  driver safety and 
braking  systems.  This  poses  a  var~y of problems,  cutting down  the 
length of  production  runs  and  requiring very complex  and  extensive 
material  and  production control  systems. 
In  the machining of  components,  for  example,  were  it simply  a  question 
of producing  95,000  standard mesh  gears,  a  line of machines  could  be 
set up  connected  by  automatic  transfer machinery  and  operated continu-
ously without  tool  changes  and with high  machine  and  labour utilisation. 
But  the diversity of its markets  forces  the Massey  Ferguson Coventry 
plant to manufacture  10  different mesh  gears,  pushing it  to~rards batch 
operations with  the  attendant costs of  down  time  and  component  storage. 
In assembly,  product variety poses  problems  of  balancing  the  production 
line,  i.e.  avoiding  situations where  some  sections of  the  line are 
under-employed.  The  more  complex  tractors  impose  greater  loads  (up  to 
10%  in  terms  of  laboup content)  on  those  sectors of the  line which  add 
the  special  features.  A  line can only go  at the  speed dictated  by  the 
slowest operation and  to minimise  the  retardation caused  by  these bottle 
neck operations,  considerable  assembly  is  compl~ted  off the  production 
line.  Economies  in assembly are offset by  some  degree  by  the  costs 
of off-line fitment 
' 
To  convey  the extent of this problem,  since  the 
1950s when  Ferguson,  Ford  and  David  Brown  each  produced  one  basic 
tractor,  variety has  increased.  Due  to  the  expanded  model  range  of 163 
around  seven models  each,  the choice  of options  and  the  introduction of 
legal  standards  in many  countries,  Massey  Ferguson has  had  to double 
their factory area per  tractor unit produced  solely to  cope with this 
off-line  fitment and with increased variety. 
Clearly  the variety problem is greatest at the  assembly  stage because 
it is at the  final  stage where  the  number  of permutations of features 
is greatest.  For  this reason it makes  sense  to  look  for  scale econo-
mies  mainly at  the  component  level  rather  than at the plant level. 
For  a  given  degree  of variety,  the  90,000 plant offers  scale advantages, 
but  this  fact  does  not have  the crucial significance attributed to it 
by  economic  analysis.  The  real  issue  for  the  company  is not whether 
it can minimise  unit costs but whether markets  can  be  found  for  its 
capacity.  And  it happens  that for  Massey  Ferguson product variety is 
a  key  to  selling its 95,000 units, So%  of which are  exported.  The 
greater flexibility of build needed  to sell 95,000  tractors annually, 
and  the  increase  in the  number  of variables  that this  implies,  tends 
to nullify a  large  component  of the scale economies  that  this  size of 
plant has  the potential  to exploit. 
Production flexibility is also the  basis of  the chief difference  in 
the way  the  Massey  Ferguson and  David  Brown  plants are operated. 
Both  companies  assemble  tractors  to  order,  but whereas  David Brown 
run  the production line for  two  or  three weeks  on  a  batch basis 
alternating between models,  Massey  Ferguson build  random~y,  launching 
each  tractor onto  the  assembly  line with limited  regard  to  the model 
preceding or  succeeding it.  Orders  for  tractors are fed  directly 
from dealers  into a  computer  in a  coded  form.  The  computer  is pro-
grammed  for  the plant production  and  supply constraints and  proceeds 
to print out furee  instructions;  the  tractors Xhat can  be built in the 
following  15  day  production  programme,  the parts required and  the 
track build sequence.  From  the  operational point of view this 
difference has  two  major  implications.  First,  the  controlled  random 
build method  is vastly more  difficult to operate  and  requires consider-
able  investment  in computerised material handling  systems  and  the staff 
with  the  experience  to operate it,  in order  to  sequence  components  to 
exactly match  the assembly  sequence.  The  batch system operated by 164 
David  Brown  is easier  to,  operate  and  can be  controlled manually with  the 
usual  paperwork  system.  It is a  question of deciding  the  assembly  pro-
gramme  some  months  in advance,  calculating  the  lead  times  required  for 
the various  components  and  sub-assemblies  and  launching batches of 
components  on  to  the  machine  shop which  correspond  to  the final  assembly 
programme. 
The  second major  difference lies in  the  disposition of stocks.  The 
random build  system reduces  the  lead  time  to  only  15  days  in normal 
market conditions  and  requires large stocks of  components  since  the lead 
time  is insufficient  to  produce  economic  batches.  David  Brown  require 
a  far  smaller  stock of components  since  the  batch  system gives  rise  to 
a  predictable demand  for  components  far  enough  ahead  to allow economic 
batches  to  be  produced  fairly  soon  before  they are  needed.  The  random 
build  system is designed  to  improve  delivery performance  and  flexibility. 
Under  the  batch  system the  customers may  be  required  to wait till it is 
the turn of  the particular model  they ordered  to appear  in  the  produc-
tion programme,  whereas  the  random build  system offers customers  the 
prospect of being fitted  into  the  programme  rather quicker,  as  soon  as 
capacity permits. 
On  balance  random building can  reduce  unit costs,  if managed  well. 
Managed  poorly,  the  system could  lead  to  chaos.  The  flexibility it 
provides permits  switches  of build when  key  components  are missing.  In 
batch production,  component  shortage  stops  assembly  completely or results 
in incomplete  tractors.  If the missing  component  is internally located 
in the machine  the  labour  cost of rectification can  be  as high as  50% 
of  the  labour cost of the whole  tractor.  Fl€xibility also avoids 
running up  against capacity constraints;  it also  improves  line balance 
and  reduces off-line fitment. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  system requires  larger  stocks  of components  and 
investment  in computer  systems.  It also  requires quick decisions,  places 
heavy  demand  on  individuals,  and  seems  to  require  a  very flat plant 
management  structure which must  require  considerable ability at the  top. 
At  Coventry  the  production director has  no  less  than  eleven subordinates 
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In  terms  of facilities  the  two  plants are not  strikingly different, 
granted  that  David  Brown  manufacture  their own  engines whereas Massey 
Ferguson  buy  in  from their own  Perkins plant at Peterborough.  Both 
plants buy their castings  from  the  same  supplier and  each  buy  in tinwork, 
Massey  Ferguson  from  G.K.N.-Sankey  and  David  Brown  from  their own  plant 
at Leigh.  In  regard  to  the operations  that both plants  have  in common, 
component  manufacture ·and  assembly,  the main  difference lies in the 
greater use  by Massey  Ferguson of  automated  transfer equipment for  a 
limited number  of machining operations,  notably  for  gearbox housingand for all 
major/casti~Soking at the  Canadian Costs  Estimates  set out  in Table  8.3 
in this context,  it is possible  to understand why  the  achieved  scale 
economies  in the  25,000/95,000  range  are  rather less  than  is suggested 
in the Table.  The  fact  that both plants  buy  in their castings  from  the 
same  dominant  supplier,  apparently without difference  in quantity 
discount.  An  industry conwent  on  this question  emphasised  that  the 
dominant  supplier of castings,  Birmid Qualcast,  has  a  strong disincentive 
to discriminate  in favour  of  its larger customers,  since  this could 
contribute  to  the  emergence  of  dominant  customers. 
As  regards  the  pressing operation,  it is difficult to  interpret either 
company's  decisions  on  the  pressing operation in the light of  the 
fi.gures  in Table  8.3. (1)  The  fact  that  the  larger plant is calculated  to 
derive  far  greater  economies  in  the  pressing operation  than  in pur-
chasing would  lead us  to expect that Massey  Ferguson would  do  their 
own  pressing and  David  Brown  would  buy  in, whereas  the  reverse  is the 
case.  Taking  this  argument  to its logical conclusion one  might  expect 
that David  Brown  would  simply  assemble  tractors  since its estimated 
cost disadvantage  is less  in respect of purchased  items  than castings, 
tinwork and  machining.  Economies  in assembly are practically nullified 
by  greater variety.  Administrative costs,  which  are estimated  to  be 
subject  to  the most  significant scale  economies  of any  process,  are 
undoubtedly proportionately higher  in Massey  Ferguson  due  to the 
investment  in control  systems  needed  to handle  its random build  system. 
In machining,  Massey  Ferguson  derives  an  advantage  from its automated 
transfer lines,  but  the  bulk of machining is carried out  in both  com-
panies with similar machines  and  in similar batch quantities. 
( 1)  Referred to  in the Table  as  'Stamping Costs 
1 
•  The  term 
1 star.tping'  is 
usually used  in connection with forgings,  whereas what  is meant  here 
(and what  HacDonald  may  have  have  been  referring to  in his  study),  was 
'pressing',  the  term used  in relation  to  sheet metal work. 166 
The  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  these  observations are  these.  First, 
scale  economies  in  tractor production  in  the U.K.  are  not very signi-
ficant.  The  essence  of  tractor production cost control consists  in 
achieving  the  fullest  loading of  the  production  line with  the  maximum 
rate of  completion.  It is  this objective which preoccupies  tractor 
production managers  and  the  reasons  for  their success  or  failure  have 
little to  do  with plant size. 
Second,  plants of very different sizes differ far  less  in respect of 
the machinery  employed  and  its degree  of utilisation than  in the way 
they are operated  and  the  tasks  they  are  asked  to  perform.  Operating 
styles reflect managers'  objectives and it seems  important  to  realise 
that whereas  academic  economists'  writings  on  scale  economies  see plant 
performance  simply  in  terms of minimising  the  costs of  producing  the 
output  for which  the plant is designed,  managements  have  to operate 
in a  market  context and  have  a  wider  set of objeetives,  embracing 
variety,  flexibility and  delivery  time  in addition  to  economy  of 
operation. 
2.  SCALE  ECONOM~ES IN  CO}ffiiNE  HARVESTER  PRODUCTION 
In  the  production  of  combine harvesters  the Canadian Costs  Study 
estimated that  the minimum-optimum scale is 20,000 units per year. 
The majority of plants  in operation lie between  500  and  20,000,  over 
which  range  the  Study  estimated  that unit costs  decline  by  22%.  Is 
this  the  reason why  in the  U.K.  there  is now  only  one  combine  plant, 
the Massey  Ferguson operation at Kilmarnock,  producing  1,800  units? 
In recent years  two  other plants ceased production, Allis Chalmers 
with an  output of less  than  1,000,  and  Ransomes  with 1,500. 
The  acid  test of  the  entire  scale argument  is whether  or not  the 
achievement of a  certain minimum  scale makes  the  difference between 
survival or failure:  whether,  in other words,  scale  economies  shape 
the  industry's  structure. 
It would  be  easy  to  argue  that  small  scale was  the  cause  of  these 
companies'  demise.  The  larger  of  the  companies  concerned,  Ransomes, 
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attempt  to  compete with  the multinationals operating at a  sub-optimal 
scale.  But it is not cle&  that scale is the crucial factor here. 
A Ransomes  spokesman  estimated  the minimum  efficient scale  to  be  only 
3,000 units.  On  the  basis of  the  Canadian estimates  Ransomes'  unit 
costs would  have  been  only  3%  higher  than  those  of  the 3,000 combine 
plant which  the  company  regarded  as  the  optimal  scale.  This  is a 
slight margin  and  one  wonders whether other factors,  such as  the  lack 
of commitment  and  the marketing  strategy adopted,  might  not have  had 
more  to do  with  the  demise of  the  Ransomes  combine  than  the ~ale on 
which  the  company  manufactured  it.  The  trade  speaks well of the  pro-
duct itself but notes  that  so  long  as  doubts  hung  over  the company's 
commitmentw combines,  farmers  were  reluctant  to  buy  a  machine  for 
which  spares  and maintenance might  not be  fully available.  In marketing 
the  product,  Ransomes  suffered  from not having exclusive  dealing 
arrangements  for  the product.  Ransomes  have  a  reasonably  successful 
mutually  exclusive distribution arrangement wfrh  Ford  in respect of 
tillage equipment,  Ransomes'  main  product.  This  arrangement  does 
not  agiy  to other equipment.  It happened  that  the  dominant harvesting 
machinery  company  in the U.K.,  New  Holland,  has  no  tractor of its 
own,  and  since  Fard  is a  market  leader  in  the  tractor market  and  has 
one  of  the  two  best dealer networks  in the country,  New  Holland  looks 
to Ford  dealers as  distribution outlets.  Thus  it was  that the  Ransomes' 
combine  stood  side  by  side  in  dealers'  ya-rds  with a  market  leader's 
product and  suffered  in consequence. 
The  indigenous manufacturer  receives  a  certain amount  of  sympathy 
from  the  farming  community  and  derives  a  marketing advantage  from 
having a  plant located in  the  market.  In most other European countries 
an  indigenous  combine  producer has  survived,  despite uneconomic  scales 
of production in several cases;  Clayson  in  Be~gium, Claas  and  Fahr  in 
Germany,  Volvo  in  Sweden,  Dania  in Denmark,  Braud  in France,  and  Laverda 
in Italy.  Had  Ransomes  formulated  a  more  coherent  and  aggresive 
marketing policy  for  their product,  the  company  might have  been able 
to  develop  its market position and  bring its unit costs  down  at the 
same  time,  despite  a  slight cost disadvantage  in  the  early stages. 
This  example  tends  to  reinforce  the point made  earlier in the discussion 
on  tractors,  that  the  scale  economies  argument  looks  less  compelling 
in a  market  and operating context  than would  appear  from production 
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3.  OTHER  SECTORS  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 
In the  remainder of  the  industry  the vast majority of  companies manufac-
ture in batches.  Batches are fairly large - rarely less  than  100 units  -
and  give  rise to a  steady production routine  ("this month  its .harrows, 
next month  ploughs").  It would  be  fair  to  say  that operations management 
questions  do  not excite management  greatly,  except when  machines  fall 
behind  schedule at the height of  the  buying  season.  There is an over-
whelming  sense  that management  problems  have  been  coped with;  there are, 
for example,  few  attempts  to measure  plant performance  in any  detail. 
The  chief areas of concern are  factors  over which  managements  have 
little control,  such as  component  shortages.  Managements'  perception 
of scale economies were  found  to  be  very vague.  For  example,  when  asked 
to comment  on  the  changes  that might arise  from doubling  the size of  the 
existing plant,  most  managers  could  envisage  few  radical beneficial 
changes.  The  universal  reaction was  that management  difficulties would 
increase considerably and  that different methods would  have  to  be  employed. 
The  scale economies  argument,  in  so  far as  there  is one  in  this sector 
of the  industry,  boils  down  essentially to  the  difference  between  flow-
line production  and  batch production.  Flow-line  production  systems 
are said  to have  several  advantages  over batch  systems:  better shop 
balance,  lower work-in-progress,  higher  labour and  machine utilisation 
and  easier control  problems.  A  comparison  of  the  Census  of Production 
results for  the  tractor  industry,  which  is a  purely flow-line operation, 
and  the  remainder of  the  industry were  batch operations  predominate, 
would  seem  to bear out  some  of  these  observations.  In Table 8.1,  labour 
productivity among  the  tractor companies  was  30-40%  higher  than  in the 
non-tractor sector.  Stock  levels were  proportionately  lower;  in  relation 
to gross output finished  stocks were  lower  iq  the  tractor sector  by  50%, 
work-in-progress  by  25%  and  materials  by  70%.  Stocks are  an  important 
component  of assets  in  this  industry,  averaging around  30%  turnover for 
the non-tractor sector.  In most  companies  they  exceed  fixed  assets. 
In  this sector it is not apparent that many  companies  exploit  the 
advantages  of  flow-line  production.  Even  the way  the  term is used  is 
sometimes fairly unambitious=  'flow-line'  sometimes  merely refers  to 
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and work-in-progress accumulates  in front of machines  instead of  in the 
parts store.  One  consequence of this is that the differential in stock/ 
turnover which exists between  the  large  scale  flow-line  tractor com-
panies  and  the  smaller batch operated  equipment  companies  does  not  exist 
within  the  equipment  sector.  Two  of the  largest companies  in the  latter, 
Bamford  and  Ransomes,  have  had  the  highest rates of stock/turnover in 
the  industry in recent years.  In Ransomes'  case  a  contributory factor 
is the company's  decision  to  schedule  the production of components  to 
maintain predetermined  levels of  component  stocks,  in preference  to 
scheduling directly  to  the  component  requirements  of a  final  assembly 
programme,  as  is  the practice in most  of  the  inmstry.  Maintaining 
availability of complete kits of components  by  this method  can  involve 
heavy  stocks. 
Some  observations on  two  well  run plants of very different sizes will 
illustrate the  rather muted  practical significance of the flow-line/ 
batch production distinction in the  industry and  place  scale economies 
in perspective.  First,  the processes  themselves. 
In general  the products of  this sector have  few  components,  are not 
highly engineered  and  require  fmrly  low  machining  tolerances.  Equip-
ment  consists usually of  general purpose machines without automation 
in machining or  transfer operations;  purchasing and control is usually 
performed manufally rather than  by  computers.  Products are manufac-
tured  in batches,  partially against orders and partially for  stock. 
There  are  four  basic operations. in a  typical plant: 
1.  Cutting and pressing  metal  sections and  sheets are cut and 
pressed  and  delivered  to  a  parts store •. 
2.  Machining:  brought-in castings undergo  a  number  of machining 
operations  in batches  and  are  delivered  into a  parts store. 
3.  Welding:  metal  sections are  fabricated  into  frames  or bodywork. 
4.  Final assembly:  kits of parts and  sub-assemblies are  drawn 
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The  larger plant employs  around  900  employees  and  the  smaller plant 
around  200.  The  complexity  of  the products  and  the product variety 
is comparable  in  the  two  plants.  Both plants cater for a  seasonal 
demand.  The  larger plant has  two  assembly  lin~s,  one  of which alter-
nates  between  three  products,  the  other producing  the  main  product 
continuously.  The  smaller plant has  no  assembly bays  through which 
the product is passed.  Machines  are  produced  in batches  on  which  the 
plant operates exclusively for  4-6 weeks  at a  time. 
In the context of scale economies  it is interesting to  note  that although 
there  is a  four-fold  scale advantage Permitting  the  large plant to 
operate a  flow  line,  there are  remarkably  few  physical differences;  and 
that the significant differences  in  t~operating methods  have  more  to 
do with managerial  style than  the  scale of operations.  The  flow  line 
in the  larger plant has  little by way  of fixed  equipment  and  it only 
requires ·two  days  for maintenance  staff to  switch  the  fine  over  to 
another product.  There  is no  transfer equipment  and  few  fixtures. 
Assemblies  are moved  between work  stations  in both plants  by  the  simple 
expedient of putting their wheels  on  first and  pushing  them!  Work 
stations overlap  and workers  occasionally move  from  one  station to 
another if bottlenecks arise,  just as  they are  free  t~ do  in  the  smaller 
plant.  Operating differences are  even  less  in  the  upsteam operations  -
cutting,  stamping,  welding  and  machining,  which  both plants perform in 
batches.  Batch  sizes in  the  smaller plant are  around  100  - sufficient 
with general purpose  machines  to  reduce  set-up  times as  a  proportion 
of machining  time  to only  5%.  The  management  do  not  consider it 
worthwhile  to  increase  the  batch size  even  though  the  commonality of 
many  parts  facilitate  this.  Whereas  the  smaller  plant use  only 
general  purpose machines,  the  larger plant use  two  special  purpose 
machines  - numerically controlled equipment  to perform several  machining 
operations  simultaneously  on  gearbox housings  and  an  automated paint 
shop.  Scale was  undoubtedly a  factor  in this  selection since,when  the 
plant was  previously one  third of its size,  gearboxes were  bought-in 
items,  and  the  paint  shop  was  a  makeshift affair.  Nevertheless,  batch 
sizes  in  the larger plant  are  on  average  no  higher  than in  the  smaller 
plant.and it is  by  no  means  the  case  that the  special purpose  machines 
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Control  and  Mon1toring 
The  large plant operates a  more  formal  system of monitoring and  control. 
In common  with most  plants  in the  industry,  the  smaller plant's per-
formance  is assessed  simply  in  terms  of whether its output is according 
to plan and  whether it meets  its planned  budget.  Management  in  the 
larger plant also assesses  production against plan  and  against budget, 
but it also analyses  the  internal  operations  in more  detail;  actual 
hours worked  are measured  against  standard hours'  work  achieved;  machine 
utilisation is monitored  and  detailed  reasons  are  sought  for any  down 
time.  Those  employees  in  the  larger plant who  operate functions where 
individual  output can  be  measured  - cutting,  stamping and machining  ~ 
are paid  on  an  individual basis.  Assembly workers  are paid  bonuses  an 
a  group  basis.  In ·the  smaller plant  the entire workforce  is paid  on  a 
group  basis. 
The  greater formality of the  larger plant entails more  paperwork and 
this is reflected  in the  considerably greater proportion of indirect 
to direct workers  - 3  to  1  as  against  1  to  3.  In production control, 
the  larger plant has  40 clerical staff and  240  direct workers,  the 
smaller has  only  2 clerical staff and  130  direct workers. 
Problem Factors 
The  main  problem factor  in  the  large plant is to  do  with managing  stocks 
in such  a  way  as  to maintain a  timely  flow of components.  J.s  in many 
engineering companies  the  problem centres on  up-grading  the  low  status 
clerical and  store-keeping functions  to  the  point where  an effective 
requirements planning  system can be  made  to work.  This problem  is 
less apparent  in  the  small. plant due  to the  fact that  the operation is 
just small  enough  to  be  grasped  in detail  by  one  man,  aided  by a 
straightforward paperwork  system.  The  smaller plant has more  of a 
problem with plant balancing  arising  from  the batch assembly 
process, which  places  loads  on  different work  sections, in varying pro-
portions  dependent  on  the machine  being assembled.  It is this considera-
tion which limits batch  sizes rather  than  the  familiar  economic  batch 
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the  company  from  expanding  the production of  the  more  profitable machines 
at  the expense  of the  less profitable.  The  problem ig coped with  to 
some  extent by  the  labour flexibility within  the plant,  both in terms 
of work  rate and  the  types  of work  employees  are able  and willing to 
do.  This  flexibility is aided  by  several factors:  the  groups  bonus 
system;  the  stability of  the product  range  and  the restricted variety 
of  the  product;  and  the  amiable  labour relations which obtain in small 
plants,  which  are  invariably  located  in small country  towns  where  tmy 
are often  the  dominant  employer  of  engineering and,  indeed,  any manufac-
turing workers. 
This brief account  illustrates that although continuous production 
and  batch assembly are  in principle very different,  and  might  be 
expected  to  form  the  basis of  substantial scale economies,  practical 
differences  between  these  systems  in this  sector of  the  industry are 
not  striking.  Where  differences  do  emerge  the  balance of advantage 
is clear.  Large  scale permits  flow-line  assembly  and  the use  of 
specific machinery,  but it requires considerably higher indirect labour 
content  to cope with  the greater complexity of  the  large plant and 
the  more  formal  control  system that  is  required.  Small  scale  gives 
rise  to plant balancing problems  but,  in compensation,  the  small plant 
has  greater flexibility which  provides  the means  of coping with this 
problem,  and  is cheaper  to manage. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter  illustrates three significant points which  tend  to be 
ignored  in discussions of  scale economies  and  industrial structure. 
First,  questions of scale are  irrelevant to managers  because  the 
likelihood of their seeing dramatic  changes  ln  size,  by  factors of  two 
or more,  is remote.  Their entire preoccupation is with operating 
existing plants  to meet  the  budgeting and  market  demands  placed  on  them. 
Second,  large  increases  in  the scale of plants require different and 
more  formal  control  systems  and  probably different people  to  run  them. 
Small  plants appear to  rely heavily  on  the  familiarity of  the work-
force with  the work  and with  each other.  It is therefor unrealistic 
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plants to achieve unit cost reductions based  on  engineer1ng  estimates. 
Third,  in this industry and probably in others  too,  differences  in 
production methods are quantitatively as  important as differences  in 
scale.  They  are also more  relevant  for  business policy purposes 
because managements  can  change  their production methods more  readily 
than  the  size of their plants. 175 
CHAPTER  13  - PRICE  COMPETITION 
AND  PRODUCT  DIFFERENTIATION 
This  Chapter  discusses price competition  and  product differentiation 
in  the  industry  and  examines  the  impact of  industry  structure  on  them. 
In  trying  to  get a  feel  for  the  impact  of  structure it is as well  to 
be  prepared  for  the possibility that  the  major  forces  which  shape  the 
competitive practices of  the  industry have  more  to  do  with  the  nature 
of  its products,  the  market,  distribution  system,  and  the  traditions 
within  the  industry,  than with  structure  itself.  The  Chapter will  try 
to  come  to  terms with  these  facrors  but will also  try  to  abstract  from 
them,  by  looking at  the  structural variety within  the  industry  for 
signs  of  differences  in  the  modes  of competition adopted. 
In  the  academic  literature on  competition  the  discussion is really 
about  price competition  and  its importance  relative  to other  forms  of 
competition.  The  argument  proceeds  from  the  premise  that for  an 
industry as whole,  price-cutting is unprofitable.  The  sensible  com-
mercial practice is to  avoid price competition and  compete  in other 
ways  - on quality,  advertising and  distribution.  Economic  theory  argues 
that the market  leaders  in concentrated  industries are  better able  to 
avoid  price competition  than  companies  in more  fragmented  industries. 
Because  there  are  so  few  of  them  they  are  in a  better position to  come 
to  an  agreement;  or alternatively,  they  can reach  an understanding 
independently because  they are  in  a  better position to  recognise  that 
price cuts  by  any  one  of them wou~  impact  noticably on  each others' 
market  shares  and  provoke  retaliation.  Conversely,  in fragmented 
industries,  there  are  too  many  companies  to  reach  understandings  on 
price,  or  for  any  one  company  to have  any  appreciable  impact  on  rivals' 
market  shares.  The  predictions arising  from this  argument  are  that 
in highly  concentrated  sectors,  profitability is high,  prices are 
faocly  uniform and  considerable efforts are directed at style changes, 
advertising and  developing  a  distribution  system. 
The  Canadian  Royal  Commission  Review  and  its Relevance  to  the  U.K. 
In his  study,  "Oligopoly  in Farm Hachinery",  Professor Schwartzman(!) 
examined  the  North American  farm machinery  industry within this 
( 1)  Da.vid  Schwartzman,  "Oligopoly  in  the  Farm Machinery  Industry",  Royal 
Commission  on  Farm Machinery,  Ottawa,  1970. 176 
analytical  framework.  Four  of his  conclusions  are  of particular 
interest: 
(1)  The  major  producers  of  tractors,  Massey  Ferguson,  International 
Harvester,  Deere  and  Ford  did  not  earn unusually high  rates  of 
return as  the  theory predicts;  in fact  their profitability was 
lower  than  the  average  for  U.S.  manufnct~ring industry in  the 
post-war  period. 
(2)  They  did  appear  to restrain their efforts at price  competition, 
to  judge  from  the uniformity of  tractor prices. 
(3)  Because  of restraints on  price competition  the  level of North 
American  tractor prices was  uncompetitive,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that it provided  a  less-than-average  rate of return  to  the 
tractor industry.  Schwartzman calculated  that  the price level 
was  8%  higher  than  a  notional  'competitive'  price level,  corres-
ponrling  to  the unit cost of a  90,000  tractor plant,  permitting 
sub-economic  capacity  to  survive.  This  excess margin  he  ' 
attributed to  the oligopolistic structure of  the  industry.  If 
price competition were  present,  companies with optimally  sized 
plants would  lower  their prices and  drive  the  sub-optimal  plants 
out of the  industry. 
(4)  The  companies  concerned  competed  actively in other ways, 
increasing  the  number  of models  and  variations offered and 
spending considerable  sums  subsidising their deale.r  networks 
which,  as  a  result,  were  larger  than  Sch~;oJartzman considered was 
economically  necessary. 
Similar observations  could  be  made  of the United Kingdom  tractor  industry, 
unsurprisingly,  since  the  same  multinationals  dominate  the United 
Kingdom market.  The  profitability of  the  industry's  leaders has 
generally been  low.  The  average  profit margins  on  sales  in  the  period 
1968-73  for  Hassey  Ferguson,  International Harvester and  David  Brown 
were  respectively  5%,  0.5%  and  zero.  As  in North America,  the  product 
range of  the  trActor  companies  has  expanded  despite  the  fact  that  the 
U.K.  tractor population  declined  by  25%  between  1966  and  1974.  The 177 
four  largest  tractor producers  increased  their  combined  number  of 
models  offered  from  14  to  25  in that period.  As  in  the North American 
market,  dealer  networks  are  a  key  factor  to which  the  dominant  com-
panies  give  a  lot of attention,  but with  this  important  difference. 
In North America  tractor companies  finance  the dealers'  stocks  \~hereas 
this  is not  the  case  in  the U.K.,  with  the partial exception of John 
Deere,  which  provides credit to  the  time  of retail sale,  up  to  6  months. 
U.K.  tractor prices are  fairly  comparable  in  the  popular middle  horsepower 
ranges,  as Tables  13.1  and  13.2  illustrate.  Table  13.1  gives  the  basic 
data,  and  Table 13.2  compares  tractor prices  on  a  standardised  £/HP  basis. 
Ford's  and  Massey  Ferguson's prices are very close,  David  Brown's  are 
3-4%  lower,  International's and Leyland's are around  5%  higher. 
TABLE  13.1: 
PRICES  OF  POPULAR  TRACTOR  MODELS  AT  JUNE  1974 
Manufacturer  HorseEO\o7er  Range 
45  - 50  55  - 65  70  - 75 
Hodel  HP  Price  Model  HP  Price  Model  HP  Price 
( £)  (f)  (f) 
Massey 
Ferguson  135  47  1,954  165  62  2,366  185  75  2,660 
Ford  3,000  47  2,024  4,000  62  2,436  5,000  75  2,752 
David  Brown  885  48  1,940  990  58  2,084  1,210  72  2,515 
International  454  50  2,163  574  63  2,528  674  75  2,697 
British 
Leyland  245  47  2,073  255  55  2,263  270  70  2,623 
TABLE  13.2: 
CO"NPARISON  OF  TRACTOR  PRICES  ON  A  f/HP  BASIS* 
Manufacturer  HorseEO'\ver  Range 
45  - 50  55  - 65  70  - 75 
Massey  Ferguson  100  100  100 
Ford  104  103  103 
David  Brown  96  94  98 
International  104  105  101 
British Leyland  106  108  106 
Spread  of Prices  11%  17%  9% 
-/(  Referring  to  the models  and  prices  in Table  9.1,  Massey  Ferguson  =  100 
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As  regards  the  overall  level  of tractor prices,  as  opposed  to  their 
dispersion,  the U.K.  tractor market  has  traditionally been  regarded 
as  a  low  price market  due  to  Massey  Ferguson's  pricing policy.  Though 
comparable  now,  up  to  1970 U.K.  tractor prices were  around  40%  below 
Continental  levels.  This  resulted  in substantial exports of  second-
hand  tractors  and  it was  said  that  the  second-hand  Ford  tractor was 
the market  leader  in  the  Danish market  a  few  years  ago.  According  to 
the  thinking underlying  the  Canadian  study,  a  price  level  is considered 
'excessive'  or  not  depending  on  whether it permitted  the  survival  of 
uneconomic  plants.  If the  Massey  Ferguson plant  is considered  to  be 
of  optimum size,  roughly  60%  of  the U.K.  output  of  two-wheel  drive 
tractors coild  be  said  to  be  produced  in  sub-optimal  plants.  Neverthe-
less,  the  price  regime  operating  in  the U.K.  probably contributed  to 
the  departure  of  three  small  scale  tractor producers  in  the  1960s: 
Barford,  Doe  and Allis-Chalmers.  In  recent  years  the  price  level has 
not  been  such as  to  permit  the  long  run  survival of the  20,000 unit 
plants;  two  ~ompanies with plants  this  size,  International  and  David 
Brown,  barely made  profits at all over  the period  1968-73. 
What  Does  'Price Competition'  Mean? 
We  have  described  the price  regime  prevailing  in  the  U.K.  tractor market, 
but how  are  we  to interpret it?  Before  doing  so  there~ an  important 
conceptual  point  to  clear up  here.  In academic  literature,  price 
competition  is almost  tautologically identified with price differentials. 
The  mere  existence  of  a  regime  of near-identical prices  is sometimes 
regarded  as  evidence  that price has  been  ruled  out as  a  competitive 
weapon.  Conversely,  large price differentials are  regarded as  a  sign 
that price  is an  active  competitive  eleme-nt.  The  difficulty with 
interpreting price  comparisons  lies  in  their inherent ambiguity.  The 
degree  of price uniformity  found  in  the  tractor sector could  as  equally 
be  regarded  as  evidence  of  keen  price competition,  or  evidence of a 
tacit understanding  that prices  should  be  comparable  to  such  a  degree 
that price ceases  to  be  an  active  element  in  the marketing  mix. 
By  themselves,  price comparisons  are  not very  informative  about  the 
presence  or  absence  of price competition.  In order  to  interpret  them 
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behaviour wou!i  indicate  'price competition'?",  bearing  in mind  the 
fact  that  the  significance  of price differences  can vary  a  lot,  depen-
ding  on  the customer's  attitudes.  A differential of  5%  may  mean  more 
in  the  case  of  a  standardised product  than  a  20%  differential  in  the 
case of dis-similar products. 
What  then is  the  significance  of  tractor price  differences?  For 
instance,  do  changes  in  the  industry's  overall price  level account  for 
changes  in  tractor  demand?  And  do  changes  in  the  price differential 
betv1een  one  model  and  another account  for  changes  in market  shares? 
There  have  been  two  econometric  studies of tractor  demand  by  Raynor 
and  Cowling at Harwick University which  answer  these questions.  The 
first study  concerned  the total U.K.  demand  for  tractors,  the  second 
concerned manufacturers'  shares of  the market. (l)  In  both  studies,  the 
same  factor emerged very strongly - value  for  mone~. 
The  authors  constructed  an  index of  t~actor quality,  which  turns  out 
to  be  mainly  a  reflection of  the  horsepower  of  each model.  They  then 
deflated retail prices  by  this quality  index  to  give  a  measure  of what 
might  be  termed  'horsepower  for money'.  Changes  in  this variable,  in 
relation to  the wages  of agricultural workers,  explained  over  90%  of 
the year-to-year variations  in  both  the  value  of  tractors  and  the  total 
ho-rsepower  embodied  in  them purchased  in  the U.K.  market  between  1950 
and  1964.  It also explained  70%  of  changes  in a  manufacturers'  shares 
of the U.K.  tractor market  over  this period.  Conceptually,  this  is 
the correct way  to  look at prices.  The  tractor has  been  developed 
steadily  throughout its history,  but  considered  crudely,  a  tractor 
represents capacity  to  deliver power  to  farm  implements,  whether  by 
draw-bar/pull  or  power  take-off shafts.  It is therefore appropriate 
to analyse  tractor prices  in conjunction with  the  horsepower  involved. 
The  explanatory power  of  the  'horsepower price'  in  these models  confirms 
that  farmers  collectively think of tractor prices  in  these  terms  as well. 
In  trying  to  come  to  some  kind  of conclusion about  the prevelance or 
otherwise of  price  competition in  the  industry,  the  two  lessons  to  be 
learnt  from  these  studies are,  first,  that price is regarded  as  highly 
significant by  purchasers  of  tractors,  and  second,  there  has  been  a 
considerable  degree  of  jmplicit price competition  in  terms  of value 
(1)  Referred  to  in Chapter  10. 180 
for  money  in  the U.K.  tractor market,  and  it is  this element of 
competition \vhich  largely explains  the variations  in market  shares  in 
recent years. 
Implicit price  competition  amounts  to  saying  that when  new  features 
and  increases  in horsepower  are  introduced  by  manufacturers,  they  are 
accompanied  by price  increases "t-lhich  do  not  fully  reflect their addi-
tional  cnsts.  Conversations with tractor manufacturers  confirm this 
practice.  Explicit price comretition,  in  the  sense  of price  reductions 
on  existing models,  or alternatively,  decisions  to  raise prices  by 
less  than  the  industry as  a  ,..,hole,  is rather muted,  though  it does 
exist.  Tractor prices generally move  together,  usually  following  the 
lead  of Massey  Ferguson,  follov1ed  by  Ford,  which  for many  years  have 
been  the market  leaders.  There  is no  collusion as  such;  it is merely 
that  those  engaged  in all sectors  of  the agricultural machinery  industry 
know  each other sufficiently well  for  there  to  be  little element  of 
surprise  in  the  annual  price  increases.  The  explicit active  eleme11i..: 
of  price competition  is not  on  the  recommended  retail price but on  the 
discounts which manufacturers offer to dealers.  From  time  to  time, 
manufacturers  launch  promotional  drives which  include  as  part of  a 
marketing  package  an  additional  discount which  is  intended  for  the 
dealer  to  trade with.  This  discount  can  amount  to  £50  or  so,  equivalent 
to around  2%  of  the  price of a  typical  tractor.  This  method  provides 
manufacturers ,..,ith  a  means  of waging  limited  and  selective price wars, 
restricted in scope  to particular models  and  areas  of  the market if so 
desired. 
In  short,  implicit price competition,  in  the  sense  of value  for  money, 
is active  and  effective  in  the  tractor market.  Explicit price  com-
petition is muted,  restricted  to  occasional  and  selective price cuts of 
not much  more  than  2%  in  typical  market  conditions. 
Price Behaviour  in  the  Non~Trnctor Sector  -------·--------------
Hhen  one  begins  to  study price  and  competition  in other sectors of  the 
agricultural machinery  industry,  it is  ilTh-nediately  apparent  that  there 
is not  the  degree  of product  convergence  that is evident  in  the  tractor 
market.  It is  simply  not possible  to  group  different models  in a  way 181 
'\>1hich  fac i 1 ita  tes  comparisons  of  di:fferent manufacturers'  products,  as 
is  done  for  tractors  in Table 13.1.  Instead  one  finds  B  continuous  and 
confusing  spectrum of prices  and  characteristics.  Nonetheless,  an 
attempt has  been  made  to  draw  some  detailed price  comparisons  in the 
implements  sector.  Implem0nts  are  less  complex  than  tractors,  con-
sisting mainly  of  straightforward steel  fabrications,  with  a  unit cost 
of  bet,veen  £150  and  £1,000.  Entry  into  these  sectors  is  easy;  many 
companies  in  the  industry manufacture  them and  many  more  could  easily 
do  so.  Some  sectors are fairly  specialised with concentrated market 
structures.  Two  sectors of  this  type  are  reversible  ploughs  and 
fertiliser broadcasters. 
In  the  U.K.  reversible plough  market  the  market  structure is very 
similar  to  that  found  in  tractors.  Ransomes  have  traditionally held 
around  50%  of this market,  slipping  to around  40%  in 1974,  followed  by 
a  German  company,  Lemken,  with a  30%  share,  Hassey  Ferguson with  15% 
and  Bamford '\vith  a  Norwegian  plough,  10%.  The  prices of  the  three 
leading producers are closely matched,  with a  spread of only  5%  or  so 
in 1974.  But  the  fourth  largest supplier,  Bamford,  entered  the market 
in 1972  at a  price  14%  below  the market  leader.  Having achieved  a 
market  foothold  of  10%  in 1974,  its price  stood  20%  above  the  market 
leaders'.  In fertiliser broadcasters  changes  in relative prices as 
between  an entrant and  an  established supplier have  also  been  evident. 
Bamford  entered  the market  in  1971  (with its model  1000)  at a  price 
30%  above  the  dominant  firm's  corresponding product  (Vicon's Vari-
Spreader PS400).  By  the  spring of  1975  its price was  10%  lower. 
Wide  and  changing price differentials were  also apparent  in  the  more 
basic  products.  In disc harrows,  Ransomes'  disc harrow  (model  HR31/97) 
retailed at  15%  above  a  broadly comparable  Bamford  product  (D24/20) 
during  the  period  1965-66.  This price premium had  expanded  to  25%  by 
1973-74.  In June  1974  the  Ransomes  implement  retailed at well  below 
its closest equivalents  - 13%  below Massey  Fergusorls  9  foot model  and 
39%  below  the  10  foot  6  inch  model.  A further  example  from  the  ti~ 
cultivator sector revealed  that a  Ransomes  implement  (C79)  retailed 
at  8%  above  a  slightly  smallerTI~se product  (TB13)  during  the  1965-70 
period.  In a  later period,  1973-75,  this differential had widened  to 
20%  despite  the  smaller  size of  the  more  expensive  implement.  A  com-182 
parison of  the  product  ranges  of  two  leading companies  selected at 
random provides  further  illustrations of  the wide  price differentials 
in  the  implement  sectors.  Four products  produced  by Hassey  Ferguson 
and  Bamford  seemed  broadly  comparable,  a  ~a~er,  a  reversible  plough 
and  two  seed  drills.  At July  1974  the  price differentials were 
respectively  5%,  20%,  40%  and  60%.  These  examples  indicated  that 
price differences
1 at  given  times,  and  changes  in  relative prices  over 
time,  tend  to  be  greater  in  implement  sectors  than  in  the  tractor 
sector. 
A conventional  economic  interpretation of  these  rather different price 
patterns would  argue  that  price competition is active  in  the  implement 
sectors  and  supressed  in  the  tractor sector.  Our  interpretation is 
rather different.  Price competition  is not particularly active  in 
either sector;  the  relative variability of  implement  prices  is  due  to 
the  farmers  relative  indifference about  implement  prices  and  the  relative 
lack of comparability of the  products. 
Product  comparability is a  pre-condition for price competition and 
unless  this exists,  customers  cannot make  much  sense  of price differen-
tials.  Price comparisons  are  simple  for  tractors  because  the  basic 
tractor design  is  now  fairly  standardised and  in respect of  the  principal 
differentiating factor,  horsepower,  the  popular  tractors are  conveniently 
grouped  together.  In  implements  it was  difficult to  match  products of 
different manufacturers  and  compare  prices  - hence  the  fragmentary 
nature of  the price comparisons  mentioned  abo\e •  Even  a  humble 
product  such  as  a  tine cultivator exhibited  differences  in weight, 
width,  depth  and  configuration of  the  tines  themselves,  restricting 
price  comparisons  to only  two  or  three  companies  at a  time. 
An  example will  illustrate this.  The  range  of  fertiliser broadcasters 
available  on  the  U.K.  market  at February  1975  varied  in price almost 
continuously  between  £100  and  £1500.  Some  nodal  grouping was  notice-
able  in  the  £190-£220 price  bracket within which  nine  tractor-mounted 
versions were  offered  by  six  manufacturers.  The  wide  and  confusing 
variations  in product  dimensions  and  performance  make  if difficult to 
compare  these  products  from  the point of view  of value  for  money.  The 
quantifjable parameters  of  the  products  are  fertiliser capacity,  spreading 183 
width  and  flexibility of application rate.  Within  the price  bracket 
mentioned,  capacity varies  between  5  end 12  cwt  and  spreading width 
between  22  and  52  feet.  The  application rate of  the  least flexible 
machine  could  be  adjusted  between  100  and  760  lbs.  per acre;  and  for 
the most  flexible  machines  between  4000  and  4800  lbs.  per  acre.  To 
confuse matters  further,  the  parameter which is perhaps  the most 
crucial in  this machine,  the  uniformity of application,  is not  speci-
fied  by  manufacturers at all,  nor is it easily quantified. 
Price  in this  sector  seems  relatively unimportant.  Econometric  studies 
support  this view.  The  studies of  demand  forecasting mentioned earlier 
"  included  three  implements,  balers,  fertiliser broadcasters and  manure 
spreaders over  the period  1963-73.  Only  in  the  baler market was  there 
any hint of any price effects.  Conversations  in the  industry  tend  to 
confirm this  finding.  Price is not mentioned  as  an  active competitive 
ingredient;  "we  set a  price and  go  from  there",  rerna rked  one  company 
spokesman.  Small  implements  are  subject  to  sudden inspirational 
demands.  "They  want  it yesterday"  is a  phrase which  recurs  among 
implement  producers who  wryly  remark  that many  farmers  are prone  to 
order vital equipment  a  few  days  before  they intend  to use it.  Capacity 
to  supply  these  demands  at short  notice  is more  relevant  than  the  price. 
Success  in this department has  more  impact  on  market  shares  than price, 
despite  the  substantial  divergence  in prices  in many  cases.  Some 
observers  noted  farmers'  interest in  pr:i.ces,  expressed  in  spirtied 
attempts  to play  one  dealer off against another.  But  there  is an 
important distinction  between  product  competition and  dealer  competi-
tion.  Farmers  enjoy haggling over  prices - it is a  tradition in  the 
farming  industry.  But  the  farmers  interest centres  more  on  the 
discount  that can  be  obtained  from different dealers  for  any  particular 
model,  rather  than  the  relative prices of different models. 
Prices are  usually  set by  top  management with  one  eye  on  profitability 
and  the other on  the competition  ("we  like  to  be within range"  remarked 
one  manufacturer).  During the  inflationary period  since  1970 prices 
have  diverged markedly,  It would  be  a  mistake  to  interpret this as 
a  sign that  price  competition has  intensified.  The  divergence  simply 
reflects differences  in  the accounting methods  used  by  companies  to 
adjubL prices  to  rising costs,  and  the  speed with which  they  do  so. 184 
An  example  of hmv  price  comparisons  can  be misinterpreted arises  in 
the  grain drier market.  Alvan  Blanch  is currently  the  market  leader 
in grain driers,  but  has  had  a  disappointing pr6fit performance  in 
recent years;  Bentall holds  a  much  smaller  share  of  this market  but 
is highly profitable,  earning over  10%  on  sales during  1968-73.  What 
appears  to  be  an  attempt  by Alvan Blanch  to penetrate  the market  through 
low prices  is in  fact  a  reflection of differences  in  accounting practice. 
Alvan Blanch  committed  itself to  fixed  price contracts  during  this 
period whereas  Bentall adjusted prices  frequently  in  line with castings 
and  charged  customers  the  price prevailing at  the  time  of delivery. 
The  reasons why  price  co~etition is fairly  muted  in this  industry are 
four: 
(1)  It would  be  a  shortsighted policy for  a  farmer  to  put price first as 
a  criterion for  buying  equipment.  In  corrrrnon  with most  purchasers 
of  industrial equipment,  a  farmer  considers  that  the  reliability 
of his machines  and  the  dealer's ability to  support its operation 
through  spares  and  services,  are more  important  than price. 
Because  timeliness  is of  the  essence  in farming,  breakdowns  and 
delays  in obtaining  replacement parts can  impose  costs  on  the 
farmer  far in excess  of any  savings  likely to  be  derived  from 
shopping around  for  the cheapest model. 
(2)  Marketing agricultural machinery is essentially  to  do  with mobil-
ising dealers.  The  relationship  between  good  dealers  and  the 
farmer  is very  good  indeed,  and  if a  farmer  trusts his  dealer  he 
will often  buy  whatever  equipment  the  latter recommends. 
(3)  The  market itself is highly  fragmented;  only  3%  of  farms  employ 
more  than  5  people.  There  is  therefore  no  prospect of single 
large  orders of the  sort that are placed  by fleet owners  to  the 
vehicle  industries,  for  exam~ple.  It is therefore difficult for 
manufacturers  to  identify sectors of the market where  selective 
price cuts would  bring extra business and,  consequently,  the 
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(4)  Dealers would  misinterpret prlce cuts  as  a  sign of weakness  an~ 
would  begin  looking  to  rival manufacturers  for  a  replacement  as 
an  insurance  against  the possible withdrawal  of  the price cutter's 
product.  Loss  of dealer cotnmitment  would  outweigh  the modest  gains 
derived  through price cutting. 
Price Levels  and  Uneconomic  Capacity  in the Non-Tractor  Sector 
It was  noted earlier that  the  Canadian  Royal  Commission  Study concluded 
that  the  existence  of  uneconomic  capacity in the  tractor industry was 
due  to  the  excessive price  levels prevailing in  the North American 
market.  We  noted  that  t~ U.K.  tractor price  level  is not sufficiently 
high  to  permit  the  long-run  survival of plants of  20,000 units.  But 
there  is  a  more  fundamental  point  involved here.  In arguing  that 
prices are  excessive  in relation to  the unit costs of minimum  optimum 
plants,  what  is  the  standard of  comparison here?  Most  industries 
comprise  a  mix  of plant sizes,  some  optimal,  many  not.  Generally 
speaking  one will expect that the optimally-sized plants would  earn 
an above-average profit margin  - why  else would  companies  build 
them?  Rather  than  compare  the actual price  levels and  plant mix  in 
the  tractor industry with a  theoretical  long  term situation in which 
price warfare  relentlessly drives  out all plants of  less  than optimal 
size,  as  the Canadian  Royal  Commission  does,  it would  seem more 
reasonable  to  compare  the  tractor  industry situation  with that of  a 
representative "competitively structured"  industry in respect of 
price levels  and  the  proportion of its output accounted  for by 
"sub-optimal" plants.  It is instructive,  therefore,  to colll}ll:"e  the 
U.K.  tractor sector with other manufacturing industries in  the U.K., 
and  in particular with  the  remainder of the agricultural machinery 
industry. 
If the Massey  Ferguson plant at Coventry  alone  is considered "economic", 
60%  of U.K.  tractor output might  be  said  to  derive  from plants outside 
the economic  size range.  If,  in addition,  the  Fdrd plant at Basildon 
is deemed  'economic',  this proportion falls  to  only  40%.  A  study by 
Rees(l)  found  that  for  30  manufacturing  industries  the  proportion of 
net output  deriving  frorn  plants outside  the  economic  size  range was  40% 
(1)  "Optimal  Plant  Size  in U.K.  Industries:  Some  Survivor Estimates", 
R,D.  Rees,  Economica,  November  1973. 186 
on  average.  For  the  non-tractor agricultural machinery  sector  the 
proportion was·  50%  in  1963  and  40%  in  1968.  In other \a70rds,  a  roughly 
similar situation existed  in  the competitively  structured machinery 
equipment  sector as  existed  in  the  hi~1ly concentrated  tractor sector. 
In conclusion,  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  link between  high  concen-
tration and  excessive prices,  when  see11  in  the  context of  typical plant 
size distributions  in  the  manufacturiug  industry  e,enerally,  and  in  the 
more  fragmented  non-tractor  sec tor  in  pnrticu la r. 
Product Differentiation and  Narket  Inf.~~matio~ 
Price competition  is present  in this  industry but it is not  the key 
competitive  dimension;  some  of  the  reasons  for  this have  been  outlined 
above.  But  does  price competition matter?  And  if it does. 
what  types of changes  in  the  industry \vould  intensify price competition 
in ways  which were  beneficial  to  the  farming  co~~unity? 
A  factor which has  recurred  in  the  discussion  so  fa.r  is value  for money. 
It was  noted  that  in  the  tractor market,  value  for  money  in  terms  of 
£/horsepower  is relatively easy  to  assess  (see Table  13.2~ it is also 
the  subject of active competition.  In  the  implement  market  on  the 
other hand  value  for  money  is relatively difficult  to assess  because 
of the greater variety of product.  In  a  loose  sense,  value  for money 
is  too  vague  to  be  useful  - all  industries  can  be  said  to  compete  in 
terms  of value  for  money.  What  is being  referred  to  here  is  something 
more  precise,  namely,  the  provision of  a  quantified  set of performance 
characteristics which  can  be  casted  and  compared  effectively with 
those  of rival products.  It is argued  here  th8t  this  dimensbn  of 
competition is more  important  than price competition  and  is indeed  a 
precondition for  the  latter.  Unless  customers  know  exactly what 
bundle  of performance characteristics  they are  buying  it is difficult 
for  them  to  interpret price differentjals  betw~~n rival products  and 
any  changes  in  them  that may  occur. 
The  primary  requi.rement  of scientific  fnrming  is  information;  informa-
tion on  expected  crop  prices and  on  the  productivity of  the  various 
inputs  - land,  fertiliser,  labour  and  rn~chincry.  As  regards  the 
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the  rate  of work  of various  machines  in  normal  conditions,  hm-1  this 
is effected by  different weather  and  soil conditions,  by  delays  due 
to  breakdowns,  maintenance  and  adjustment.  IdeAlly,  the  farmer  should 
be  in  a  position  to  construct a  picture of  the operating economics  of 
various alternative machines  enabling  him  to  select  the  system which 
is optimal  for  his particular situation.  In discussing  the  dimensions 
of compe titian, it therefore  seems  important  to  discover whether manu-
facturers  have  attempted  to  quantify  the  performance  of  their machines 
and  present  farmers  with  the  type  of  information which  would  enable 
them  to  make  relevant  comparisons.  This  is important  for  the health 
of  the  farming  sector for  two  reasons;  at the  macro  level,  active 
competition  in  respect of machine  performance  is necessary  for continual 
improvements  in the  general  standard of machinery  design;  at the micro 
level it is  important  from  the  point of view  of matching machines  to 
the  individual  needs  of each  farmer  in  such  a  way  as  to minimise  his 
costs.  In assessing  the  informational  content of  the  industry's 
marketing and  its adequacy  we  try  to  take  note  of  the  industry's context-
the  problems  of measuring performance  of agricultural machinery  and  the 
strength of farmer's  demand  for this  type  of information, trying  to  collie 
to  a  view as  to whether it would  be  commercially prudent  for  the  industry 
to  behave  differently  from  the way  it does. 
Taken  as  a  whole,  marketing  in  the  industry is all about  product 
features  and  not  about  product performance.  Machine  performance  is 
rarely mentioned  in  the  sales literature,  nor  does  it feature  very 
much  in  sales material  supplied  to dealers.  Even  less  in  evidence  is 
information  of  the  total operating  economics  of agricultural machines, 
or even  the  basic facts which would  permit  the  user  to  infer what 
these might  be.  The  complementary  inputs are  rarely mentioned,  unless 
there are engineering reasons  for  doing  so,  e.g.  the  tractor horse-
power  necessary  to  drive various  implements  is usually stated.  Thus, 
for  example,  labour-intensive potato harvesting machines which  require 
several operatives  to  sort potatoes  from  the  trash,  are marketed 
without mention  of  the  labour requirements;  and  conversely,  the sales 
literature  for more  sophisticated machines with  an  automatic  sorting 
mechanism neglects  to  inform the buyer of  the  unit cost per  ton 
which  the  product  achieves.  Fuel  consumption  is rarely mentioned  for 
tractors  or  for  any  other power  source,  despite  the  rise  in oil p:ices. 188 
Grain driers  in particular are  highly  fuel  intensive;  according  to  an 
h  .  .  (l)  f  1  aut or1tat1ve  source  ue  costs accounted  for  around  50%  of grain 
driers'  total operating costs.  Yet  even  in this case  no  data  is pro-
vided  on  fuel  consumption or conversion efficiency. 
The  industry's aversion  to  promoting its products  in quantitative 
terms  needs  some  explaining,and  so  too  does  the  farming  industry's 
purchasing decisions  since  apparently  they  occur without  the  benefit 
the  relevant data  on  performance.  Manufactu~s defend  the  qualitative 
style of  their marketing  in  these  terms.  First,  making  claims  for 
agricultural performance  is a  perilous  business  in  view  of  the  variety 
of the  conditions  under which  machines  have  to  operate.  The  perfor-
mance  of agricultural machinery  depends  very  much  on  the skill of  the 
op·erator,  the  conditions  of  the  crop,  the  state of  the weather and 
the  soil.  Any  claims manufacturers  make  would  presumably  refer to 
normal  or  ideal operating conditions and  correct operating methods 
and  there  is  bound  to  be  some  difficulty in defining what  these are 
are  in general  and  even  more  so  in relation to particular cases where 
manufacturers'  claims  are disputed.  The  inherent risks here are 
compounded  by  the Trade Descriptions Act which  renders  suppliers liable 
to  prosecution for  making misleading  claims  for  their products. 
Second,  it is argued  that  farmers  are  not  interested  in  reading  about 
the  performance  that is claimed  for  machinery.  They  do  not have  any 
faith  in  figures;  farming  is an  open-air business  and  farmers  prefer 
to watch  machines working  for  themselves  rather  than  to  read  about 
them - hence  the  popularity of machinery  demonstrations  as  an aid  to 
marketing. 
To  gauge  the  substance  of  these  two  arguments,  that machinery perfor-
mance  is  too variable  to measure  reliably and  that,  in  any  case,  farmers 
are not  interested even it were,  it is interesting  to  consider  the 
institutional  frame";rork  that exists  in  the U.K.  for  testing agricultural 
machinery performance,  some  findings  of  some  typical  comparative  studies 
of machinery  performance  and  their  significance  in marketing  terms. 
The  authorities  on  machine  performance  in  the U.K.  are  the  Government-
funded  National  Institute of Agricultural  Engineering  (NIAE)  and  the 
(1)  "Farm Hanagement  Handbook",  John  Nix,  6th Edition,  Farm Business 
Unit,  Wye  College,  1974. 189 
Agricultural  Development  and  Advisory  Service  (ADAS)  which  is part of 
the Ministry of Agriculture,  Food  and  Fisheries.  The  former  began 
operating lts Users'  Testing  Servi~e in  1963  as  a  service  to  farmers, 
funded  partly by  fees  from  the manufacturers concerned,  partly by 
Government  funds  and  partly  from  revenues  from  test. reports.  ADAS 
provides  advice  to  farmers  on  types  of mechanisation but is not 
intended  to  discriminate  between  the machines  of different manufacturers; 
another  of its activities  is concerned with  surveys  of  machines  in use, 
jointly with  the  NIAE.  The  history of  the  NIAE  Testing Service  reveals 
something of  the  demand  for  thoroughgoing machinery  testing  by  the 
farming  industry.  The  financing  of  the Testing Service has  been  a 
contentious  issue.  Manufacturers  resented paying fees  for  a  service 
intended  for  the  farmer,  especially as  the  reports  may  well re  uncom-
plementary  to  their products.  The  Government  body which originally 
funded  the  service,  the Agricultural Research Council,  eventually 
excluded  testing from  the  definition of  ,, research',  despite  the  fact 
that most agricultural engineers  regard  such  tests as  an essential 
first stage of  research into machine  design.  The  main  beneficiary of 
the  service,  the  farming  community,  has  lost what  little interest it 
hadh the  service  and  volume  of work  declined  as  a  result and  was 
eventually  terminated altogether.  Subscribers  to  the  service  peaked 
at 4,550  in 1965 when  78  reports where  published;  4  yeas  later the 
number  of reports published  had  dwindled  to only 16.  The  farmer  has 
the  means  of expressing his  demands  for  the  service  through  individual 
subsciptions  and  through  the highly efficient and  effective National 
Farmers'  Union  so  that  the  decline  in  the  service can only  reflect the 
luke warm  attitude of  the  farming  community  to  the quantitative aspects 
of  farming  machinery.  Customers'  attitudes which  are  revealed here  go 
some  way  to  excusing manufacturers  from providing  information of this 
kind  themselves. 
To  gauge  the  sensitivity of machine  performance  to  operating conditions 
and  to get a  feel  for  the  number  of dimensions  of machinery  performance 
which  need  to  be  considered,  it is useful  to consider  two  surveys 
carried out  by  NIAE  and  ADAS  on  potato harvesters  in  1971  and  sugar-beet 
harvesters  in  1973(l).  The  potato harvester  study was  based  on  work 
records  of 192  machines,  the  sugar-beet  study  on  52  machines,  observed 
(1)  "The Utilisation and  Performance  of Potato Harvesters  1971"  and  "The 
Utilisation and  Performance  of Sugar-Beet Harvesters  1973",  Fann 
Mechanisation Studies  24  and  26,  NIAE,  Silsoe,  U.K. 190 
over  a  full  harvesting  season.  Sugar-beet harvesters were  compared  in 
respect of  their  spot,  net  and  overall  seasonal  rates  of work,  the 
surplus  trash which was  harvested with crop  and  the  proportion of crop 
which  the machines  failed  to harvest.  In addition  to  these  dimensions, 
potato  harvesters were  investigated  in  respect  of crop  damage.  The 
tests confirmed  that performance varies  considerably with  the  operating 
situation.  In  the  sugar-beet harvester study  for  example,  tests  on 
12  identical machines  (the  Standen  Rapide)  revealed  a  range  of net 
rates of work  (referring to  the  average  rate  of work  excluding break-
downs  and  delays)  between 0.2  and  0.6 acres per hour,  a  range  of  average 
seasonal work rates  (taking account  of all breakdowns  and  delays) 
between  0.13  and  0.29 acres per hour.  The  same  machines  picked  up 
surplus dirt and  trash amounting  to  between  8%  and  25%  of  the  crop; 
they also left between  2%  and  15%  of  the  crop  in  the  ground.  This 
degree~ variability is typical  and  lends  some  weight  to  the  conventional 
wisdom of  the  industry which  argues  that performance  claims  have  a 
limited role  in  the marketing of agricultural machinery. 
Could matters be  otherwise?  There  is a  definite  segment of the market, 
sometimes  put at around  5%  of U.K.  farmers,  which is interested in 
studying  the  economics  of  their operations  in a  numerate  fashion; 
manufacturers  of precision up-market  equipment  make  special efforts  to 
identify  these progressive  farmers.  And  it is certainly possible to 
make  sense  of performance  studies,  despite  the variability due  to  operating 
conditions.  The  precise point of recording  the  performance  of  samples 
of machines  over  an  entire  season  is that  the  average  performance  of 
different  types  of machine  can  be  compared,  allowing for  the  random 
factors  to which  each machine  is inevitably subject.  For  example,  in 
the  sugar-beet harvesting  study  the  net work  rate of  the  two  types  of 
intermittent loading trailer machines  produced  by  Standen  and  Armer, 
was  found  to  range  between  0.2  and  0.6 acres  per hour  and  0.5  and  1.1 acres 
per hour  respectively.  Although  these  ranges overlap  the  difference  in 
the  average  performance  of  the  two  machines was  statistically highly 
significant.  Within  the  sample  the Armer machines were  50%  faster on 
average,  permitting one  to  conclude  that within  95%  limits of confidence 
they are  between  25%  and  75%  faster  in  the  maChine  population as  a  whole. 191 
The  Study allows  reliable  comparisons  to  be  made  which  are hardly 
possible  on  the basis of  sales literature and  farming  gossip.  It 
is interesting to  consider why  Armer's  performance  advantage  is not 
reflected  in  the  market,  which  is dominated  by  Standen machines.  A 
possible reason  for  this  is  that  in  this  industry product  features  are 
made  to  count  far more  than  product  performance.  Apparently  the 
decisive  feature  in  favour  of  the  Standen  trailed machine  was  the 
mechanism for  lifting the  beet  from  the  ground.  The  Standen machine 
lifted the beet  from underneath by  a  pair of  shares whereas  the Armer 
machine  pulled  the  beet  from  the  top  - a  method  considered  by  many 
farmers  to  be  less reliable when  frost  damages  the beet  tops  or hardens 
the  soil.  Since  the  Study  covered  an entire  season it presumably 
allowed  due  weight  to  this  factor yet  the Armer  machine  still appeared 
to be  superior in performance  terms.  One  wonders  therefore whether 
the  style of marketing  typical  in  this  industry is likely to bring 
about  the optimal pattern of machinery use. 
The  Study also  reveals  another aspect of  farmers'  decisions.  Three 
systems  of harvesting  sugar-beet,  one-row  trailed tankers,  two-stage 
three-row and  three-stage  five-row  systems,  are  compared  in respect of 
the capital cost per acre  for  various acreages.  In  1973  the  capital 
cost per  hectam for  these  three  systems was  £30  at 15,  40  and  90  hec-
tares respectively.  The  average  seasonal  use  of each  type  of machine 
(calculated  from Table  2,  page  5  of  the  report)  corresponds very closely 
to  these  figures,  namely,  25,  35  and  100  hectares.  It suggests  that 
farmers  make  their decisions mainly  on  unit capital costs,  particularly 
as  this is an  easy  calcu~tion for  a  farmer  to make,  on  the  basis of 
machinery prices and his  sugar-beet acreage.  This  emphasis  on unit 
capital cost occurs again  in one  of  the  few  attempts  to  base  a  marketing 
appeal  on  performance  comparisons.  After  the  publication offte sugar-
beet study,  Standen  based  its marketing  brochure  for  its two-stage 
three-row  system on  a  capital productivity comparison  inferred  from 
the  study,  namely  th~  the price of its machine  was  only  50%  of  that 
of the French  five-row  system while  its overall work-rate was  75%  of 
the  latter,  implying  that the capital cost per acre  of  the  standard 
machine  is equal  to  two  thirds of that of  the French  system for  farmers 
with  large  sugar-beet acreages. 192 
This  is a  significant step  in the  direction of more  intelligent and 
informative marketing  in this  industry - that is  to  say,  an  approach 
which considers  the  operating economics  of machines,  identifies  target 
segments  of  the  market  to which  they are most  appropriate,  and  then 
seeks  to  spell out  the  economic  advantages  to  this  segment  of  the 
market.  The  Standen approach adopted  for  this  machine  shares  one 
weakness  of most of  the  industry's advertising  in  that it ignores 
the  non-capital costs,  probably over  60%  of  total costs  in  this case. 
By  way  of illustration,  in  the  comparison of  the  Standen  and Herriau 
systems  referred  to  above,  if capital  cos~ account  for  40%  of the 
Herriau  machines'  total costs  the  capital cost advantage  of  33%  offered 
by  the  Standen machine would  be  more  than offset by  the  non-capital 
cost disadvantage arising  from  the  fact  that  the  Standen machine's 
work  rate is  25%  lower,  as  the Table  12.3  indicates.  Stanhay,  the 
importers of  the  French Herriau  system,  righly observed  that the  object 
of mechanisation is not  to minimise  unit capital costs but unit total 
costs,  and  that  taken  to  its logical  extremes,  the  type of claim made 
by  Standen for  their  three-row system  implies  that  the  optimum  system 
is a  garden  fork!  Stanhay  have  developed  a  quantitative approach 
(1) 
rather further  by  referring to  a  comprehensive  study  by  Dalton & Coney 
which  compares  the  total operating economics  of different sugar-beet 
harvesting systems,  including an  appreciation of  the  effects of harvesting 
capacity on  the  timliness  and  the  improved  sugar-beet price which  farmers 
could  expect  from harvesting  their beet earlier in the  season.  The 
Study indicates  that below  50 acreas  the  (Standen)  single-row  tanker 
is  the  cheapest  system,  between  55  and  56  acres  the  (Standen)  two-stage 
three-row machine  is marginally  cheaper,  and  that above  78  acres  the 
five-row  (Herriau)  system is the  cheapest.  Stanhay also make  calcula-
tions  of  their own  and  attempt  to identify individual  farmers  whose 
sugar-beet acreages  are most  appropriate  for  the  five-row  system. 
(1)  "The  Choice  of  Sugar-Beet Harvesting Machinery",  by  G.E.  Dalton  and 
R.T.  Coney,  Department  of Agriculture  and  Horticulture,  Reading 
University,  1973. 193 
TABLE  13.3: 
HYPOTHETICAL  COST  COMPARISONS  STANDEN  AND  HERRIAU 
Standen's Relative  Herriau  Costs  (%)  Standen Costs  (%) 
Cost  Item  Unit Cost/acre  ExamEle  1  ExamEle  2  Exam2le 
Capital Costs/ 
acre  2/3*  50  40  33 
Non-Capital 
Costs/acre  4/3*  ..  k  50  60  67 
Total  Costs/ 
acre  (%)  100  100  100 
*  Relative 2rice of  Standen and Herriau machines •  112  +  3/4 = 2; 3 
Relative work rate(l) 
Relative  labour cosm (assumed  equal) 
1  .  k  (1)  Re  at1ve wor  rate 
=  4/3 
Better performance  data  could  improve  the match  of machine  to  the 
acreage  on  which  it will  be  used.  The  data on machine utilisation 
in both  the  potato and  sugar-beet harvester studies  lllustrate  the 
1 
degree  of market  segmentation  that already exists and  the way  in which 
it could  become  more  precise if fuller,  more  objective and  more  com-
prehensible  information were  made  available  to  farmers.  It was  noted 
earlier that  the  pattern of utilisation of sugar-beet harvesters 
suggested  that  farmers  tend  to based  their decisions  on  the unit capital 
costs.  It is  therefore  not  surprising that  the pattern of machine use 
which  had  emerged  in this market  is rather different from  that which 
might  be  predicted  from  the Dalton & Coney  cost  study which  considers 
the  total operating economics.  TableD.4 indicates  the pattern of 
utilisation of  the  sample  of machines which were  tested and  the  optimum 
system for  each  acreage  according  to  the Dalton & Coney  study.  There 
is  some  broad  correspondence here at either extreme  but  some  striking 
differences  too;  a  substantial proportion of trailed tankers are  used 
on acreages  for which  they are  only  the  second  or third cheapest method. 
A majority of  two-stage  machines  are  employed  outside  their most 
advantageous  acreage,  but of greater interest is  the  fact  that the 
self-propelled  tanker  is used widely  on  British farms  across all 
(1)  "The Utilisation and  Performance  of Sugar-Beet Harvesters",  NIAE, 
Silsoe,  1973,  Table  4. 
Exam2le 
27 
80 
107 
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acreages,  despite its relatively uneconomic  performance.  The  NIAE  tests 
estimated its net work rate  (.4 acres an hour)  to  be  the  lowest  of  any 
system currently in  use  and  the Dalton & Coney  study  found  no  acreage 
at which its costs were  the most  competitive  though  they  noted  that 
its low  labour  requirement  could be  an  advantage when  labour availability 
was  low. 
:0BLE  13.4: 
SUGAR-BEET  HARVESTING  MACHINERY  UTILISATION';'( 
Proportion of Machines  of Each  Type  Used  (%) 
Type  of Hachine  less  than  more  than 
and  Manufe.cturer(s)  50  acres  50-75  acres  70  acres  Total 
Trailed  tankers 
(Standen  and Armer)  50'i':*  16  34  100 
Self-propelled 
tankers  (Standen)  20  40  40  100 
Two-stage  three-row 
(Standen)  33  16**  50  100 
Three-stage  five-row 
(Herriau)  0  0  rocr:d~  100 
*  "Utilisation and  Performance  of  Sugar-Beet Harvesters  1973",  NIAE, 
1974,  Table  2,  page  5. 
**  The  optimal  acreage  for  each  machine,  as  estimated  by  Dalton & Coney, 
op.  cit., Graph  4,  page  13. 
There was  a  similar fuzziness  in market  segmentation  in  the  potato har-
vester market.  Among  the  simplest  complete harvesting  systems,  the 
manned  one-row  trailed machines,  it was  found  that  the more  expensive 
types were  used  on  small  acreages  - over  50%  of  them on units of less 
than  30 acres  each  - in  the  same  proportion as  the  cheaper  machines, 
even  though  operating economics would  surely fit  them better for  the 
larger acreages.  At  the  expensive  end  of  the market,  it was  shown 
that  one  third of  the automated  two-row machines  were  used  on  units 
of  less  than  40  acres,  whereas  none  of  the  manually  operated  two-row 
machines  operating on  these  acreages at all,  despite  the  fact  th&  the 
relative capital-intensity of  the  automatic machine  favours  high 
utilisation. 195 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  points which  emerge  from  th~ discussion are  these: 
(1)  Product differentiation in this  industry is mainly  concerned with 
product features,  rather  than with product performance.  This has 
nothing whatever  to  do  with  industry  structure but it has  a  lot 
to  do  with  the  nature  of  the product and  the  tradition of  the 
industry. 
(2)  To  a  large  degree  the  industry is  justified in adopting  this approach 
in view of  the  sensitivity of machine  performance  to  differences 
in operating conditions  and  operator skills,  and  farmers'  apparent 
indifference  to perfonnance measurement. 
(3)  Farmers  rely on  informal  and often misleading methods  of  comparing 
machine  performance.  Comments  from other farmers  are  inevitably 
subjective  and  are based  on  limited experience;  demonstrations  are 
probably equally unreliable  because only a  small  sample  of obser-
vations  can  be  made,  without any  testing equipment  of the kind  used  in the 
course of scientific enquiries.  Precisely because  of  the  variability 
in operating conditions,  large  scale  surveys  are essential  for 
reliable comparisons. 
(4)  The  type of anomalies which arise  from purchasing machines without 
information on  performance  has  been  evident in the  cases  examined 
here.  Commercial  success  did not  appear  to  correspond very closely 
to operating efficiency.  Machines  were  used  way  outside their 
optimal  range,  implying  that farmers  were  frequently  buying machines 
which  did  not  minimise  their total unit operating costs. 
(5)  There  is  scope  for more  numerate kinds  of product differentiation 
in this industry which would  be  expected  to  educate  the  market  in 
machine  performance  and  improve  the quality of  farmers'  purchasing 
decisions.  In  turn this would  stimulate  'value  for money'  compe-
tition in the  industry and  make  it more  technically progressive. 197 
CHAPTER  14  PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE 
AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY  INDUSTRY 
Methods  of Analysing_g_&  D 
In  the  economic  literature on  industrial organisation an  analytical 
tradition has  developed which  tries to measure  'technical progres-
siveness'  and  relate it to structural features.  R & D budgets of 
companies  and  industries are analysed  to  see whether larger companies 
spend  proportionately more  on  R & D than  smaller companies  and whether 
concentrated  industries  spend proportionately more  than  fragemented 
industries.  This  approach  is not pursued here  since it seems  to  be 
both uninteresting and  inappropriate,  for  several  reasons. 
(1)  The  comparison of budgets  of  large and  small  firms  is difficult 
because  large  firms  have  R & D budgets whereas  small  firms  often 
do  not.  This  itself may  indicate  that larger firms  take R & D 
more  seriously,  but it is more  likely that it simply  indicates 
that  they  take cost accounting more  seriously,  because  large 
scale  organ~ions require more  formal  systems  of control  to be 
manageable at all. 
(2)  The  R & D/sales  ratio is a  peculiar criterion in itself since it 
is the  inverse of R & D productivity.  Why  then  should it be  con-
sidered a  desirable variable  to maximise?  It picks up  two  distinct 
elements;  the  company's  emphasis  on  R & D  inputs  expressed  financially; 
and  the quality of  its research outputs.  Other  things being equal, 
a  company  whose  quality of R & D work  is high generally designs 
successful products which  sell well  in large  numbers.  This will  tend 
to  depress  the  R & D/sales ratio  so  that  the  companies which  score 
highly on  this test may  in fact  be  the  inefficient users of product 
development  resources. 
(3)  Inter-industry comparisons  of  R & D intensiveness  take  no  account 
of  the  technological opportunities  facing different industries and 
can  lead  to highly misleading  interpretations.  One  instance was 
Galbraith's observation  that  the U.S.  petroleum industry was  more 
technically progressive  than  the U.S.  coal  industry because  the 198 
former  had  a  highly  oligopolistic  structure whereas  the latter 
was  highly  fragmented.  The  very different  technological  oppor-
tunities  facing  these  industries  in  the  1960s  was  apparently 
ignored. 
It is precisely this  issue which  is discussed here,  in  the  context 
within which  the  industry \vorks,  with particular reference  to  such 
factors  as  the  state of  the art,  the  nature  of  the  functions  that 
agricultural  machines  have  to perform,  the  technical  receptivity of 
the  farming  comnrunity  and  the  capacity of distribution channels  to 
cope Hith  design  change.  No  attempt  is made  here  to measure  R & D 
inputs.  For  the  reasons  mentioned  above  this  seems  to  be  one  of  the 
least interesting aspects  of  R & D.  Instead  the  discussion centres 
on  the  manner  in which  R & D is conducted,  how  it is organised  and 
intergrated with other functions,  how  responsive it is to changes  in 
the  market  and  technology,  and what  types  of  research are undertaken 
by  different  types  of  company. 
The  Technology  of the  Industry 
The  technology  of  the  industry is fairly static.  Its most  basic  and 
highly  engineered  product,  the  tractor itself, may  be  described  as  a 
mature  product.  By  1960  or  so  most  of  its key  features  had  been 
developed  - three  point  linkages,  automatic  draught  control,  indepen-
dent  power  take-off and  differential  lock.  Since  1960  the  significant 
improvements  have  been  made  in  semi-automatic  transmissions  which 
permit  gear  changing  to  be  performed without  loss of traction.  Recent 
product  developments  have  been  to  do  with operator  comfort  and  safety, 
forced  on  the  industry  by  legislation. 
Tractor manufacturers  seem  committed  to  the  traditional  concept of the 
tractor,  a  mechanised  horse,  wedded  to  ploughing  - the  function which 
places  the  highest  den1ands  on  the  tractor's  draw-bar  pull  and  automatic 
draught  control  - the  device  which  responds  to  changes  in soil condi-
tions  to  bring about  compensating  changes  in  traction.  Some  obervers 
would  argue  that  this  emphasis  on  tractor's ploughing capabilities is 
becoming  less  relevant.  Ploughing  occupies  only  7%  of the  tractor's 199 
working life and  is itself being  replaced  to  some  degree  by  minimum 
cultivation techniques which  either  involve  breaking  the  soil  rather 
than  inverting it completely,  or  simply drilling directly  into  the 
stubble.  The  widespread  use  of weed-killers,  notably  Paraquat)  reduces 
the  need  to  bury  the  trash by  traditional ploughing methods.  It is 
also  becoming more  difficult to apply  the  increasing tractor horsepower 
to  the soil efficiently by  sing  the  tractor's pulling capacity;  it is 
difficult to maintain  traction without  increasing  tractor weight  and 
this  tends  to  damage  the soil structure  and  impede  good  drainage. 
From  the  operating point  of view,  the  traditional tractor has  the 
disadvantage  that the  operator must  face  in  one  direction  to  steer,  the 
opposite direction  to control  the  trailed  implement.  This  is particularly 
disadvantageous  in operations  involving  two  or  three  implements  linked 
together  to  perform two  or more  operations at one  pass.  The  trailing 
arrangement also  implies  that  the  tractor wheels  run  through  the  standing 
crop  during  the  harvesting operation. 
There  is an alternative and  practical tractor concept,  embodied  in  the 
Intrac  system developed  and  marketed  by  Deutz,  part of  the  German  company, 
Glockner-Humboldt Deutz.  This  design  resembles  a  truck  in  that the  operator 
sits in a  cab at the  front  of  the vehicle.  Power  is delivered  simultan-
eously if necessary  to  implements at the  front  and at the  rear of  the 
machine;  some  transport capacity is provided  in  the middle of  the  tractor, 
useful  for  carrying  seed  and  fertiliser.  The  advantage  of this arrangement 
is that the  operator has  a  better view  of his operations  and  can perform 
two  or  three operations  together~  such  as mowing  and  loading hay;  harrowing, 
fertilising and  drilling.  The  Intrac  system is currently expensive  but 
the cost will doubtless  decline  relative  to  conventional  tractors as  mass 
production proceeds.  As  far as  is known,  the  leading  tractor manufacturers 
in the U.K.  decided  not  to  develop  such  a  system.  The  Intrac  concept 
was  suggested  to  them  in  some  detail  several years  ago  by  the National 
Farmers Union,  but  the  idea was  not  favourably  received.  In  the  tractor 
industry,  product competition is limited  in what  one  might  term  the  con-
ceptual  dimension,  and  vigorous within fairly  circumscribed  demgn  limits. 
Tractor models  remained  basically unchanged  for  ten years  or more  in both 
their styling and  engineering.  Radical  changes  arc unusual,  but  it is 
fair  to  say that in respect of  the  featurs  of  tractor design which  farmers 200 
are most  concerned with,  the  real price of applied  horsepower,  the 
tractor companies  have  n1ade  impressive  progress  over  the years. 
The  other major  product,  the  combine  harvester,  has  not  changed  funda-
mentally either  since  it was  developed  during  the  Second World  War. 
This  is particularly true of  the  mechanism  for harvesting the crop; 
the cutter-bar  and  reel  are  in principal  the .same  as  those  on 
McCormick's  famous  reaper which  marked  the  birth of  the  industry a 
century ago.  In  this  field  too,  a  revolutionary design has  gained  no 
acceptance.  Research at the  N.I.A.E.  laboratories  over  many  years 
produced  the  Silsoe Airstream Combine,  a  design whereby  the  separation 
of grain  and  chaff  is effected  by  a  current of air,  as  opposed  to  the 
mechanical  methods  used  in the  conventional  machine.  The  resulting 
simplicity of the  design affords  significant reduction  in size,  weight 
and  complexity,  and  an  added  efficiency in barley harvesting,  the 
world's major cereal  crop. 
estimated  to  be  around  50%. 
These  advantages  imply  a  cost reduction 
An  added  option with  this  design is that 
it can  be  cheaply converted  into  a  combine  module  which  can  be  carried 
by  a  general  purpose  vehicle.  This  wou~  go  some  way  to offsetting 
one  of the  main  drawbacks  of self-propelled machines  - that expensive 
capital is tied up  in a  machine  which  can  be  used  for  only  three  or 
four weeks  in  the  year.  As  yet  there  is no  sign  that combine  manufac-
turers are  seriously  interested  in  this design. 
A  number  of other products  remain  unchanged  - drills,  harrows,  manure 
spreaders.  Thus  a  spokesman  of  a  company  which  pioneered  a  pneumatic 
precission seed drill could  observe  in  1971  "the only  thing anybody 
ever did  to advance  the  seed drill was  to  take  the horse-shafts off it 
until we  came  along".  Progress  has  been  made  with vegetable harvesting 
machinery,  although performance  tests reveal  that  there  is still much 
development  to  be  done  in  this area.  In general  the progress with  new 
techniques  is slow  - hydrostatic drives  in  heavy  machinery  such as 
harvesters which  require  flexibility at  low  working  speeds,  automatic 
controls and  monitors,  suspended  cabs.  The  only automatic  control 
in all  the  industry's  products  is  the draft control  sensing  device  on 
the  tractor's  linkage which automatically  transfers extra weight  to 
the  rear wheel  of  the  tractor when  ground  conditions  require  it.  Such 
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Polish  industry,  enabling  the machine's  direction and  speed  to be 
adjusted automatically  to  the  crop's position and  density.  Generally 
speaking,  monitoring  devices  are  rare;  the  farmer  has  no  reliable way 
of knowing  how  some  machines  are performing - whether,  for example, 
seed drills are  drilling continuously  through all coulters,  whether 
blockages are  occuring  in vegetable harvester mechanisms.  Only 
recently have  grain  sensors  been  fitted  to  cqmbine  harvesters  to 
monitor  the  volume  of grain being lost.  Despite  the  revolution in 
byraulics after the  Second Horld War,  there  remain  many  small  but 
useful applications which  have  yet  to  be  exploited - adjusting the 
angle  of  disc harrows while  in motion,  power  steering for  heavy har-
vesting equipment,  controlling the  direction of discharge  of  forage 
harvesters. 
There  is very little basic  research  in  the  industry.  Design work  does 
not usually proceed  from  the  fundamental  engineering analysis of  a 
problem.  Manufacturers  of  soil-engaging  implements,  for  example,  do 
not  typically begin  by  attempting  to define  the  engineering parameters 
of what actually happens  at  the  point of contact between  implement  and 
soil.  The  soil mechanics would  be  studied  experimentally.  Similarly, 
combine  harvester manufacturers would  not  typically design  the  interior 
of  the machine  based  on  the  fundamental  understanding of  the  aero-
dynamic  and  flow  properties of grain and  straw.  Development  proceeds 
experimentally  on  the  basis of observation and  a  feel  for  the  machine's 
operating conditions.  In this respect  the  industry is rather different 
from other branches  of engineering  and  this accounts  for  the  fact  that 
there  is littls transfer of engineering personnel  from other branches 
of engineering and  the  reluctance of  the  Institute of Agricultural 
Engineers  to  be  incorporated  into  the  body  representing mechanical 
engineers  as  a  whole.  The  agricultural engineer  sees  himself as part 
of agriculture,  not  as part of the mechanical  engineering  industry. 
He  might often have  a  farming  background  himself  and his particular 
asset is an  ability to  see  and  allow for  the variety and  types of 
misuse  that agricultural machines will receive  - what will happen  to 
them when  they are  driven  too hard or backed  into  some  obstacle, 
operated  by  relatively unskilled  labourers,  blocked  by  crops,  stones 
or metal  objects.  With  experience  the  engineer will intuitively know 
what  strength particular components  require without  lengthy analysis 
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This  particular engineering culture  that we  have  tried  to  describe 
has  both  strengths and weaknesses.  Its particular strength is  that 
it provides  for  the  integration of  the  product  development  function 
with  the other major  functions,  sales and  production.  The  engineer 
is not  a  remote  laboratory  figure;  in  small  firms  he  sometimes  works 
directly  to  the  sales director.  He  spends  a  lot of  time  out in  the 
field and  attending agricultural  shows.  He  also has  considerable 
two-way  contact with production;  he  draws  his personnel  from  the 
production  devartment  and  may  often advise  on  production problems. 
The  problem,  if anything,  is  the  reverse.  The  product  development 
funation is insufficiently differentiated  from  the  others.  The  product 
development  eneineer can often be  forced  into a  service  function, 
responding  to  the  complaints of customers.  His  role  is responsive 
rather  than creative and  he  becomes  locked  into tie  traditional working 
concepts of  the  industry to  a  greater degree  than engineers with a 
more  conceptual  tradition.  It is perhaps  no  surprise that a  high 
proportion of radical  ideas  derive  not  from agricuhural  engineers  but 
from  farmers.  In  haymaking machinery,  for  example,  the big baler, 
the  forage  harvester,  the  rotary star tedder,  derived originally from 
farmers'  ideas. 
Another  consequence  of  the  emphasis  on  the  D  rather than  the  R  is an 
intuitive,  trial-and-error approach  and  a  lack of rigour  in  testing 
machine  performance,  reflected  in  the  low  standard of performance  of 
some  machines.  Studies  carried out by  the N.I.A.E.  on  sugar-beet  and 
potato harvesters  showed  that on  average,  sugar-beet machines  left 
7%  of  the  crop  on  or  in  the  ground  and harvested dirt and  trash equal 
to  15%  of  the harvested  crop.  Potato harvesters performed  similarly, 
leaving  5%  of  the crop  on  the  ground,  picking up  between  5  and  10% 
of dirt and  trash  and  damaging  5%  of  the  harvested  crop.  The  worst 
figures  to  occur in  the potato harvester  sample.for  ground  loss,  damage 
and  dirt,  measured  as  a  percentage  of  the harvested crop,  were  25%, 
20%  and  50%. 
Another aspect of  the  industry's conservatism is its attitude to 
development  from outside  the  irlustry - ergonomics  and  electronics. 
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despite its important  bearing on  machine  efficiency and  its marketing 
appeal,  bearing in mind  the  fact  that  the majority of  farmers  operate 
their own  machines  themselves and  the  remainder  have  difficulty in 
retaining labour.  The  gradual  adoption of  tractor cabs  bears  this 
out.  Tractors are  apt  to overturn and  prior  to  the  compulsory intro-
duction of  safety cabs,  killed around  35  drivers  a  year.  A  side 
effect of  the  safety  cab was  that  noise  levels were  increased  since 
the  cab acted as  a  sounding box  for  engine  and  transmission noises, 
particularly as it '-1as  bolted directly onto  the  rear axle.  Naximum 
decibel  levels are  to  be  legally enforced  by  1977  after a  year's  delay 
requested  by  the  industry.  There  is no  doubt  that  this legislation 
has  gone  too  fast for  the market  and  it is  argued  that  the  cab  repre-
sents an  excessive  investment  to  save  so  few  lives;  one  manufacturer 
recommended  the  use  of ear-muffs  as  an alternative  to  sound-insulated 
cabs.  Quite apart  from  the  safety aspect,  cabless  tractors are very 
uncomfortable  in winter  and  it is not unusual  to  see  drivers  ploughing 
with sacks  tied around  them  for  warmth.  It is also  considered accept-
able  that  ploughing  tractor drivers  should sit in a  tilted position 
for  8  hours  a  day '-1hen  the  simplest engineering changes  could  allow an 
offsetting adjustment  of  the  sitting position.  Some  root harvesters 
are uncomfortable  to  drive,  maintain and  adjust,  and  this may  account 
for  the  enormous  variation in performance  of  root harvesters  noted  in 
the  NIAE  performance  reports.  The  cabless  combine  is unhealthily dusty 
for  the  operator.  The  combine  itself poses  other operator problems 
since  there are  several controls  to  be  adjusted  simultaneously  and  the 
average  operator might  expect  to  acquire  only  cwo  or  three weeks 
experience with  them each  year.  The  NIAE  report  on  the utilisation 
and  performance  of combine harvesters  in  l969(l)  drew attention to  the 
level of combine  harvester grain losses and  the  poor utilisation of 
combine  capacity and  noted  in its conclusion  that ''it is  not  just a 
question of educating  •..  there  is clearly a  need  to  ease  the  task of 
the driver". 
This  rerni~s us  of  the  role  that electronics is likely  to  play in the 
future  of the  industry.  A combine  harvester is  the  largest  item of 
(1)  "The Utilisation and  PerfoJ~mance of Combine  Harvesters  1969", 
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farm  equipment.  It is a  self-propelled machine  for harvesting  cereals 
and  separating  grain  from  straw which it ejects  from  the  rear of  the 
machine.  A  drawback  of  the  machine  is that under  certain operating 
conaitions quantities of grain are ejected along with  the  straw and 
are never  recovered.  These  losses  can  seriously effect  the  farmer's 
net profit margin;  in  several  cases  investigated  by  the  Combine 
Harvester Study  the  loss  exceeded  200  lbs.  per acre  - around  5%  of  the 
crop.  Grain  losses arise when  the  machine's  forward  speed  is  too  great 
for its capacity  to  fully digest  the  crop  intake.  Therefore  an operator 
attempting to use  the  machine's  capacity  to  the  full  is apt  to  cause 
grain losses.  The  grain  sensor  is an  electronic device  which  is  able 
to  decipher  the  impact  of grain  from  that of  straw and  thereby  register 
the passage of grain over  the  rear of  the machine.  This  message  is 
delivered  to  the  operator  on  a  dial  so  that he  can  control grain loss 
by  reducing  ground  speed. 
Only  0ne  combine harvester manufacturer,  New  Holland,  has  designed  and 
fitted  such  a  sensor.  This  company  has  also pioneered  the metal  detec-
tor for  forage  harvesters which  shuts  off the machine  automatically 
before  damage  to  the chopping mechanism  can  occur.  Apart  from New 
Holland,  two  independent  companies  specialising  in electronics appli-
cations manufacture  sensors  in  the  U.K.  Around  25%  of  combines  in the 
U.K.  have  been  so  equipped  and  according  to  a  study  on  their application(l), 
they are  generally effective once  farmers  have  been  educated  in  their 
use. 
The  fact  that  the  development. of  such  devices  has  been  so  slow  and  has 
come  primarily from outside  the  industry is  due  to  three  factors: 
(1)  A belief in the  industry that electronic  devices  are out of place 
on  a  farm  because  dealers  are  not  equipped  to  repair  them  and 
farmers  do  not understand  them  (as  one  manufacturer put it,  "when 
a  machine  goes  wrong  the  farmer  kicks it!"). 
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(2)  Difficulties in marrying  together  two  very different  technical 
disciplines,  mechanical  engineering  and  electronics(!).  In  com-
mon  with most  human  beings,  development  engineers prefer  to 
operate  in  a  familiar  frame  of reference.  To  him,  electronic 
instruments are  literally 'black boxes'  which he would  prefer  to 
leave  alone.  It is significant that the  one  combine  manufacturer 
which  developed its own  grain  sensor,  New  Holland,  is part of  the 
Sperry Rand  Group  which  possesses  a  strong electronics capability 
to which  grain monitoring could  be  given as  an  electronics problem. 
(3)  The  industry's empirical  tradition.  Because  the  industry is 
orientated  towards  development  rather  than  towards  research,  its 
product  development  engineers  approach  design problems  on  the 
basis  of "how  are we  to adapt what  we  have?"  rather  than  "what  is 
the  essence of  a  problem;  what  techniques  are available  to  solve 
it?". 
These  insights are hardly startling but  they  serve  as  an antidote  to  the 
type of analysis which  looks  for answers  to  these  questions  in  terms  of 
scale  economies  and  industrial structure.  We  see  no  sign of  this here; 
it is a  question of companies  of all sizes being  locked  into  a  particular 
culture which  they  share with  their customers  and  which  they  tend  to 
reinforce. 
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK  FOR  RESEARCH 
In  the U.K.  product  development  in agricultural machinery  tends  to  be 
polarised  between  basic  research carried out at the  NIAE  and  its Scottish 
equivalent,  agricultural colleges  and  university engineering departments 
and  development  work  carried out  by  the  industry itself.  There  is  some-
thing of a  gap  between  these  two  which  the National  Research Development 
Corporation  (NRDC)  attempts  to bridge.  The  NRDC  acts as  the  commercial 
arm of  the  research organisations mentioned  above,  and  other similar 
organisations  for other  industries:  it identifies patentable research 
work,  files patents  and  negotiates  licenses with manufacturers  for  their 
exploitation. 
(1)  The  same  difficulty retarded  both  the  development and the commercial 
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The  NRDC  has  licensed  19  agricultural machinery  inventions  and  a  glance 
at the  licensees  is  instructive.  Only  six of the  nineteen were  pre-
viously  in  the agricultural machinery  industry itself;  four  of  these  are 
substantial  companies,  Howard,  Root  Harvester,  Simplex of Cambridge  and 
John Wilder.  NRDC  patents are  not apparently  s~ized upon  by  the  industry 
even  though it has  first choice.  Nor  are  they  regarded  by  small  com-
panies  in  the  industry as  a  means  of compensating for  their lack  of 
research capability.  To  judge  from  the  large  number  of  licensees  from 
outside  the  industry,  the  prime  function  of  NRDC  patents  is  to  serve  as 
vehicles  for  new  entry.  The  pattern of  response  from  the  industry itself 
underlines  further  its preference for  an  adaptive  rather  than  an 
innovative  style of product  development. 
The  Profitability of  R & D 
One  would  expect  that  the  importance  of R & D activities would  reflect 
their expected profitability.  What  are  the general  factors which bear 
on  managers'  perceptions of expected profitability of  research?  Is 
technical progress  seen as  a  success  factor,  or  can  rivals imitate  inven-
tions quickly of nullify  their impact  in other ways?  How  strong are 
patents  in this industry,  for  example?  There  are  limits  to which  patent 
protection operates  in  this  industry.  It is not possible  to  patent a 
principle,  only  a  specific mechanism in which  the principle is embodied. 
A company  which  evolves  a  new  principle will  need  to  develop  the market 
application of it very  rapidly in order  to  reap  the  commercial berefit, 
unless it patents an  indispensible mechanism.  Imitation  does  not  take 
long  because  in  this  industry  inventions are usually quite  straightforward 
from  a  mechanical  point of view and  once  the  principle is grasped it 
can easily be  engineered.  If one  considers  a  number  of  new  products 
which  have  appeared  in  the  last 20  years  or  so  - reversible ploughs, 
spider wheel  rakes,  rotary star hay  conditioners,  foragers,  big balers, 
precision drills,  rotary mowers,  rotary cultivators,  fertiliser broad-
casters,  rotary milking parlours,  self-loading trailers - each  product 
represents  a  significant departure  from  tradition,  but  none  involves 
radical  engineering problems  in  terms  of machine  function  and  operating 
principles.  There  is,  therefore,  some  basis  for  the  view  in  the 
industry  that pioneering new  products  does  not  pay;  imitators  learn  from 
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prepare  the  market.  This  is true  in  small markets.  In  large markets 
the  reverse  is  sometimes  the case  for  the  small  pioneer which  could  not 
expand  fast  enough  to  cope with  the  demand  and which  positively welcome 
a  rival,  particularly if it is a  well  known  company,  which will  improve 
the credibility of  the  new  product - "it must  be  good  because  XYZ  are 
making  it". 
Apart  from  imitation,  there are  two  other  reasons why  good  designs  do 
not get  their  just rewards.  The  influence of dealers  can outweight 
design advantages;  it is not  uncommon  for  a  farmer  to  acknowledge  the 
technical  superiority of  a  particular product  but  continue  to  buy  a 
rival's product because his  local dealer  stocks it.  The  second  reason, 
which  is discussed at greater length in Chapter  11  is that  the  industry 
has yet  to evolve  a  numerate  and  quantitative  style of marketing which 
would  allow machine  perfo.rmance  to have  its fullest  impact  on  the market. 
These  three  factors,  the weakness  of patents,  the  inertia caused by 
farmers'  loyalty  to dealers  and  the qualitative style of marketing,  go 
some  way  to  explain why  basic  research and  innovation  is not  a  crucial 
success factor  in this  industry. 
The  Organisation  and  Management  of Product Development:  The  Multi-
national Company 
There was  a  time when  product  development was  not  a  separate  function 
at all.  Each manufacturing unit would develop  its own  products 
through  the efforts of its industrial engineer who  would alternate 
between production and  development.  Most  small  firms  in  the  industry 
still follow  this procedure.  The  multinational  company  adopts  the 
pattern pioneered  by Alfred  Sloan of General  Hotors \olhereby  prallc t 
development  ~a  separate  function under a  manager of product.  The 
manager of product is not  to be  confused with  product managers  in 
mnsumer  product  industries.  Whereas  the latter has  a  strong commit-
ment  to particular products,  the  manager  of product  is a  detached 
impartial  figure whose  task is  to  sweep  up  and  sift ideas  for  nm·7 
products  and administer  the progress of  those  that are  selected.  He 
heads  a  group  on which all other  functions  are  represented.  The  group 
has  considerable  strategic  importance  since it also  reviews  the  com-
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be withdrawn or modified.  Its procedures  are  fairly formal.  Any 
function  in  the  organisation can  propose  a  product.  The  group  meets 
monthly  to  sift ideas  and  selects  some  of  them  for market  research. 
If results prove  favourable  the  group  looks  around  for  sources which 
might meet  the  parameters  that  the market  research  indicates  - other 
subsidiaries first,  then other manufacturers.  Failing these  the  group 
might  opt  to  develop  a  machine  itself, appointing a  product  committee 
whose  prime  task is to produce  a  costed development  programme.  Once 
accepted  by  the~oup, active  control  is exercised  from  the central 
headquarters prior to  any heavy  expenditure  on  the  development  stage. 
The  report is submitted  to  headquarters  and  passed  around  cubsidiaries. 
Other subsidiaries may  argue  that  they are already  developing  something 
similar and  could best  take  on  the  development work.  Such  claims  are 
assessed  by  the  company  headquarters  and  development work  is allocated 
accordingly. 
The  major  companies  concentrate their research efforts to a  high degree, 
Massey  Ferguson  as  much  as  any.  The  development of its tractors is 
located at its Advanced  Project Engineering Centre at Detroit,  harvesting 
machinery  development  in Toronto,  engineering development at Peterborough. 
Central  technical control  is exercised  to  enare  interchangeable  sourcing. 
The  princip[  development work  of  the  various  subsidiaries  is directed 
mainly at adapting  the  designs which  emerge  from  these  research centres 
to meet  local conditions and  legal  requirements. 
Once  a  project is ready for  release  to manufacturing again all subsidia-
ries are  considered as  possible  sources.  Three aspects of this process 
are  of particular interest: 
(1)  The  project is  'handed over'  a  number  of  times  both within and 
between  subsidiaries.  It is transferred across  the various  functions 
involved  - market  research,  engineering,  finance,  testing.  It may 
also be  transferred across  subsidiaries at the  end  of  the  report 
and  development  stages.  Occasionally development personnel  involved 
at the  report  stage  may  travel with the  project  to  other  sub-
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(2)  The  profitability of a  product may  depend  on  its suitability in 
several of  the  company's markets  so  that many  factors must  be 
ioc orporated  into its design. 
(3)  The  analytical basis  for project selection is  in  terms  of total 
profit objectives  not in  terms  of  a  rate of  return.  Risk  premia 
are  not  considered.  The  bygones  princ~le has  no  place either;  the 
decision  to continue or  to  discontinue is made  on  the basis of the 
project's total  cost not on  the cost  that must  be  expended  to  com-
plete it. 
There  are  several  consequences  of this highly institutionalised system: 
(1)  The  process of  development  is lengthy,  taking up  to  six years  from 
conception  to manufacture. 
(2)  It avoids costly mistakes.  Few  products  have  to be  abandoned  once 
they are  in production. 
(3)  It is efficient in  the  sense  that  control is exercised  throughout, 
minimising costs and  using  the  company's worldwide  resources  to 
the  best advantage. 
(4)  It produces  an  impersonal  and  disciplined atmosphere  due  to  the 
fact  that  the project is assessed  and  transferred  so  frequently. 
This discipline is likely to weed  out  uneconomic  'pet'  projects. 
On  the other hand,  it is demotivating  to  the creative  development 
staff since  they are unlikely  to have  much  control  over  a  project 
or be  permitted personally  to progress it through  from conception 
to manufacture. 
(5)  The  emphasis  is  on  the  engineering and  economic  rather than  the 
conceptual  aspects of  a  product,  manipulating a  known  technology, 
rather  than  shifting paradigms. 
{6)  The  lengthy bureaucratic process  loads  each product with  substantial 
overheads  and  encourages  the  company  to  look for large volume  to 
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There  is also  a  corporate  strategic factor which must  encourage  the  1arge 
companies  to  opt  for  the  evolutionary  types  of product  development  that 
were  noted  in  the  two  major products,  tractors  and  combines.  Market 
demand  in  the  important North American  and  European markets,  which  tend 
to  be  the most  receptive  to  new  machinery  designs,  is static  in real 
terms,  encouraging  the  major  companies  to  diversify into  industrial and 
construction equipment.  It is inevitable  that agricultural machinery 
divisions of  these  companies,  with  their established market  positions, 
are  viewed  as  reliable  sources of  cash  for  diversification moves  of this 
kind.  This  strategic consideration argues  against  the  expenditure of 
large  sums  of money  to  develop  radically  ne~v  tractors and  combines. 
Product  Development  in Smaller Companies:  Graindry Ltd.(l) 
Among  multinational  companies,  the  product  development  process  is  remark-
ably  standardised.  Among  the  smaller companies  there  is a  greater variety 
since  the  process  depends  on  the people  concerned  and  sometimes  on  the 
product  involved!  Graindry has  a  turnover of  £2-3 million and  designs 
crop  driers and  handling  systems,  by  far  the  largest component  of  their 
business,  and  machines  for  grinding and  crushing crops.  Crop  driers are 
akin  to  the  fashion  business;  systems  usually have  to  be  fitted into 
customers' existing buildings.  There  are  frequent  changes  in  the  type  of 
drying  technique which is in vogue,  and  the  company  must  anticipate and 
respond  to  these  changes within  a  year.  Like  the  fashion business, 
designs  must  be  produced  for  a  seasonal  demand.  Tooling  requirements 
are very  few  because  the  products  are  made  of  sheet steel which  has  to 
be cut,  folded  and  welded.  Precision  is not vital;  there are  few  moving 
parts  to wear  out  so  that  the  development  process  from  conception  to 
manufacture  can  be  compressed  into six months.  Cost  is  important  as  in 
any  business,  but it is not  the  prime  consideration.  The  product will 
have  a  limited  run  since it may  be  modified  the following  year.  The 
chief consideration  is  technical;  will  the machine  perform its function? 
This  is  in contrast  to  the  company's  other staple product- crushers  and 
hammer  mills.  These  are attrition machines  heavily built of cast  iron 
(1)  Fictitious  names  are  used  in  these  examples. 211 
with precisely engineered moving  parts.  Wearing processes  need  to  be 
studied carefully and  this  extends  the  design  process  to  18  months  or  so. 
The  development  function  is not  highly  formalised.  The  development 
engineer divides his  time  between  designing  new  products  and  making  pro-
duction  decisions  on  plant  layout  and  make-or-buy  decis~ns.  There  is 
no  annual  budget  as  such  but  development  costs  are  reviewed  continuously. 
The  development  function  draws  on  facilities within  the  plant whkh are 
costed  to it and  amortised  over  the products  concerned.  Project appraisal 
is not made  in  terms of  rates  return.  Projects originate  from  sales-
men's  reports  and  once  development  to meet  the market  requirement  that 
they  identify is under way,  the crucial factor which usually  determines 
which project continues  is technical,  though occasionally costs  force 
abandonment.  Size  is not  seen  as  an  impediment  to product  development 
What  is relevant  to  the  company's ability  to  develop  products  in its 
chosen field is its experience,  i.e.  accumulated output  in its field. 
Product Development  in Smaller Companies:  Drillwell Ltd. 
Drillwell has  a  turnover of  £1  million.  Its research and  development 
programme  is an  integral part of  the  company's  growth  strategy.  The 
company  successfully developed  a  precision  seed  drill which  permitted 
the  seed  to  be  spaced at precise intervals,  i-creasing crop yield  by 
allowing  each  seed  an  equal  amount  of nutrition.  The  company's  first 
drill was  suitable for  a  limited  number  of vegetables,  and  subsequent 
developments  have  been directed  toward  expanding  the  scope  for  the 
precision drill to cope with  seeds of different  sizes.  The  direction 
and  content of development  work  derives  from  the logical analysis of 
the  company's  strengths  and  opportunities.  The  company  possesses  a 
basically good  product  and  design capabilities.  The  management  identi-
fied  its market with  great clarity;  it was  a  question  of  deciding which 
of  the world's  crops  the  new  machine  would  be  equipped  to handle  and 
identifying that small  but distinct  segment  of  each market,  con~rising 
the  more  progressive  farmers  to whom  precision drilling \vould  appeal. 
Development at Drillwell  is an  ordered activity  in that for  each  project 
there  is a  planned  and accurately casted  sequence  of activities which 
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engineers  simply  tinkering about.  In  conception  this  approach  is very 
similar  to  that adopted  by  the multinational  companies,  though  the  pro-
cedures  used  to  implement  the  development  programme  is less  complex. 
In  the multinational  company,  each project will  involve  ~everal separate 
departments  and  a  critical path analysis would  probably  be  used  to  bring 
together engineering  and marketing  data at the crucial decision points 
in  a  project's life inunediately prior  to  large expenditures.  In  Drillwell 
this process  is coordinated  by  one  man  without elaborate  network  analysis, 
but  the  prograrmning  rigour is nevertheless still very evident.  Progress 
is much  more  rapid  than  in multinationals;  the  second  and  largest version 
of  the  precision  seed  drill was  developed  in only  13  months. 
Drillwell  seems  to  combine  the  administrative discipline of  the multi-
national while  retaining  the  advantages  of  informality and  personal 
creativity which  smaller  companies  generally enjoy.  The  company's 
turnover  is around  £1  million and  its development  budget  is insufficient 
to  support  a  qualified senior agricultural engineer  on  a  full  time  basis. 
This  factor  is  sometimes  cited as  an  economy  of  scale  in product 
development,  but it is  interesting  that Drillwell avoids  this  problem 
by  employing  a  consultant engineer on  a  part  time  basis.  Apart  from 
ensuring  a  supply of qualified advice,  the  company  derives  an  important 
benefit  from having  access  to  someone  who  is literate  from  the  engin-
eering point of view  in  that it can  keep  abreast of development  work 
in research  institutions  and  universities.  The  company  draws  on  this 
work  to  a  degree which  is unusual  in  the  industry. 
Product  Development  in  Small  Companies:  Hedgeditch Ltd. 
The  company  has  a  turnover of around  £1  million  and  a  fairly wide  product 
range  for  a  company  of  its size,  ranging  from  heavy  ironmongery  - chisel 
ploughs,  cultivators and  land  rollers - to  hydraulic  tractor-mounted 
attachments  for mowing,  hedging,  trenching  and  lifting.  The  company 
frequently  pioneers  new  products  and  see  this as  a  success  factor;  as 
one  executive  remarked,  "we  have  to  live  on  our wits".  Among  the 
company's  innovations  are  a  precision drill,  a  hydraulically operated 
hedge  trimmer,  a  potato planter and  a  ditching excavator.  The  company 
employs  a  full  time  development  manager  and  one  director devotes  a 
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product  development  programme  is fairly  informal.  The  company  holds 
a  weekly meeting attended  by  all functional  heads  to  discuss  problems 
which  have  arisen;  to  the  extent that  these  concern product  development, 
the meeting  becomes  a  de  facto  product  development  meeting.  The  pro-
grawme  does  not  derive  from  the corporate plan as  such;  the  approach 
is opportunistic,  based  on  ideas put  forward  by  sales  and  product 
development  staff,  some  of which  may  originate  from  farmers  or  small 
engineering  firms  outside the  indus try.  There  is little attempt  to 
define  and  develop Hedgeditch's position  in  selected markets;  the  only 
constraint  on  the  choice  of  product derives  from  the production  depart-
ment's  concern  that each  new  product  should  provide  the minimum  production 
run  each year of  around  200  units. 
The  approach  has  its strengths  and weaknesses.  Its informality allows 
the  company  to  respond  to  ideas  from all quarters  and  its innovative 
output is large  in  terms  of  the  numbers  of new  products it develops. 
The  weakness  of  the  approach  is  that it leads  to  a  very diverse  range 
of products which  have quite different  production and  marketing 
policies.  Since all products are handled  in much  the  same  way  the 
result must  be  that  some  products  do  not  receive  the  type  of marketing 
they  require;  standard pieces of  ironmongery  such as rollers and chisel 
ploughs are  produced  and  marketed  in the  same  way  as  the  more  expensive, 
highly engineered products  such  as hydraulically operated lifting and 
mowing  equipment.  The  apparent  lack of "fit" within  the  company  could 
explain why  some  of the  company's  more  interesting innovations have 
failed  to  generate  the  commercial  advantage which  technically  they 
would  seem  to  deserve. 
Product  Develvpment  & Company  Size 
With  some  feel  now  for  the  organisational context  in which product 
development  is conducted  in  the  industry it is possible  to  say  something 
about  some  structural fusues:  is  there  a  minimum  company  size  for effec-
tive product  development  and  conversely,  does  the effectiveness of 
research diminish  in very  large  companies?  Would  the  industry be 
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There  are  obvious  differences  in  style  bet,.veen  large  and  small  companies 
but it is difficult to tell whether  these  differences  correspond  to 
different  levels of  research  effectiveness or \vhether  they  simply 
reflect organisational  responses  to  differences  in  company  size.  For 
the  idea of  a  minimum  efficient firm size  to  be  interesting,  there  have 
to  be  indivisible  items  of expenditure,  such  as  testing equipment  and 
research  teams.  Pure  research  is  beyond  the  means  of  small  firms  and, 
in any  case,  management  would  probably  not  know  how  to  direct it usefully. 
But  this  need  not  deprive  the progressive  small  firm of pure  research 
results  should  they  feel  the  need  for  them  since  there are  a  number  of 
research establishments  in  the U.K.  and  in  the  U.S.A.  which  companies 
can  consult,  as  the  Drillwell  example  illustrates.  The  technically 
qualified agricultural engineer is an  indivisibility but  consultancy 
is a  possibility.  The  small  company's  disadvantage  in pure  research 
should  not  be  exaggerated.  As  we  have  already  seen,  few  companies, 
large  or  small,  show  much  interest in pure  research  in  this  industry 
and,  in any  case,  the  main  obstacle  to  securing  research  results is 
not  access  to  research results but  the difficulty in assimilating  the 
results  into a  development  process.  Nor  is  the  small  firm at a  disad-
vantage  in  respect  of  development  as  opposed  to  pure  research because 
the  industry's  technology is stable  and  straightforward,  requiring 
fairly robust products built to  inexact  standards  of precision operating 
at  low  speeds.  Testing equipment  is not  prohibitively expensive:  a 
major producer  of  lawn  mowers  built a  test rig for  simulating mowing 
conditions  for  only  £12,000.  A  typical product  development  programme 
outside  the heavily engineered products  would  not cost more  than  £50,000. 
Developing  the  more  highly  engineered products  is more  expensive.  In 
1969,  Ransomes  sought  £0.5 million  from  the Government  to  develop  a  modern 
combine.  Though  the  company  was  offered  a  loan  by  the Ministry of  Tech-
nology it decided  that  to  develop  a  combine  in competition with  the 
multinationals was  too  risky and  opted  instead  to  develop  root harvesters  -
a  more  specialised  item which  is  ignored  by  the multinationals.  The 
expense  of  the  combine  development  itself did  not  appear to  be  as  much  of 
a  deterent as  the  competitive aspects.  An  expenditure of  £0.5 million 
spread over  five years  is not  excessive  for lvhat was  then  a  £10  million 
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engineering company  is around  2%  of turnover.  The  concept of the 
minimum  efficient size of company  in this industry,  based  on  the unit 
costs of R & D,  does  not  appear  to  be  a  powerful  one. 
When  discussing  scale  economies,  economists  translate  the  question  into 
one  of units costs,  i.e.  what  are  the  indivisible components  in  product 
development  and  ho\v  much  more  heavily  do  they  impact  on  the  unit costs 
of  smaller  firms  than  on  those  of  their larger competitors?  We  believe 
that  this  approach  is rather  limited.  What  appears  to  determine  the 
type  of effectiveness  of  product  development  is  the  organisational style, 
the  company  strategy and  the personal  skills available.  It is  a  question 
too  of what  different  types  of organisation are  equipped  to  do.  Given 
that smaller  companies  survive  in competition  with  larger rivals,  they 
must  have  some  comparative  advantage.  This  advantage  cannot  occur  in 
production  since  large  companies  operate at high volumes  and where  they 
cannot,  they have  the  option of buying  in  from  smaller units.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  small  company  suffers a  significant disadvantage  in 
marketing.  Product  development  is  the  remaining major  functional  area 
where  the  small  firm  can  hope  to  gain an  advantage,  and  since many  of 
them  survive  there  is a  strong presumption  that  this is were  their  com-
parative  advantage  lies.  They  rely on  their originality and willingness 
to  design products which multinationals  describe  as  "too  fiddly". 
Multinationals  look  for  cost minimisation  by  designing  for  several 
markets.  The  design  is  inevitably  something of  a  compromise  and  may 
not  be  ideally suited  to  any  one market.  These  companies  can  overcome 
this disadvantage  by using  the  strength of  their dealer networks  to  push 
products  through. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  industry has  a  stable  technology  and  a  conservative  technical  style 
which might  be  described  as:  no  R,  some  D.  The  roots  of  this conser-
vatism lie in  the  conservatism of  the  farmers  themselves,  the weakness 
of agricultural machinery patents,  dealer  loyalty  and  the  absence  of  a 
quantitative  language  for  discussing and  marketing machinery performance. 
In  considering  scale  economies  in  R and  D the  concept itself was  not 
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are  based  on  indivisibilities  they  are  fairly weak.  The  survival  of  the 
small  firm in  industry itself is an  indirect  sign of its comparative 
advantage  in product  development,  given  the  small  firm's  sliglt disadvan-
tage  in production  and  marked  disadvantage  in marketing.  It is  largely 
a  question of different  firms  doing different  things;  smaller  firms  are 
more  adept at conceptualising and  developing  the  products,  due  to  their 
speed,  flexibility and  contact with  the  market;  the  larger firms  are 
more  adept at the  implementation of product  development  plans  because 
of their superior administration.  Studies  of  the  organisational 
contexts  for  product  developemtn  and  the  manner with \vhich it was  carried 
out  indicated  that  the  procedures  of  the  large  companies  were  very 
similar and  the  procedures  of  the  small  companies  were  very diverse. 
This  suggests  that  there  is really only  one way  to  organise product 
development  in  large organisations  but  that  in  the  more  informal 
organisational  structures of  small  firms  product  development  reflected 
management  styles,  the  type  of product  and  the  personalities  involveq. 
As  regards  the analytical approach  that  should  be  adopted  towards 
product  development  in  studie~ of this sort,  it becomes  clear  from 
fuis  study  that it is not  enough  to  measure  and  compare  R and D expen-
ditures across  and  within  industries.  What  has  been  termed  the 
"technological culture"  in this  study only  emerges  when  the  texture 
and  detail of an  industry  is understood. 
When  comparing  the product  development policies of different companies 
it makes  sense  to  compare  R and  D/sales  ratios only  among  companies 
employing  similar procedures.  In  this  industry it wou~ be  reasonable 
to  infer  that John Deere  is  the  most  technologically orientatedoc  the 
multinationals  on  the  basis of its superior R and  D/sales  ratio - 4%  of 
sales  compared  to  3%  for  the others.  Among  smaller  companies  it is more 
relevant  to  enquire  about attitudes and methods,  and  in particular, 
whether product  development policies are appropriate  to  the  company's 
corporate strategy if any,  the nature of its products and  the skills 
available;  whether it is preceded  by  systematic market  research  and 
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CHAPTER  15  - TilE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTURE 
The  previous  chapters  have  tried  to  convey  the  salient features  and  the 
flavour of  the  industry's  structure,  market,  marketing approaches, 
production characteristicD  and  product  development.  This  final chapter 
tries  to  make  sense  of  this material  in  terms  of the  industry's  structure, 
not  because  structure  is an  influential element  in managerial  thinking 
or because it is  demonstrably  a  way  of gaining  insight  into  an  industry's 
operations.  Neither  is  in fact  the  case.  The  chapter  is  focussed  on 
structure because  the  structure-behaviour-perfot~ance method  of analysis 
has  now  firmly  caught hold  in university  teaching of  industrial  economics 
and,  more  importantly,  in official governmental  policies  and  attitudes 
to\vards  monopoly  and  competition policy  in North  America  and  Europe. 
Investigations of monopoly  are  undoubtedly  guided  by  industrial structure, 
bofu in  terms  of their direction and  content. 
The  essence of  the  structure-behaviour-performance approach  can  be  sum-
marised very briefly.  Structure refers mainly  to  the  size  distribution 
of companies  in  terms  of their sales.  Interest here centres  on  the  degree 
to which  the  largest companies  dominate  the  industry  ('the degree  of 
concentration'),  often measured  for  convenience as  the  combined  market 
shares  of  the  four  largest companies  ('the concentration ratio') but 
sometimes  by  more  elaborate statistical measures  of  size  inequality.  The 
definition of  'industry'  to which  these  measures  refer is open  to  inter-
pretation;  researchers  in principal prefer  to operate at as  low  a  level  of 
aggregation as  possible but often have  to  make  do  with whatever definition 
official statistics provide  (e.g.  minimum  list headings  in the U.K., 
N.I.C.E.  in  the E.E.C.). 
Behaviour  refers  to  the  degree  of competition in the  industry and  the 
relative emphasis which  is placed  on  the  various  elements  in  the marketing 
mix- price,  sales  promotion,  termstt  sale,  product  development.  There 
is a  presumption  that high  concentration  is conducive  to  collusive 
behaviour,  e;g.  price agreements,  or alternatively  to practices which 
though  not  collusive  are  anti-competitive  - parallel pricing and 
restrictive  terms  of  sale. 218 
Perform~~~ refers mainly  to  the  extent  to which  an  industry earns  exces-
sive profits,  'excessive'  being  defined  in  relation  to  the  average  rate 
of return  for  manufacturing.  Also  considered  are  technical progressiveness, 
achievementof  efficiency  and  any  available  scale  economie~.  By  far  the 
greatest amount  of  empirical  research,  and  really  the  only  conclusive 
research,  has  been  directed at concentration,  price collusion and  profit-
ability.  Over  thirty studies were  carried out  between  1950  and  1970  and 
many  more  since.  A  typical  study  selects  a  sample  of  industries and 
looks  at  their average  rates  of  return on capital or profit margins  on 
sales  and  their concentration ratios.  There  is an  impressive  concensus 
among  the  many  studies  that  there  is a  definite  link between  concentration 
and profitability(!)'  suggesting  that  on  average  the  degree  of competition 
in highly concentrated  industries  tends  to  be  less  than  might  occur  in 
fragmented  but  otherwise  similar industries,  by  a  small  but  statistically 
detectable  amount.  The  main  purpose  of this  study is to  confront  this 
framework  of  thought with  some  observations about  the  agricultural machinery 
industry,  including  those  of  some  of its managers,  in  the  belief that  new 
ways  of  thinking about  structure  and  performance are  needed  rather  more 
urgently  than  a  further &Hition  to  an  already  large  stockpile of econo-
metric  studies  on  this  subject. 
CONCEPTS  AND  PERCEPTIONS  OF  PERFORMANCE 
An  enquiry  of  this  type affords  an  opportunity  to  compare  and  contrast 
businessmen's  perceptions of  structure  and  its consequences  with  those  of 
academic  economists.  One  conclusion derived  from  the  discussions  is  that 
to many  businessmen  the  usual  interpretation placed  on  'performance'  by 
academic  researchers  and  by anti-trust authorities,  namely,  whether  or 
not profits are  excessive  in  relation to  the  normal  rate of  return for 
the  economy,  is rather narrow  in  scope  and  eccentric  in character.  The 
people  engaged  in  trying  to  make  a  living in  industry  regard profits as 
a  measure  of their  success  and  find it strange  to  be  told  th~ high 
profitability is  regarded  as  an  index  of monopoly  behaviour.  How  then 
are  industries which make  losses  to  be  regarded  on  this basis;  are  they 
to  be  ayliauded  for  competitive behaviour,  for  example?  It is also apparent 
that  managemen~ think about  structure in ways  very different  to  those  of 
(1)  See  Leonard Heiss,  "Quantitative Studies  on  Concentration"  in "Frontiers 
of Quantitative Economics'',  edited  by  Michael  D.  Intrigilator,  p.362-403, 
North Holland,  Amsterdam,  1971;  and  B.S.  Yamey  "Do  Monopoly  and  Near 
Monopoly  Natter?  A Survey  of Empirical Studies"  in "Essays  in Honoui.·  of 
Lord  Robbins",  edited  by  Pestbn  &  Corry,  Weidenfcld  &  Nicholson,  London, 
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the  academic  researcher.  When  considering  company  performanee  in 
operational detail managements  are  interested  in their ability to  supply 
the  needs  of  their customers  in  terms  of  the ·value  for money  of their 
products,  eniliracing  price,  technical  quality,  service  and  delivery. 
i'hese  aspects  of performance  are difficult to  measure  and  some  managements 
find  it convenient,  ironically in  the  context of  this discussion,  to  use 
market  share  as  a  yardstick by  which  to  judge managerial  performance. 
Market  share is a  convenient  tool  for 'keeping .score' since it abstracts 
from  factors  outside  the  company's  control 'vhi.ch  impact  on  the  company's 
market.  It is  therefore  natural  for  a  company  with  a  large 1narket  share 
to  feel  that an  industry  dominated  by  a  fev.r  companies  like itself  i.'s 
performing well  and  that  if the  industry  should  earn  above-average profits, 
it is no  more  than  they  deserve.  To  those  accustomed  to  thinking about 
performance  in these  terms,  the  relation  bebveen  structure and  performance 
is tautologous  and  not worth  discussing;  market  share  is performance. 
The  way  that businessmen view  market  structure  is clearly very different 
from  the  economist's  conception of it.  The  structure-performance  analysis 
views  the  economic  system as  a  set of  industries  defined  by  technology 
and  consumer  needs;  the  analysis considers  the  extent  to which  the  sup-
plies  of  these products  are monopolised  and  if so,  whether  there are any 
adverse  consequences  of  this.  Wnile  this  broadly  reflects  reality it 
neglec~ the  extent  to which  companies  themselves  can  locate market  segments 
and  define  their boundaries.  Part of  the  art of  commercial  survival  is 
to create a  market  niche  and  develop  a  defensible  share within it, as 
illustrated in this  industry by  Howard  in rotary cultivators,  Stanhay  in 
precision drills,  Fullward  in rotary milking  parlours  and Vicon with 
spinner  broadcasters.  The  Deutz  Intrac tractor design probably heralds 
the  growth  of  a  distinct  sub-market  in which Deutz will probably  be  the 
market  leader.  In other words,  structure-performance analysis  is only  to 
do  with the  effects of industrial  structure  on  the  company;  it ignores 
the prior and  more  important question of how  market  structures are  developed 
in  the first place,  i.e.  companies'  impact  on  structure rather  than 
structures'  impact  on  companies.  And  because  it seems  to  take  as  given, 
something which  is  the  object of business  strategy and  activity,  the  spirit 
of the  structure-performance analysis  is one which  businessmen  cannot  be 
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There  are tln:re  additional practical reasons  for  this.  The  first is that 
industrial structure  to  most  businessmen  refers  to  the  market  shares of 
the particular segments  in which  they  arc  operating.  Most  market  seg-
ments  are highly concentrated  in  terms  of  the  sum  of  the  largest  four  markets 
shares  or  the  share of  the  market  leader,  i.e.  the  market  leader  frequently 
has  a  market  share  in excess of  25%,  the  definition of  'monopoly'  in U.K. 
legislation.  Far  from  being  an  exception  to  a  general pattern of  fragmented 
industrial  structures,  concentration appears  to  be  the  normal  situation 
at the market  segment  level;  hence  the  lack of  interest  in what  its effects 
are.  A  second  reason  is that  the effects  of industrial  structure  (structure 
here  referring  to  the entire industry)  are  simply  too  small  for  businessmen 
to  notice  them.  A  company  may  be  able  to perceive  changes  in profitability 
related  to  changes  in its own  market  share,  but  not  to  changes  in  the 
concentration of  the  industry or even of  the market  segment  in which it 
operates,  unless  the  company  itself has  a  large  influence  on  these  changes  •. 
It must  be  remembered  that the  effect of inter-industry differences  in 
concentration on profitability is of a  fairly trivial order of magnitude, 
even  though it is often  found  to  be  statistically significant.  The  third 
reason is that the proposition  that  concentration has  a  general  tendency 
to reduce  competition strikes  many  businessmen as  odd.  To  them,  the 
presence of other large  rivals  implies  strong competition;  the  larger 
their rivals'market  shares  are,  the  more  they  are  co~ous of  them  and 
concerned  about what  they  might  be  doing.  In  fragmented  market  sectors, 
on  the other hand,  companies  are  less  aware  of  each  other  and  take  less 
account  of  each  others' actions.  Psychologically,  the  competitive  atmosphere 
tends,  if anything,  to  be  sharpened  in concentrated  industries. 
It seems,  then,  that the  structure-performance  style of analysis  forms  no 
part of business  concepts;  indeed,  in several ways  it runs  counter  to  those 
concepts.  This  is not  to  say  that industrial structure has  none  of  the 
effects hypothesised  by  its students;  merely  that because  the  structure-
performance  model  is  so  out of key with business  thinking one  would  not 
expect its effects  tore other  than modest. 
THE  IMPACT  OF  INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTURE 
The  Definition of Structure 
What  dimensions  of industrial structure are  significant?  Should  market 221 
shares  be  measured  in relation to U.K.  production,  the U.K.  market or 
segments  of  this market?  When  considering  the  structure of  an  industry 
it is helpful  to  bear  in mind  that  'industries'  are  statistical constructs 
.for  collecting and  organising data.  They  need  not necessarily have  any 
operational  significance  to  those  engaged  in  them.  They  may  be  appropriate 
for  some  purposes  but  not  for  others.  The  aggregate  'agricultural 
machinery'  has  a  definite meaning  to  its members  in  the  sense  that  they 
share a common  environment,  face  similar marketing problems  and  belong 
to  the  same  trade association;  but it does  not mean  that  they all compete 
with  one  another  or  that  there are  no  other companies with whom  any  of 
them compete.  Market  segmentation  defines  the areas within which  competi-
tion in  the  industry occurs;  international  trade  exposes  its member  to 
competition  from  outside.  As  Chapter  9  indicated,  in  this industry  there 
is a  pronounced  degree  of market  segmentation and  specialisation and  in 
many  of  these market  segments  the  foreign  company  holds  the market  leader-
ship.  It is  important,  then,  to  try and  assess  in what  respects  the 
industrial structure at the  aggregate  industry  level  is significant,  and 
in what  respects  the  structure of the market  segment  is significant. 
And  regardless of this question,  what  allowance  is to be  made  for inter-
national  trade;  is the  structure of the domestic  market  more  important 
than  the  structure of  the  domestic  industrY-?  Rather different  structures 
emerge,  depending  on  how  these questions are  answered. 
In Chapter 9  it was  noted  that the  industry leaders  rarely held market 
shares  of more  than  40%  of  the  segments which  they  dominated  but it is not 
unusual  for  smaller  companies  to  enjoy much  greater dominance  in the 
segments where  they hold  the  leadership.  The  trade  factor bears most 
strongly  on  concentraion  in  segments  dominated  by  foreign  companies  but 
shoua  be  considered also at the aggregate  level.  It happens  that  the 
leading  companies  - tractor companies  for the most part - export propor-
tionately more  than  small companies,  with  the  result that  the U.K. 
agricultural machinery  market  is less concentrated overall than  the  U.K. 
industry;  the  top  four  companies  of  the  23  largest companies  in our 
statistical data  base  accounted  for  79%  of  industry sales  in 1972, but 
only  63%  of U.K.  sales. 
The  following  approach  to measuring structure suggests itself as  being 
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(1)  Refer where possible  to  market  structure  rather  than  industn 
(l)  d  h  .  l.  1  .  'f'  f  h'  1  .  d  .  1  structure  an  wen we1g11ng  t1e  s1gn1  1cance o·  1g1  1n  ustr1a 
concentration calculated on  this basis,  grant  less  signific~ce to 
those  cases  in which  intra-E.E.C.  trade  accounts  for  substantial 
market  shares,  since  this  element  reflects  the  extent  to which  the 
market  is exposed  to  intra-E.E.C.  competition. 
(2)  Place particular emphasis  on  the  market  structure of market ~~1ents 
defined  as  far  as  is reasonable  such  that all major  companies  in 
the  segment  compete  with each  other.  Aggregates  which  contain  non-
competing  companies \vill  tend  to understate  their market  positions. 
THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  INDUSTRY  STRUCTURE 
In  this industry  the  largest  four  companies  in our  data  base  account  for 
around  63%  of U.K.  sales  in  1972  - a  degree  of concentration which  is 
fairly  typical of U.K.  manufacturing  industries.  What  is  the  significance 
of  these  dominant  positions  in  relation  to  the  total U.K.  market  for 
agricultural machinery,  as  opposed  to  the  market  segments  in which  the 
major  companies  are  engaged?  How  are  such  shares maintained  and  what  do 
they  permit  t~e  industry leaders  to  do? 
As  Chapters 10 and 11 explained,  success  in  this  industry  depends  on  dealer 
support more  than  on  any  other  factor.  Therefore marketing,  and  the  dealer 
organisation in particular,  is  the critical functional  area  for  management 
in this  industry.  Securing  dealer  support has  a  lot to  do  with  the 
aggregate  volume  of business  that a  company  can provide  a  dealer,  implying 
that  companies'  share  of  the  total U.K.  market  for agricultural machinery 
is of  some  significance.  Massey  Ferguson  and  Ford  in particular,  and 
also David  Brown,  International Harvester,  New  Holland  and  Bamford,  are 
able  to  appoint  good  dealers  and  exert  effective control  over  them roughly 
in proportion  to  their position  in  the  industry.  This  advantage  is 
beneficial  to  the  major  companies  in  three  main  ways: 
(1)  They  are  able  to  insist on  exclusivity ('full line  forcing').  The 
effect of  this arrangement  is  that  the  company  uses  its position in 
the high  turnover products  in which it has  a  competitive advantage 
(1)  In  the U.K.  legislation which  relates  to  monopoly  policy,  monopoly 
situations are considered  in  relation  to  the  nsupply  of  goods"  in  the 
U.K.,  or part of it where  appropriate  (Fair Trading Act,  1973,  Clauses 
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(tractors and  combines)  as  a  lever with which it can push  many 
smaller items  in which it has  little or  no  particular competitive 
advantage.  This  is not  to  say  that Massey  Ferguson,  for  example, 
pushes  second  rate products  onto  the market  in this way,  because 
dealers would  resent this.  In  fact,  many  of  the  less  engineered 
products  supplied  by  major  companies  are  bought  in  from  leading 
specialists  in  these  products,  such  as  Huard  and  Howard.  Nor  does 
it mean  that  the major  companies  can  expect  to  obtain  shares  in 
implement markets  as  great as  those  obtained  in  the markets  for 
their major  products,  but it does  mean  that their  shares are  higher 
than  they would  otherwise be. 
(2)  The  industry  leaders  can  obtain more  and  better directed promotional 
inputs  in return for  their dealer  discounts. 
These  advantages  are  sensed  by  the  smaller companies,  'vhich  feel  that 
dealers  exert  themselves  proportionately less for  a  company  which provides 
a  ·small  proportion of their business.  Even  though  small  companies  try  to 
avoid head-on  competition with major  companies,  they  inevitably  find  them-
selves  competing with  them,  at  something of a  disadvantage,  for  dealer 
representation.  In  short,  the  significance of industrial structure  in 
the industry derives  from  the  fact  that the  nature  of  the  products  and 
the market  requires  dealers,  who  in  turn  require  ranges  of  products 
sufficient to  provide  an  income.  Full  line or  long  line companies  with 
significant overall U.K.  market  shares  can  provide  these aggregates  and 
so  derive  a  definite but  limite commercial  advantage which wruld  not  exist 
in an  otherwise  similar industry which  marketed  directly  to  its customers. 
What  is  the  pay-off  from  these marketing advantages  that high  market  shares 
help  to  sustain?  The  indications are  that  the  commerical  advantage  derives 
from an  increasing and  stable  volume  of business,  rather  than  from  increased 
profitability in  relation  to  that level  of  turnoer.  In other words,  high 
market  share contributes  to yet higher market  shares.  It also helps  to 
stabilise sales;  it was  noted  that  during  the  recent period  of  limited 
supply,  when  the  tractor companies  were  forced  to  allocate  tractors  to 
their dealers,  imports  rose  far less  than was  necessary  to  meet  demand, 
partly because  dealers  persuaded  many  farmers  to 'vait  up  to  18  months  for 
their new  machines.  But  this  is a  short  term benefit.  In  the  longer  term 
the  larger  companies  are  unable  to  exclude  entry of  new  sellers. 224 
An  analysis of  the  published  accounts  of  22  companies  over  five  years 
revealed  that the  four  largest companies  in  the  sample  (Hassey  Ferguson, 
Ford,  International Harvester and  David  Brown)  accounted  for  81%  of  the 
total  industry  sales but only  73%  of total  industry profits.  As  Table  12.2 
indicates,  the profit margins  on  sales of  the  industry  leader,  Massey 
Ferguson,  in  the  period  1968-73 was  slightly belmv  average  for  the  industry; 
the profit margins  of International Harvester  and  David  Brmvn  Here  very 
much  below  this level.  The  marketing  advantages  referred  to  above  do  not 
seem  to  be  translated  into profitability.  Nor  do  they  appear  to  be  suf-
ficient  to  defend  industry  leadership.  The  sales of  the  leading companies, 
Massey  Ferguson,  International Harvester,  David  Brown,  Ransomes  and  Bamford, 
grew  significantly more  slowly  than  the  industry  sales over  the  period 
1968-73.  The  share of  the  four  largest companies  in the U.K.  market 
declined  from  70%  to  63%  in  that period. 
One  reason why  the  marketing advantage  inherent  in high U.K.  market  shares 
works  in  favour  of high sales,  rather  than higher profit margins,  is that 
companies  elect or are  compelled  by  goodwill  considerations  to  maintain 
roughly  the  same  dealers'  discounts  as  the  rest of  the  industry,  and 
secure higher  turnover at the  same  distribution cost per unit rather  than 
try  to  secure  a  lower unit distribution cost  through  smaller dealers' 
discounts. 
At  the  industry level,  concentration does  not  appear  to  be  having  its 
predicted effects  on profitability and  price  levels.  In Chapter  12 this 
issue was  examined  in  the  light of  the  Canadian  Royal  Commission  Report, 
"Oligopoly  in  the  Farm Machinery  Industry" which  concluded  that  in  the 
North American  market  tractor prices were  uniform and  excessive  (notwith-
standing  the  low profitability of  the  companies  concerned)  and  that  there 
was  an  aversion  to price competition  in preference  for  non-price  forms  of 
competition  such  as  dealer  representation and  the  expansion of  the  model 
range.  The  U.K.  industry  shows  signs of all  these  features,  but  in our 
interpretation of their significance  and  origins we  depart  from  the 
Canadian  study.  In our view  a  discussion of  these  issues  in relation  to 
concentration  is fairly meaningless  in  isolation  from  some  prior expectation 
of how  an  otherwise  similar industry with  a  fragmented  structure would 
behave.  It seems  likely that regardless  of its structure,  the agricultural 
machinery  industry is bound  to  emphasise  distribution rather  than price, 225 
because  the  nature of  the market  and  the  products  demand  good  dealer 
organisations.  In  this  industry,  cut-price  tactics are  not  a  viable 
altert~tive to  developing  dealer representation.  As  regards  the 
expanding  range  of  tractors,  this  is  to  be  expected  due  to  the  increasing 
use  of power  take-off drives  and  the  need  to  match  horsepower  to  imple-
ments'  power  requirements.  to  In contrastrthe  growth  in  the  number  of models, 
basic  tractor design  has  n~mained unchanged  for  a  decade  or more  and  the 
concept of  the  tractor  itselfbas hardly changed  at all in fifty years. 
Oligopolistic price behaviour was  apparent  in  the U.K.  tractor  industry 
The  price differentials were  found  to  be  lower  than  in  the  rest of  the 
industry and  price  leadership was  apparent.  But  though  price differentials 
were  lower  and  price warfare  restricted  to  narrow  limits, it was  argued 
that  these  differentials and  changes  could  be  as  significant as  anything 
to  be  found  in the rest of  the  industry,  due  to  the  relative comparability 
of  different manufacturers'  products  and  the price-sensitivity of  tractor 
demand.  There  is  strong econometric  evidence  of considerable  'value  for 
money'  competition  in  the  tractor sector.  The  level of U.K.  tractor prices 
was  always  below  the  international level until  recently  and  even  now  it 
does  not  appear  to  provide  excessive profits or permit  the  long  run 
survival of unduly  uneconomic  plants,  again,  using  the  non-tractor sector 
as  a  standard  of comparison.  In  short,  the apparently oligopolistic 
behaviour of the  industry leaders  could  be  interpreted  in  terms  of other 
factors  and  in any  case  did  not have  its predicted effects.  A possible 
explanation of  this  is discussed  later. 
MULTINATIONAL  DOMINANCE 
An  alternative  interpretation of the  industry structure was  proposed  by 
the  P-E  Consulting Group  in its report  to  the National Economic  Development 
Office(l) which  noted  that  the  industry's  'top  heavy  structure'  was  due  to 
the  dominance  of  the multinational  companies.  The  report  suggested  that 
this had  unfortunate  effects  on  the  performance  of  the  indigenous  companies 
which  had  gravitated  towards  the  more  fragmented  markets  for  lower  cost 
items,  unable  to  raise  the capital necessary  to  compete with  the multi-
national companies  head  on.  The  report noted  that the product  development 
(1) 
11Agricultural Machinery:  A  Study  of U.K.  Demand  and  World  Trade 
1963-1975",  N.E.D.O.·,  London,  1970. 226 
emphasis  of  the  multinational  companies  in Britain was  orientated more 
towards  adapting American  designs  for  U.K.  conditions at  the  expense  of 
fundamental  research  into  new  products.  The  report  observes  that  "it is 
significant  that  many  of  the  recent  innovations  in  machinery  design, 
especially  in  low--cost  implements,  have  come  from  Scandinavia  and  West 
Germany  where the  North American  companies  are  less entrenched".  This  view 
is related  to  another,  that the E.E.C.  agricultural machinery  industry  is 
shaped  by  multLnational  companies  and  their location and  sourcing decisions. 
To  consider  these  views  and  thE!l to  shed  some  1 igh  t  on  the performance  of 
the  various  sectors of the  industry,  it is  interesting  to  look at  the 
balance  of  trade  in  each  of  the  major  sectors,  indicated  in Table 15.1. 
Some  of  the major  sourcing  decision:; of  the multinational  companies  '\vere 
indicated  in Table  9.6 and  these  have  a  significant bearing  on  some  of 
the  trade  movements.  One  would  guess  that around  50%  of the  imports  of 
balers  are  due  to Massey  Ferguson's  decision  to  source  balers  from France; 
25%  of tractor  imports  and  a  substantial  fraction of the  forage  harvester 
imports  are  due  to  the  location of John Deere's  European  manufacturing 
operations  in  Germany.  Decisions  to  locate  tractors  in Britain by  Ford 
and  Internat:io nal Harvester and  balers  by  New  Holland help  to  explain  the. 
U.K.  trade  advantage  in  these  categories.  But  in general it would  be  an 
exaggeration  to  say  that  the  European  agricultural machinery  industry 
and  its trade pattern is like modelling clay in  the  hands  of  a  few  multi-
nationals.  Britain's tractor industry has  traditionally been  strong  due 
to  the  designs  and  inventive  genius  of Harry  Ferguson,  the  efficiency of 
Perkins  diesels,  both  of which Massey  Ferguson  acquired,  and  the  engineering 
expertlle of David  Brown,  now  acquired  by  Tennecco.  Conversely,  this country's 
heavy  dependence  on  European  combines  has  been  due,not  to  the multinational 
companies  but  to  the  specialist producers  Claeys  (now  part of New  Holland), 
Claas,  Laverda  and  Fahr. \ 
\ 
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TABLE  15.1: 
U.K.  TRADE  IN  AGRICULTURAL  MACHINERY  PRODUCTS  1974 
(£  million) 
Product  Group  EXEC:!"_!:S  Imports  Imports/Exports 
Wheeled  tractors  147.0  11.0  0.1 
Combine  harvesters  4.1  19.4  4.7 
Balers  7.7  2.5  0.3 
Forage harvesters  1.4  4.0  2.9 
Haymaking  machinery  0.5  2.5  5.0 
Milking machinery  3.4  1.0  0.3 
Other dairy  equipment  7.9  2.8  0.4 
Root  harvesters  0.6  2.0  3.3 
Manure  spreaders  0.5  0.8  1.6 
Fertiliser distributors  0.2  0.7  3.5 
Drills and  planters  1.3  0.9  0.7 
Rotary  cultivators  2.0  0.4  0.2 
Disc  ploughs  0.9  0.0  o.o 
Mouldboard  ploughs  0.1  12.  12.0 
Source:  U.K.  Trade  Statistics 
There  are  six sectors which  registered  strong adverse  trade  balances 
combine  harvesters,  forage  harvesters,  haymaking machinery,  root 
harvesters,  fertiliser distributors and  ploughs.  In only  one,  forage 
harvesters,  could  the  adverse  balance  be  attributed  to multinationals' 
sourcing decisions.  The  two  market  leaders,  New  Holland  and  John  Deere, 
source  from plants  in Belgium and  Germany  respectively.  It is  therefore 
rather difficult to  explain  the  weaknesses  in  the  industry's  trade per-
formance  on  the  basis  of multinational  dominance.  It seems  unlikely  that  the 228 
multinationals have  undermined  the  industry's performance  indirectly by 
pushing  the  indigenous  companies  into  the  fragmented  low  volume  segments 
of  the  market.  In  the  first place,  the  most  striking instance of this 
displacement,  the  Ransomes'  decision  to  abandon  combines  in  1974,  was 
mainly  brought  about  by  two  indigenous  European  specialists which  intro-
duced  high volume  combines  to  the  U.K.,  Claeys  and  Claas.  But  accepting 
the point  that  indigenous  companies  do  in fact  seek  low  volume  niches 
out of  the~y of  the  multinationals,  their lack of  international  success 
in  these  fields  cannot  be  attributed  to  the multinationals.  The  adverse 
situation in  these  segments  is  due  to  the  design  skills and  volume  produc-
tion of a  number  of European  specialists;  the  combine  manufacturers 
already mentioned,  Fahr,  Kuhn,  P.Z.  and  Lely  in haymaking  machinery;  Grimme 
in potato harvesters;  Vicon  in fertiliser distributors;  Huard,  Kverneland 
and  Lemken  in ploughs;  and  Kongskilde  in cultivators.  TI1e  success of 
several of  these  companies  was  based  on  an  early  technical lead,  allied  to  a 
commitment  to  developing  a  market  positioil.  which allows  companies  to  accumulate 
the  relevant  experience  faster  than  their competitors  and  establish 
unassailable  leads. 
Some  of  the weaknesses  of  the  industry  owe  nothing  to  structure or market 
factors.  The  blunt fact  is that with  the  exception of fertiliser distri-
butors,  the weak  sectors are  encompassed  in  the  product  ranges  of  two  of 
the most  illustrious British agricultural  engin~ers,  Ransomes  and  Bamford, 
which  have  failed  to capitalise on  their early advantages.  In  the  decade 
1963-73  sales of these  two  companies  did  not  grow  in real  terms  at all at 
a  time when  British farmers  v1here  increasing their expenditure  in  real 
terms  by  40%.  Neither  company  developed  such  a  coherent  long  line position 
as  New  Holland,  for  example.  Bamford  was  an  early specialist  in harvesting 
and  mowing  machinery  but has  tended  to manufacture  under  license or  factor 
foreign products,  rather  than  develop  its own.  The  company  manufactured 
balers  and  finger-type  swathers  in  the  1950s  under  llcense and  has  since 
imported  foreign  combines  and  more  recently  forage  harvesters.  In hay-
making machinery  the  company  has  been  outflanked  by  continental  developments 
of drum  mowers  and  rotary star tedders.  The  company  imports  Kuhn  equipment 
from  Fra~ce and  competes  against its own  supplier  in  the U.K.  market. 
Ransomes  pioneered  the  steel plough  and  the  cylinder  lawn  mower,  since 
which  time  a  number  of products  have  been  launched  and  dropped  - grain 
driers and  combines,  for  example.  A number  of observers  in  the  industry 
I 
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remarked  that the  company  has  failed  to  develop  its strengths,  allowing 
foreign  ploughs  to  invade  its domestic  market.  Ransomes  acquired  Catchpole, 
a  pioneer  in  sugar-beet harvesting machinery,  but  the  latter's product 
was  supeceded  by  a  Standen machine.  In short,  the  strengths  and weak-
nesses  in  the  various  sectors have  more  to  do  with managerial  decisions 
than  the  industry's  structure,  either at  the  aggregate  level  or at  the 
level  of  the  sector. 
THE  STRUCTURE  OF  HARKET  SEGHENTS  AND  THEIR  SIGNIFICANCE 
An  alternative approach to  industrial structure  is  to  consider markPt 
segments  and  whether  the  performance  of individual  companies within  them 
is  related  to  their market  shares.  This  approach has  been  developed  by 
the BoBton  Consulting Group  whose  thesis is that companies  with high 
market  shares are more  profitable.  The  basis  of  this  thesis  is  that most 
companies  sell their products at similar prices  so  that profttability 
depends  on  relative unit costs.  Unit costs  are  inversely related  to 
the cumulative  experience of each business.  The  B.C.G.  have  calculated 
a  considerable  number  of what  they  term  'experience curves'  whi.ch  relate 
unit costs  to  the  cumulative  output  of  an  industry or company.  These 
relationships  indicate  that unit costs  decline  in real  terms  by  a  con-
stant percentage  with every  doubling  of  cumulative  output.  It has  also 
found  that market  share correlates with  cumulative  experience with  the 
result that market  leaders  tend  to be  more  profitable.  This  view is 
supported  by  an  empirical  study of the profitability of American  companies(l). 
The  Boston  Group  emphasise  that their relationship  is not  automatic;  it 
refers  to potential profitability which  has  to  be  appreciated and  secured 
by  good  management  and  therefore  one  cannot expect  the relationsip  between 
market  share  and  profitability to apply  in all cases.  There  is also 
bound  to  be  some  ambiguity  about  the  relevance~ companies'  'experience' 
to  a  particular business.  For  example,  John Deere has  considerably more 
experience of manufacturing  tractors  than David  Brown  but much  less 
cumulative  experience  of  selling them  to the U.K.  market;  and  how  much 
of Howard's  experience  in rotary cultivators  transfers  to  farmyard  grain 
storage  equipment? 
There  is  some  evidence  in  favour  of  the Boston  thesis.  From  the Table 9 • 2 
in Chapter  9 several market  leaders  can  be  identified  in  the various  seg~ents -
(1)  R.D.  Buzell,  B.T.  Gale  and  R.G.M.  Sultan,  "Harket Share- A Key  to 
Profitability", Ha·rvard  Business  Revie'>v,  January/February  1975. 230 
Massey  Ferguson  (tractors),  Howard  (rotary cultivators),  Ransomes  (ploughs), 
Fullward  & Bland  (m~lking equipment),  Bentall  (grain  drying  and  handling 
equipment),  Standen  (sugar-beet harvesters),  and  Bamford  (chisel ploughs 
and  hedge  trimmers).  In  addition,  New  Holland  (harvesting  equipment) 
should  be  included  also.  Assessing  New  Holland's profit margin  on  sales 
conservatively at 10%,  the  average profit margin  for  this  group  is close 
to  10%,  rather  above  the  average  for  the  industry.  Remembering  that  all 
the  companies  concerned  do  not  specialise  completely in d1e  market  in "t:vhich 
they  dominate,  one  would  not  expect  the  relationship  between profitability 
and  n~rket share  to  be  totally clear-cut.  Nevertheless,  the  relationship 
noted  above  is extremely  suggestive,  consistent as  it is with  a  great  deal 
of  research  into this  subject. 
The  best  illustration of  this relationship  can  be  found  by  comparing  the 
profitability within market  segments,  notably,  the  superior profit perfor-
mance  of Massey  Ferguson  compared  to  its smaller  tractor competitors, 
International Harvester  and  David  Brown,  and  the  superior profitability 
of  Standen  compared  to its smaller  root harvesting rivals,  Root Harvester, 
Teagle  and  Edmonds.  The  experience  curve manifests itself in several 
obvious  ways.  Massey  Ferguson  confirm that  a  long  learning process applies 
in  the  production control methods  used  to  manage  its controlled  random 
build  tract~operation at Coventry.  The  real price of tractor horsepower 
has  declined  since  the  War.  The  experience  curve  is also  reflected in a 
comment  by  a  spokesman  of Howard,  which holds  an  estimated  85%  share  of 
the  U.K.  rotary cultivator market.  to  the  effect that the company's  com-
petitors "must  find  it hard  to  sell profitably because Howard's  experience 
d  d  .  1  1  .  .  1  .  .  d  "(l)  an  pro  uct1on  vo  ume  resu  t  1n  a  comparat1ve  y  1nexpens1ve  pro uct  • 
The  experience  curve  is also  reflected  in  the  trade patterns exhibited  in 
Table  15.1.  Patterns of  trade  in  several  segments,  in  tb.e  view of a  number 
of observers,  is  largely  due  to  the efforts of  specialist producers which  are 
driven hard at developing  their market  shares  and  accumulating  the  rele-
vant  experience  in manufacturing  and  marketing  their product  faster  than 
their rivals. 
This  approach  to  market  structure  is of real practical benefit  to  companies 
since it has  definite  implications  for  their business  strategy,  unlike 
the  structure-performance  analysis which  offers  the  businessman  very little 
(1)  Cited  by  Ian  Greig,  "Tillage  Tacl~le;  A  £20 Million Market",  Agricul-
tural Machinery Journal,  August  1975. 
/ \ 
231 
guidance  indeed.  From  th(:  competition policy point of vie\v,  the  inter-
prf~tation provlclcd  by  the  Tjoston  thesis  is  of  great significance  becaut>e, 
firstly,  m3rket  leaders  do  not  typically  derive  their high profits  from 
'market  power'  'ltJhich  en::tbles  them  to  charge  higher prices  than  their 
rivals.  The  profit advantage  derives  from  lower unit costs based  on  a 
greater  accunrulatcd  experience.  In  thjs  industry  there was  very little 
evidence  that m.1rke!..  leaders  charg~d higher prices.  As  Table  13.1 
indicates,  Massey  Ferguson prices for  the  popular  range  of  tractors were 
representative  of  the  industry's price  levels;  David  Brown  charged  lower 
prices  but  International Harvester  and British Leyland  charged higher 
prices.  Ransomes'  reversible  ploughs  and  Standen's  sugar-beet harvesters 
are  priced at similar  levels as  rival machines.  Fullward & Bland  and 
Howard  have  tended  to  price below  the  opposition,  and Bentall  slightly 
above.  New  Holland's  combine  harvester prices  are high  but  the quality 
of  the  construction of  their machines  is generally  recognised  as  deserving 
some  premium.  In  the American  study  referred  to,  prices were  found  no~ 
to  be  related  to market  shares,  except in  the  instances where  industry 
observers were  able  to  identify  a  definite quality advantage.  in which 
case  a  price  premium was  found  to  exist.  This  is not  to  say  that  market 
leaders  cannot  cash  in  some  of  their market  share advantage  by  charging 
a  price premium;  as  one  n:nnu[acturer  put it, "we  add  5%  for  the  name".  But 
according  to  the  Boston  Group's  exposition of  the  strategic  implications 
f  .  ( 1 )  k  1  d  ld  b  .  . f .  o  exper~ence curves  ,  mar  et  ea  ers wou  e  unw~se to  sacr~ Lee 
market  share  for  a  higher  profit margin  since  this would  invite  rivals 
to  increase  their market  shares  and  thereby gain  accumulative  experience 
faster  than  the market  leader  and  narrow  the unit cost differential  on 
which  the  market  leaders'  superior profitability is ultimately based.  In 
short,  market  leadership  tends  to  generate  higher profitability but  does 
not  lead  to  higher  prices  in general nor,  apparently,  in  this particular 
industry.  The  second  in~lication of this analysis  for  competition 
policy is that highly  concentrated  sectors are  the~' not  the  exception. 
According  to  the  Boston  thesis,  corr~etitive relatior1ships  are  inherently 
unstable until  a  dominant  producer  emerges  with  lower  costs  than  its 
rivals,  derived  from  gaining  a  lead  in accumulative  experience which 
provides  a  cost  advantage which,  in  turn,  reinforces  the market  leadership. 
Since  these  dominant  positions  art.~  rooted  in superior efficiency,  attempts 
(1)  See  "Perspective  on  Experience",  by  the  Staff of  the Boston Consulting 
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to  interfere with  this process  by  anti-trust action will  tend  to 
be  expensive in  terms  of  the  economies  foregone. 
The  pattern that we  think has  emerged  from  this discussion  seems  to be 
this:  at the  _!_~du~!E.Y level,  a  high  market  share  tended  to  reinforce 
a  marketing advantage  and  there was  a  hint of oligopolistic behaviour 
among  the  industry  leaders  in respect of pricing polk ies.  However, 
this behaviour was  not  associated with high profitabili.ty,  contrary  to 
the predictions of  the  traditional  structure-perfonnance analysis.  At 
the  market ~gment level,  there were  signs  that  market  shares were  assoc-
iated with profitability,  not  through price advantage  but  probably  through 
the effects of  the  experience curve  on  unit costs.  There  wa~ little 
sign of any parallel  pricing in  the  non-tractor  segments,  regardless  of 
their market  structure. 
Two  questions  need  explaining: 
(1)  Why  does  market  segment  leadership  improve profitability whereas 
industry leadership  apparently  does  not? 
(2)  Why  does  oligopolistic behaviour  appear  to  operate  among  industry 
leaders  but not  among  segment  leaders  (with  the  e~ception of 
tractors)? 
An  answer  to both  these questions  can  perhaps  be  found  by  considering  the 
impact of an  independent variable which  has  a  strong bearing  on  both market 
structure and  company  behaviour,  namely,  company  size. 
COMPANY  SIZE  A1~ INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTURE 
In  the course  of discussions with  companies  a  single but  important  fact 
emerged  very quickly  - many  smaller companies  do  not have  much  information 
on market  shares  in  this  industry.  In many  sectors,  industrial structure 
plays little part  in managers'  thinking  because  they  do  not have  an  accurate 
picture of the  structure of their markets.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons 
for  this.  The  fact  that companies  attempt  to  develop  distinctive products 
inevitably confuses  market  boundaries;  companies  tend  to  be  clearer about 
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in  segments where  they  are weak.  Sometimes  the  nature of  the product 
confuses  the picture.  Where  a  product  is a  discrete  and  relatively 
standardised  item,  such  as wheeled  implements,  it is possible  to  talk 
ab6ut market  shares  fairly  sensi.bly  in  terms  of units.  This  is not 
possible  to  the  same  extent  in respect of  the  less discrete  items which 
are  designed  around  the  farmers'  installations,  such  as  milking parlours 
and  grain handling  and  drying  systems.  Another  important difficulty, 
mentioned  already  in Chapter 11  is that it is difficult to calculate 
retail  sales  on  the  basis of deliveries  to  dealers,  due  to  the  fact that 
dealers'  stocks  can  accumulate  or  run  dmvn  to  significant but often 
unknown  extents.  The  larger companies  are well  informed  about the  level 
of retail sales  since  they  can  obtain regular reports  from dealers  on 
sales and  stocks and  are also party  to  an  elaborate computerised  informa-
tion  sharing  system  through  their trade association,  the Agricultural 
Engineers Association.  This  system provides details of market  shares 
down  to  the parish level if so  desired. 
The  availability and  use  of marketing  information is strongly related to 
two  things,  the  type  of competitive  responses  t:o  be  found  in various 
segments  of the  industry  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  size of the  companies 
concerned  on  the  other.  To  begin with company  size,  detailed studies  in 
organisational  behaviour  indicate that company  size is the  single most 
important  factor  determining organisational characteristics,  notably,  the 
degree  of  formality  and  standardisation and  the  use  of  information  systems. 
In view of  these characteristics,  large  companies  require  formal  managerial 
methods  and  detailed market  intelligence  systems  to be  capable of functioning 
well  at all.  Such  systems  permit  accurate monitoring of  their markets  and 
their position  in  them  and  contribute  to  a  responsive style of marketing; 
for  example,  tractor  companies  are  in a  position  to  set sales  targets  to 
each  of their dealers  and  to monitor their progress  towards  them,  to 
identify  to which  rival  sales are  being  lost if market  share  in any  region 
of the  country is falling and  take  steps  to  counteract  these  trends.  In 
such  an  environment it would  be  impossible  to gain an  advantage  unobstru-
sively.  It is quite otherwise  in sectors occupied  by medium/small  companies; 
due  to  the  lack of  information about market  shares it is quite possible 
for  a  company  to  increase its market  share without  rivals noticing at all. 
Three  market  leaders  known  to  the  author,  all with  substantial market 
shares,  were  concerned  that  their  shares  remained  confidential  to  avoid 234 
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provoking rivals,  who  \-lould  not  othenvise  have  known  the  degree  to  which 
the  leader  dominated  the  market. 
Now,  because  company  size has  separate  impacts  on  industrial concentration 
and  on  the  type  of marketing which  is  employed,  there  is an  interesting 
interaction bet"tveen  industrial  structure,  company  size  and  competitive 
behaviour,  along  the  lines  suggested in Di.agram  15.1.  Company  size  leads 
to  high  concentration  and  the  use  of  formal  and  quantitative  systems  of 
management.  The  interesting aspect of  this is that these effects  in  turn 
lead  to  opposite  and  in  some  ways  compensating  types  of competitive 
behaviour.  Concentration  can  encourage  a  degree  of parallelism;  it was 
noted  in Chapter 13  that  a  pattern of price leadership  existed in  the 
tractor industry  and  that prices and  tractor characteristics are closely 
matched.  But  on  the other hand,  the  informed  marketing  approach of  the 
large companies  generates  a  responsive  type  of  interaction between  them. 
As  the  diagrame  sug0ests,  the picture is  further  complicated  by  two 
additional  linkages.  Concentration itself can highten  a  sense of rivalry. 
Competition  for  the  market  leadership  in the tractor and  combine  sectors 
is stimulated  by  the  fact  that  in  these  sectors  there are  respectively 
two  and  three  companies with  substantial  shares within a  few  percentage 
points of  each .other  (see Table  9 .5).  Companies  in  fragmented  sectors 
appear much  less concerned  about  their rivals.  The  difference  in outlook 
could  be  characterised in this way;  smaller  companies  see  life  simply  in 
terms of persuading customers  to buy  more  of their products,  larger com-
panies  in  terms  of persuading customers  to  buy  their products  in preference 
to rivals'.  There  appears  to  be  a  lot of  truth  in that  famous  economics 
examination question;  "In perfect competition,  what  is the  firm in competi-
tion against?"  The  point of  the  question was  that because  the  firm in a 
highly  fragmented  industry is in competition with  everybody  in a  generalised 
way,  it is  in competition with  no-one  in particular. 
The  last link  in  the  diagram running  from  'management  style'  to  'parallel 
behaviour'  is of great importance.  The  left-hand  side of  the  diagram 
represents  the familiar  structure-performance model  of oligopoly.  The 
essence  of the  theory  is that in concentrated  industries,  attempts  to 
gain market  share  by  any  leading company  will  impact  on  rivals  to  a 
noticeable  degree  and  will  inevitably provoke  retaliation.  Because  this 
is a  predictable outcome,  oligopolists  'recognise their inter-dependence' 236 
and  avoid  damaging  confrontation  such  as  price v1ars  - the  connnercial 
equivalent of  nuclear warfare.  Nmv  if companies  do  not  have  the  information 
necessary  to  detect aggresive moves  of this sort  (extra discounts  to 
dealers,  for  example)  this chain of  reasoning  breaks  down,  As  in  the  arms 
race,  knowledge  of  the  opponents  moves  is essential  for  the  stability of 
the  system. 
The  implications  of this  are clarified in Diagram 15.2 \vhich  depicts  the 
three most  likely  types  of situation,  depending  on  the  size of the  market 
leader and  the  structure of  the  sector (large  companies  in  fragmented 
sectors  is an unlikely  combination  and  is ignored).  First,  and  less 
interesting,  is  that  'oligopolistic behaviour'  cannot  be  ~ually expected 
among  small  companies,  whatever  the  structure of  the  sector,  because  com-
panies  of this  type  do  not  typically  operate  information  systems  capable 
of monitoring  rivals'  behaviour.  The  second  significant implication is 
that  'oligopolistic behaviour'  is apt  to  coincide with rivalrous  and  inter-
active marketing  behaviour,  because  large  company  size  is both  a  precondition 
for  the  former  and  a  direct cause  of  the  latter.  This  proposition  sounds 
very  similar to but  is distinct  from another,  namely,  that oligopoly 
suppresses  price competition and  encourages  forms  of non-price  competition 
such as advertising and  model  changes.  The  point being made  here  is not 
that  the  large  companies  spend  relatively more  on  promotion  and  product 
development  than  the  smaller companies  but  that their perceptions of each 
other are clearer and  that  competition  between  them  is of a  higher quality. 
If this  interpretation is correct it helps  to  explain  the pattern of 
profitability in  the  industry,  i.e.  the  'oligopolistic'  tractor sector 
eaa5 profit margins  rather  lower  than  the  average  for  the  industry and 
the  opportunity  for  high margins  (greater  than  10%  on  sales)  only occurs 
outside  the  dozen  largest companies  (see Table  12.2).  It could also 
explain why  a  great number  of empirical  studies  of  the  relationship  between 
concentration and  profitability have  revealed  a  connection between  these 
two  variables which  is like a  seismic  disturbance  - unmistakably  recognis-
able  to  those with  the  appropriate  measuring  equipment  but  too weak  to be 
noticed  by  those  on  the  ground. 237 
(ii) CRANES  (WRITTEN  BY  MISS  A.  DOVE) 
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CHAPTER  16  OUT LINE  OF  TilE  CRANE  INDUSTRY 
1.  ¥AJOR  PRODUCT  GROUPS 
What  distinguishes  cranes  from other products  in  the Mechanical Handling 
sector is their ability to lift and  move  heavy o.bjects.  The  output of 
the  cr8ne  industry  falls  into  five major  product  groups: 
Tower  Craneo  - tnese  are  the very  tall structures  seen  on  building 
sites;  they  differ  from  other jib cranes  in that they utilise a 
strictly vertical lift,  the  boom  removing horizontally.  They  have 
on  average,  lifting capacity of  up  to  6  tons. 
Pmver  Operated Mobile Cranes  - these are of several different 
types:  'tvheel,  truck  and  crawler mounted,  both electric and 
hydraulic;  major  customers  are  from  the  construction industry 
and plent hire companies.  They  all utilise a  jib for lifting 
purposes. 
Electric Overhead  Travelling Cranes  - these have  booms  slung 
between horizontal  runners  that  travel  lengthwise along  the  roof 
of  buildings,  thereby facilitating  the  movement  of  goods  from 
one  area of  the  shop  to  another;  they are  installed  in most  fac-
tories and warehouses  and  so  customers  are  in all sectors of 
industry. 
Specialist Land  Cranes  - these  include: 
(a)  heavy  duty  types  of electric overhead  travelling cranes  used 
in steelworks,  for  example; 
(b)  goliath and  semi-goliath cranes which are used  outside,  in 
railyards  and  dockyards;  they  are large  steel  structures 
supporting  an  overhead  boom  (the  semi-goliath,  being  the 
shape  of  an  inverted  'L',  supporting the  boom  from one  side 
only);  the  structure moves  horizontally along  runners  in  the 
ground. 
(c)  container cranes which are  a  specialist type of goliath 
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Marine  and  Dockside  Cranes  - off-shore cranes,  dock  cranes  and 
dockside  cranes  of  the  jib-types. 
Hoists  - the  actual lifting mechanism of the  crane;  these  are 
included  since  they  are  normally made  by  the  crane manufacturers 
themselves. 
GROWTH  TRENDS  IN  THE  CRANE  INDUSTRY 
Industry sales are  cyclical  like all capital  goods  but appear  to  be 
growing over  the  longer  term.  Tables  16.1 and  16.2  summarise  deli.-
veries  by  product class  for  1966  to  1974. 
TABLE  16.1: 
DELIVERIES  OF  CRANES  BY  U.K.  ~ANUPACTURERS 1966-71  (£  mill) 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Electric Overhead 
Travelling Cranes  9.9  11.0  9.8  11.3  14.0  llJ.. 4 
Dockside & Gantry 
Jib Cranes  5.2  4.1  3.3  3.2  6.9  8.8 
Power  Operated 
Mobile  Cranes  20.1  19.4  24.2  29.9  34.0  34.8 
Special  Steelwork 
Cranes  0.8  1.0  2.7  4.1  3.7  7.9 
Tower  Cranes  0.9  1.1  0.8  0.5  0.6  1.0 
Rail :Hounted  Cranes  0.8  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.9  0.2 
Derrick Cranes  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.6 
Other complete  cranes  0.5  0.4  0.8  0.5  0.7  1.2 
Spares  4.0  4  .. 6  4.8  3.8  7.0  7.7 
TOTAL  42.9  42.5  47.3  55.2  68.2  76.6 
Source:  Business Honitor,  Third Quarter  1972. 241 
TABLE  16.2: 
DELIVERIE~_OF CRANES_  BY  U.K.  MANUFACTURERS  1972-74 
(£ mill) 
1972  1973  1974 
Electric Overhead  Travelling Cranes  26.8  19.6  21.3 
Dockside & Gantry Jib Cranes  *  4.9  6.2 
Power  Operated  Mobile  Cranes  35.3  44.4  62.4 
Wall  Mounted  & Pillar Jib Cranes  for Light 
Industrial Cranes  0.6  0.8  0.9 
Other  7.1*  4.5  2.4 
Part·s & Accessories  9.5  11.7  15.7 
TOTAL  79.3  85.9  108.9 
*  In  1972  figures  for  dockside  and  gantry jib cranes are included with 
those  for all other cranes. 
Source:  Business Monitor. 
NOTE:  Changes  in official definitions make  individual product class 
~igures in Tables  16.1 and  16.2 difficult to compare. 
Power  operated mobile  cranes account  for over half of U.K.  deliveries, 
with  overhead  travelling cranes accounting for nearly one quarter.  The 
present recession in  the  U.K.  has  depressed activity although export 
markets  throughout  1974  and  1975  have  been more  buoyant. 
Table  16.3  summarises  the U.K.  demand  for cranes  (as opposed  to production). 
TABLE  16.3: 
!G.!<·  DEHA.~TD  FOR  CRANES 
(£ mill) 
1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
U.K.  Production*  43  43  47  55  68  76  79  86 
Expor ts..,·:·k  12  9  9  15  18  28  21  23 
Import  s-.':·k  4  5  8  6  8  11  19  19 
U.K.  Consumption  35  39  46  46  57  59  77  82 
Imports  as  a  % of 
U.K.  Consumption  11%  13%  17%  13%  14%  19%  24%  23% 
U.K.  Consumption  51  49  57  55  67  73 
at 19 70  Prices-;':-;':•': 
Sources:  ~·:  Business Monitor. 
*-;':  Overseas  Trade Statistics. 
~~**  Adjusted using crane wholesale price index. 242 
The  sophistication and  complexity of crane  design  for  specific  tasks 
has  led  Ilk'lny  manufacturers  to limit  their activities \vithin  a  narrmv 
specialist area.  This  is reflected in  the  trade balance  for  individual 
types.  For  example,  ir•1ports  of  derrick  ~ib cranes  and  toVJer  cranes  have 
increased  substantially;  in contrast exports  of  travelling jib cranes 
and  overhead  travelling cranes  have  also  j_ncreased. 
Examination of the product  lines of  the  major U.K.  manufacturers  (see 
Annexe  16.A  (at the  end  of  this Chapter)  shoHs  the  extent of product 
sophistication within  the U.K.  Stothert & Pitt are  a  good  example;  they 
specialise  in  two  separate areas  - dockside  cargo  jib cranes  and  construc-
tion equipment.  They are  a  significant force  in the world  dockside  crane 
market,  exporting between  50%  and  70%  of  their crane  production with 
recent  large contracts  in Algeria  and  Saudi Arabia,  demonstrating  their 
ability to  compete  internatio·nally. 
Specialisation rests  on  two  factors,  design  skills and  production and 
labour  skills.  There  is,  in  a  very  real  sense,  a  steep  learning  curve 
inherent  in  the  acquisition of both  sets of skills.  The  new  entrant  to 
a  specific  sector of  the crane market  is  faced with potential customers 
who  like  to  see  a  record  of  successful  experience  in manufacture  of  the 
specific  type  of crane,  and  with  the prospect of high. production costs 
and  uncertain quality on  the  initial contracts.  The  industry and  its 
market  are both conservative:  crane  technology has  advanced  but  designs 
and  manufacturers  are  ~till much  the  same  as  they were  fifteen  years  ago. 
Such  conservatism makes  it difficult for  new  entrants  to appear,  but 
liberalisation of  international  trade over  t"\vO  decades  or  more  has  created 
a  much  greater  a"\.;areness  of  the  importance  of marketing and  a  markedly 
more  intense price and  product quality competition. 
2.  MAJOR  STRUCTURAL  FEATURES 
In  the  U.K.  the  majority of cranes  are  not  bought  but hired  from  one  of 
the many  plant hire  companies  that  have  grown  up  over  the past fifteen 
years.  Turnover  of  these  companies  has  risen  from  £15  million  in  1962  to 
approximately  £450 million  today.  Before  the  growth  of plant hire, 
builders had  to  fully  equip  themselves  for  any  work  they were  undertaking. 243 
However,  the  cost of this has  become  very  large,  a  200  ton  crane  costing 
as  much  as  £~ million and  a  basic  70  ton  telescopic  crane  £100,000.  At 
such prices contractors  require but  cannot  guarantee  constant utilisation 
of  the  machine.  Consequently hirers who  can  guarantee  minimum  levels of 
utilisation have  become  the major  buyers  of mobile  cranes  in  the U.K. 
The  business  appears profitable;  the  t\vO  larg.est  crane hire  companies 
have  been making  better returns  on  sales than  the manufacturing companies, 
although with  a  smaller capital base. 
TABLE  16.5 
RETURN  ON  SALES  (%) 
Crane 
Richards,  Wallington 
1968  19.6 
1969  9.7 
1970  7.3 
1971  8.5 
1972  9.7 
1973  11.9 
1974  10.8 
Source:  Company  Accounts. 
Hire 
Sparrow Crane Hire 
13.4 
9.4 
11.0 
12.6 
10.1 
13.4 
13.4 
Average  of 12 
Crane Manufacturers 
4.4 
4.1 
3.1 
5.6 
5.1 
In spite of  the higher  returns of plant hire companies,  the  crane 
manufacturers are  unwilling  to  integrate  forward  into plant hire  since 
this could put  them  into direct competition with  their other customers. 
However,  some  manufacturers,  such as Jones  Cranes,  are  subsidiaries in 
a  large group,  e.g.  George  Cohen  600  Group,  which may  have  another  sub-
sidiary in plant hire,  600  Leasing. 
It is difficult to  say anything meaningful  about  industry structure at 
the aggregate level.  There  is surprisingly little overiap  between 
sub-sectors  in that nearly all the major manufacturers  produce  for  only 
one  of the  sub-sectors.  It is noticeable  that amongst  the  companies 
operating in  the  U.K.  n~rket there are  relatively  few  foreign  subsidiaries 
and  no  major multinationals.  But  a  large  number  of major U.K.  engineering 
companies  have  crane-manufacturing  subsidiaries;  for  example,  George 244 
Cohen  600  Group  and Thomas  Ward  & Sons.  The  largest crane manufacturer 
in the U.K.,  Clarke Chapman  Ltd.,  is itself a  large diversified  engin-
eering company,  cranes accounting for  less  than  50%  of its turnover. 
Annexe  16.A  (referred  to earlier) provides  a  listing of manufacturers 
with indication of status of  the  company  (e.g.  subsidiary,  quoted,  etc.) 
names  of partent and subsidiary companies,  main products  and  product  lfnes. 
3  TECHNOLOGICAL  CHANGE  AND  INNOVATION 
By  outward appearance cranes have  changed littl  ver  the  past decade  and 
there have  been  no  major  innovations,  just gradual  development  and 
~rovement.  In mobile cranes  the hydraulic  telescopic  type of boom  has 
taken over gradually from  the diesel electric type at the  lighter end  of 
the market.  The  'mono-box'  design  for overhead  travelling cranes  for 
which J.H.  Carruthers received  the Queen's Award  for  Technological 
Innovation have  reduced  the total amount  of steel  required  and  therefore 
the total cost  by  limiting the  number  of overhead  beams  required  from 
two  to one.  Their design has  been  so carefully patented  that no  other 
U.K.  manufacturers have  been able to imitate this new  innovation. 
Levels of technology vary considerably between  the  sub-sectors:  the 
heavier  types of crane usually require  more  complex  engineering.  The 
steel structures have  to cope with much  wider  range  stresses and  strains. ANNEXE  16.A:  CRANE  INDUSTRY  :  ENTERPRISE  & U.E.A.  LISTING 
Identi-
fication 
Number  Name  of Cornp.any 
Type  of 
Company 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Herbert Morris 
Ltd. 
U.K. 
quoted 
Butters Cranes  )  U.K. 
Ltd.  )  subsid. 
)-
Thos.  Smith &  )  U.K. 
Sons  (Rodley))  subsid. 
Ltd. 
British Hoist &) 
Crane  Co. 
Jones  Cranes 
Ltd. 
J.H.  Carruthers 
& Co. 
Clarke  Chapman 
Ltd. 
) 
)-
) 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
(post 
1973) 
U.K. 
quoted 
Parent Company 
Thos.  W.  Ward 
II 
George  Cohen  600 
Group 
" 
Burmah  Oil Co. 
Type  of Crane  Produced 
Major Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
E.O.T.  cranes,  both  British Monorail 
standard & heavy;  h~ts  Ltd.  - stacker cranes 
Craven Bros  - steel-
work  cranes 
Henry  Lowe  Lifts -
lifts 
Vaughn  Crane Co.  -
E.O.T.  cranes 
Associated Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
Crane Aid  Services Ltd. 
Dockside & derrick 
cranes 
Mobile  & crawler cranes 
11Iron Fairy"  hydraulic 
mobile  cranes 
T~uck mounted  & crawler  (Jones  did  not  trade 
mobile  cranes 
E.O.T.  cranes,  the 
"Monobox"  range 
Heavy  E.O.T.  cranes; 
marine  cranes;  steel-
work  cranes;  dockyard 
cranes 
as  a  separate  com-
pany until 1968; 
before  this it was 
part of  K.  & L. 
Steelfounders) 
Sir W.M.  Arrol  (post 
1968)  - dockyard 
cranes 
Wellman  Cranes  (post 
1969) & Clyde  Crane 
& Booth  (post  1968)  -
heavy  E.O.T.  & steel-
work  cranes~·, 
(John  Smith  (Keighley) 
(Ltd.  - E.O.T.  cranes 
~Frank Parker & Co.  -
-(contractor's plant 
(Marshall-Fowler - crmvlers 
( 
(Thos.  W.  Ward  (Plant Hire) 
(Ltd. 
(Crane Travellers Ltd.  -
(crane carriers 
-~600 Leasing - plant hire 
(K.  & L.  Steelfounders 
Merged  with John  Thompson 
Ltd.  in  19i0  (boiler-
makers) Identi-
fication 
Number 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Name  of Company 
Adamson  Alliance 
Ltd. 
Matterson Ltd. 
w"harton  Crane  & 
Hoist 
(see  9  above) 
Demag  Materials 
Handling  Ltd. 
Type  of 
Company 
U.K. 
subsid. 
(post 
1973) 
U.K. 
subsid. 
(post 
1971) 
U.K. 
subsid. 
(post 
1970) 
Foreign 
subsid. 
Coles  Cranes  Ltd.  U.K. 
subsid. 
Grove  Allen  Foreign 
subsid. 
Parent Company 
Crittal Hope  Engin-
eering  (which was 
acquired  by Norcross 
Engineering in  1974) 
Type  of Crane  Produced 
Large E.O.T.  cranes; 
steelwork cranes 
William H~dson Group  Standard  industrial 
Dexion  Comino 
International up  to 
1974,  then part of 
William Hudson 
Group 
Demag  A.G.,  Germany 
A  crow 
Grove  (USA) 
E.O.T.  cranes 
Heavy  duty industrial 
E.O.T.  cranes 
Standard  industrial 
E.O.T.  cranes 
Self-propelled mobile 
&  speed  cranes 
Mobile  hydraulic  truck 
cranes 
The  Following  Companies  have Under  50%  of their Turnover Arising  from Crane  Sales: 
14  Stothert & Pitt  U.K.  Dockside  cranes  (also 
15 
Ltd.  quoted  construction equipment, 
road  rollers,  etc.) 
N.C.K.  Rapier 
Ltd. 
U.K. 
subsid. 
The  Central &  Mobile  cranes  (also 
Sherwood  Trust  excavators) 
Major  Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
Took  over Dexion 
~.fuarton Cranes  in 
1974  who  manufacture 
large  E.O.T.  cranes 
Became  part of The 
Steel Group  in 1966 
and  the  latter was 
taken  over  by  Acrow 
in  1972 
Before  merger  in 1973 
Grove  (USA)  had  been 
providing cr&ne  for 
which Allen & Sons 
(Oxford)  made  the 
chassis 
Part of.Ransomes  Ra 
Rapier Ltd.  which is 
made  up  of N.C.K. 
Excavators  & N.C.K. 
Rapier 
Associated Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
Butterley Engineering  -
large E.O.T.  cranes 
Arrow  Construction 
Equipment 
Part of  the  large mater-
ials handling group, 
Dexion  Comino  Interna-
tional,  between  1970  and 
1974  (see  18  below) 
German  parent  ~3kes full 
range  of cranes  including 
mobile  cranes 
Priestman Bros.  - cranes 
& excavators  (also part 
of The  Steel  Group) 
Acrow  Crane  & Hoist -
standard  industrial  E.O.T. 
cranes  & hoists  . 
Allen & Sons  (Oxford) 
acquired by  Grove  (USA) 
in 1973 
Previously members  of 
Newton  Chambers  Engineer-
ing who  were  acquired  by 
Central  Sherwood  Trust  in 
1973 Iclenti-
fication 
Number  Name  of Company 
16  Priestman Bros. 
Ltd. 
(see  12  above) 
17  Ruston Bucyrus 
Ltd. 
18  Dexion  Comino 
International 
Ltd.  (see  9 & 
10 above) 
Type  of 
Com:ean:Y 
U.K. 
subsid. 
Foreign 
subsid. 
U.K. 
quoted 
-~ 
Parent Co!!!Eanx 
Acrow 
Bucyrus Erie Co., 
U.S.A. 
Type  of Crane  Produced 
Cranes  (also excavators) 
Crawler  cranes  (also 
excavators) 
Major  Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
E.O.T.  & stacker cranes  Entered crane  market 
between  1970-1974 
when  it owned  Wharton 
Crane & Hoist Ltd. 
*  These  three companies  are  autonomous  subsidiaries but part of the group. 
Associated  Subsidiaries 
& Their Products 
Became  part of The  Steel 
Group  (1968)  which was 
subsequently  taken  over 
by Aero\.; 
Dexion Autoflow  Systems  -
conveyors 248 
ANNEXE  16.B:  PERFOID-'!ANCE  RECORD  OF  23  CRANE  MANUFACTURERS 
AVERAGE  FOR  5  YEAr{s- FROH  19 68  TO  19  7  2'-" 
Company 
Herbert Morris 
Butters Cranes•·  .. ,  ... 
J.  H.  Ca rru  ther  s•·~ -:r 
Thomas  Smith 
Jones 
B;ritish H.oist  &  Crane 
Sir William Arrol 
C.C.  & Booth 
Matter  son 
De mag 
Coles 
Profit/Sales 
3.7 
5.4 
5.4 
-.001 
4.6 
6.0 
4.3 
11.4 
1.4 
0.6 
4.1 
Expor:.t/Sales 
18.0 
20.5 
20.5 
17.8 
43.7 
17.0 
30.0 
21.0 
3.3 
9.7 
43.0 
Value Added 
per  __  Emp loyc~ 
1.53 
1.66 
1.66 
1.08 
1.34 
1.74 
1.29) 
1.  ~6~: 
1968  only 
1.33 
1.90 
1.98 
*  Excludes all companies where  crane manufacture  is less  than  50%  of total 
turnover. 
**  Some  of the  figures  for  these  two  companies were  not available  so  they 
were  averaged  together. 
ANNEXE  16.C:  SU:HMARY  OF  DATA  COLLECTED  FOR  23  CRANE  NANUFACTURERS 
Enterprises:  Turnover 
Number  employed 
Wages  and  salaries 
Net profit 
Cash  flow 
Own  means 
Exports 
U.K.  market 
Profit margin 
Rate of return on  own 
capital 
Value  added  per 
employee 
Wage  per employee 
Total value  added 
Turnover 
(£ mill) 
( 'OOO) 
(£ mill) 
(£ mill) 
(£ mill) 
(£ mill) 
{£ mill) 
(£ mill) 
(%) 
(%) 
('000) 
(£ mill) 
1968 
44.3 
9,729 
10.5 
2.5 
3.3 
15.3 
8.9 
35.3 
5.6 
16.3 
1.43 
1.08 
13.9 
1969 
48.1 
8,919 
10.9 
2.7 
3.5 
13.1 
12.5 
34.6 
5.6 
20.6 
1.64 
1.22 
llj., 6 
1970 
59.0 
9,363 
13.3 
1.9 
2.7 
13.5 
20.2 
32.3 
3.2 
14.1 
1.74 
1.42 
16.3 
(£ mill)  55.6  59.8  81.5 
1971 
57.5 
9,002 
14.3 
3.5 
4.3 
13.2 
23.9 
33.6 
6.1 
26.5 
2.07 
1.59 
18.7 
79.5 
1972 
49.5 
8,974 
13.9 
1.2 
2.0 
13.7 
16.0 
33.5 
2.4 
8.8 
1.79 
1.55 
16.1 
71.9 249 
CHAPTER  17  MARKET  SEGMENTATION  IN  TilE  CRANE  INDUSTRY 
1.  MARKET  BOUNDARIES 
The  five  sub-sectors were  outlined  in Chapter  16  as  follmvs: 
Tower  Cranes  (jib type). 
Power-operated Mobile  Cranes  (jib type). 
Electric Overhead  Travelling Cranes  (overhead  boom). 
Specialist Land  Cranes  (overhead  boom). 
Marine  and  Dockside  Cranes  (jib type). 
But  although  these  define  separate areas of manufacture,  they  do  not 
reflect precisely market  boundaries.  There are,  for  example,  many 
different specific  types  of mobile  cranes  ranging  from  the  small  truck-
mounted  type,  sold  mainly  to  the plant hire companies,  to  the huge 
crawler  machin~bought by  civil engineering contractors.  But  these 
machines  are  sometimes  manufactured  by  the  same  companies,  implying  a 
degree  of potential competition based  on  the  common  technology.  There 
are,  of course,  other potential competitors outside  the sector,  for 
example,  the  excavator manufacturers at present classified with  'con-
struction equipment';  several  of  these manufacture  mobile  cranes. 
The  Tower  Crane  Market 
There  are  no  major U.K.  manufacturers of  tower  cranes  - the U.K.  market 
is only worth  £4  million per  annum.  U.K.  builders  do  not  use  tower  cranes 
as  much  as  their European counterparts  because  of  the wider use of  scaf-
folding  in  the U.K.  The  first  tower  cranes were  made  in France  and 
French manufacturers still dominate  the  market at the world  level. 
Entry into  this sector by  U.K.  manufacturers  has  occurred  in  the  past; 
for  example,  Stothert & Pitt designed  and  began  to manufacture  a  tower 
crane.  As  the U.K.  market  alone  is not  large  enough  to  sustain the 
necessary  design  overhead  and  reasonable  production  levels  they  needed 
to  gain export markets,  this  proved  difficult in  the  face  of well-
established  foreign  competition.  The  structure of  the U.K.  market 250 
involved selling to  the plant hire  groups,  thus  reducing  the  margin 
availablb  to  the manufacturers.  Stothert & Pitt therefore withdrew  from 
the market  and  concentrated  on  their dockside  jib cranes. 
Babcock & Wilcox  began  manufacturing  Richier  tower  cranes under  licence 
but,  faced  with  the  same  difficulties as Stothert & Pitt,  they  also 
withdrew and  became  import agents  for  the French  produced  Richier  crane$. 
Domination  of  the  U.K.  market  by  fonign  manufacturers  at first  sight 
appears  surprising;  all  tower  cranes  are  constructed  on  site and  are 
large  enough  to  make  transport costs  a  significant proportion of  total 
costs.  But it is not  the  builder who  usually  buys  the machine  but  the 
large contractors  and  the plant hire  groups.  They  require  a  wide  range 
of products with  a  comprehensive  spare parts service.  This  requires  high 
initial costs  in relation  to  a  relatively  small  potential market  in  the 
U.K.  Coupled with the conservatism of  buyers,  this adds  up  to  fairly 
substantial  deterrents  to potential new  entrants  to  the  market. 
The  U.K.  market  is  dominated  by  'Potain'  cranes  imported  from France  by 
Record  Tower  Cranes Ltd.  They  have approximately  80%  of  the  market. 
Their ability to  maintain this  share  is probably helped  by  the  fact  th~t 
they are part of  the  Richards Wallington  Group  who  aldo  own  the British 
Crane  Hire Corporation,  the  largest crane hire  business  in  the U.K.  The 
remainder of  the  market  is  shared  between  two  other French  firms,  Pignon 
and  Richier.  Trade  statistics show  that the U.K.  does  in fact  export 
tower  crane;  these are  second-hand  cranes  to  developing countries.  New 
markets  for  these  cranes  have  appeared with  the  North  Sea  oil field with 
their use  on oil rigs. 
TABLE  17.1: 
Company/Nationality 
Potain/French 
Pingnon/French 
Richier/French 
Kroll/W.  Germany 
Leibherr/W.  Germany 
Import Asent  !ERrox.  Market  Share 
Record  Tower  Cranes  Limited  75% 
(part of Richards Wallington) 
Dow-Mac  (Plant & Transport)  Ltd.  ) 
20% 
Babcock & Wilcox  Limited 
Wyesplant  Limited  ) 
Leibherr-G.B.  Limited  ) 
) 
5% 251 
MOBILE  CRANES 
Coles  Cranes  Limited  is a  world  leader  in  the  truck-mounted  type  of 
mobile  cranes  and  holds  the  lion's  share  of  the U.K.  market.  The 
company's  turnover  in  1973  ~vas  £32  million;  the  total U.K.  industry 
deliveries were  only  £44  million  (the Coles'  figures  include  sales  by 
foreign  subsidiaries).  In  spite of their dominant  position,  they insist 
competition  is  strong. 
Crane hire appears  to  have  been  a  major  factor  in  their development 
over  the  past fifteen years.  They  foresaw  plant hire as  a  major  growth 
area  in  the late  1950s  and  produced  cranes  to  meet  the  specific require-
meocs  of  this  sector.  Now  80%  of Coles'  production  goes  into the 
manufacture  of  the  hydraulic  telescopic  truck-mounted  cranes which  form 
the  backbone  of the hire business.  The  hydraulic  telescopic  boom  has 
been  the  major  technical  change  in recent years.  Its advantages  lie in 
the  speed at which it can  be  erecta:land  in its mobility.  The  lifting 
capacity ranges  from approximately  10  to  40  tons,  and  the  trucks  can 
travel at up  to nearly  40  miles  an hour;  the  road-worthiness  of  a  crane 
is important  to  the hire companies. 
The  area  is competitive with  three  companies  producing the  same  type  of 
hydraulic machine  as  Coles  themselves.  The  merger bebveen  Groves  and 
Allen's of Oxford  in  1973  presents  a  threat  to  Coles,  since it represents 
the entry of Groves,  the  giant American  crane  company,  into  the  U.K. 
manufacturing market,  with all its technical  resources  and  marketing 
skills.  The  other  two  competitors are British companies:  British Hoist 
& Crane  Company,  part of  the  George  Cohen  600  Group,  and  Thomas  Smith, 
part of the Thomas  Ward  Group. 
The  hydraulic  crane  seems  to have  taken  over  from  the  diesel electric 
crane,  although  several U.K.  manufacturers  still concentrate on  the 
latter,  notably Jones  Cranes,  the  other George  Cohen  subsidiary.  Jones 
have  a  remarkable  export  record  and  their  cranes  seem  to  sell particularly 
well  in  the Arab  states  and  South America.  The  lattice  type  of boom  with 
diesel electric  transmission can lift  larger weights  to greater heights  than 
the hydraulic  type.  Ports  tend,  therefore,  to  stick to  the  former  type 
of crane.  Jones  have,  in fact,  produced  a  new  type  of crane  specifically 
for  the  direct  loading and  unloading of ships. 252 
The  trend  in mobile  cranes  is  tmvards  heavier  unit~;  Coles  introduced  the 
Colossus  range  of  truck-mounted  cranes  in  1971  \dlich  can  lift up  to 
220  tons,  and  dominate  this  sector of  the  mRrket.  But  there  is no  U.K. 
·manufacturer of  the  heavier  type  of whee led mobile  and  crmvler crane.  The 
American  companies  have  exploited this market  niche.  The  major  importers 
are American Hoist & Derrick Ltd.,  Bucyrus-Erie  and  Manitovoc.  American 
Hoist & Derrick are  themselves  one  of the  largest crane  manufacturers  in 
the world  and  rnake  a  full  range  of  rnobil6  cranes.  They  do  not  bother  to 
promote  their full  range  in  tne  U.K.  because  they cannot  compete  on  price 
with  the  U.K.  manufacturers.  This  is because,  (a)  transportation costs 
are  too  high,  that  is  8-12%  of  total value,  (b)  import  duty is  6.4%  of 
c.i.f.  value,  both  of  these  adding  20%  to  the  ex-works  price.  But  they 
do  exist as  a  threat of potential competition  for Coles.  Coles  has  also 
benefitted considerably  from  the  North  Sea  oil  boom  since  they  have  experi-
ence  in  this  type  of crane manufacture  \·7hich  gave  them  an  advantage  over 
their U.K.  competitors. 
The  crawler market  is  dominated  by  Manitm·Joc  and  American Hoist &  Derrick 
who  in value  terms  share  the  market  between  them.  Manitowoc  with  smaller 
machines  lead  in  number  of units,  and  American Hoist & Derrick sell  the 
expensive  and  larger  types  of cranes.  Their ~ajor customers  are  Taylor 
Woodrow  and  Wimpey,  1\vho  buy  in  the U.K.  although  the  cranes may  be  actually 
used  in various  countries  throughout  the world.  There it is very difficult 
to assess  the  size of  the U.K.  illarket  as  such.  In value  terms it is 
thought  to  be  about  £10  million per annum. 
Although  overall concentration  in  terms  of  the  U.K.  market  appears  to  be 
high,  the  mobile  crane  industry  faces  potential  competition 
from manufacturers  abroad,  particularly from  the U.S .A., and  Germany  in 
the  form of Demag.  There  is also  the  threat of entry  by U.K.  engineering 
companies,  particularly  those  already manufacturing excavators.  Several 
excavator manufacturers  do  already manufacture  mobile  cranes,  namely 
Ransomes  Rapier  and  Priestman.  The  technological  and  production  require-
ments  for  mobile  cranes  and  excavators  are  similar and  they  serve  a 
connnon  market. 
Mergers  have  been  relatively  few.  In  the  late  1960s  Coles  parent company, 
the  Steel  Group,  purchased  the  U.K.  cra1vler  crane  and  excavator  company, 253 
Priestman Brothers.  The  two  crane  businesses were  quickly  integrated, 
but although it had  a  long  history of  success  in  the  rope-operated  exca-
vator  field,  Priestman were  relatively late in  the  hydraulic market, 
establishing  themselves  in  this field tvith  a  range  of competitive machines 
only  in  the  last  two  or  three years.  Today  both companies  are still 
linked  to  a  common  parent,  but operate  cornp letely independently.  A  netv 
corporate  identity emerged  3s  a  result of  the  merger which  took place  in 
June  1972  when  the engineering group,  Acrow,  took  over  the  Steel  Group. 
At  the  time  of  the  takeover Acrow  was  smaller  than Coles U.K.,  but  the 
Coles  Board  felt that association with Acrow  would  be  preferable  to  e 
takeover proposed  by  Slater Walker.  Acrow  allows  its subsidiaries  com-
plete autonomy  of operation.  The  company  does  itself operate  in  the 
sector with its subsidiary,  Acrow  Crane & Hoist,  making  overhead 
travelling cranes.  The  complementary world  market  coverage  of Coles  and 
Acrow  probably provides  some  mutual  advantage;  they manufacture  non-
competing products  for  a  con~on clientele. 
INDUSTRIAL  CRANES 
Industrial cranes  include  both  the  standard electric overhead  travelling 
crane,  found  in most warehouses  and  factories,  and  the  specialist heavy 
duty  overhead  and  goliath  crane~  The  markets  for  these  two  types  of 
crane are very different;  the  latter are  sold  almost  exclusively  to 
nationalised  industries  such  as British Steel, British Rail  and  the 
National Port Authority.  However,  some  of the  larger manufacturers, 
namely  Clarke  Chapman  and  Herbert Morris,  produce  a  full  range  of over-
head  cranes  and  serve  both markets.  This  accentuates  the  existence of 
potential  competition  from other  manufacturers  in  each market. 
Standard Electric  Overhead  Travelling Cranes 
The  lighter type  of  crane  in  this particular market  embodies  very little 
recent  technological  development.  With  minimal  technical barriers  to 
entry  new  companies  can  enter the market easily.  The  most  complex part 
of  the  crane,  the hoist blocks,  can  be  bought  from  one  of the  established 
companies,  such as Matterson,  Herbert Morris  or Demag.  The  smaller  com-
pany  can  then build  the actual  structure  themselves.  Many  of  these 254 
companies  tend  to  appear when  demand  is high  and  move  out of  the  market 
when  demand  slackens.  The  marginal  presence  of  these  companies  over  the 
years  has  tended  to  pull  down  the price  level  by undercutting  the  estab-
lished  firms.  The  low  level  of  profit rleters  the  large  established 
companies  from diversifying into  the market. 
TAB I.E  1 7 . 2 : 
PROFIT  HARGIN-;':  FOR  THE  THREE  MAJOR  MANUFACTURERS  OF  STANDARD  INDUSTRIAL  CRANES 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
Herbert Harris  5.7  2.8  -0.6  4.0  6.6 
Hatterson  0.6  -2.0  -0.2  2.1  6.6 
De mag  -6.8  o.o  1.4  3.1  5.4 
-Jc  Profit/Sales 
Source:  Company  Accounts. 
The  market  leader is Herbert Morris with  a  30%  share of sales.  They are 
an old  established  engineering  company  with  a  turnover  in  the  range  of 
£11  million  in  1973;  they were  the  first company  to  begin  serious  produc-
tion of  these  standard  types  of cranes,  and  introduced  their  'Universal' 
range  in  the mid  1960s.  The  design  sold well  because  of the  ready 
availability of cheap  cranes with  a  variety of capacities and  spans. 
Matterson  soon  followed  suit introducing their  'Spacefinder'  series  in 
1969/70.  Components  are  produced  in quantity and  then assembled  to order 
in similar fashion  to Herbert Morris.  This  company  now  has  20%  of  the 
market. 
The  two  British companies  are  followed  closely by Demag,  the  German 
company  who  began  manufacturing E.O.T.  cranes  in Britain in  the  1960s. 
This  company  could  be  described  as  an  'aggressive'  competitor,  not being 
afraid of price-cutting tactics.  Their market  share is around  20%.  The 
top  three  firms  then  account  for around  70%  of sales. 
The  remainder  of  the market  is shared  between  twenty manufacturers. 
J.H.  Carruthers & Company  have  made  significant advances  since  the 
introduction of their  'Monobox'  range  which proved  to have  a  great market 255 
potential.  Other  competitors  include Acrow  Crane  & Hoist,  John  Smith 
(Keighly)  Ltd.  and  A.S.E.A.,  the  Swedish Electrical Company  who  also 
manufacture hoists.  Many  of  these manufacturers  also  produce  the heavier 
type  of custom built industrial cranes.  Matterson moved  into this  sec-
tion of  the  market  in  1974 when  they  took  over  Dexion Warton  Cranes  Ltd. 
Specialist Land  Cranes 
The  specialist overhead  cranes  (costing as  much  as  £1  million)  have  a 
much  higher unit value  than  the  standard  industrial crane.  They  are all 
built to  specific order  requirements.  The  goliath and  semi-goliath 
cranes  are used  outside  in both  docks  and  railyards;  the  very  large  type 
of E.O.T.  cranes are  used  in  steelworks.  The  uses  for  these  types  of 
crane are many  and  manufacturers  tend  to  specialise  in specific types. 
Concentration  in this market has  changed  considerably as  a  result of  the 
takeover,  by  Clarke  Chapman,  of both Sir W.M.  Arrol  and  Clyde  Crane  & 
Booth,  in 1968,  with assistance  from  the  Government  sponsored  Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation.  This  merger  is discussed  in greater detail 
in Chapter 18. 
TABLE  17.3: 
RELATIVE  SIZE  OF  COMPANIES 
Sir W.M.  Arrol 
Clyde Crane & Booth 
Clarke Chapman 
Source:  Company  Accounts. 
1968  Turnover 
(£  '000) 
5,623 
2,550 
17,443 
1969  Turnover 
(£ 
1000) 
28,100 
In 1969  Clarke  Chapman  also  took  over  the  crane  interests of Wellman 
Engineering Ltd.  Clarke  Chapman  were  a  large diverse  engineering  company 
who  prior  to  1968  manufactured  jib marine  cranes  and  some  light,.;eight 
E.O.T.  cranes.  In  less  than  a  year after entering  the  sector  the  company 
gained  approximately  a  70%  share of the  specialist land  crane market. 256 
However,  major  competitors  have  survived  alongside  the  new  combine. 
Adamson  Alliance,  who  manufacture  steelwork,  dockside  and  container 
cranes,  have  increased  their turnover  from  £1  million  in  1968  to  nearly 
£2~ million  in  1972.  This  is a  much  better  growth  record 
than  companies  of  a  similar size in the  standard  industrial crane  sector. 
Matterson's  turnover  rose  from£~ million  to  £1  million  over  the  same 
period.  It is difficult  to  compare  the  growth  rate of Adamson  Alliance's 
turnover 'tvith  that  of Clarke Chapman.  The  latter  merged  with  the 
boilermakers,  John  Thompson  Ltd.,  in  1970,  with  a  resulting  increase  in 
turnover  from  £28  million  in  1969  to  £98  million in  1970.  Craven Brothers, 
a  Herbert Morris  subsidiary,  also manufacture  steel\o7ork  cranes.  They  have 
been  little effected  by  the Clarke  Chapman  merger  since  they  produce  cranes 
of a  lower  lifting capacity.  Butterley Engineering also produce  cranes 
for  the  steelworks  industry,  but  these are often highly specialised,  such 
as  ladle cranes  and  scrap  charging cranes  rather  than  the huge  E.O.~. 
variety.  The  high  degree  of product  specialisation in this section of  the 
market helps  to  ensure  that  survival  of  these  smaller  com~nies alongside 
the  major manufacturer,  Clarke  Chapman  Ltd. 
There  is little threat  from  foreign  competition  since most  of  the output 
in  this sector is  sold  to  nationalised  industries.  However,  British Rail 
have  bought  from  foreign  manufacturers;  in 1973  they  bought  a  large Finnish 
container crane. 
There are greater  export opportunities available  for  manufacturers  of 
these  specialist cranes,  than  for  the  standard E.O.T.  crane manufacturers. 
This  is  because  of  their higher  level  of engineering expertise.  Although 
the European  market  is marked  by  strong national manufacturers,  there 
are  export opportunities  in  the  developing countries.  Here  companies 
like Clarke  Chapman  meet  strong competition  from  their counterparts  in 
Germany,  Japan  and  the  U.S.A.  The  Japanese  and  Germans  are  thought  to  be 
particularly keen  to  develop  these  rr~rkets  because  of the  saturation of 
their domestic  markets  and  resulting excess  capacity. 
JIB  MARINE  & DOCKSIDE  CRANES 
The  output  of  this sector is,  again,  diverse;  some  specialist overhead 
crane manufacturers  also produce  specific  jib cranes.  The  cranes are 257 
all made  to  order  and  each manufacturer  seems  to  specialise  in a  partic-
ular  field.  Stothert & Pitt are  the  only  regular manufacturer  of  the 
dockside  jib gantry cranes;  Clarke Chapman  will manufacture  this  type  of 
crane but  tend  to  leave  the  market  to Stothert & Pitt who  have  the 
specific experience.  Clarke Chapman  concentrate on  the manufacture  of 
overhead  travelling dockside  and  container cranes.  At  one  stage,  when 
demand  was  falling,  Herbert Morris  and  Butters Cranes  ventured  jointly 
into Sothert & Pitt's market,  but  their lack of  experience was  a  great 
handicap. 
There  is  a  high  degree  of  international  specialisation in this  sector. 
The  market  is not  merely  the  U.K.  but world-wide.  Haggland  is  the world 
leader in the  manufacture  of deck  marine  cranes;  they  have  an  automated 
plant in  Sweden  producing  in excess  of  200  units per annum.  Clarke 
Chapman  also produce  these  types  of  cranes,  but  their volume  of  sales  in 
this  sector is much  smaller  witl1  higher costs of production. 
The  North  Sea oil boom  has  provided  a  new  market  for  specialist jib cranes, 
but historical American  dominance  in this field has  made  entry by  U.K. 
manufacturers difficult.  Customers  like the American  dominated oil explo-
ration companies  tend  to  buy  from  their  traditional  suppliers with  technical 
and  production capabilities.  American Hoist & Derrick have  benefitted 
considerably  from  this. 
PRICING 
As  most  cranes  and  their associated  equipment are  sold  through  a  process 
of pricing for  each  specific contract,  it is difficult to assess  the 
degree  of price competition.  In bidding  for  a  contract it is not  only 
the price which is  important  but also  delivery  time, and  evidence  and 
guarantees of quality.  Manufacturers  in all the  sectors of  the  crane 
market  emphasise  the  competitiveness of  their markets  perhaps without 
distinguishing very clearly between price competition and  rivalry on 
other dimensions. 
Pri.cing  in  the  industry has  traditionally been  based  on  a  cost plus 
formula,  with  demand  conditions  having little influence  on prices.  This 
stems  from  the  days  when  the U.K.  market '"as  unique  and  separate  from 258 
international  forces,  when  crane manufacturing 'tvas  dominated  by  engineering 
and  production  considerations.  Patterns  of  trade  have  changed  radically 
over  the last  two  decades,  and  the  traditional organisation of  the  industry 
has  been  radically affected  by  the  need  to  actively market  its products 
against  international  competition.  The  bigger  companies,  at least,  have 
acquired  a  marketing  orientation Hhich  reflect foreign  competition, 
static U.K.  markets  and  rising costs. 
The  combination of  a  static U.K.  market  and  the  existence  of  numerous 
small  companies  has  led  to difficulties in  the  standard  industrial 
crane  sector.  Below  capacity working  leads  to price-cutting  tactics, 
magnified  by  the tail of  small  companies  who  maintain  a  precarious 
existence vlhen  demand  is static or  falling.  The  consequence  is thought 
in the  industry  to  be  a  form  of  'destructive competition'  where  low 
prices  over  many  years  have  been  reflected in  low profitability, 
relatively little investment  and  a  resulting inability to  reduce  unit 
costs  and  restore  profit margins.  Some  manufacturers,  like Herbert 
Morris,  actively differentiate  their products  by  emphasising  quality 
and  reliability and  even  by  different methods  of  packaging  smaller  pieces 
of equipment.  There has  certainly been  a  drive  to  identify users  and 
buyers  of equipment  and  to  design  and  market  to  those  specific people. 
Haggland,  the world  leader  in rnarine  crane  manufacture,  sell specialised 
crane  attachments  for  different  types  of cargo.  Herbert Morris  have  a 
subsidiary - Crane Aid  Services  - which  services all types  of electric 
overhead  travelling cranes.  These  two  examples  reflect  the  trend  towards 
direct assessment  of market  needs. 
The  future  prospects  for  the  dowmvard  spiral of prices,  profit and  invest-
ment  is not  clear at  the present  time.  There  are  indications  tm t  a  type 
of oligopolistic price  leadership exists  in standard  cranes.  In other 
sectors  one  cannot  readily generalise. 
Steelwork crane  manufactur~rs have  also been  conscious  of  low  profit 
margins,  being  recently caught  between  fixed  price contracts  and  high 
inflation.  Generally  the  prospec~ for  steelwork cranes  are  good  thanks 
to  the British Steel Corporation's  £4.  million  investment  programme.  The 
mergers  involving Clarke  Chapm:1n  in  1968  appear  to  have  circumvented  the 
type  of destructive competition  found  in  standard  industrial cranes. 259 
Mobile  crane manufacturers  sell their hydraulic  truck mounted  cranes  to 
large plant hire  companies.  The  latter seem  to act as  a  soutce  of 
countervailing  power  in price negotiations  and  it is difficult to  identify 
any  degree  of  monopoly  pricing  in  spite of Cole's  dominant  position. 
Manufacturers  of  crawler mounted  cranes  are also  dealing with large 
customers  in  the  form  of  the  major civil engineering companies. 
Economic  analysis  tends  to  concentrate  on  allocative efficiency and 
assumes  technical  efficiency.  But  only  in  few  cases is the  latter likely 
to be  achieved.  In most  of  the  plants visited several  products and 
variations of  the  same  product are produced  in  the  same  factory;  this 
is wasteful  of  capacity  and  can  lead  to a  great deal of technical  inef-
ficiency  because  of  the  ensuing  complexities  of production planning and 
control.  It  in~lies that substantial economies  could  be  achieved  by 
better  standardisation of product or,  alternatively,  investment in capital 
intensive methods  of planning  and  control  (e.g.  computer  based  loading 
systems  or numerically controlled machine  tools).  But  hmv  far this  is 
possible  depends  on  the  size of  the U.K.  market,  and  the  impression one 
gains  is that  for many  types  of crane  this would  probably  be  too  small. 
If exports  could  be  increased  significantly this  type  of product 
standardisation or production control might  be  economical.  There  does 
seem  to  be  perhaps  some  trend  towards  this  in  the higher  degree of inter-
national  specialisation that  is appearing in  the  crane  industry world-wide. 
It is very difficult to  make  any  assessment of production methods  on  a 
short one-day visit to  a  plant.  Many  companies  do  in fact  seem to  have 
undertaken  fairly recent product  rationalisation with  a  reduction  in the 
number  and  variety of different products  produced.  Most  companies  have 
standardised  spare parts.  The  largest plant manufacturing cranes  in  the 
U.K.  belongs  to Coles;  their plant at Sunderland  covers  approximately 
112  acres  and  employs  2,600 people,  and  undertakes  the  entire  fabrication 
of  the  telescopic  boom  crane.  But Coles have  several other plants  in  the 
U.K.;  one  at Grentham producing  the  rough  terrain cranes  and  another  near 
Manchester  producing  the  Colossus  range.  Clarke  Chapman,  the  largest 
crane  manufacturers  in the U.K.,  has  a  divisionalised structure with 
strong central  financial  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  marketing  functions. 
The  divisions  arc  based  on  the  pre-merger  company  identities \vith  greater 
product  specialisation and  a  more  balanced  capacity utilisation. ANNEXE  17.A:  CO:t-.::?ETITION  BETh"EEN  MOBILE  CRANE  MANUFACTURERS 
Parent  ComE any  U.K.  Manufacturers  Truck  Mounted  Cranes  Lleeled  Mobile  Rough  Terrain  Crawler Mounted 
(up  to  25  (25  - 50  (over 50  (up to  15  (over 15 
tonnes)  tonnes)  tonnes)  tonnes)  tonnes) 
George  Cohen  600  British Hoist &  X 
Crane Co.  X  X  X 
II  II  "  Jones  Cranes  X  X  X  X 
A  crow  Coles  Cranes  X  X  X  X  X 
II  Priestman Bros.  X 
Grove  u.s.A.  Grove  Allen  X  X  X  X 
Thos  Ward  T.  Smith & Sons  X  X  X 
(Rodley) 
Central &  Ransome3-Rapier  X  X  X  X 
Shen.;rood  T·rust 
Bucyrus-Erie  Ruston-Bucyrus  X  X  X 
U.S.A. 
Minor  Companies  Henry  Gooch  X 
II  "  G. E.  Macpherson  X  X 
II  II  Handimer  X 
II  "  Hydrocon  X 
Major  I!::Eorted  Cranes 
American Hoist & Derrick  X  X  X  X 
Manitowoc 
Gottwald  X  X  X 
Demag  X  X  X  X  X  X 
PPM  X  X 
Pettbone  X  X 
Link Belt  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Source:  Cranes  Today Handbook.  ;-,., 
::... 
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CHAPTER  18  }lliRGER  ACTIVITY  AND  THE  I.R.C. 
The  main  reason  for  undertaking  this more  detailed  review of  the  crane 
industry is the  change  in  structure  sponsored  by  the U.K.  Government 
through  the  Industrial Reorganisation Corporation.  The  I.R.C.  was 
created  by  the  Labour  Government  in  1966  to  promote  mergers which would 
rationalise and  make  more  efficient British industry. 
"The  need  for  more  concentration and  rationalisation  to  promote  the 
greater efficiency and  international competitiveness  of British 
industry,  v1hich  was  ~mphasised in  the  National Plan,  is now  widely 
recognised.  With  the  co-operation of  financial  institutions,  many 
industries have  already  substantially altered  their structure  and 
organisation  through mergers,  acquisitions  and  re-groupings.  This 
process has  been accelerating in recent years  and  may  be  expected 
to continue.  N~vertheless,  the  pace  and  scale of change  do  not yet 
match  the  needs  of  the national economy."(l) 
This  description of  the rationale of  the  I.R.C.  goes  on  to  say  that 
British production  units are  smaller  than  those of competitors,  that  the 
U.K.  market  base  is  too  small,  economies  of scale are  not achieved, 
research  and  development  is not effective,  etc.  The  nub  of  the  argument 
is that  the  relevant measure  or yardstick for  industrial organisation is 
an international market  and  not  a  U.K.  market.  In  the U.K.  situation 
there  exists  a  confusion arising from  the differing disciplines exerted 
by  U.K.  market  forces  and  international market  forces,  and  industry can 
find  it difficult  to  organise  for  a  U.K.  market  and  yet  remain  competi-
tive  internationally.  On  the  grounds  that the  converse  is likely  to  be 
true,  the  I.R.C.  was  intended  to  be  a  catalyst  for  reorganisation of 
specific  industries onto  a  larger  scale. 
The  I.R.C.  assisted  in mergers  between  some  of  the  largest firms  in 
British manufacturing.  For  example,  the  British Leyland Motor  Corporation 
was  created  in  1968  by  an  I.R.C.  financed  merger  between  Leyland Motor 
Corporation  and  British Motor Holdings.  There  is  no  public  investigation 
of major  I.R.C.  mergers,  for  example  by  reference  to  the Monopolies 
(1)  "Industrial Reorgan:Lsation  Corporation",  London,  H.H.S.O.  Cmnd  2389, 
1966,  (Para.  2). 262 
Commission,  and  so  there  is  no  discussion  of  the  advantages  that  the 
increase  in concentration may  or  may  not  bring. 
The  units  created  in  the  crane  industry were  nothing  like as  large as 
B.L.M.C.  and  have  not  suffered  similar management  problems.  But it is 
interesting to  investigate  the  advantages  that have  been  realised,  if 
any. 
The  land  crane market was  one  area  that  the  I.R.C.  picked  as  one  requiring 
rationalisation.  In  1968  Clarke Chapman,  a  diverse  engineering  company 
manufacturing marine  cranes  and  some  light weight E.O.T.  cranes,  acquired 
Clyde  Crane & Booth Company  Limited  and  then  bought  Sir W.M.  Arrol  o"f 
Glasgow,  one  of  the U.K.'s  largest crane manufacturers  maki~ heavy 
cranes  for  steelwork,  shipbuilding  And  dockyards.  In  1969  the  crane 
interests of Wellman  Engineering were  incorporated  in  the  Clarke  Chapman 
Group.  The  new  ClarkeChapman  had  achieved  a  70%  share  of the  land  crane 
market,  in  less  than a  year after entering it, aided  by  a  £2  million 
Government  loan. 
It is seven years  now  since  the merger  took place  and  no  great rationalis-
ation of production has  occured.  One  crane  factory was  closed during 
1972  and  other factories  increased  their output,  but  the  three  companies 
still operate as  separate corporate  identities,  producing at the  same 
locations,  but  no  longer  compete with  each other for contracts.  Marketing 
and  selling have  been centralised.  Although  not directly responsible 
for  marketing,  the companies  still have  to  operate as profit centres 
and  are  subject  to  close  financial  control  by  their parent company.  It 
is very difficult to analyse  the effects  of  the  mergers  because Clarke 
Chapman  only publish  one  set of consolidated accounts;  moreover,  in  1970 
they  took over John  Tompson  Ltd.,  a  large U.K.  manufacturer  of power 
plants.  The  company's  turnover  rose  from  £13  million  in  1967  to  £98  mil-
lion  in  1970,  the  increase  being very  largely due  to  acquisitions  rather 
than  internal  growth. 
One  of  the  aims  of  the  I.R.C.  mergers  was  to  promote  a  good  export 
performance.  In  1968  Sir William Arrol  had  an  export  turnover percentage 
of  30%  and  Clyde  Crane  & Booth  21%;  Clarke  Chapman  do  not  seem  to  have 
improved  significantly on  this.  The  exports of  their crane  and  bridge 263 
division were  21%  of  the  total  sales  in  1972,  22%  in  1973,  and  27%  in 
1974.  There  may  be  other additional returns available  to  the  company 
because  of its large  absolute  size.  Clarke Chapman  themselves mention 
the  ability to  smooth  capacity utilisation by  sub-contracting between 
plants,  assisted by  common  design  for  standard parts  such  as  gear  boxes, 
Any  advantages  in  economies  of  scale  of  production  that may  be  obtained 
from  a  large plant are  thought  to  be  offset by  the management  problems 
that arise  in controlling the larger workforce. 
The  merger at the  mobile  end  of the  crane market was  less  significant. 
In  1966 Coles  Cranes,  the major U.K.  manufacturer of mobile  cranes, 
became  part of  the  Steel  Group.  Priestman Brothers,  the  crane  and 
excavator manufacturer,  came  under  common  ownership  with Coles  in 
October  1969.  This  is  the  only other  I.R.C.  promoted merger  in the 
crane  industry.  The  crane  interests of  Prie~tman and  Coles  were  quickly 
integrated,  but  since  1972,  when  the  Steel Group  was  take  over  by  Acrow, 
the  two  companies  (Coles  and  Priestman)  again  became  two  separate corpo-
rate  identities operating autonomously. 
The  only  other major  merger  resulted  in  the  creation of Grove  Allen  in 
1973  from Allens  of Oxford  and  Groves  of  the United States.  For years 
before  the  merger  Groves  had  been  supplying cranes  for which Allens  made 
the chassis.  Since  the  merger  the  group  has  been expanding at both 
factories  in America  and  in Oxford. 
There  have  been  several  ownership  changes  over  the period:  in  1973 
J.H.  Carruthers,  who  received  the  Queen's Award  for  Industry after the 
introduction of their mono-box  type  of  overhead  crane,  became  part of 
Burmah  Oil Engineering Division.  Ransomes  Rapier was  part of Newton 
Chambers,  which has  been  taken over  by  another  industrial holding 
company  - Central & Sherwood  Trusts Ltd.  Matterson,  the  overhead  crane 
manufacturer,  became  part of  the William Hudson  Group  in 1971.  Matterson 
seem  to have  benefitted  from  this move  by  gaining access  to more 
financing  and  to  the  specialised legal  and  financial  advice  from  the 
group;  also  there  does  not appear  to have  been  any  major  loss of inde-
pendence  for  the  company.  Carruthers also  found  they were  able  to  expand 
production capacity at a  faster  rate  than if they  had still been  an 
independent  company. 264 
In  1974  Mattcrson  took  over Dexion Harton  Cranes  for  a  very  limited 
nominal  value.  The  latter had  been  rnnk:i.ng  substantial  losses  and  Hould 
otherwise have  gone  into voluntary  liquidation.  They  manufacture  large 
custom built E.O.T.  cranes,  an  area  in which Matterson were  interested. 
Matterson' s  major  limitations had  been  lc:~ck  of manufacturing capacity; 
Warton's  plant  is  located  under  twenty  miles  ar.vay  from H.::l.t-terso-n's  m\Tn 
plant.  Hatterson \vould  not  have  been able  to  consider  such  a  merger  jJ: 
they had  not  had  the  backing and  encouragement  of their  parent~group. 
The  level of concentration  in  the  crane  industry,  therefore,  has  increased 
considerably  since  1968.  Without  access  to privately held  informat~on on 
the  relationship  between costs  and  prices  and  the  achievable  economies  of 
scale,  it is  impossible  to  make  definitive  statements  about  the  potential 
and  actual exercise of market  pmver. 
CONCJ,U S IONS 
It is appropriate  to  conclude  by  summarising  the main  points: 
(1)  Concentration has  increased. 
(2)  The  Government  has  been  party  to  this  increase. 
(3)  Technical  economies  of scale are  very  likely  to exist. 
(4)  The  market  is  increasingly characterised  by  large  sellers and  large 
buyers,  a  bilaterial monopoly  in  some  cases. Belgique  - Belgie 
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